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Abstract 
 
Development projects, such as plantations and infrastructure improvements, provide benefits 
for people at the regional and national scales. They can also result in negative impacts and 
costs borne by some members of society. Projects are deemed worthwhile if overall welfare 
is enhanced and, in principle, the gainers could compensate the losers. In this respect, 
compensation is an important measure or method of redistribution of benefits and costs 
between the gainers and losers in the context of development projects. It is also a potential 
strategy for addressing concerns of social justice, fairness, equity and disputes through 
negotiation. This research explores the potential use of compensation for promoting the 
sustainability of development projects and rural livelihoods in the context of developing 
economy, namely Tanzania. 
 
The literature review and exploratory visits to the study area revealed relevant theories, 
concepts and practical issues of compensation. An innovative framework that integrates the 
Coase theorem, Millennium ecosystem approach and the concepts of sustainable livelihoods 
was developed and used in assessing and analysing compensation practices of two project 
case studies. The research adapted a case study strategy for studying compensation in its 
geographical settings. Tanzania was used as the country case from which the teak and gas-
pipeline projects were selected as project case studies. One village in each project area was 
selected for detailed study. Key informants and focus group interviews provided initial 
insights into project impacts and compensation regimes. Twelve in-depth case studies were 
carried out on affected households. Key sustainability issues pertinent to compensation, 
people’s livelihoods and projects were verified using a questionnaire survey that involved 
120 households. Other two surveys were carried out to collect views on compensation views 
in Tanzania from project developers and service providers. Triangulation of research 
methods, tools and sources of information enhanced quality of both qualitative and 
quantitative information. 
 
As currently practised, compensation schemes in Tanzania lack comprehensive planning, 
involvement of the host communities, monitoring and record keeping. The elites participating 
either as service providers or middlemen affect information flows in compensation schemes 
and in some cases confuse the negotiation process for their own interests. At household level, 
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both the quantitative and qualitative analyses indicated the association between project 
impacts, compensation and deterioration of all five household assets namely natural, physical, 
human, financial and social capitals. Rural livelihoods have been affected due to impacts on 
annual and perennial farming systems especially due to loss of land. Among the threatened 
ecosystem functions include agricultural production systems due to land loss (reported by 
81% of respondents) and, support and regulation systems in terms of decline of soil fertility 
(74% of respondents). 
 
Loss of land and reduced agricultural production were the main type of impacts on people’s 
livelihoods and losses encountered by rural communities. The ambiguous ownership of lands 
between the State, Villages and Villagers means that it is difficult under the current property 
rights regime in Tanzania to specify compensation entitlements. The study confirmed that 
unclear property rights, asymmetry of information and high transaction costs in compensation 
processes in Tanzania prevent the resolution of a Coasian welfare maximising outcome. 
However, the Coasian bargaining framework was shown to provide a useful basis for 
improving negotiation between project developers and affected parties, which is currently 
limited to ‘information-giving’ and ‘consultation’. It can also help to increase the 
effectiveness and efficiency of compensation systems by reducing transaction costs and 
improving relationships between project developers and affected parties and host 
communities. 
 
In contrast to the current conventional ‘one-payment’ monetary compensation, the study 
recommends ‘benefit sharing schemes’, taking a variety of forms, in order to promote 
fairness and sustainability through enhancement of potential benefit, as well as improved 
intragenerational and intergenerational equities. Such schemes also have potential to reduce 
intrusion of elites attracted by money and other short term interests. 
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Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Chapter one presents introduction to the study in terms of background information and 
the context. Information collected from exploratory visits to the study area (Tanzania) 
guided the process of conceptualisation of compensation challenges related to 
development projects in a developing economy context. The chapter also presents the 
aim and objectives of the study.  
 
1.1 Context and background 
Development projects in developing nations aim to improve people’s well-being, yet 
such projects can impact negatively on some portion of the population. This typically 
occurs because the projects need land to operate on. Among those adversely affected 
include those whose assets are taken or modified and, their production activities, flows 
of services and other benefits are impaired or halted. These people and their 
communities may become losers despite efforts of project developers to compensate for 
their losses. Compensation for the losses encountered by rural people in particular is 
arguably one of the most challenging issues associated with the development projects in 
developing economies1.  
 
Despite this, the number and scale of local and foreign private investments have been 
increasing in many countries (UNCTAD, 2002 cited in Chamani, 2003). This growth 
has been largely influenced by the radical economic reforms, commonly known as 
Structural Adjustment Programmes, which were jointly instituted by the International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank in early 1980s. Basically, Structural Adjustment 
Programmes focused on transforming the state-operated economy into a liberalized 
market economy. However, a series of reviews carried out worldwide by WWF (1992), 
Cernea (2003) and UNCTAD (2006) report that the social, economic and environmental 
consequences of Structural Adjustment Programmes have been profound and 
controversial in many countries. The major reason reported was that the reforms and 
                                                 
1 Developing economies are found in developing countries and depend heavily on the extraction of their 
natural resources. They are also characterised by relatively low levels of industrial activities, agricultural 
mechanisation, technological capability, economic productivity and Human Development Index (HDI). 
HDI is a United Nations’ compound indicator for human development level computed based on income 
per capita, gross domestic product (GDP), life expectancy, literacy rate and so many factors (UNCTAD, 
2006). 
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subsequent investments disregarded both the local socio-economic priorities and 
environmental concerns. One of its manifestations is in the compensation issue. In many 
countries, compensation disputes are increasing and processes of compensation are 
perceived to be ambiguous, inconsistent and present issues of great concern in relation 
to future sustainability (ADBAfrica, 2003 and ADBAsia, 2007). 
 
1.2 Compensation in developing economy context 
Compensation involves actions to offset or make good the losses incurred by those 
parties who are, or are likely to be, negatively affected by a development activity. 
Losses may involve a reduction in the values of assets or incomes of affected parties, or 
of entitlements to flows of beneficial services such those provided by open access to 
land or water. Therefore, compensation is an important method of redistribution of 
benefits and costs between gainers and losers in the context of development projects. 
Compensation can take a variety of forms, usually involving monetary compensation is 
more common and in some cases in-kind payment. Likewise, the methodological 
approaches used neither recognise all losses incurred as a consequence of the 
development projects nor situations that would have prevailed in the absence of the 
development projects. Generally, compensation payments in developing countries have 
not fully recognised changes in the overall welfare of the affected parties and host 
communities that are attributable to development project compared to the ‘without 
project’ scenario. Here, compensation in principle is made against the ‘counterfactual’ 
situation that would have otherwise prevailed possibly involving a continuation of pre-
development conditions or, some changes of either an improvement or deterioration in 
social, economic and environmental conditions. 
 
However, experience shows that compensation associated with development projects is 
often dominated by disputes between project developers and affected parties or/and host 
communities (Thabane, 2000; Zaman, 2002; Cernea, 2003). The disputes are largely 
land and resource-based issues, due to unclear entitlements in particular. Since less 
attention is paid to these disputes from the outset, few projects have appropriate 
mechanisms for conflict resolution and management. Circumstances are worse when the 
affected parties and host communities are dispossessed of their lands and forcibly 
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relocated elsewhere to give room for development undertakings without adequate 
consultation, preparation and compensation (Mtoni, 1999; Kironde, 2003; Mwalyosi, 
2004). These disputes happen in the developing world because of a number of 
limitations during project appraisal, implementation and compensation processes. The 
important limitations reported by Hitchcock and Shauri (1999), Mwalyosi (2004); 
Orindi and Huggins (2005), include inadequate policy and regulatory frameworks; 
unclear administrative mechanisms; lack of competent expertise and; few support 
schemes to both the affected parties and host communities and project developers. 
 
Compensation issues in developing countries often create much dissatisfaction amongst 
project proponents and affected parties and host communities. The project proponents 
carry burdens associated with costs of planning, implementation and paying 
compensation and, maintaining the quality of the environment. They view some of these 
costs as extra to their proposed projects. On the other hand, most of the affected rural 
people in developing countries are poor and their livelihoods are entirely dependant on 
the land which also has many socio-cultural values associated for example with identity, 
status, ritual, ancestry, sense of place and belonging. When such rural communities are 
relocated by a development project, it is rare for them to be satisfied with the amount of 
compensation paid. In this respect, compensation could essentially mean the plan to 
harmonise or balance the willingness to pay compensation by project developers and 
willingness to accept compensation by the affected parties and host communities. 
Depending on whether the affected parties or host communities have entitlement, 
compensation for the lost welfare could be worked out using utility function that shows 
changes influenced by a development project. Moreover, compensation outcomes that 
are likely to bring satisfaction depend on how well the compensation was planned and 
implemented, there thus has to be a process that involves negotiations between project 
developer and affected parties and host communities. 
 
While compensation is distinguished as a measure carried out just before the project 
becomes operative, opportunities exist for the compensation process to reduce costs. 
This is possible through making use of some information generated by other project 
appraisal frameworks such as feasibility studies, Environmental Impact Assessment and 
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Cost Benefit Analysis as input information when planning the compensation schemes. 
Essentially, it needs repositioning of compensation process in the project appraisal 
system in order to promote cost-effectiveness. Another opportunity is for the 
compensation process from the beginning to focus on searching for possible ways of 
improving relationships between project developers and affected parties and host 
communities, possibly through negotiations. 
 
1.3 Development projects and compensation practices in Tanzania 
Development projects in Tanzania have a long history back to the colonial rule (i.e. 
mining and farming activities) through post independence (i.e. nationalisation and 
collective ownership under socialist economy) and currently the liberalised economy. 
Both the State and private sector are project developers in Tanzania but the latter 
dominated by foreign private companies is currently the leading investor in the country 
(TIC, 2009). Project developers have been investing largely in sectors such as 
manufacturing and industrial processing; road and communication infrastructure; energy 
generation and distribution infrastructures; mining activities; banking and financial 
services; agricultural and forestry plantations; conservation, tourism and service 
facilities. Figure 1.1 shows the number of new projects by sector approved by Tanzania 
Investment Centre (TIC) for the period between 1990 and 2003. 
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Figure 1.1: Number of new projects approved by Tanzania Investment Centre by sectors 
for the period of 1990-2003 (Source: ADBAfrica/OECD, 2006 and Elibariki, 2007) 
 
Despite the economic achievements and other benefits harnessed from the economic 
reforms, there is need to reflect on compensation processes and outcomes in rural areas 
where the majority poor people live in developing countries. Among the issues to be 
looked into critically include impacts of compensation schemes on people’s livelihoods, 
environmental goods and services and, sustainability issues. For instance, the following 
have been reported to happen in different compensation practices in Tanzania: 
 
z The affected parties and host communities see both the criteria and methods of 
economic valuation used as a basis for determining compensation are not always 
suited to address the diverse values of services and goods that they derive from 
their lands (Kombe and Kreibich, 2001; Lovett, 2001 in Lovett et al., 2001). 
z Compensation processes lack both transparency and participation in which the 
affected parties and host communities lose their compensatory entitlements 
(Hitchcock and Shauri, 1999; URT, 2002). 
z Compensation processes involve middlemen actors or agents who are not 
stakeholders but are attracted by monetary benefits gains and other short-term 
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interests that can increase costs, delays and involve complicated disputes (Lissu, 
1999; Mwalyosi, 2004). 
z Although the affected parties are paid compensation, they still experience some 
losses due to undercompensation and problems associated with late 
disbursement of compensation (Mtoni, 1999; Kironde, 2004; Mwalyosi, 2004). 
 
1.4 Study aim and objectives 
In this context, the aim of this study is to develop and critically evaluate a framework 
for compensating people impacted by development projects in a developing economy 
and to inform policy accordingly. 
 
The following study objectives were identified in order to meet the above aim: 
 
01. To identify and describe key stakeholders, their interests in and influence on the 
process and outcomes of compensation systems. 
 
02. To identify and explain compensation systems commonly used and determine 
their potential suitability for sustainable development. 
 
03. To identify and explain effects of existing compensation systems on livelihoods 
of affected parties and their implications on sustainability issues. 
 
04. To propose a form of compensation and its cost-effective implementation 
suitable for a developing economy context. 
 
05. To apply and critically evaluate relevance and potential of the Coase Theorem in 
understanding project-based compensation systems in a developing economy 
context. 
 
The study focuses on Tanzania as a case study in order to respond to the above 
objectives and frame the compensation challenge in the context of development 
projects. Tanzania was selected as a country case after a careful scrutiny of various 
issues pertaining to time and financial resources; suitability and accessibility; mobility 
and logistics and; ‘health and safety’. 
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1.5 Thesis structure 
This thesis has eight chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the study by giving its context and 
background information. It also presents the aim and objectives of the study. Chapter 2 
reviews concepts, principles and theories of compensation in the context of 
development projects, ecosystem functions, sustainable livelihood framework, and 
Coase Theorem as a central theory for this study. The conceptual framework for 
assessment and analysis of development project-based compensation is also presented 
in this chapter. Chapter 3 outlines data needs, sources, methods for collection and 
analysis. It also presents the research strategy, criteria for selection of different cases 
and critique of research methodology. 
 
Chapter 4 discusses the findings of stakeholder analysis and their views on 
compensation systems and practices in Tanzania. Chapter 5 assesses and discusses 
post-compensation outcomes in terms of changes and implications on people’s 
livelihoods and ecosystem functions. The chapter also presents project and 
compensation benefits and costs experienced by affected parties and host communities. 
Chapter 6 compares the perceived loss of household income, total household loss and 
actual compensation paid. It also presents relationships between losses and various 
contextual factors. Chapter 7 proposes a compensatory framework for the developing 
economies by defining compensation, presenting its core values, principles and 
procedures. The chapter also presents critical evaluation of both the proposed 
framework and the application of Coase Theorem in a developing economy context. 
Chapter 8 presents the main conclusions and recommendations of this study including 
their implications for further research work. 
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Chapter 2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS FOR ASSESSING 
PROJECT-BASED COMPENSATION PRACTICES 
 
This chapter presents the main ideas, concepts and theories of sustainable development, 
socio-economic welfare and ecosystem functions as linked to the compensation matter. 
Further to that the chapter frames relevant literature information in the context of 
Coasian seminal work (Coase theorem) that suggests basic compensation principles to 
observe such as property rights, negotiation and transaction costs. Practices and 
experiences of compensation from rural Tanzania have largely been used in narrowing 
down the theoretical information that helped to confirm study questions, validate the 
research topic and set boundaries of the study (Figure 2.1). Finally, the chapter 
presents a novel conceptual framework for assessing compensation schemes influenced 
by development projects in a developing economy context. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Phase I: Setting-up the conceptual framework for the study 
 
2.1 Sustainable development and welfare  
Introduction of project activities in an area brings both positive and negative changes to 
people’s living conditions and their environment. Experiences show that many projects 
quickly jump into administering compensation as a measure for negative impacts that 
are likely to occur or have occurred already. The big question is can compensation 
sustain the affected people’s livelihoods, environment and project activities. According 
to SAIEA (2003) the community has to seek to establish a path along which 
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development activities can progress while enhancing quality of people’s life and 
ensuring the viability of land resources on which both people and their development 
depend.  
 
However, sustainable development means different things to different people. The 
definition by the United Nation World Commission on Environment and Development 
(WCED) is perhaps the most common and quoted within the extensive literature (Bell 
and Morse, 2003). The Commission’s concept constitutes an ethical element that 
associates with development that meets the needs of the present generation without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs (WCED, 1987). 
Another definition by Asheim (1994) similarly requires the current generation to 
manage the resource base in such a way that the average quality is maintained and 
shared by all future generations. Although authors and organisations set out their 
sustainable development definitions using the wording and phraseology that reflect their 
own interests, missions and visions, it is very interesting to learn from different 
definitions (Meter, 1999). For example, many definitions of sustainable development 
feature aspects of fairness and equity within and across generations.  
 
Robinson (2004) categorises sustainable development definitions into three groups viz., 
(i) those emphasize social, economic and ecological dimensions as the three pillars of 
sustainable development; (ii) those emphasize on humanity and nature relationships 
and; (iii) those perceive development as a source of social and environmental problems. 
The literature has widely accepted the 3-pillar category as an operational definition for 
sustainable development as in many communities such perceptions and beliefs exist 
(Pearce et al., 1990; Rao, 2000; Robinson, 2004). However, the big challenge is how to 
practically integrate and balance the 3 pillars in order to sustain people’s livelihoods, 
environment and project activities. Since development is a value-loaded word implying 
positive changes in desirable socio-economic objectives (Pearce et al., 1990), planning, 
implementation and monitoring remain to be critical aspects of sustainability. 
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2.1.1: Concept of weak and strong sustainability 
Literature has extensively reported several efforts of searching for a more functional 
definition of sustainability. Environmental and resource economists have gone further 
by considering sustainability in terms of stocks of resources and the technology used to 
exploit them, collectively, referred to as capital assets (Atkinson and Hamilton, 2003). 
Capital assets have been grouped into 5 forms namely natural capital (Kn); human 
capital (Kh); social capital (Ks); physical capital (Kp) and financial capital (Kf) (Ashley 
and Carney, 1999). Based on substitutability of natural capital, Turner (1993) identifies 
four different types of sustainability, ranging from very weak (that assumes complete 
substitution) to very strong (that assumes no substitution) (Table 2.1). However, from a 
practical point of view, the two extremes of sustainability sound meaningless as far as 
development issues are concerned. 
 
Table 2.1: Weak sustainability versus strong sustainability 
Very weak sustainability Weak sustainability Strong sustainability Very strong sustainability 
• All capital assets (Kn; 
Kh; Ks; Kp and Kf) 
should remain 
constant over time 
• Allows compensation 
between capital assets 
• Man made capital assets 
(Kh; Ks; Kp and Kf) are 
substituted for Kn 
• Indicates environmental 
quality at optimal 
economic level 
• Undertakes Cost 
Benefit Analysis (CBA) 
to evaluate mitigation 
measures 
• Potential for decline of 
environmental quality 
• Countries facing 
resource depletion and 
ecosystems may look 
sustainable  
• Environmental 
Standards is not a 
priority 
• Kn is kept constant 
(critical Kn is strictly 
not substitutable) 
• Acknowledges 
environmental integrity 
and rights to nature. 
• Kn is recognised as 
essential inputs in the 
economic production, 
consumption and 
welfare 
• Minimum levels of 
different forms of 
capital assets are 
established and 
maintained in real 
physical/biological 
terms 
• Requirement to meet 
environmental standards 
• Economic activities 
kept at extreme lowest 
level 
• Strictly promotes 
ecological efficiency 
(i.e. every ecosystem, 
subsystem, species and 
physical features must 
be preserved) 
 
According to Hediger (2006), the weak scenario implicitly assumes sustainability would 
be possible even when savings are invested in manmade physical capital and human 
capitals and, that physical capital is perfectly substitutable for natural capital. Minimum 
environmental quality standards are not a matter of priority for the economic 
development following the logic of this paradigm. Regardless of other development 
constituents, only one variant of the weak sustainability measure (present value) of 
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development benefits should be positive (Pearce et al., 1990). When substitution of 
physical capital for natural capital reaches one to one, the environmental quality would 
be at risk. Once natural capital is transformed into physical capital, depending on the 
level of technology the process is easier and profitable but in most cases irreversible 
following system failures due to environmental deterioration (Faber et al., 2002). 
However, it is very hard to maintain the economic achievements and really impossible 
to reversing physical capital back to natural capital when either the renewable or non-
renewable natural capitals face depletion. 
 
Strong sustainability recognises that all types of natural capital are essential inputs in 
economic production and consumption but minimum levels of extraction for all types of 
capitals need to be established and maintained (Ayres et al., 1998). The possible 
motivations of this school of thought include acknowledgement of environmental 
integrity and rights to use. This strictly interprets the widely accepted WCED’s (1987) 
definition of sustainable development that requires both the present and future 
generations to benefit from the resources available. It also fits precisely within 
Asheim’s (1994) sustainable development definition that requires the current generation 
to manage all land resources so that average quality of each resource is maintained and 
equitably shared by all generations. 
 
Studies by Hanna et al. (1996) and SAIEA (2003) found that sustainability issues in 
African rural communities are strongly linked to people’s rights to nature under their 
arrangements of ‘use and spare’. These traditional based arrangements are always part 
of their socio-cultural values and traditional institutions. 
 
Kideghesho and Mtoni (2008a) found that the rural communities bordering Serengeti 
National Park in Tanzania were ready to support conservation efforts if the conservation 
benefits compensate all losses caused by wildlife and help to secure their livelihoods. 
This however, brings doubts whether benefits and costs encountered by affected rural 
people because of development or conservation projects are carefully considered. There 
is also the question of whether the overall project benefits and costs are equitably 
distributed among the concerned parties. 
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This is possible only when a community has both informal (i.e. non-governmental) and 
formal (i.e. governmental) institutions functioning properly. As it has been seen earlier, 
compensating the victims of investments is a process that entails issues of social justice, 
entitlements and environmental equity, thus the theoretical framework of this study is 
based on strong sustainability paradigm. 
 
2.1.2: Sustainable livelihood framework 
Livelihood thinking goes back to the work of Robert Chambers in the mid 1980s in 
which according to Chambers and Conway (1992), ‘a livelihood comprises the 
capabilities, assets and activities required for a means of living’. They further noted that 
a livelihood is sustainable if it copes with and recovers from shocks, stresses and keeps 
enhancing its capabilities and assets without undermining the natural resource base of 
now and the future. The sustainable livelihoods approaches evolved over decades from 
the poverty-vulnerability context and kept its focus on the way resource-disadvantaged 
(poor) people live and, shocks and risks they normally encounter in their daily life 
(Ashley and Carney, 1999).  
 
Currently, the concept of sustainable livelihoods is highly linked to aspects of rural 
development, poverty reduction, natural resources and environmental management 
(Scoones, 1998). Development and research agencies such as DFID, UNDP, CARE, 
Oxfam and so many others have made significant contributions towards making these 
approaches more people-centred and suitable for rural environments. According to Ellis 
(2000), these efforts were further modelled into different frameworks depending on the 
goals and objectives of an organisation. For example, CARE developed a framework for 
analysing the social, economic, political and environmental contexts. On the other hand, 
DFID came out with the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework (SLF) focusing on social, 
human, physical, financial and natural assets as important capitals for improvement of 
well-being of an individual, household or a community (Figure 2.2).  
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Figure 2.2: DFID’s Sustainable livelihood framework (Source: Ashley & Carney, 1999) 
 
According to Ashley and Carney (1999), the DFID’s sustainable livelihoods framework 
has proved to be a quite useful tool in holistic approach, promoting wider informed 
views and opportunities for development activities and puts people and their priorities at 
the centre of analysis and solutions. Sustainable livelihoods framework shows potential 
for providing a framework for conceptualisation, assessment and analysis of changes in 
rural societies if compensation schemes introduced by project developers are regarded 
as one of the shocks operated in a context of vulnerability. Alternatively, it can be used 
as a checklist tool in situations where development approaches put in practice bring 
confusion to grassroots stakeholders. However, Ellis and Mdoe (2003) caution that 
sustainable livelihoods framework’s effectiveness in application requires relatively 
more time and financial resources. Another challenge of sustainable livelihoods 
framework is on understanding and facilitating the link between the micro and macro 
levels, rather than working only at grassroots level. 
 
2.1.3: Sustainability in the context of millennium ecosystem assessment 
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MA) is the most recent approach that links 
ecosystems and human well-being with the view of promoting sustainable development 
(MA, 2005).  
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2.1.3.1: Millennium development goals 
The Millennium development goals are an output of collective agreement between the 
majority of the countries and international leading development organisations. Table 2.2 
below lists the eight (8) goals and their respective targets to be achieved by 2015.  
 
Table 2.2: Millennium development goals and their targets 
Goal Goal aim (target) 
Goal 1: to eradicate extreme poverty 
and hunger 
To halve the proportion of people living on less than 1 USD a 
day, and halve the proportion of people suffering from hunger, to 
achieve full and productive employment and ensure everyone has 
access to decent work, including women and young people. 
Goal 2: to achieve universal primary 
education 
To ensure that all children, boys and girls complete primary 
school education 
Goal 3: to promote gender equality 
and empower women 
To eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education 
Goal 4: to reduce child mortality To reduce mortality rate for children under five by two thirds 
Goal 5: to improve maternal health To reduce by three quarters the number of women who die during 
pregnancy or in childbirth 
Goal 6: to combat HIV/AIDS, 
malaria and other diseases 
To provide universal access to treatment for HIV/AIDS, and to 
halt and reverse the spread HIV/AIDS, malaria and other major 
diseases 
Goal 7: to ensure environmental 
sustainability 
To integrate principles of sustainable development into 
government policy, reduce biodiversity loss and to reduce by half 
the proportion of population without access to safe drinking water 
and basic sanitation. 
Goal 8: to develop global 
partnership for development 
To address the needs of least developed countries, develop non-
discriminatory trading and financial systems, deal with 
developing countries’ debt, and make available new technologies 
 
The Millennium development goals act as a blueprint that provides a common 
framework for communities to guide both the policies and programmes in order to 
promote human well-being. Hindmarch, Harris and Morris (2006) define human well-
being as “a state dependent on a decent, healthy and secure life and conditioned by 
geography, economic context and a range of social factors”. As per above definition, a 
review of contents of the eight goals indicates that the possibility exist for the 
Millennium development goals to help in addressing human well-being in developing 
economies if integration with people’s preferences, development plans and national 
policies is well done. Without questioning whether the above eight targets are 
achievable in the given time frame (i.e. by 2015), it is obvious that a number of 
challenges exist. Definitely, a good number of projects (i.e. both development and 
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support projects) is required to facilitate achievement of the targets set for the 
Millennium development goals. 
 
Other than funding and socio-cultural limitations, there are other constraints that pose 
big challenges in starting new projects in new areas, particularly rural ones. Mwalyosi 
and Hughes (1998) found that a number of environmental impact assessment reports in 
Tanzania reported that generally rural people feel safer if a development project does 
not involve taking a large area of land. Things get worse when the affected people have 
to be resettled with or without compensation (Mbiba, 1999; Saku, 2002; Abuodha, 
2002; Mwalyosi, 2004; Cernea and Mathur, 2008). Normally, this has been due to 
fundamental question of security of life and socio-cultural issues as mentioned by 
Hindmarch, Harris and Morris (2006) in their definition of human well-being.  
 
2.1.3.2: Concepts of ecosystem functions-uses-values 
The Ecosystem Functions-Uses-Values framework is built on earlier theoretical works 
on ecosystems and economic welfare by Costanza et al. (1997); de Groot et al. (2002) 
and Turner et al. (2003). However, slight differences exist. The Millennium 
Assessment’s ecosystem framework does not explicitly show carrier or habitat function 
as put forward by de Groot et al. (2002). The framework focuses on linkages between 
ecosystem services and humans as far as human well-being is concerned (MA, 2005). 
The linkages place humans as integral parts of ecosystems and try to awaken a sense of 
valuing ecosystem services and not to assume a limitless supply of natural raw 
materials. Worries exist regarding the ongoing unwise use and exploitation of 
ecosystems. To a large extent, this is aggravated by the failure of both the national 
economic plans and policies to recognise the importance of ecosystem services 
(Hindmarch, Harris and Morris, 2006). 
 
i) Functions 
According to de Groot et al. (2002) ecosystem functions are renewable environmental 
goods and services that flow from the natural capital base to satisfy human needs. MA 
(2005) categorizes ecosystem functions into four main groups, namely; 
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 Production functions: provision of resources e.g. water, food, raw materials and 
energy. 
 Support and regulation functions: regulation of essential ecological processes and 
life support systems e.g. climate, flood, diseases, water purification and recycling of 
nutrients. 
 Cultural or Information functions: contribution to knowledge and experience and 
sense of relationship with context such as spiritual experiences, aesthetic pleasure 
and recreation. 
 Habitat and carrier functions: provision of space and location for activities, unique 
refuges, nurseries for plants and animals, conservation, recreation and so many 
others. 
 
Figure 2.3 shows the ecosystem functions and services likely to be affected by 
development projects and potential for mediation by socio-economic factors (MA, 
2005) which are among the critical aspects to be dealt with during compensation 
schemes (Sebenius et al., 2005). It also estimates intensity of linkages between 
ecosystem services and constituents of human well-being. 
 
Figure 2.3: MA ecosystem functions and services framework (Source: MA, 2005) 
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ii) Uses 
According to de Groot et al. (2002), use is an act or practice of obtaining goods or 
services from the function in order to fulfil a certain purpose. For example, wetlands 
provide for direct use through goods (water and fish) and services (wildlife habitat or 
flood control). Uses fall under major types of human activities such as agriculture, 
fisheries, conservation, recreation and amenity. As with functions and services, uses 
may be compatible or competitive as well. 
 
iii) Values 
Value is the beneficial effect of an entity on another entity and is reflective of 
usefulness in terms of fitness for purpose (Teitenberg, 2003). Alternatively, value can 
be measured in terms of the cost of providing the service by some other means (Turner 
et al., 2001). Value simply shows both human interests to and appreciation of goods and 
services (de Groot et al., 2002). In real practice, market prices of goods and services are 
the most commonly used for comparison and exchange, and provide signals of both 
value and scarcity of a service or good (Costanza et al., 1989; Clarke and Joosten 2002; 
Brauer, 2003). However, market is most effective where there are large numbers of 
buyers and sellers and there is a clear system of property rights. Unfortunately, these 
conditions do not apply to all ecosystem functions, especially those generating indirect 
use-values (e.g. hydrological functions of wetlands) and those associated with ‘non-use 
benefits (e.g. bequest, existence values of conserved wildlife). 
 
Joosten and Clarke (2002) suggest three approaches to determine values namely:- 
(i) Idealistic: specifies value as ideal, objective and independent of the real 
world 
(ii) Naturalistic: specifies value based on the objective properties of an entity 
independent of the assessor 
(iii) Preference: each person assigns value of an entity based on the way he/she 
feels about it. 
The current practices of compensation around the world, in developing countries in 
particular support the preference approach where a “valuer or assessor” decides values 
of estates (assets and properties). Many authors such as Sebenius et al. (2005), 
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MacDaniels and Trousdale (2005) and Cernea (2008) identify valuation stage as the 
source of most of the distortions and disputes happening in the compensation process.  
 
Based on the concept of total economic value, utilitarian value of ecosystems can be 
grouped into two main categories namely use (instrumental) and non-use (intrinsic) 
values. Use value of an ecosystem includes a service or good that is used by humans for 
consumption or production. It can be tangible or intangible, direct or indirect or service 
or good with potential of providing future use values. Non-use value is when people 
assign value to an entity because it exists even if they do not use it directly. 
 
However, Brouwer et al. (1999) call for careful judgments during estimation of various 
values so as, not to undermine ecosystem functions. Further to that, Garrod & Willis 
(2001) & Turner et al. (2003) suggest that the estimates be regarded as indicators of 
relative values and not as absolute values. 
 
2.2 Coase Theorem: The question of transaction costs and efficiency 
The seminal work titled “The Problem of Social Cost” by Coase (1960) that later 
became famous in the name of Coase theorem can be summarised as presented in Figure 
2.4 below. According to Webster (1998), the Coase theorem tends to focus on 
transaction costs rather than simply social costs, process efficiency rather than outcome 
efficiency, and the allocation of property rights rather than just the allocation of 
resources. 
19 
 
Paul Mtoni  Cranfield University, 2010 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4: Concept flowchart of Coase Theorem 
 
Coase (1988) examined what would happen in a world in which transaction costs were 
assumed to be zero. The assumption describes a simple setting in which further analysis 
of fundamental role of transaction costs in shaping the institutions is necessary. The 
Coasian assumption of zero transaction costs draws out implications of perfect 
competition which many welfare economists view it as the central perspective in 
modern economic analysis. In perfect competition, pricing system operates without cost 
(Coase, 1988). Likewise, Stigler’s (1966) price theory makes a similar connection 
between perfect competition and zero transaction costs and emphasises that under 
perfect competition private and social costs will be equal and in fact this is Coase 
theorem. Because transaction costs are never zero and sometimes are very high, Stigler 
(1966) named Coase’s insight the Coase theorem and regards it as the case where 
people who value the good more than its price get the good and those who have the 
initial property right but do not value the good as much as its price, get the money (i.e. 
compensation). 
 
While Coase (1992) saw his theorem as a stepping stone on the way to analyses of 
economy with positive transaction costs, Hirschey (2003) regards Coase theorem as one 
of the cornerstones of institutional economics. According to Gilpin (2000); Ostrom 
(2003); Schmid (2004), the Coase theorem has become an important basis for most of 
the economic analyses of government policies and regulations, in North America in 
Then a state will be developed and if mutually accepted terms can be agreed upon, the 
mutually beneficial exchanges take place when Pareto-optimality is attained  
(a condition that does not depend on who has been assigned the property right first) 
and 
Transaction costs of negotiation 
between involved parties are not 
prohibitively high 
Property rights are  
well-defined 
Coase Theorem states that 
external costs will be 
internalised when
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particular. For instance, the Coase theorem examined the widely accepted Pigovian tax 
imposition of “polluter pays principle” and viewed an externality as the question of 
entitlements and voluntary negotiation between the concerned parties (Cerin, 2006). 
According to Stigler and Pashigian (1989); Coase (1992), actions of some governments 
that use taxes, subsidies and other legal actions to restrain activities that have negative 
effects on others are based on standard economic theory which assumes zero transaction 
costs. Coase (1988 & 1992) argue that the solutions to an externality problem which are 
based on taxes, subsidies and other regulations always have high transaction costs and 
are unnecessary in situations where the concerned parties would have voluntarily 
negotiated to maximise wealth.  
 
Although, the Coase theorem generally considers the market-based mechanisms of 
exchange can be more economically efficient than regulatory methods, Coase (1992) 
argues that in some circumstances, regardless of high transaction costs, government 
interventions could produce more efficient outcomes than negotiations. For example, 
when one side of a negotiation process involves many parties, especially where the 
affected parties are as generally poor as rural people in developing countries, many 
would decide to free-ride. A free-riding incentive is a common phenomenon when large 
numbers of individuals or groups are involved in negotiations (Webster, 1998). It is 
worth noting that an externality can be positive and squatters are a typical example of 
people who benefit from land services and goods as free-riders. This behaviour not only 
increases transaction costs, but also causes the failure of market-based solutions during 
negotiations (Coase, 1992).  
 
Another example of where the government intervention is necessary is when the 
concerned parties have unjustifiable claims which can prevent negotiation from 
reaching an agreement, even if the expected gains from agreeing outweigh the 
transaction costs. This has been a big challenge in rural areas in developing nations 
where property rights are not well defined. In such situations, the regulators may use 
compulsory purchase orders to acquire land or property for public benefits (Webster, 
1998). Although, the compulsory acquisition of lands is necessary to allow projects to 
proceed in the public interests, affected parties still have the rights to compensation, 
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negotiate, make representations, refer to property arbitrators and, object and be heard 
(Harris, 2002). In other words, the compulsory acquisition or purchase order may be the 
last resort but will facilitate negotiation. 
 
The Coase theorem treatment of an externality seems to suggest aspects that are equally 
important to compensation influenced by development projects, namely; (i) an 
externality implies inefficiency, (ii) government intervention does not necessarily result 
in efficiency and, (iii) inefficiencies provide opportunities for potential gains if they are 
dealt with or reduced. The Coase theorem perceives negotiation as an effective way for 
engaging concerned parties in the process of dealing with externalities that commonly 
affect development projects in the developing world. The Coase theorem is a theorem of 
exchange potentially based on the Pareto improvement and since in the real world 
transaction costs could not be neglected, therefore the initial allocation of property 
rights matters. It thus provides a possible framework for project developers and project 
hosts to find efficient ways possible to compensate each other through better 
distribution of project costs and benefits. 
 
Another interesting part of the Coase theorem is who is supposed to compensate the 
other between a party generating negative externality and the affected parties. Some 
writers (Posner, 1993; Medema and Samuels, 1997; Butler and Garnett, 2003) interpret 
the Coase theorem to imply that, depending on whoever possesses the property rights, 
any one side could compensate the other. This means that there might be circumstances 
where the affected parties would compensate the developer for not implementing the 
project, or some aspects of it. Theoretically, other authors have found this conclusion 
absurd especially from the moral point of view. However, this review views it 
differently and tends to support the basic argument of the Coase theorem that where the 
socially efficient solution is to maximise overall welfare (i.e. a combination of private 
benefits and social costs), an externality problem is not about one party hurting the 
other, but it is about how best to allocate entitlements among the concerned parties in 
order to redress bias (Coase, 1960). Who is to compensate whom, should be determined 
by who has the property rights and whether the private benefits are enough to cater for 
project costs including the amount needed to pay compensation. The review found 
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Coase theorem’s argument valid if exchanges of ‘win-win principle’ application are 
carefully considered. This calls for careful study of what capital assets the affected 
parties would willingly forego or sacrifice for the sake of having a project in their area 
without affecting their livelihoods. 
 
2.2.1: Concept of bargain in compensation context 
Coase theorem perceives bargain as an effective way that concerned parties could use to 
arrive at efficient resolution of an externality (Coase, 1960). Bargain would make sense 
for the hosts (affected parties) to negotiate with the externality causer (developer) to 
reduce effects and compensate for the loss of its private benefits (Figure 2.5). The 
bargain would continue to the point where it is not possible to further increase overall 
welfare. This optimal point ‘S’ is where the marginal private benefits (and cost of 
compensation) equal the marginal external social costs (benefits of mitigation) 
(Webster, 1998). 
 
 
Figure 2.5: Coasian bargain process 
 
Webster (1998), Tietenburg (2003) and Sebenius et al. (2005) foresee the Coasian 
bargain theory as an opportunity for the affected parties to defend their interests and 
negotiate for mutual benefits from the proposed undertakings. However, Rhoads and 
Shogren (1998) and Shogren et al. (2002) cast doubts on whether the bargainers would 
not tend to look for moderate outcomes-best described by their constrained self-
• If a developer inflicts harm on host 
communities it is possible to deal with 
the imposed externality using legal 
measures. 
 
• Alternatively, harm can be avoided or 
reduced by inflicting harm on the 
developer and this is possible through 
compensation. 
 
• If a host community accept to seek 
compensation and a developer is willing 
to pay compensation, then negotiation 
can take place (This is Coase Theorem). 
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interests. Views from both groups of authors suggest the possible outcomes of 
individual affected parties to benefit from the Coasian bargain. However, doubts raised 
by the group of authors are equally important. With high levels of poverty in most rural 
areas, such a bargain may pose potential threats to commonly owned resources such as 
most of the ecosystem goods and services. There are two important aspects here that 
need consideration viz, (i) not only households incur losses due to compensation but 
also a host community and different groups inside and outside the community may 
suffer as well, (ii) Depending on motives and preferences people have during the 
bargain process, interests of the affected households can possibly override those of the 
community or group(s) and its vice versa. In Box 2.1 below, Sebenius et al. (2005) 
presents a bargain case showing complexity, approach used and outcomes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
However, Harris (2002) and Hackl et al. (2007) argue that both the self-organisation 
and cost-effective coordination of the concerned parties in their respective groups could 
potentially help to overcome many foreseeable problems such as equity issues, free-
riding and holdout incentives during Coasian or non-Coasian bargaining. These 
measures, the cost-effective coordination in particular, could potentially help to cut 
down unnecessary transaction costs (Hackl et al., 2007). Use of a system of 
representation and general rules during negotiation may be efficient for both sides. 
 
The project developers proposing activities involving large areas of land such as 
plantations may face a potential holdout problem (Hoffman and Spitzer, 1986; Miceli 
and Sirmans, 2007; Cadigan et al., 2009). This happens when negotiation that involves 
Box 2.1: Bargain between community and community 
Source: [Sebenius et al., 2005] 
 
Ideological compensation is a very interesting idea. An example might be the Montana dispute 
over who owned the Snake River. The local native American tribe saw the river as its lifeblood, 
whereas local Mormon farmers saw it as a commodity for use and livelihood. The dispute was 
settled by combining their short and long-term views through negotiation. The native tribe was 
satisfied by long-term protection of the river. The agricultural community was convinced to 
negotiate by the short-use provisions. The above Snake River dispute example, exactly shows the: 
 solution came from Coase theorem-framework and both sides were satisfied with the so-
called ideological compensation. 
 practical and less costly solutions are possible through negotiation 
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a large number of affected parties and those whose property is essential to the 
completion of the agreement for the project to begin, strategically have incentives to 
demand very high payments of compensation (Cadigan et al., 2009). The holdout 
problem can delay an agreement and is a potential source of high transaction costs and 
obstruction of development activities (Ibid.). Miceli and Sirmans (2007) and Cadigan et 
al. (2009) found that the holdout problem is similar to land speculation problem where 
land owners hold large areas of land while doing no development or production at all. 
Such land owners do so with expectations of selling their lands in future when land 
prices go up. Like what many countries do in dealing with land speculation behaviour, 
Miceli and Sirmans (2007) and Cadigan et al. (2009) recommend rules be enacted to 
regulate the behaviour that leads to the holdout problem. 
 
2.2.2: Concept of transaction costs in the context of bargain 
According to Lai (1994), transaction costs refer to all costs other than the costs of 
physical development or production. Focusing on information, Buitelaar (2004) argues 
that transaction costs emerge because of incomplete information and imperfect 
rationality and thus transaction costs are both financial and non-financial costs incurred 
to increase information availability. The transaction costs also appear in the form of 
institutional costs because both the creation and use of institutions cost resources (i.e. 
time, effort and money) (Furubotn and Richter, 1991). According to North (1990b), 
institutions are referred to as humanly devised rules of games (constraints) that shape 
human interactions in a society. Kideghesho and Mtoni (2008b) reported that rural 
communities in west Serengeti were found to have functioning traditional institutions 
that govern their daily life and resource base in a cost-effective way. Costs are cut-down 
as community members volunteer in fulfilling different obligations required by their 
traditional systems. Bromley (1991) and Ungaro (2005) found that functional traditional 
institutions in different communities have potentials of minimising uncertainties. For 
example, in a very specific way Mahapatra (1999) discusses the roles of tribal-based 
institutions in avoiding landlessness, food insecurity, social disarticulation and other 
shocks and risks caused by resettlement and compensation schemes in India. This 
suggests a rationale for considering local or traditional institutions as a possible way for 
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reducing transaction costs, compensation uncertainties and a means for organising the 
affected parties to enter into the compensatory bargain process. 
 
Coase (1960) assumes zero transaction costs and Coase (1988) emphasizes that in the 
real world transaction costs are not zero but opportunities exist for minimising them. In 
order to have optimal transaction costs, it is probably very important to get to know 
possible sources and associated factors from both concerned parties that generate 
transaction costs in key stages of compensation process. Table 2.3 below provides a 
generic list of potential sources for transaction costs during compensation process as 
suggested by Buitelaar (2004) and Ungaro (2005). 
 
Table 2.3: Possible sources of transaction costs in the compensation process 
Crucial aspects of compensation process Possible TC-generating factors 
Planning stage: 
1. Land acquisition process 
2. Resettlement/relocation 
3. Valuation 
4. Participation process 
5. Execution 
6. Complaint handling mechanisms 
7. Post-compensation monitoring 
8. Entire communication process 
• Exploration (feasibility study) 
• Type of land ownership 
• Conflict of interest 
• Types of assets and land resources involved 
• Number of parties involved 
• Information search  
• Methods and approaches to compensation 
• Agency (consultants & middlemen) 
• Forms of compensation 
• Stakeholder participation 
• Structure of the plan (expertise requirements) 
• Structure of the plan (legal requirements) 
• Structure of the plan (administrative requirements) 
Implementation stage: 
1. Valuation 
2. Agreement draw up, preparation & 
signing up 
3. Executing payments 
• WTA/WTP compensation 
• Conflict of interest 
• Number of parties involved 
• Bargaining processes 
• Agency (consultants & middlemen) 
• Structure of the contract, (detailed & flexibility) 
• Complains and appeals 
• Intermediations (repeated transactions to reduce uncertainties) 
• Litigation  
Post-compensation stage: 
1. Monitoring and reporting 
2. Policing and enforcement 
• Policing and enforcement of compensation agreements 
• Conflict of interest 
• Number of parties involved 
• Monitoring programme (simple & participatory) 
• Feedback mechanisms 
• Intermediations (repeated transactions to reduce uncertainties) 
Source: (Buitelaar, 2004 and Ungaro, 2005) 
 
According to Hennart (2006), the common theoretical transaction costs in relation to 
agreement processes aiming at establishing equity among parties include:- (i) 
information costs (i.e. costs incurred when searching for initial information about 
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different aspects), (ii) contract costs (i.e. costs of bringing the key parties together for 
bargaining) and (iii) policing and enforcement costs (i.e. costs of making sure that 
parties stick to the terms of the contract). However, focusing on rural settings in 
developing countries, more factors that tend to raise transaction costs may exist and 
they have never been analysed before as far as compensation and bargain processes are 
concerned. High transaction costs may even limit the participation of affected parties in 
the bargaining process. Hence, mechanisms for ensuring negotiation provide efficient 
outcomes in compensation schemes need to be devised. This will include establishing 
criteria on how to get a reasonable number of players to participate in negotiation at 
possible optimal transaction costs and how to safeguard collective public interests and 
enhance overall community welfare. Some of the important information this study has 
to find out with respect to Tanzanian compensation context includes; what are necessary 
and unnecessary transaction costs? What main factors contribute to unnecessary 
transaction costs? What social institutions are best suited to the Coasian bargain 
process? How do institutions define compensation entitlements? What are legitimate 
decisions within an institutional setting? 
 
2.2.3: Property rights: The critical issue of compensation 
In common use, property is simply one’s-own-thing and refers to the relationship 
between individuals and objects. In law, property is conceptualised as the rights of 
ownership (Hackl et al., 2007). Scholars in social sciences conceive of property as a 
bundle of rights and obligations. To them, property is not a relationship between people 
and things, but a relationship between people with regard to things. According to Gilpin 
(2000) property rights and duties are entitlements that accompany the ownership or 
control of assets such as land or water, together with the associated duties that may be 
imposed by laws, planning, licensing or leasing conditions. 
 
It has been argued by Tietenberg (1996 & 2003), Berglund and Johansson (2004) and 
Carpenter and Folke (2006) that allocation of property rights is essential to the rational 
allocation of resources and the resolution of dispute. The property rights facilitate 
regulation and control of the resource base through preventing misuse, overuse and 
speculative use of resources and transferability process (Tietenberg, 2003). However, 
challenges exist in the property right regimes (Gilpin, 2000). For instance, difficulties 
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exist in assigning property rights to some of environmental goods, transboundary 
resources in particular such as air and waters (Ibid.). According to Hanna et al. (1996), 
the property right regimes fail because of pursuit of short-term profits, rapid 
technological changes, cultural change, population pressures and inappropriate policies. 
Thus, the property rights offer a necessary but not sufficient requirement for efficient 
resource management and environmental safeguard. In addition, the aspect of 
responsibility is important for property rights to function effectively. All community 
members have duties and responsibilities to fulfil if the property right regime has to 
function effectively and efficiently. 
 
Kolstad (2000) argues that well-defined property rights make assets excludable and, this 
is a pre-condition for smooth operation of markets. Similarly, De Soto (2001) and Saku 
(2001) underscore the importance of developing countries to clearly-define property 
rights in order to transform their locked capitals into legally recognised assets in the 
competitive market economies. Tietenberg (1996) argue that property rights are clearly 
defined if they satisfy the four conditions for efficient allocation of resources, namely; 
i. Universality: rights over costs and benefits (entitlements) are completely defined 
and specified, 
ii. Exclusivity: all benefits or rewards and costs or penalties resulting from 
ownership and use are accrued to the owner (common ownership and use do not 
exist), 
iii. Transferability: all property rights are voluntarily transferable from one owner to 
another, and 
iv. Enforceability: property rights holders are secured in their entitlements and free 
from unlawful seizure or encroachment by others. 
 
It is on the same ground that eligibility to compensation is coupled to ‘clearly-defined 
property rights’ and the same are used to determine compensation entitlements someone 
deserves. Literature is relatively consistent that clearly-defined property rights avoid or 
minimise externalities and disputes and safeguarding private properties (Kolstad, 2000). 
However, things are not happening to be the same in common resources (public goods) 
because of the irresponsible behaviour among the resource users. The situation is even 
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worse when outsiders in one way or another infringe the resource base without clear 
consent of the resource owners (local communities). It is noted that local communities 
face difficulty in challenging the power and influence of big companies pursuing 
corporate economic interests in the developing world (Morris et al., 2006) and this may 
include compensation plans as well. In this context, the relationships between 
communities and ecosystems are currently changing to a large extent because of 
development activities. According to Carpenter and Folke (2006), institutions are also 
supposed to continuously transform accordingly. This study supports the idea of 
‘adaptive governance’ where further investigation is necessary to ascertain how and to 
what extent realignments of property rights and permitting or licensing procedures are 
required to facilitate fair compensation. 
 
2.3 Estimation of costs and benefits of development projects 
2.3.1: Concept of Cost Benefit Analysis 
Cost benefit analysis was another main theoretical contribution made in the 20th century. 
It uses concepts of modern welfare economics to determine the total value of a proposed 
project in terms of inputs and outputs. Cost benefit analysis evaluates the social costs 
and benefits of proposed project when deciding upon its desirability. If the net present 
value is positive, proposed changes including those in resource use and environment are 
desirable regardless of the impact disparity on groups and individuals (Chapman, 1999). 
According to Turner (1988), cost benefit analysis incorporates potential problems of 
equity, as it does not support welfare as a multidimensional concept, which 
encompasses, among other variables, per capita gross domestic product, distributional 
equity and environmental quality. Moreover, it does not emphasise that the project 
should go ahead only if gainers compensate losers all losses or costs encountered 
(Beardshaw et al., 1998).  
 
Although, cost benefit analysis tries to place values on costs and benefits that never go 
through the market, the monetary values placed on environmental goods and services do 
not capture their all values (Field and Field, 2006). There is need to rethink about 
approaches and methods used during economic valuation. It is critically important to 
know how development projects affect social welfare and the environment, and also 
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how benefits and costs are distributed among project developers and affected parties and 
also among different social groups in the host communities. 
 
2.3.2: Valuation: A challenge to compensation and sustainability 
Economics is an important tool for environmental management and human-well being 
while valuation forms a key part of environmental economics (Emerton, 1996). One of 
the most important contributions of environmental economics is the estimation of the 
value of the environmental goods and services in terms of the support it gives to human 
economic or development activities. Through valuation, economics can help to quantify 
environmental benefits and costs and facilitate incorporation into decisions. However, 
getting the values of both the benefits (gains) and costs (losses) for compensation 
purposes is perhaps the most important and a big challenge in valuation process 
(Sebenius et al., 2005). This is case because people or communities have a unique set of 
value judgements about what ought to be produced, consumed and reserved and the way 
natural resources ought to be distributed between now and future generations (Pass et 
al., 1988). Since compensation is happening within spheres of social and economic 
welfare, satisfaction of stakeholders and sustainability issues are both critical 
requirements for a successful compensation. 
 
2.3.3: Measuring welfare gains and losses in compensation 
Environmental services and goods support both life and production of other goods, 
which in turn, enhance quality of life (Kirby, 2001). Contrary to that, unmitigated 
adverse impacts of development activities often degrade the environment and 
consequently causing serious harm to human social-economic welfare of the affected 
communities. According to Costanza et al. (1997), the overall social and economic 
(human) welfare depends on capital stock that exists at a time in a certain society, and is 
the product of natural capital stocks and human capital stocks. All natural capital stocks 
exist in physical forms while human-made capital stocks exist in both tangible and 
intangible forms. Determination of losses from both the natural and human capital 
stocks encountered by the affected parties has been a big challenge and a serious issue 
of concern during compensation. Goulder and Kennedy (1997) report the reason behind 
the challenge is that stakeholders (i.e. local communities, developer, valuers, scholars, 
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etc.) conceive differently the values of land resources and ecosystems to human well-
being.  
 
In recent years, there has been an increase in recognition of the fact that natural 
ecosystems generate a range of goods and services that are highly valuable but may not 
have an immediately apparent market value (Scoones et al. (1992). Peters et al. (1989) 
and Campbell et al. (1997) show that it is possible to assign monetary value to 
environmental goods and services in order to estimate their values and represent them in 
the market. Progress has been made in the proposition of different valuation methods 
such as contingent valuation, hedonic, travel costs and so many others. However, 
Portney (1994), Common (1995) and Ludwig (2000) object to the use of proposed 
valuation methods since most of the economic theories and assumptions underlying 
them lack empirical evidence. Arguing in similar line, Godoy (1992); IIED (1997) and 
Garrod & Willis (2001), caution that many rural people within their local environment 
enjoy a number of environmental goods and services including the resources owned 
collectively as a community. Despite the achievements realized by some approaches in 
estimating welfare loss of the affected parties, the review realizes challenges ahead in 
establishing some values such as socio-cultural links people have to their ecosystems. 
 
During determination of the losses encountered by the project-affected communities, 
very recent studies recommend the valuation process to focus on the affected people’s 
views (Finholt and Fyksen, 2001; Rawles, 2002; Kim and Kim, 2002; Sebenius et al., 
2005; McDaniels and Trousdale, 2005). Some values that valuers or assessors may 
place on these losses are likely to be incomplete as they lack socio-cultural ingredients. 
Ravnborg and Westermann (2002) support the idea by an argument that valuation 
results require scholars to have a clear understanding of existing social, economic and 
ecological interactions within the society. Different works by Ewert et al. (2004) & MA 
(2005), want values assigned to natural resources to be more multidimensional values. 
For example, forests are not only for timber, but also provide for amenity, recreation, 
wildlife management, water quality, microclimate regulation and so many others (Box 
2.2). Moreover, some communities value directly or indirectly the ecosystem goods and 
services that are currently not utilized (non-use values).  
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It is now clear that standard methods of economic valuation as a basis for determining 
compensation are often not capable of computing all losses, especially when important 
resources are impaired by development activities. Many important intangible values do 
not arise in contexts in which market based values are meaningful to the affected 
parties. It is therefore important to focus on communities that have had compensation 
experience in the past and acquire much information as far as valuation is concerned. 
The study intends to make use of the MA’s ecosystem function framework as a starting 
point for evaluation of losses encountered by the affected parties in relation to 
development projects and their compensation schemes. 
 
2.4 Compensation: Definitions, concepts and theories 
2.4.1: Defining compensation 
The definition of compensation rests on the assumption that there is something to be 
compensated for and a party whom in one way or another has been affected. According 
to Chambers (1997), the verb to compensate (from Latin word ‘compensare’) means to 
weigh one against another in order to make amends for loss encountered, or to 
recompense, to counterbalance, to offset. The definition by Schwindt (1992) states that 
compensation is a process that generally aims at making the affected parties feel 
indifferently about their losses. McDaniels and Trousdale (2005) present a ‘well-being-
based’ definition of ‘fair compensation’ as a way that puts the affected people in ‘a 
good position’ as if the losses had never occurred. Sebenius et al. (2005) recommend 
‘fair compensation’ to compose both monetary and in-kind payments made to the 
affected parties. However, Rawles (2002) argues that compensation would typically be 
understood as a legal procedure to make amends for perceived or actual loss, injury, 
harm, damage or imposition of risks to persons and their properties. 
Box 2.2: Environmental and social values as part of the value of the house 
Source: Garrod & Willis (2001) 
A house primarily provides shelter and based on its architectural design and location. It may also 
give varied levels of comfort, security, easy access to quantities and qualities of public or 
community services, quality and quantity environmental goods and services. The values of all these 
need to be valuated together with other obvious features (e.g. plot size, house size, number of 
rooms, workmanship, types of materials, etc.) in order to determine the house value. 
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In summing up the afore-mentioned definitions, the main points include, compensation 
is a term that primarily entails procedural, distributional and justice matters. In order to 
attain the level of development that sustains the economy, people’s livelihoods and 
environment, it is important for compensation to have and observe special ideals such as 
guiding principles, standards, morals and ethics. Similarly, Cernea (1999) cautions that 
it is likely for the compensation to adversely impact on the affected parties if ethical 
issues are not adhered to. The likely negative impacts include causing social 
disorganisation, psycho-cultural stresses, loss of assets, impoverishment risks and loss 
of welfare. Sebenius et al. (2005) analyse the above-mentioned adversity from political 
point of view that in development processes, both the economic losses and ecosystem 
impairment signal a failure in policy or markets in a particular society. Compensation 
has been a big development challenge as it assures that policy and project objectives 
primarily have development benefits greater than costs; that everyone is better off in 
aggregate; and that it addresses distributional and equity aspects of development. In 
view of this, compensation is not only about fairness but also efficiency. 
 
2.4.2: Concepts of social-economic welfare: Cornerstones of compensation 
The theoretical work on compensation has its historical roots back to early 19th century 
and involves contributions from a number of welfare economists namely Jules Dupuit 
(1804-1866), Alfred Marshall (1842-1924) Vilfredo Pareto (1848-1923), John Hicks 
(1904-1989) and Nicholas Kaldor (1908-1986). These laid down the foundation work 
that devised a way of determining total value of a proposed undertaking in terms of 
inputs and outputs. 
 
According to Gilpin (2000), Pareto efficiency is a welfare position where no one can be 
made better off without at least making some people worse-off. Essentially, the Pareto 
criterion seeks improvement of allocation in such a way that all parties get optimal 
satisfaction. In other words, if there is a way to make someone better off without hurting 
somebody else, why not do it? (Varian, 1996). In some incidences, welfare economists 
recognise the failure of Pareto optimality in identifying the socially-acceptable 
allocations (Gilpin, 2000; Magyari-Beck, 2002). From the practical point of view, 
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Chapman (1999) finds the criterion to be very strict as it is quite impossible to have 
development and policies that do not impose some costs (however small) on some 
individuals. 
 
In attempts to deal with cases of losers and gainers, Kaldor and Hicks developed 
further the Pareto optimality into the compensation principle (Hicks-Kaldo Criterion). 
The principle states that if those who gain from the change could pay damages to the 
sufferers of the same change and still remain better off, the change should then be 
implemented. Primarily, the concept is for enhancement of total community welfare 
through having policies, programmes and technologies with so large gains in order to 
compensate the losers. The principle however, is criticised for lacking a quantifiable 
verification of relative gains and losses (Chapman, 1999), and doubts intragenerational 
and intergenerational equity issues (i.e. distribution of benefits and costs) (Gilpin, 
2000). The current practices of compensation have been concentrating on the 
identification of losers only and forgetting other beneficiaries apart from the developers. 
Potentials exist for this group of beneficiaries to share compensation costs with 
developers or governments. 
 
2.4.3: Concepts of social satisfaction 
Scitovsky (1976) provides a quite useful reference for the relative importance of 
economic value and other values. He underscores the importance of understanding the 
fact that human good life includes satisfaction in terms of comfort and inspiration. Both 
can happen up to a certain point, but beyond that point they behave as mutually 
exclusive events. That is, one is more achieved at the expense of another. Scitovsky 
(1976) concluded that good life is always a compromise, and to make the best 
compromise, one must try hard to understand the nature of the conflict between comfort 
and inspiration. Dealing or determining somebody’s satisfaction (good life) is even 
more complex, but it is only possible through respecting people’s choices and 
preferences. According to Bishop (2003), ‘revealed preferences’ are good indicators of 
actual commitments that people might have on various socio-economic, socio-cultural 
and environmental resources. Scitovsky (1997) in Magyari-Beck (2002) concludes that 
better general socio-economic welfare can be achieved when there is larger consensus 
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among community members on what should be done and how. Within the context of 
this study, Scitovsky’s (1976 & 1997) ideas underline the relevance of investigating 
more on how the affected parties’ satisfaction can be met. Since satisfaction differs from 
one person to another and from one society to another, only data from carefully studied 
cases can however add into a process of developing a generalized social-economic 
welfare framework. 
 
2.4.4: Indifference curve theory 
Economists often use concepts of utility to measure changes in the welfare of an 
individual (Hanley and Spash, 1998; Boardman et al., 2006). New development 
projects, policies or programmes are intended to improve overall welfare but may lead 
to deterioration in welfare of some affected parties (Perman et al., 2003). According to 
Pauwels (1978); Perman et al. (2003); Mishan and Quah (2007) there are two widely 
used monetary measures of the utility change, namely compensating variation and 
equivalent variation. Indifference curves can be used to illustrate the concepts of 
compensating variation and equivalent variation (Knetsch and Sinden, 1984; Perman et 
al., 2003; Zhao and Kling, 2004; Mishan and Quah, 2007). An indifference curve, 
which is also known as utility function, maps out all choices comprising combination 
bundles of goods and services that have the same satisfaction level of utility (Figures 
2.6 and 2.7). 
 
2.4.4.1: Compensating variation measure 
Considering a situation where the quantity or quality of services provided by the 
affected party’s land have been reduced as a consequence of a development project, an 
equivalent money payment that would compensate for the lost welfare could be worked 
out using the utility function (Figure 2.6). 
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Figure 2.6: Indifference curve analysis indicating compensating variation measure 
 
The loss in welfare associated with the decrease of land services (LS2-LS1) corresponds 
exactly to the compensating variation value (M2-M1), which essentially is an amount of 
money that the affected party would need to recover the original level of utility (curve 
I2). Thus this payment of money substitutes in terms of utility for the loss of goods and 
services from land. The decrease in the utility of an affected party provides a close 
approximation of his/her willingness to accept (WTA) compensation to avoid 
deterioration (Perman et al., 2003; Boardman et al., 2006; Mishan and Quah, 2007) and 
this is possible if the affected party has an entitlement. The compensating variation 
measure therefore is the minimum amount of money an affected party would need in 
order to prevent a fall in utility due to a decrease of his/her land services because of the 
project. However, from a project developer’s viewpoint, a project developer could pay 
more than the compensating variation value if expected benefits are larger than the total 
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cost of project implementation, including compensation payments. If this happens, an 
affected party’s level of utility would move to a higher indifference curve (above I2). 
 
2.4.4.2: Equivalent variation measure 
The equivalent variation measure is an amount of money that would make an individual 
feel indifferent between that amount of money and a given increase in the services and 
goods of land (Boardman et al., 2006). It can therefore be viewed as an amount of paid 
by a beneficiary to secure the increase in utility that would be associated with a given 
increase in land services and goods for which there is no prior entitlement (for example 
LS1 to LS2 in Figure 2.7). Alternatively Perman et al. (2003); Mishan and Quah (2007) 
use the equivalent variation measure to show equal willingness to accept (WTA) 
compensation for the change not occurring when there is a perceived prior entitlement. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.7: Indifference curve analysis indicating equivalent variation measure 
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According to Levy and Friedman (1994); Medema and Zerbe (1999); Mishan and Quah 
(2007), for normal goods as opposed to inferior ones, researchers have empirically and 
repeatedly demonstrated that compensating variation as a measure of WTA tend to be 
higher than equivalent variation measure of WTP. The discrepancy is significantly 
higher for special or unique goods and services connected to people’s livelihoods such 
as land and other environmental services and goods (Chapman, 2000; Mishan and 
Quah, 2007). Based on empirical evidence, literature suggests that an affected party’s 
demand for (WTA) compensation to give up for instance, land services and goods in 
his/her possession or enjoyment is greater than his/her willingness to pay (WTP) to 
acquire the same goods not currently in his/her possession (Knetsch and Sinden, 1984; 
Zhao and Kling, 2004; Mishan and Quah, 2007). The differences are due to loss 
aversion, risk aversion, income effects and substitution possibilities (Hoehn and 
Randall, 1987; Hanemann, 1991; Shogren et al., 1992; Hoffmann and Spitzer, 1986). 
Zhao and Kling (2004); Mishan and Quah (2007) recommend that consideration of 
realistic conditions that involve uncertainty, irreversibility and future risks is necessary 
for effective estimation of values of goods and services in terms of welfare gains and 
losses. 
 
It should also be noted that the WTP argument is a function of budget constraint and 
entitlement whereas the WTA is a function of psychological sense of ownership 
(Perman et al., 2003; Boardman et al., 2006). On ethical grounds, some people are 
unwilling to accept compensation for the loss of environmental services and goods 
(Hanley and Spash, 1998; Chapman, 2000). WTA often reflects protest responses 
leading to large claims for compensation. For this reason, WTP estimates are often used 
due to their conservatism (Ibid.). This however, does not adequately justify the use of 
WTP bids over WTA bids in determining compensation value, as it is possible that 
chances exist for WTP to underestimate WTA indirectly. WTP estimate is therefore 
appropriately used when the affected parties do not own the resource providing the 
service or when the service levels are being increased, and WTA is properly used when 
the affected parties own the resource providing the service or when the service levels 
are being reduced.  
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Those designing, estimating or soliciting WTP/WTA bids need a thorough 
understanding of the characteristics, entitlements and capabilities to engage in 
compensatory processes of the concerned parties before hand. It is also important to 
establish specific factors from institutional, socio-economic and socio-cultural 
dimensions that influence compensation choices, WTP and WTA compensation. Box 
2.3 gives an example of disparities between the developer’s WTP compensation and 
affected parties’ WTA. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.5 Systems of compensation: approaches, practices and experiences 
Compensation regimes differ from one country to another because of the approaches 
used, the legal frameworks backing them and how the involvement of key stakeholders, 
the affected parties in particular is done (McGovern, 1995). The following sections 
present approaches, practices, legislation and experiences drawn from different 
compensation systems globally and Tanzania. 
 
2.5.1: Compensation in the context of Environmental Impact Assessment framework 
Globally, environmental impact assessment is widely used as an effective 
environmental management tool and appropriate project planning tool (Canter, 1996; 
SAIEA, 2003; UNEP 2004). Its operation in many countries has been simplified in 
terms of well-prepared country-based procedures, guidelines, user-friendly checklists 
Box 2.3: Songosongo Gas to Electricity Project (SONGAS) in Tanzania 
[Source: CEEST (1997) & Innocent (2004)] 
 
SONGAS is a project owned by a number of private companies and the Government of Tanzania. 
The project is designed to extract natural gas from Songosongo Island and transport it 232km 
through pipeline to the capital city Dar es Salaam for electricity generation purposes. In 
compensating the affected parties that gave up their land for the project gas pipe wayleave, 
SONGAS used market-based rates. An amount received by every affected party was 3 times 
higher than the compensation computed using government rates. Yet more complaints were heard, 
especially from those who had dwelled longer in their affected areas, implying that there were 
some losses in association with the duration of occupying land were probably not adequately 
considered. However, the key question is whether the affected parties have full entitlement to 
compensation. If they do have, the developer’s willingness to pay (WTP) compensation would 
have been higher in order to secure land for the project. Otherwise, affected parties’ willingness to 
accept (WTA) compensation will be less than if they had full entitlement. If affected parties have 
no full entitlement, they possess no negotiation powers and get what they are given. 
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and integration of policy-legal frameworks (SADC, 1996; SAIEA, 2003 UNEP 2004). 
It also tries to enhance project benefits through promotion of potential positive aspects 
of project proposals and also to reduce social and environmental costs of development 
projects by suggesting cost-effective mitigation measures for likely significant effects 
(Mbiba, 1999 and Abuodha, 2002). Therivel and Partidario (1996) and UNEP (2004) 
report the way environmental impact assessment based monitoring and auditing make 
environmental impact assessment a strategic tool that suggests changes and direction for 
policies, legislations, regulations, and procedures.  
 
An environmental impact assessment strives to achieve balance and justice among 
various choices (alternatives) and among different stakeholders (UNEP, 2004). 
Experience from several countries shows that when environmental impact assessment 
studies foresee the possibility of having compensation, compensation becomes an 
integral part of impact assessment and when confirmed, the developer is liable of paying 
all compensation costs caused (SAIEA, 2003; UNEP, 2004 and NEMC, 2004). In 
environmental impact assessment context, compensation is prescribed as the last resort 
remedy of unavoidable residual adverse effects (Figure 2.8). Implicitly, environmental 
impact assessment regards compensation as a challenging process that requires proper 
approaches to its planning and implementation. Learning from the environmental 
impact assessment experiences, this study perceives the compensatory framework as 
important as far as procedural matters are concerned. 
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Figure 2.8: Environmental impact assessment based hierarchy for project impact 
mitigation measures (Source: NEMC, 2004). 
 
2.5.2: Types of compensation 
Compensation paid to the affected parties can take different forms (Kunreuther and 
Easterling, 1996). According to URT (2005a), the World Bank compensation to 
affected individuals, households or community can be monetary or in-kind 
compensation. Depending on the need, the World Bank has been advising project 
developers to provide support or assistance to the affected parties and host communities 
before, during and after compensation as it has many benefits to both sides (Cernea, 
2006). Furthermore, many socio-economist researchers such as Van Wicklin (1998); 
Cernea (2008); Égré et al. (2008); Nakayama and Furuyashiki (2008) and Trembath 
(2008) emphasize compensation payments based on benefit sharing schemes as outlined 
in section 2.5.2.3. 
 
2.5.2.1: Monetary compensation 
This is a conventional approach used when private property is expropriated to make 
way for a project (Nirex, 2002). Depending on agreements reached, developers pay 
lump sum compensation to the affected landowners for the losses encountered. Other 
monetary compensation that may be paid indirectly is through either property value 
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guarantees and contingency fund (Kunreuther and Easterling, 1996). Property value 
guarantees are funds earmarked to protect properties against any decline that might 
occur in the areas contiguous to the project area. With contingency fund, the developer 
promises to cover any losses that might occur from future accident in case it happens. 
Many like Ludwig (2000) have been constantly opposing granted monetary 
compensation without thorough evaluation of likely impacts. He argues that although it 
provides the affected parties with money, the amount of money provided cannot always 
make up for the trauma faced during relocation and in the post-compensation era (Box 
2.4).  
 
Box 2.4: Modern Land Agreements and Northern Canadian Aboriginal Communities 
[Source: Saku, 2001] 
Here is a very interesting compensation experience from Canada. According to Saku (2001), in mid 
1970s, the Canadian government started a modern treaty approach to resolve critical issues related to land 
rights, compensation rights and other benefits in the aboriginal communities. His evaluation study 
revealed the approach had no substantial positive socio-economic development on the aboriginal people. 
The study did not explain why the programme failed. However, learning from the data by ARA 
Consulting Group (1995) in Saku (2001), it is clearly presented that benefits accrued from these 
agreements were largely financial in nature. In the current liberalized market economy, money as medium 
of exchange has gained precedence over in-kind exchanges. Many people in both rural and urban areas 
prefer cash to other material things. However, this study would like to explore why people prefer to have 
cash over other forms of compensation? What are the likely pros and cons of each form of compensation? 
How can fair and effective compensation be realized within a given environmental set up? 
 
2.5.2.2: In-kind compensation 
In-kind compensation provides material-things such as alternative land, house, building 
materials, seedlings and so many others to the affected parties and host communities 
(URT, 2005a & 2005b). Social scientists and development researchers have found in-
kind compensation appropriate for the affected parties and host communities that are 
vulnerable to poverty (Cernea, 1999). According to Cernea (2005), major reasons of 
offering in-kind compensation are to offset potential effects due to risks by adverse 
impacts of some development projects and those associated with cash such as theft, 
inflation, depreciation, misuse and misallocation. For instance, Kunreuther and 
Easterling (1996) found that both the benefit assurance and economic good-will 
incentives aim at raising the overall standard of living of the affected parties or host 
communities. 
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In-kind compensation may include provision of services (e.g. food, accommodation, 
transport, labour, special training, microfinance, etc.) that are requested if deemed 
necessary by the affected parties and host communities (GoI, 2005). According to Claro 
(2002), through giving assistance or support to the affected parties, it facilitates them to 
offer their cooperation during resettlement or compensation processes and to the project 
in the post-compensation era. 
 
2.5.2.3: Benefit sharing schemes 
According to Égré et al. (2008), benefit sharing is a mechanism that ensures 
redistribution of shares of project revenues to the population adversely affected by 
projects. McLeod (2000) refers to benefit sharing schemes as rent equity, and argues 
that the schemes go beyond compensation through providing rehabilitation of disrupted 
livelihoods and financing for development activities in the affected communities. 
Benefit sharing schemes can be implemented either by providing benefits in monetary 
terms or in-kind support to community services such as education, health and water 
projects to mention a few (Van Wicklin, 1998). According to Égré et al. (2008); 
Nakayama and Furuyashiki (2008) and Trembath (2008), such schemes are suitable for 
forced relocated communities. And according to Égré et al. (2008), the overall 
advantage of benefit sharing schemes over other forms of compensation is provision of 
full compensation of both social and environmental costs. However, Cernea (2008) 
reports that project developers in developing countries have been so reluctant in 
adopting benefit sharing schemes, as the arrangements are not supported by policy and 
legal frameworks in many countries.  
 
However, literature review shows potentials exist for improvement of compensation 
efficiency and cost-effectiveness if project developers would seek to have combinations 
of different forms of compensation. These can be determined based on the nature of 
livelihoods of affected parties; their eligibility and entitlements to compensation and; 
both temporary and permanent losses caused by the project. 
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2.5.3: International practices and experiences in compensation 
McDaniels and Trousdale (2005) point out that compensation for losses of both market 
and non-market values faced by the affected poor people on their land resources and 
ecosystem goods and services are crucial issues for both legal and social justice. An 
international comparative survey by Hagman (1978) cited in Kim and Kim (2002) 
established that most of the countries have no compensational issues mentioned in their 
constitutions. Kim and Kim (2002) report an interesting case of Korean practice where 
its constitution calls for fair compensation to be effected “according to the law”. 
Surprisingly, the Korean Supreme Court’s decision 1976.10.12, Dae-Pan-76-Da-1443 
interpreted ‘according to the law’ as no compensation if there is no proper legislation 
governing the specifics. This emphasizes the necessity of having clear compensation 
legislation, regulations, procedures and criteria in place. 
 
Compensation experiences show that irrespective of constitutional and legal provisions 
in many countries, compensation is more likely to be offered if the affected parties 
confront the regulators and project developers (Kim and Kim, 2002). Sometimes, 
personal interests of regulators and project developers significantly influence decisions 
whether to pay or not to pay compensation (Sebenius et al. 2005). They also influence 
selection of approaches to valuation and subsequently the entire compensation process. 
For instance, Garrod and Willis (2001) observe that the USA Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 was formulated 
based on restoration or replacement costs approach. An environmental good is valued 
based on its replacement costs after it has been damaged. 
 
According to Mbiba (1999), both legislation and government decisions can override 
other provisions and interests. He pointed out the Mineral Act of 1990 in Zimbabwe 
which has caused the following consequences in Mutoko district:- 
• developers considered themselves not legally or administratively obliged to 
compensate affected parties for their losses and, 
• affected people and local authorities had no power to negotiate project 
effects, type and amount of compensation. 
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Literature shows consistently that nations have different approaches to compensation 
process. Compensation is represented in national constitutions; as fully-fledged laws; as 
strategies for implementing policies and projects; as special programmes or plans in 
dealing with special events or changes that have adverse consequences to communities. 
A very fundamental question is how best the framework for the project-influenced 
compensation can be represented nationally. 
 
2.5.4: Tanzanian experience in compensation: Legislation and practices 
According to Sections 5 and 6 of the Tanzania Investment Act No. 26 of 1997, project 
proponents are required to register their new project or investment proposals with the 
Tanzania Investment Centre where among others, their project goals and financial 
capabilities are initially evaluated against the national development interests (URT, 
1997a). The next step prior to project implementation is for the project proponent to 
carry out environmental impact assessment studies and obtain an environmental 
clearance certificate issued by the Minister responsible for environmental management 
affairs (URT, 2004a). This certificate is a pre-requisite for a developer to be served with 
other relevant permits and licences such as land occupancy certificates and water 
abstraction rights obtained from different sectoral ministries (Ibid.). Land occupancy 
certificates are the most important and are intended to ensure compensation matters 
have been settled and that no land disputes exist between a project proponent and other 
land users.  
 
2.5.4.1: Legislation governing compensation in Tanzanian 
Section 24(1) of the National Constitution of Tanzania emphasizes on the rights of 
Tanzanians to own property and protection of the property held in accordance with the 
law (URT, 2005c). In Section 24(2), the Constitution states that it is unlawful for any 
affected party to be deprived of property for development purposes including 
nationalisation without fair and adequate compensation (Ibid.). The big challenge is 
how to determine fairness and adequacy of compensation payments. Further to the 
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Constitution, a number of laws2 provide legal requirements for addressing compensation 
issues in Tanzania, but in some aspects of compensation, some laws are not consistent 
with others (Box 2.6). Compensation in Tanzania is mainly regulated through land 
legislation which consists of the Land Acquisition Act (No. 47 of 1967), Land Act (No. 
4 of 1999) and Village Land Act (No. 5 of 1999). 
 
Land Acquisition Act, 1967 governs the processes of obtaining land and compensation 
in Tanzania. According to URT (1967) all land in Tanzania is public land and remains 
vested in the Head of State (the President) as the trustee for and behalf of the citizens of 
Tanzania. Sections 3 and 4 of this Act give powers to the Head of State to acquire land 
on a compulsory basis for the public development purposes or interests that have been 
approved by the Parliament (Ibid). Further to that Sections 12(2 & 3) state that 
compensation not exceeding the value equal to the cost of the development done on the 
land be paid to the affected party before land is acquired. Regardless of the type of land 
occupancy involved, Section 12(1) of this law restricts compensation to be paid only for 
development done on the affected land and not on interest in holding land such as profit 
expected to be derived from future development plans that involve the same land. 
Although this helps to avoid holding land on speculative basis, the reported experience 
shows that many stakeholders including regulators, decision makers and project 
developers have either misinterpreted or assumed that undeveloped land has ‘no value’ 
irrespective of land been cleared and used for agricultural production (Hitchcock and 
Shauri, 1999; Lissu, 1999). This has however been pointed out by Lissu (1999) and 
Mwalyosi (2004) as one of the major sources of compensation disputes in rural areas in 
Tanzania. Basically, this is linked to the forgone benefits which their compensation 
could be determined counterfactually. 
 
The law also emphasises the use of compulsory land acquisition order to resolve 
compensation disputes. Section 13(1) of the Act stipulates that “if such dispute or 
disagreement is not settled by the concerned parties within six weeks from the date of 
the publication of notice that the land is required for a public purpose, a holding or 
claiming any interest in the land may institute a suit in the Court of law”. 
                                                 
2 The National Constitution of 1977, Land Acquisition Act (No. 47 of 1967), Mining Act (No. 15 of 
1998), Land Act (No. 4 of 1999), Village Land Act (No. 5 of 1999) and the Forestry Act (No. 14 of 2002) 
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Land Act No. 4 of 1999 provides for the basic law in relation to land other than the 
village land, the management of land and settlement of disputes (URT, 1999a), where 
the Village Land Act No. 5 of 1999 regulates the related matters of lands in villages 
(URT, 1999b). According to the Section 1(1) of the Land Act of 1999, the objective of 
the land laws in Tanzania is based on the fundamental principles of the National Land 
Policy (URT, 1999a). One of these principles is to pay full, fair and prompt 
compensation to an affected party whose right of occupancy is revoked by the State 
under on compulsorily basis (Ibid.). Section 34(3) of the Land Act, 1999 and Sections 4, 
5 and 6 of Village Land Act, 1999 recognise both the occupancy under customary rights 
and directs prompt payment of full compensation for loss of any interest in land and 
other losses incurred due to interference with their occupation. Compensation shall be 
based on market value of the real property; disturbance allowance; transport allowance; 
loss of profits or accommodation; cost of acquiring or getting the subject land; any other 
loss or capital expenditure incurred to the development of the subject land and; interest 
charged at market rate in case of delays in paying compensation (Ibid.). According to 
URT (2001), Sections 13 – 19 of the regulations to implement Village Land Act, 1999 
provide more information on how the above mentioned compensation entitlements shall 
be worked out (See Appendix 2.2). 
 
While Section 21 of the regulations to implement the Village Land Act, 1999 requires 
the affected party to submit his/her claims for compensation on a special form within 
not less than 60 days of the receipt of the notice, Section 24 states that where a claim 
has not been accepted and mediation has failed, the claim may be referred to the court 
of law (URT, 2001). In relation to the types of compensation, Section 25 of the 
regulations lists seven (7) possible forms of compensation that may be negotiated 
between the affected parties and project developer and these include: 
1) land of comparable quality, extent and productive potential to the land lost, 
2) a building of comparable quality, extent and use with comparable to the building 
affected, 
3) plants and seedlings, 
4) access to communal assets, 
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5) a sum of money equal in value to the development done on land, loss of land, 
disturbance and other losses specified in the Act, 
6) regular supplies of grains and other basic foodstuffs for a specified time and, 
7) such other forms of compensation as may be agreed between the claimant and 
the developer. 
 
In view of the aspects of compensation listed above, it is therefore necessary to establish 
from the perceptions of key stakeholders which types or forms of compensation 
maintain and sustain the livelihoods of the affected parties in developing economy 
context. 
 
Section 8(a) of the regulations to implement the Village Land Act, 1999 recognises 
losses encountered at community level that the village council may claim compensation 
on behalf of the villagers in respect of the losses of communal land, assets and benefits 
derived from that communal land. Sections 9 – 12 stipulate the basis for assessment is 
market value and valuation be carried out by qualified valuer(s) and verified by the 
Chief Government Valuer positioned within the ministry responsible for lands. In 
principle, compensation regulations in the new land legislation3 are based on market 
values of land lost, development done on land, transport costs involved in relocation, 
disturbance caused and need of accommodation for the affected homes (URT, 2001). 
Despite the fact that the current legislation regulates all land expropriation, land 
acquisition and compensation issues (Wily, 2003), but still different approaches to 
compensation exist. This is partly due to inconsistencies in the legal framework. 
 
Although, the review shows that the basis for compensation is reasonably 
comprehensive in principle, all land laws outlined above, including the land regulations 
of 2001 do not take into consideration transaction costs involved in the processes of 
acquiring land, preparing and paying compensation and, dispute resolution. 
Furthermore, the review revealed that the current legal framework for compensation 
lacks administrative procedures and guidelines which potentially could have increased 
                                                 
3 Land Act No.4 , 1999 and Village Land Act No.5, 1999 
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an overall compensation efficiency and effectiveness through minimisation of disputes 
and transaction costs. 
 
Compensation regulations in the new land legislation4 are based on market values of 
land lost, development done on land, transport costs involved in relocation, disturbance 
caused and need of accommodation for the affected homes (URT, 2001). Despite the 
fact that the current legislation regulates all land expropriation, land acquisition and 
compensation issues (Wily, 2003), there exists different approaches to compensation. 
This is partly due to inconsistencies in the legal framework (Box 2.6).  
Box 2.6: Inconsistencies Between the New Land Legislation and the Mining Act (No.15 of 1998) 
[Source: URT, 1998; URT, 1999b; URT, 2001] 
 
New land legislation enacted in 1999 states that undeveloped land has value (which is a new concept in 
Tanzania) but the Mining Act, 1998 still based on an old general assumption that undeveloped land has 
no value. It therefore directs compensation based on losses related to the limitation of the property rights 
by mining or prospecting licence. Valuation of damages is based on lawful occupier’s interests but strictly 
excluding values due to speculation created by the discovery of minerals in the area. This regulation is 
difficult to implement without triggering massive disputes. Experience shows that in many mining 
operations, mineral exploration is a continuous activity done within and outside of their licensed areas. 
Moreover, the “no-value” land in areas contiguous to the ones licensed for prospecting and mining 
activities could suddenly fetch high values and attract more people that seek for employment and business 
opportunities. Based on the compensation regulations of the new land legislation, such people deserve 
compensation through customary rights of occupancy if their stay in the area is continuous for at least 3 
years. However, this is viewed as a speculative stay by the Mining Act, 1998 and thus the affected parties 
deserve no compensation. Under the on going land and economic reforms, land owned or occupied 
through customary land tenure systems is gradually turning into a commodity and therefore perceived to 
have value that can be bartered and exchanged for personal economic gain. 
 
 
2.5.4.2: Compensation practices in Tanzania 
Planning for compensation schemes in Tanzania is done and guided by the State, but 
largely influenced by project proponents and financiers. Mwalyosi (2004) reports that 
compensation paid to the victims of newly established development projects in 
Tanzania depend much on either the pre-prepared resettlement policies or negotiations 
held between investors and affected parties. When the government is the developer, 
normally, the responsible sector ministry takes a lead in preparing the compensation 
scheme (URT, 2005b). However, the process is hardly independent of influence from 
donors. For instance, the Tanzanian law relating to land acquisition and compensation 
                                                 
4 Land Act No.4 , 1999 and Village Land Act No.5, 1999 
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does not recognise tenants (property occupiers) as eligible for compensation. But the 
World Bank policy (OP 4.12) recognises them as being eligible to receive some 
compensation entitlements such as disturbance allowance and relocation assistance. 
World Bank environmental policies require all their funded projects (predominantly 
Government-owned) to prepare Resettlement Policy Frameworks (RPFs) (Box 2.7) 
within which compensation is the main component (O’Brien, 2007 and URT, 2003a). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On the other hand, privately owned projects after securing relevant investment permits, 
embark on land acquisition process which normally involves discussing potential losses 
and appropriate compensation payments with potential affected parties (Box 2.8). Other 
stakeholders regarded this process as land purchase. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Box 2.7: Agricultural Sector Development Programme (ASDP) 
[Source: URT (2006)] 
 
The government of Tanzania (GoT) was requested by the World Bank to prepare a Resettlement 
Policy Framework (RPF) before appraisal of ASDP. In this case the GoT, represented by the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security prepared the RPF in accordance to World Bank policy 
(OP4.12). The RPF establishes principles, organizational arrangements and design criteria for 
resettlement and compensation to meet the needs of the people who may be affected by the 
implementation of ASDP nation wide. Among others, the RPF highlights principles, criteria, 
eligibility, valuation methods and grievance redress mechanisms in regard to compensation. The 
RPF also requests the District Agricultural Authorities (main implementers of the ASDP) to 
prepare their district specific Resettlement and Compensation Action Plans. All approved 
investments whether they involve resettlement and compensation or not, would be subject to the 
final approval and confirmation of the World Bank. 
Box 2.8: Kilombero Valley Timber Company (KVTC) 
[Source: Mwalyosi & Hughes(1998)] 
 
The KVTC Environmental Impact Statement recommended that the affected villagers should 
receive monetary compensation and be facilitated further to participate in teak out-grower 
schemes. The developer did not implement this recommendation, instead the project is currently 
compensating villagers through special established Community Social Fund. Under this 
arrangement, the KVTC pays annual index-linked payments for each hectare leased to the project 
for teak growing and other in-kind payments such as preferential employment. In the beginning, 
KVTC contracted Plan International (NGO operating in the area) to facilitate villagers in the 
identification of their development priority needs, planning and implementation of their 
community based development activities such as construction of classrooms, clinic and market. 
Plan International also helped in disbursing social funds to the all host villages in Kilombero and 
Ulanga district. According to the discussion held with the KVTC project manager in June 2006, 
the KVTC top management decided the project officials should deal with local communities 
directly in relation to social funds and other supports since the intermediary agent (NGO) did not 
effectively link the project and host communities for relationship improvement. 
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Although, some plans for the implementation of compensation schemes by some 
developers seem to ensure the affected parties’ satisfaction, the compensation processes 
are still problematic (Baya et al., 1996; CEEST, 1997 and Innocent, 2004). Different 
reports by Kombe and Kreibich (2001); Lovett et al. (2001); URT (2002); Hernandez 
(2003); Kironde (2004); Mwalyosi (2004) are relatively consistent about the factors like 
lack of participation, unprocedural and corruption acts that bring delays and disputes in 
the compensation processes. 
 
Clear frameworks, principles and criteria for use during compensation processes are 
very crucial and urgently needed to minimise compensation disputes and transaction 
costs involved. For example, when all compensation processes get documented properly 
and sectoral laws address among others the compensation issue in a specific way, 
chances of having disputes would narrow down (Box 2.9).  
 
Box 2.9: Extended Compensation Entitlements by the Forestry Act (No.14 of 2002) 
[Source: URT, 2002] 
 
The Forestry Act, 2002 that was enacted after the new land legislation, comes out as a good example of a 
carefully prepared law that tries to consider more broadly the losses and damages faced by the affected 
parties. The review has found no contradictions between the Forestry Act, 2002 and new land legislation 
of 1999. Instead, the Forestry Act has extensively broadened compensation entitlements to cover both 
direct and indirect losses due to: diminution in value of the existing rights; damages done to the forest 
reserves; damages caused by protection plans and protected wild animals; interference by new rights; 
breach of agreements and; environmental damage including damage to the sustainability of the forest 
reserves or any part thereof. However, neither the Act nor its regulations states the criteria for valuing the 
losses. The big challenge lying ahead is how to find competent experts to precisely carry out impact 
assessment and evaluation of the above-listed losses. 
 
 
2.6 A framework for assessment and analysis of compensation 
If transaction costs are kept as low as possible, the Coasian bargaining process has 
potentials to influence efficient compensation outcomes. Unlike the Coasian bargaining 
where only two parties (externality causer and affected person) participate in the 
negotiation, the study assumes possibility of having bargaining process that is open to 
all key stakeholders, particularly the developer and the affected parties. This has 
potentials for avoiding effects of “self interests” and safeguards the public welfare. 
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On the other hand, the recently established Millennium ecosystem functions framework 
and the DFID’s sustainable livelihood framework have demonstrated potentials of 
providing the study with the conceptual and assessment framework if combined 
together with Coase theorem. The ecosystem functions framework provides effective 
approach towards the assessment and analysing of benefits that individuals and society 
derive directly or indirectly from their environment. It therefore discloses their uses and 
values. The sustainable livelihood framework as a research tool is used as a special 
checklist that helps identification of contextual information, main livelihood assets and 
challenges at the interface of development projects and people’s livelihoods. It describes 
the transformation processes of each asset, livelihood outcomes and strategies in place. 
 
A combination of ecosystem functions framework, sustainable livelihood framework 
and other institutional factors within Coasian bargain context, provide a novel 
conceptual framework that will also be used for assessing and analysing both the gains 
and losses in compensation processes. Thus a conceptual and analytical framework 
(Figure 2.9) links compensation process and Coase Theorem and provides for a basis to 
compare and contrast performance, efficiency, sustainability, equity and outcomes of 
various alternative processes. Finally, the conceptual and analytical framework 
tentatively provides a basis for the assembly of variables and contextual factors to 
formulate the compensatory framework for sustainable development and carry out its 
critical evaluation. 
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Figure 2.9: Conceptual framework for assessment and analysis of compensation influenced by development projects  
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2.7 Key messages from the literature review 
The literature review has identified the following key aspects in relation to the proposed 
study: 
 
In general, compensation that is caused by development projects has not been clearly defined. 
Instead, there have been several efforts trying to express it using different concepts from both 
the human well-being viewpoint and welfare economics perspective. Summing up all main 
concepts of compensation, it is clear that both researchers and authors have been expecting 
compensation practice to achieve the following, viz. recognition of entitlements and people’s 
preferences; fair distribution of benefits and costs among concerned parties and; promotion of 
people’s satisfaction through observing procedural, moral, ethical and equity matters. This 
study is therefore tentatively defining project-influenced compensation as a bargain-based 
procedure or process that recognises entitlements, preferences, morals and ethics of 
concerned parties in order to equitably distribute benefits and costs among them. 
 
Through comparing the theory and practices of compensation, the review has revealed a 
serious gap between the two. Compensation practice, the valuation in particular concentrates 
on the identification of losers and their losses only and forgets side beneficiaries who in one 
way or another, direct or indirectly benefit from the same project operations. The review 
further realised the potential of this group of beneficiaries to share compensation costs with 
developers and subsequently influence positively the developers’ willingness to pay 
compensation. 
 
The Coasian bargaining process has potentials to influence efficient compensation outcomes. 
If negotiation process involves two sides, developer and affected parties, it can potentially 
avoid effects of ‘self interests’ in compensation process and public welfare. However, this is 
likely to be limited by high transaction costs involved and greater knowledge and wealth 
differences between the two sides.  
 
This literature review has shown that the Millennium ecosystem functions framework links 
properly people and their environment, through ecosystem goods and services they get from 
the natural capital. In addition, the sustainable livelihood framework helps to show the way 
development projects influence or change household livelihoods assets. The review has 
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therefore confirmed that both the ecosystem functions framework and DFID’s sustainable 
livelihood framework have potentials for helping in the assessment of both benefits and costs 
during compensation. 
 
A combination of conceptual and analytical framework and other institutional factors 
provides a novel conceptual framework that will also be used for assessing and analysing 
gains and losses in compensation processes in developing countries. Using Tanzania as a 
country case, conceptual and analytical framework provides for a basis to identify contextual 
factors required for the formulation of compensatory framework. Finally, the review confirms 
the validity of the research questions and justifies the importance of this study entitled 
“Compensatory Framework for Sustainable Development: The Case of Tanzania”. 
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Chapter 3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
This chapter presents the considerations upon which the methodology and entire operational 
process of the study are rooted. The connections between key theoretical concepts related to 
compensation and the way they were linked together to formulate a framework for 
conceptualisation, assessment and analysis have been presented as the main methodological 
tool for this study. It also reports on the criteria used in the selection of the study area, 
project case studies, village cases, household cases, and other respondents of this research. It 
further presents the approach to the study, type of data required, their potential sources, 
sampling procedures and strategies used in the fieldwork. Information from literature and 
interviews held during exploratory visits to the study area provided a scientific background 
to the methodological concepts used in this study (Fig 3.1). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Phase I: Design of research methodology 
 
3.1 Overview of research approach 
Figure 3.1 summarises the main research components and steps taken to achieve the research 
objectives and yield the expected research outputs. The research comprised three main 
operational phases namely study set-up, data collection and initial analysis and, critical data 
analysis and formulation of compensatory framework. 
 
3.1.1: Phase 1: Study set-up 
Information from literature review, opinions and views collected from different stakeholders 
and experts facilitated in the identification of gaps and issues of concern; formulation and 
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confirmation of the research questions (objectives) and; setting the study boundaries. The 
exploratory visits paid to the study area provided the study with useful information for 
development of the conceptual framework for assessment and analysis of compensation 
influenced by development projects (Fig 2.4 in chapter 2). It also confirmed the criteria for 
selection of project case studies and village cases. The criteria for selection of the affected 
household cases was tentatively drafted and confirmed later during fieldwork (beginning of 
data collection phase). Phase one ended by working out data required to achieve each 
objective and confirming their sources, methods of collecting and analysing them (Table 3.2). 
 
3.1.2: Phase two: Data collection and initial analysis 
This was the phase for data collection, preliminary analysis and initial interpretation of data 
in the field. The study collected both qualitative and quantitative information on 
performances in compensation schemes, development projects, people’s livelihood assets, 
ecosystem goods and services and sustainability issues. Data collection started by mailing a 
questionnaire to both the project developers and services providers to solicit their views and 
opinions on general aspects of compensation and development projects in Tanzania.  
 
Primary data collection involved two project case studies from Tanzania. One village case 
was selected from each project case study and und different numbers of household cases were 
selected for in-depth (rich) interviews. Application of methods was carefully triangulated in 
an orderly manner that the first applied method provided useful information to other methods 
that followed latter.  
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Figure 3.2: Research methodological and operational framework 
Project & Village 
Case Studies 
Objectives Methods 
Phase 3 
(i) Critical data analysis 
(ii) Construct compensation 
framework and determine policy 
implications 
Phase 2 
 
(i) Data collection & 
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framework 
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(i) Formulation & 
confirmation of Research 
questions 
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and stakeholders 
(iii) Draft of Conceptual and 
Assessment Framework 
(iv) Selection of case studies 
Objective 1: To identify and 
describe key stakeholders, their 
interests in and influence on 
the process and outcomes of 
compensation systems. 
Objective 2: To identify and 
explain compensation systems 
commonly used, and determine 
their potential suitability for 
sustainable development 
Objective 3: To identify and 
explain effects of existing 
compensation systems on 
livelihoods of affected parties 
and their implications on 
sustainability issues 
Objective 4: To propose a form 
of compensation suitable for a 
developing economy context. 
Objective 5: To apply and 
critically evaluate relevance and 
potential of Coase Theorem in 
understanding project-based 
compensation systems in a 
developing economy context. 
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1) Compensation framework to suit developing economy context developed 
2) Researched definition of compensation suggested 
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4) Policy recommendations provided 
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Different methods were used for different purposes. Information about people, places, 
projects and compensation performances by project cases were collected using key 
informants’ interviews. The conceptual framework for assessment and analysis of 
compensation influenced by development projects was used at household level (in-depth 
household cases) to study in-depth both the compensation and project performances; 
distribution of benefits and costs at individual household and community levels and; their 
implications on people’s livelihoods and ecosystem goods and services.  
 
Focus group discussions were used throughout the fieldwork to investigate further selected 
issues that needed either clarification or more details and thereafter the information was fed 
into the conceptual framework for assessment and analysis of compensation. Outputs from 
preliminary analysis and interpretation of data informed and supported data collection 
processes in the field. For instance, all key issues pertinent to compensation, people’s 
livelihoods, sustainability were verified using a questionnaire survey that involved a larger 
sample of households (n=60) in each village case study. Other methods such as 
photographing, researcher’s observations and collection of secondary data (i.e. reports, maps 
and letters) were put in use throughout the period of data collection. 
 
3.1.3: Phase 3: Critical data analysis and formulation of compensatory framework 
This comprises critical data analyses and results interpretation that were made through 
embedding results onto the conceptual framework for assessment and analysis of 
compensation. Variables with significant results in regard to compensation related aspects 
were further analysed statistically and analytically to have contextual factors related to 
compensation. It also involved assembling all relevant contextual factors into a framework 
for addressing compensation challenge in the context of development projects in the 
developing world economy. This phase also involved determination of policy implications 
and necessary adjustments; suggestions to theory including definition of compensation suited 
to development project context and; finally communication of the research findings (thesis 
writing). 
 
3.2 Conceptual frameworks in research design  
According to Neuman (2003), theories provide ideas, concepts and general information on 
various issues that researchers pull them together to establish possible linkages for easy 
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understanding. This could be presented as simple flow charts or diagrams named as 
conceptual framework (Robson, 2002). Conceptual frameworks establish and group variables 
and help to focus the study on the most important data only (Marshall and Rossman, 2006). 
The formulation of the conceptual framework for assessing and analysing compensation 
issues in this study (simply called conceptual and analytical framework) was guided by 
relevant or key issues that emerged from the literature review as presented in chapter two. 
 
The conceptual framework for assessment and analysis of compensation integrates the Coase 
theorem, ecosystems framework and the concepts of sustainable livelihoods framework in 
order to frame the compensation challenges in the context of development projects. The 
sustainable livelihoods framework provides a versatile checklist for identifying stocks and 
flows of livelihood assets in and out of a rural-based household (Ashley and Carney, 1999). 
At the interface of a rural community (people’s livelihoods) and development projects 
(compensation schemes), sustainable livelihoods framework helps to capture transformation 
processes of different types of assets (capitals) in the community. It helps also in identifying 
the influenced changes, coping strategies, outcomes and their implications to people’s 
livelihoods and sustainability at individual, household or community. On the other hand, the 
ecosystem functions framework helps to reveal preferences and interests of different 
stakeholders on ecosystem goods and services (MA, 2005). This was specifically done using 
ecosystem functions framework to link the underlying goods and services of ecosystems to 
the uses people have or had before.  
 
The Coase theorem suggests an approach towards resolving externality problems through 
which concerned parties bargain for efficient compensation outcomes. However, in the real 
world, developing economies in particular, the bargain process is likely to be shaped and 
influenced by a number of factors including interests of bargainers and other stakeholders; 
poverty issues; cultural aspects; market-based aspects; policies, institutions and so many 
others. Therefore, Coase theorem integrates together information from sustainable livelihoods 
framework and ecosystem functions framework and focuses on the assessment of 
compensation practices by project cases. However, efficient compensation outcomes by 
Coase theorem framework are realised when two key assumptions are met (i.e. concerned 
parties accept willingly to meet and bargain at lowest possible transaction costs and; property 
rights are well-defined). Following these assumptions, factors affecting bargain and clarity of 
property rights and those influencing transaction costs were identified and analysed. The 
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analysis made a base for the identification of factors limiting application of Coase theorem in 
the developing economy context. 
 
The nature of operation, use and application of all three frameworks (i.e. sustainable 
livelihoods, ecosystem functions and Coase theorem) are centred on “valuation”. This 
integration forms a quite useful framework in assessing and analysing compensation as it 
involves “valuation” as a critical stage that determines the well-being of the affected people. 
This naïve integrated framework showed versatile strengths in the identification and analysis 
of costs and benefits, their flows and distribution among concerned parties. 
 
3.3 Design of research methods 
Designing study methodology is a well planned procedure aiming at obtaining valid and 
accurate answers to the research questions in a cost-effective way (Kumar, 2005). A 
successful research design according to Robson (2002) should logically link the study aim, 
objectives and methods. However, determination of data requirements is the first thing and 
the second is identification of the right sources of data. 
 
3.3.1: Determining requirements and right sources of data 
The conceptual framework for assessing and analysing compensation (Figure 2.9) helped to 
logically link the study purpose, theory and research objectives or questions in order to 
determine type of information required to answer research questions. In other words, the 
gaps, misconceptions and malpractices identified during the review of literature (chapter 2), 
summarised and expressed in terms of research questions pointed out the data needs. 
Likewise, the stakeholder identification done during exploratory visits to the study area 
(chapter 4) suggested possible sources of the information required. The nature of the data 
required when combined with stakeholder analysis suggested the possible methods to use in 
collecting information from the identified sources and likely methods for analysis. Table 3.1 
summarises the linkages between study objectives, data needs, sources of data, methods of 
collection and analysis for this study. The main sources of primary data were both the 
compensated and non-compensated households located in the communities that hosted 
project case studies. Others included key informants, purposively formed groups, project 
developers and service providers. Section 3.4 provides more details of how data was 
collected from each source. 
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3.3.2: Research strategy. 
A research strategy is defined by Robson (2002) as a roadmap or a plan for undertaking a 
systematic investigation of something studied. Yin (2003a) points out that research strategies 
include experiments, surveys, archival analysis, historical analysis and case studies. The ‘type 
of study questions’ influence the choice of research strategy (Robson, 2002) and according to 
Yin (2003a), the case study is the right research strategy as it would appropriately cover most 
of the contextual conditions of broad research topics and enhance reliability if multiple 
sources of data are used. Yin (2003b) recommends study questions of a ‘why’ and ‘how’ - 
nature are suited for case studies, history and experiments. A case study approach was 
therefore adapted as the right research strategy for this study. Yin (2003b) suggests the case 
studies be combined with other methods applied in a well pre-determined order. Therefore, 
the research strategy for this study included sub case studies (i.e. Tanzania as a country case 
study; two project case studies; two village case studies – one for each project and; 12 in-
depth household cases) and a number of methods. Section 3.3.3 below describes the 
categories of case studies involved in this research and the criteria used for their selection. 
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Table 3.1: Data requirements, sources and proposed methods for data collection analysis per each objective 
Objectives Data needs (i.e. information on:)  Data sources Collection methods Analysis methods 
Objective no.1: 
To identify and describe key 
stakeholders, their interests in and 
influence on process and outcomes 
of compensation systems 
• key stakeholders of compensation and their roles, 
preferences, plans and strategies now and in future. 
• stakeholder analysis 
 
• Reports, records project docs from 
Govt depts., Project developers (PDs) 
& Service providers SPs); 
• Libraries, Documentation centres & 
Electronic sources 
• Sampled affected households (HHs) 
& PDs & SPs. 
(1) Search for documented data 
(2) Interviews & discussions 
during exploratory visits  
(3) Service providers’ survey 
(4) Project developers’ survey 
 
Content Analysis 
& 
Descriptive Analysis 
& 
Qualitative Analysis 
Objective no.2: 
To identify and explain 
compensation systems commonly 
used, and determine their potential 
suitability for sustainable 
development. 
• compensation system, approaches, methods criteria 
used and policy-legal statements in Tz.  
• participation, negotiation and decision-making 
processes 
• mechanisms for handling compensation disputes 
and environmental problems 
• transaction costs during compensation.  
• stakeholders views on different changes influenced 
by compensation system. 
• Reports, records project docs from 
the Govt depts., PDs & SPs; 
• Libraries, Documentation centres & 
Electronic sources 
• Sampled affected PDs & SPs 
• Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) 
(1) Search for documented data 
(2) Interviews & discussions 
during exploratory visits  
(3) Service providers’ survey 
(4) Project developers’ survey 
Content Analysis 
& 
Descriptive Analysis 
& 
Qualitative Analysis 
& 
Statistical Analyses 
Objective no.3: 
To identify and explain effects of 
existing compensation systems on 
livelihoods of affected parties and 
their implications on sustainability 
issues. 
• livelihood assets, their current status and changes 
that have happened on assets 
• distribution of benefits and costs of projects among 
different groups of people 
• gains and losses due to compensation 
• values lost due to compensation 
• affected people’s responses to changes caused and 
consequences  
• Sampled affected HHs 
• Service providers; 
• Project developers 
• Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) 
(1) Key informants  
(2) Rich household case studies 
(3) Focus group discussions 
(4) Verification Surveys 
 
Qualitative Analysis 
& 
Statistical Analyses  
 
Objective no.4: 
To propose a form of 
compensation suitable for a 
developing economy context. 
• forms of compensation, advantages, disadvantages 
& embedded risks of each and AP’s preferences  
• potentials for combining different forms of 
compensation and/or having alternative 
compensation that promotes equity. 
• Sampled affected HHs 
• Service providers; 
• Project developers 
• Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) 
(1) Key informants  
(2) Rich household case studies 
(3) Focus group discussions 
(4) Verification Surveys 
 
Qualitative Analysis  
& 
Statistical Analysis 
Objective no. 5: 
To apply and critically evaluate 
relevance and potential of Coase 
Theorem in understanding project-
based compensation systems in a 
developing economy context. 
• strong and weak points of CT in the context of 
developing economy 
• Necessary policy and community adjustments if 
CT has to be adapted. 
• Results and outputs of data analysis   
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3.3.3: Selection of case studies and samples 
Taking account of available time and financial resources; suitability and accessibility; 
mobility and logistics; health and safety issues and, sponsorship conditionality, Tanzania was 
selected as the country case study. The above decision considered and observed research 
ethics in regard to selection of research sites and sampling procedure as put forward by 
Bryman and Cramer (1994); Robson (2002); Neuman (2003) and; Marshall and Rossman 
(2006). An interest to study rural livelihoods was influenced by the current trends of the 
development projects in developing countries being targeting rural areas where lands can 
easily be obtain. 
 
Prior to selection of both project case studies and village cases for this research, a two month 
exploratory visit to Tanzania was arranged between mid April and mid June 2006. During 
this time interviews and discussions were held with different groups of stakeholders including 
service providers, project developers and village communities hosting different development 
projects in Dar es Salaam, Coast, Morogoro and Dodoma regions. The purposes of the 
exploratory visit were among others to obtain details on conditions and general information 
about the study area; collect relevant secondary data on project-influenced compensation 
processes in Tanzania and; apply and process research permit. The collected information was 
analysed and the results helped to develop criteria for selecting both project case studies and 
village cases. Sections 3.4.2.1 and 3.4.2.2 explain the steps and criteria used. 
 
3.3.3.1: Selection of project case studies 
Table 3.2 below gives three multistage criteria that were used to select the two cases. At first 
place, it was assumed that studying from rural communities that received compensation from 
development projects, might provide rich information that is useful in developing the 
compensation framework. The study focused on rural communities because they have direct 
link to most of the natural resources and thus may offer diverse structural and contextual 
issues related to compensation challenges. In this case, a list of all major development 
projects that compensated rural communities in Tanzania was generated as a sampling frame.  
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Table 3.2: Criteria for choosing project case studies 
Criteria Target Outcome based on real situation Decision 
 
1. Involvement 
in 
compensation. 
To identify 
projects that paid 
compensation to 
the affected rural 
communities 
 
A list of 13 big projects was identified national 
wide. 
 
Two case studies are 
needed to allow 
comparison  
 
 
2. Controversy 
and 
Sensitivity 
To identify 
projects that were 
controversial or 
sensitive or had 
on-going cases in 
courts 
 Government intervention to review 
agreements of all mining projects was likely 
to influence responses of respondents due to 
expectations people had in regard to the 
unresolved disputes between communities 
and mining companies. 
 Poses possibilities of not accessing some 
important information that may be branded as 
“confidential” 
Based on data reliability 
and accessibility, all 
mining projects and those 
with ongoing court cases 
were dropped from the 
list. 
 
 
3. Ownership 
and 
Implementation 
To have both the 
government and 
privately owned 
and operated 
projects. 
 Govt of Tanzania (GoT) shares ownership 
with private sector in all govt-affiliated 
projects.  
 GoT has utmost 35% shares in all projects 
except in Songosongo Gas-to-Electricity 
Project, where it has at least 50% shares and 
implementation including project monitoring 
is done by GoT. 
 GoT was found to have neither shares nor 
implementation influence in Kilombero 
Valley Teak Project  
 Songosongo Gas-to-
Electricity Project 
selected as a 
government-influenced 
case and, 
  Kilombero Valley Teak 
Project qualified as a 
privately operated 
project case. 
 
3.3.3.2: Selection of the village cases 
Selection of study areas was done with respect to the project case studies selected in section 
3.3.3.1 above. Geographically, each project case was found to have activities in more than 
one district. Apart from urban areas in Dar es Salaam-based districts, the Songosongo Gas-to-
Electricity (SONGAS) project covers a number of rural-based communities in Mkuranga and 
Rufiji districts (Coast region) and Kilwa district in Lindi region. The Kilombero Valley Teak 
Company (KVTC) project operates in Kilombero and Ulanga districts in Morogoro region 
(Figure 3.3). 
 
In the first place, all villages that host the above-selected project case studies were identified. 
Totals of twelve (12) and nine (9) village communities were considered as sampling frames 
for SONGAS and KVTC project cases respectively. Due to the nature of this study being to 
learn from the previous compensation experiences from rural communities, all urban based 
communities whether compensated or not were eliminated at the second stage of sampling 
procedure. Only Idete and Namawala villages of Kilombero district were involved in 
compensation paid by the developer of KVTC project. Considering the possibility of getting a 
good number of compensated households from two villages in the shortest possible distance 
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was the third sampling procedure. 14 and 5 households were compensated in Idete and 
Namawala villages respectively. Based on the number of compensated households, Idete 
village (14) was selected over Namawala village (5). Mwanambaya (abbreviated as M’baya) 
village was selected over other villages based on shortest distance (511km) from Idete 
village. Thus, Idete in Kilombero district (for KVTC project) and M’baya in Mkuranga 
district (for SONGAS project) qualified as village cases (study areas). This was the only 
combination possible to facilitate the researcher to budget effectively in terms of time and 
financial resources while studying the two project case studies. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3: Map of Tanzania showing study areas and locations of project case studies 
 
N 
2
1 
1: Songosongo Gas to 
Electricity Project (SONGAS)
2: Kilombero Valley Teak 
Company Project (KVTC)
Legend 
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3.3.3.3: Selection of household case studies 
Key informant interviews and initial focus group discussions carried out at the beginning of 
fieldwork were used to quickly collect background and general information in both Idete and 
M’baya villages. The information helped in making necessary adjustments to the sampling 
approach. It was tentatively planned to involve eight (8) household cases compensated by the 
project case studies (i.e. four from each project case) in the in-depth household study. 
However, this was adjusted based on the conditions found in the study areas. For example, in 
Idete (with KVTC project), there was about 43 households who were not compensated and 
yet their names appeared in both sampling lists presented by the village leaders and KVTC 
officials. 
 
Studying more about why 43 households did not receive compensation was necessary for the 
study intended to reveal contextual factors for the formulation of a compensatory framework. 
It was later decided to have four compensated and four uncompensated households from 
Idete and four compensated household from M’baya. 
 
The collected background and general information during key informant interviews and focus 
group discussion helped in setting out criteria for the selection of household cases for the in-
depth household study. Because of the adjustments made, some criteria applied to both 
village cases and some were specific to one village case. The criteria used included:- 
 
1) Compensation by project case studies: In-depth household study to involve 
households that at least received compensation from the project cases. Households 
compensated by other projects such as SIEMENS/TANESCO and Church (Mission) 
in Idete village were excluded in the in-depth household study. However, their views 
and experience in regard to projects and compensation schemes were thought relevant 
and solicited using focus group discussions. 
 
2) Household headship: This was meant to balance male and female-headed households 
(gender aspects) during the study. However, there was only one female-headed 
household in each list presented by the village leaders for sampling. A total of three 
(3) out of twelve (12) households who participated in the entire in-depth household 
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studies were female headed. It was however, observed that in most of interview and 
discussion sessions held, wives and other family members joined in. 
 
3) Existing compensation disputes: It was quickly discovered that in each village there 
were groups of people whose assets were affected following implementation of mini-
projects intended to deliver the agreed benefits to the host communities. The ‘road 
construction project’ in Idete and ‘construction of electricity distribution line project’ 
in M’baya affected farmers’ crops and triggered new compensation claims that were 
unsettled in both villages. These households were excluded from sampling frame to 
avoid bias for the information that could have been provided. However, focus group 
discussions were used again to have their views and opinions in relation to 
compensation, benefit implementation in particular. 
 
3.3.3.4: Selection of respondents for the surveys 
According to Glasow (2005), sampling strategy needs to observe both the statistical 
procedures and other community-based conditions in order to have reliable and valid data. 
The sections below clearly show how the above mentioned aspects were carefully observed 
in all selections done in this research. 
 
i) Selection of respondents for project developers’ and service providers’ surveys 
Lists of 52 project developers and 62 service providers and both their postal and physical 
addresses were obtained from the offices of National Environment Management Council. The 
National Environment Management Council is the national environmental agency responsible 
for environmental protection, management and enforcement issues including Environmental 
Impact Assessment in Tanzania. The National Environment Management Council has 
updated records of all developers and service providers that were involved in Environmental 
Impact Assessment in Tanzania and compensation schemes in the country. Project developers 
had different nature of activities ranging from plantations, mining, conservation, tourism, 
agriculture, power generation and many others. Lists of service providers included 
researchers, consultants, contractors, government departments and Civil Society 
Organisations. No sampling was done here, as the questionnaires were sent to all project 
developers and service providers by post. The target was to get at least 30 questionnaires 
back from each category. 
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ii) Selection of respondents of the verification survey 
The intention was to obtain a representative sample of both the compensated and 
uncompensated households that were involved in compensation schemes by the project cases. 
Among the very important things observed carefully, was to make sure that the sampling 
procedure used allow various statistical tests such as tests of significance, analysis of 
variance, correlation and regression analyses. Therefore, purpose sampling coupled with 
randomisation was adopted. Sampling frames were made from lists of people who received 
compensation from the developers of the two project cases. The lists were received from both 
the project and village leaders. Harmonisations of the lists were done which involved village 
executive committee members, project officers (applicable only for KVTC project) and few 
people drawn from the lists presented.  
 
Idete village had a sampling frame of 14 households who received compensation from KVTC 
project and a list of 61 households who were not compensated. Only 13 out 14 compensated 
households participated in the survey in Idete village. The survey randomly picked 47 
households from the list of uncompensated affected households to have a total of 60 
respondents. In the other site, M’baya presented a list of 55 households compensated by 
SONGAS, out of which 38 households responded to the questionnaire survey. The 
whereabouts of the other 17 were not exactly known. However, some were known to be 
deceased and some are Dar es Salaam city dwellers who owned farms in M’baya village. The 
survey had to obtain their close relatives who responded to the questionnaire on their behalf 
based on their knowledge. 
 
3.4 Data collection methods 
Collection of data included both primary and secondary information from different sources as 
described in sections 3.4.1 and 3.4.2 below. In total, more than three hundred (>300) people 
contributed to this research through giving their views, opinions and experience in regard to 
development projects and compensation schemes. Table 3.3 also summarises all methods 
used in this research, their order of application and outlines type of data (information) 
collected. 
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Table 3.3: The type and amount of data or information collected 
  
Sources/Methods 
Type of 
information 
collected 
Number of 
responses, 
meetings & 
cases  
 
Topic/issue/theme 
1. Project Developers’ 
Survey 
Notes 24 (out of 52) Views and opinions on different aspects 
of compensation including distribution of 
costs and benefits among stakeholders Service Providers’ 
Survey 
Notes 38 (out of 62) 
2. Key Informants’ 
Interviews 
Audios and  
notes 
 
7 
Historical and background information 
about study areas, project cases and 
compensation processes 
3. 
 
In-depth Household case 
studies (Compensated) 
Audios and 
notes 
 
8 
 
Project case study and livelihood aspects 
in relation to compensation (un)paid. In-depth Household case 
studies (Non-
compensated) 
Audios and 
notes 
 
4 
4. Focus Group Discussions Audios and  
notes 
 
6 
Selected issues that needed clarification 
and details in connection to Project cases, 
compensation and study areas 
5. Household/Questionnaire 
interviews 
Notes 120 (out of 
120) 
Verification of the informed issues 
6. Field photographs Images About 200 Various scenes and field events  
7. Secondary data Reports, 
letters & 
maps 
 
Many 
Community meetings, compensation 
correspondence and maps of study areas 
 
3.4.1: Ethical considerations 
Ethical matters in research are important and need to be considered at an early stage of the 
preparations for the research work up to the time of communicating the research findings 
(Robson, 2002). Fieldwork-based ethical matters for this study included obtaining research 
consent from authorities and respondents. Plans for obtaining research permit were made 
earlier during exploratory visit and it was a pre-requisite for the fieldwork (data collection). 
The permit to carry out this study was obtained from Sokoine University, as the Vice 
Chancellor of the Sokoine University is mandated by the law (Act No. 6 of 1984) to provide 
his/her academic staff, students and affiliated researchers with research permits. Both the 
research permit and introduction letter from Cranfield University were presented to various 
authorities and more importantly to officials of the project case studies and authorities of 
Mkuranga and Kilombero districts. The research clearances (consent) were obtained from 
project cases and District authorities. The District authorities provided introduction letters 
and copies were channelled down to the government leaders at M’baya and Idete villages, 
also serving copies to a number of intermediary government bodies.  
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Neuman (2003) emphasises on respondent’s ethical matters that “the greater the risk of 
potential harm to study subjects the greater the need for a written consent statement”. 
However, Blaikie (2000) and McIntyre (2005) suggest that when respondents are assured of 
anonymity and confidentiality an informed verbal consent is preferred. This study used both 
the written assurance to the respondents of mailed questionnaires and verbal assurance for the 
rest of respondents. Prior to data collection all respondents were informed about the study, 
purpose and expected outcomes of the study. It was emphasised that the study was done for 
academic purposes only. Both anonymity and confidentiality aspects were highly emphasized 
to all respondents and respondents were given freedom not to respond to questions they felt 
uncomfortable with. All relevant ethical matters were carefully observed and maintained 
throughout the project life and this was promised to continue even after the research. 
 
3.4.2: Primary data collection 
Different qualitative and quantitative methods were used and triangulated in the collection of 
primary data in order to enhance data reliability and validity of results. The methods used are 
outlined below. 
 
3.4.2.1: Key informant interviews 
Key informants are people with adequate knowledge of either the target community (area) 
involved in the study or the subject matter being studied (Kakuru, 2006). According to 
Robson (2002), anthropologists normally use the key informant techniques to collect 
information, where an informant controls the interview and the interviewer maintains a 
passive role but active in listening and observing. This study adapted the same techniques in 
using the key informants as sources of important information. In each study area, 
introductory discussions were separately held with the staff of project case studies, 
contractors and government leaders at district and village levels. The discussions covered the 
introduction to the study; historical background of the project cases; the way compensation 
was carried out; existing relationships and collaborations between projects and nearby local 
communities and; who did what during the processes of land acquisition by project cases and 
implementation of compensation schemes. Key informants that are familiar with both the 
compensated communities and the project cases were easily identified from these discussions 
for further interviews. Data collected among others included background and general 
information necessary for setting out criteria for the selection of household cases for the in-
depth study (section 3.3.3.3).  
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3.4.2.2: Case studies 
Case study is an effective approach to both creation of an understanding of empirical 
phenomena and generation of novel theory (Eisenhardt, 1989 and Yin, 2003a). According to 
Yin (2003b), case study research should have a very specific protocol which is a procedure or 
a way for increasing the reliability of case study through guiding the researcher in how to 
approach and carry out case study investigations. Data collected from both the secondary 
sources and interviews during exploratory visits to the study area, supported the creation of 
the case study protocol as expressed in section 3.3.3 above. A multiple case study approach in 
which a couple of methods for identification and probing more on the compensation issues 
from planning to post-compensation eras deemed appropriate for this study. In each case, the 
study involved multiple data sources to produce evidence in order to answer the research 
questions. Through comparison of compensation experiences of the two project cases plus 
views from other stakeholders, very useful information was revealed and which made 
possible the mapping out of key issues for the factors or variables of the compensatory 
framework. 
 
3.4.2.3: Focus group discussions  
According to Nueman (2003), focus group discussions are useful in exploratory research, 
generation of new ideas for hypotheses, generation of questionnaire items, clarification and 
analysis of information and interpretation of results. In this study, a total of 8 meetings of 
focus group discussions of 1½ - 2 hours were held to explore further and to seek more 
clarification on issues that were found unclear from both the key informant interviews and in-
depth household case studies (Photos 3.1 & 3.2). Responses (opinions and views) from 
discussions were only regarded as raw data and were subjected to verification through other 
focus group discussions and some taken into the verification survey. All focus group 
discussions were recorded to capture the discussion details for aide-memoir purposes only. 
Prior to the start of each focus group discussion session, permission to record the discussion 
was sought from the participants. Some accepted easily but some were left to discuss 
amongst themselves until a common agreement was reached. 
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Nueman (2003) and Robson (2002) recommend 6-12 people as optimum sizes for effective 
group discussions. Based on the “valuation” nature the compensation has, the focus group 
discussions of this study were however planned based on Mullings’ (1985) proposition that 
“for specific purposes such as assessment and evaluation, an optimum number for group 
discussion is 6 participants”. The focus group discussions composed of 4-6 people where in 
most meetings the number of participants was 6 in order to avoid too small and too large 
groups that normally lead into shallow ideas and experiences and difficult in manageability 
and moderation respectively. 
 
3.4.2.4: Surveys 
The study carried out three (3) surveys which involved project developers, service providers 
and household heads as respondents. Categorically, the first two surveys had the same 
purpose of generating information (understanding) on identified issues of compensation and 
development projects. It also provided a unique opportunity for project developers and 
service providers as stakeholders of development and compensation process in the country to 
Photo 3.1: One of the focus group 
discussion that involved parties that 
were affected when the Contractor 
was installing the electrical 
transmission line (a benefit that was 
promised by the developer of 
SONGAS project) in M’baya village 
(Appendix 5.23). 
Photo 3.2: One of the focus group 
discussion that involved young 
farmers (youths) in Idete village to 
discuss benefits and costs of KVTC 
project in their community 
(Appendix 5.24). 
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contribute their views and opinions based on their experience. The last survey was for 
verification purposes. Its questionnaire comprised questions formulated from information 
collected through the review of secondary data, the first two surveys, key informant 
interviews, focus group discussions; in-depth household study and field observations. The 
information was carefully sorted out and the very important ones that needed verification was 
put on the semi-structured questionnaire and got administered using a large sample size of 
respondents (n=60) in study area. Section 3.3.3.4 presents the way sampling of respondents 
was approached step by step in all three surveys conducted in this study. 
 
i) Project developers’ and service providers’ surveys 
Two different questionnaires (Appendices 3.1 & 3.2) with both open and closed-ended 
questions were mailed to 52 project developers and 62 service providers. Both questionnaires 
sought to solicit their views and perceptions on various issues of compensation and 
development projects that were identified to be very important for the compensatory 
framework. The project developers and service providers were provided with four weeks to 
respond to the questionnaire and send it back using an enclosed envelop with pre-paid 
postage and return address printed on it. After four weeks, a person was recruited to follow-
up on the delayed responses by telephone, e-mail and visiting them physically for those based 
in Dar es Salaam. This helped to achieve 46.2% and 61.3% responses from project 
developers and service providers respectively. 
 
ii) Verification survey 
This used a questionnaire survey intended to collect both quantitative and qualitative 
information from both compensated and non-compensated households residing in the two 
village cases. Questionnaires used in the two study areas were slightly different following 
different conditions found on both sites. KVTC project has established social fund and 
contracts systems to channel benefits to all involved villages while none existed on the other 
side of SONGAS. Both questionnaires however, comprised of open and closed-ended 
questions (Appendix 3.3). 
 
As pilot study becomes necessary for ensuring that a developed questionnaire serves the 
intended purposes of the study (Robson, 2002), the questionnaires were tested using 20 
respondents in each study area, before they were put in use by enumerators. All aspects 
identified to have brought confusion to either respondents or enumerators were adjusted. In 
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each study area, two enumerators were trained on the research topic, respondents and how to 
ask both the key and probing questions. Each enumerator had an average of administering 
three questionnaires a day and a total of 60 respondents were interviewed in each village case 
study. Interviews took a “question and answers approach” with few cases (i.e. very aged 
respondents) where a questionnaire was administered in a conversational manner while 
making sure all key questions were responded to. 
 
3.4.3: Secondary data 
According to Helstad (2006), data from documents are stable and useful as they are usually 
produced for other reasons than research, which means, it is not possible for the researcher to 
influence them. Information relevant to compensation and development projects were 
collected in the form of reports, maps, letters and other documents. Most of this information 
was collected during exploratory visits in Tanzania. Reports included Environmental Impact 
Statements, Resettlement Policy Frameworks, Project feasibility study reports and 
Monitoring reports. Collection of secondary data from different stakeholders continued 
during and after the fieldwork.  
 
3.5 Data analysis and management 
3.5.1: Approach to data analysis and strategies 
The study used several strategies in handling, cleaning and counterchecking information 
collected from each source. These involved the order of applying different methods of data 
collection and type of questions asked. The approach adapted to data analysis that started in 
the fieldwork and made to overlap with data collection helped to clean data, enhanced clarity 
of information and flagged gaps of information as described below: 
i) Types of data required and their respective methods of analysis (i.e. content, 
statistical or qualitative analyses) were known early before data collection started 
in the field. 
ii) All variables were categorised into four levels of measurement (i.e. nominal, 
ordinal, interval and ratio scales) in order to determine the appropriate tests 
required and amount of information each variable can give. 
iii) Initial analysis of data overlapped data collection in the field to reveal out useful 
adjustments to data collection methods in order improve their effectiveness based 
on conditions met in the field. The initial analysis of data was extended into 
preliminary interpretation of how various issues under investigation were related. 
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This clarified issues that seemed to be ambiguous and also detected gaps in terms 
of information collected. For effective qualitative-based research, Stone and 
Harris (1984b); Robson (2002); Neuman (2003); Stake (2005) and; Marshall and 
Rossman (2006) recommend that the final analysis of data to be preceded by pre-
analysis which goes hand-in-hand with data collection in the field. 
iv) Focus group discussion was used throughout data collection period as both a 
method of seeking more information (i.e. details and clarification of issues) and as 
a tool for analysis of qualitative data.  
v) The questionnaire that was used in a household survey held at the end of the 
fieldwork was informed by other methods of data collection. Questions asked 
included issues that needed verification and more digestion (pre-analysis) using 
larger sample size.  
 
3.5.2: Analysis of qualitative data 
i) Stakeholder analysis 
The study used a two stepped technique in carrying out stakeholder analysis. First, interviews 
and discussions were carried out with different project developers and service providers 
during exploratory visits in order to identify potential stakeholders in development and 
compensation processes in Tanzania. Potential list of stakeholders was created and 
categorised into three main groups namely, affected parties and host communities, project 
developers and service providers. The latter group comprises of government departments and 
agencies, consulting firms, academic and research institutions and civil society organisations. 
Initial information on their characteristics (roles, interests, interactions, expectations, 
preferences and future plans) were also obtained during the visits.  
 
Secondly, the questionnaire surveys that involved project developers and service providers 
confirmed the key stakeholders and their characteristics. Respondents were also asked to 
gauge their interests and influence by allocating relative weights using a ‘four-point scale’ 
(i.e. 1=Very low; 2=Low; 3=High and 4=Very high) (Appendix 4.1). Each respondent was 
also asked to gauge others using the same scale. The allocated relative weights allocated to 
each stakeholder were summed, averaged and rounded to the nearest integers. Then these 
were finally put into a classification matrix (Figure 4.2) which was firstly developed by 
Lindenberg and Crosby (1981), used and developed further by Eden and Ackerman (1998) 
and more recently applied in natural resource management by Reed et al. (2009). 
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ii) Analysis of audio information 
Audio information from key informants, in-depth household cases and focus group 
discussions in each project case study were transcribed into text (transcripts) and arranged 
together with other text information (self notes) into matrix displays. In order to simplify a 
search for patterns all issues raised were expressed in terms of narratives and summarised in 
1-2 pages (Appendices 5.1 – 5.26) and grouped into their related themes. Key messages 
(main issues) from each thematic narration were pulled out and presented as summaries of ½-
1 of A4 sheet and such information appears in the thesis as either findings or evidence to 
support other results. 
 
Conceptual themes central to research objectives, questions and variables studied were coded 
based on the way contents were related to the theoretical concepts and their cause-effects 
explained in the theoretical framework of the study as linkages were established. 
Comprehensive notes were built on all observed variables that appeared to be significant and 
relevant. After factual information on various variables was deduced, their influence to 
compensation and implications to rural people’s livelihoods and sustainable development 
were then identified and discussed. Additionally, both reading and re-reading the transcripts 
and listening and re-listening to the original recorded audios were adopted as a strategy 
during result discussion to avoid loss of the original meaning of the information. This helped 
to extract all relevant contextual information that was expressed by respondents. In the course 
of making inferences, evidence were provided based on the bounds of the discussion context, 
the framework of assessment and analysis of this study and also comparing and contrasting 
with secondary information.  
 
iii) Analysis of surveyed categorical data 
Qualitative information from surveys was tested statistically using computer aided software 
of Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS-15) to determine performance of the project 
case studies in regard to different variables (aspects). With respect to different categorical 
variables, cross tabulation using Chi square (χ2) tests was mainly carried out to determine 
whether significant differences existed between respondents of the two village cases. 
Respondents’ preferences or ranks to various aspects including benefits, costs and types of 
compensation were assigned numeric values (weights) using a relative scale such as (1 – 3) or 
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(1 – 4) across sample(s). For instance, first rank = 3; second rank = 2 and third rank = 1. 
The score for each ranked aspect was calculated as the product of corresponding number of 
households and weight allocated. Finally, the total score for each benefit or cost was obtained 
by summing up all scores obtained when it was ranked first, second and third. The following 
mathematical expression summarises the computation. 
 
TS = ∑niwi 
Where: 
TS  = Total score calculated for each benefit/cost identified 
n  = Number of counted households who ranked it 
w  = Weight allocation (w = 1, 2 & 3) 
i  = Integers designating first, second and third rank. 
 
Such results were compared with other qualitative responses from other sources such as in-
depth household cases and focus group discussions in order to draw out inferences around 
different variables. In most cases, other sources provided basis and guidance to the 
discussions. 
 
3.5.3: Analysis of quantitative data 
According to Robson (2002) and Neuman (2003) quantitative data are normally organised, 
manipulated and subjected to descriptive analysis and presented as descriptive and inferential 
statistics; percentages; tables, charts, figures or graphs. This study used the Statistical 
Package for Social Sciences (SPSS-15) for quantitative analyses, a user-friendly software that 
facilitates data management and analysis (Field, 2005). 
 
i) Descriptive statistics and T- test 
Quantitative data were analysed to obtain descriptive statistics for household assets and flows 
in relation to losses encountered and actual compensation received in both village cases. The 
T-test was carried out to examine whether the means of different household assets, flows and 
other numeric variables were significant different between the studied villages. 
 
ii) Correlation test and regression analysis 
Correlation test was carried out against all household-based numeric variables that were 
considered to be possibly associated with losses suffered by the affected parties during 
compensation. Losses were identified as loss of land, perceived loss of household income and 
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perceived intangible losses. Variables involved during the analysis included demographic, 
production and distribution factors. Correlation matrices for each village case and an overall 
case are presented in Appendices 6.2, 6.3 & 6.4. Multiple linear regression analysis was 
carried out for all independent variables that were at least moderately correlated (Pearson’s 
coefficient of correlation above 0.4) to the perceived household loss of income 
(TZS/household). This established relationships between various predictor variables (factors) 
and perceived household loss of income as a dependent variable. However, some variables 
were dropped in order to avoid multi-co-linearity effect. It should be noted that the calculated 
total household loss (CTHL) was not involved in the multiple linear regression analysis since 
it was not an observed variable. No regression analysis was done for land and perceived 
intangible losses as both showed weak correlation with most of the variables (Tables 6.5 and 
6.7). 
 
iii) Comparison of compensation payments and losses 
Respondents of the household verification survey carried out in each village case estimated 
their perceived losses of household annual income (PLHIs) caused by the respective 
development projects. As it was established from the previous methods of data collection that 
household incomes in both villages were agriculturally based, estimations of PLHIs were also 
based on their lost production or harvests of various agricultural crops. Respondents were 
asked a day before the interview to work together with their family members to prepare in a 
written form the estimates of their perceived losses of household annual incomes from their 
lost farmlands, crop harvests and selling prices by then. This was possible because most of 
the respondents and some of their family members were literate. During interviews the same 
respondents (Appendix 3.3) were asked to provide information on their: 
i. areas of lost farmlands by household (ha/hh);  
ii. types of crops cultivated on their lost farmlands;  
iii. estimated proportion (0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75 or 1) for each crop grown in mixed 
cropping system in the lost farmland;  
iv. average annual harvest for each crop (measured in either volume or weight basis);  
v. number of times the crop is harvested in a year (i.e. 1, 2, 3…) and; 
vi. average selling price of each crop. 
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The above information helped to check the self-reported biases and also in working out crop 
values once categorised in annual, semi-permanent and permanent or perennial crops. Further 
to that, information in relation to crop productivity and their respective prices obtained from 
other sources of data (mentioned in step 3 below) helped to verify household derived values 
for PLHIs. Moreover, the following steps were undertaken to treat further the estimated 
losses of perceived household annual incomes and to calculate total household losses: 
 
1) Data of size of household lost land (ha), types of crops that were formerly cultivated 
on the lost land and average harvests per hectare for all crops were obtained during 
the verification survey. 
2) Crop prices were computed using average price of the three preceding years obtained 
in the nearby markets (i.e. 1995-97 for M’baya and 2004-06 for Idete). 
3) Other necessary data such as interest, inflation and discount rates and farm 
operational costs for rain-fed subsistence farming were obtained from Central Bank of 
Tanzania, Planning Commission and Ministry of Agriculture. 
4) Discount rates were adjusted using the following formula before were used: 
[d = (1+r)/(1+i) - 1], where d = discount rate; r = interest rate and;  
i = inflation rate. 
5) The net future income flows from permanent crops (fruit, cashew and coconut trees) 
and semi-permanent crops (banana, pineapples and canes) were discounted at 15% 
rate for 7 and 3 years respectively and aggregated to determine their present value 
sums.  
6) The value of each area of farmland lost was calculated using income or yield 
capitalisation method present worth of all future income streams to be generated by 
the land were discounted and summed for 20 success years. 
7) Estimations for gross incomes of annual crops and values of structures (houses and 
huts) were calculated using actual market costs adjusted according to condition, 
quality and age. 
 
Actual amount of compensation paid to the affected parties, perceived loss of household 
income (PLHI) and calculated total household loss (CTHL) were compared in each village 
case to establish relationships between the three parameters. Graphical method and simple 
linear regression analysis were both used in establishing the relationships between the three 
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parameters. Results were then compared between village cases. However, the fractions of the 
variations in the dependent variable (R2) explained by predictor variables in all simple linear 
regression analyses were low (Table 6.2).  
A written guide on how to estimate perceived loss of household income (PLHI) was provided 
to the respondents a day before the interview during the verification survey. Essentially, the 
guide requested information in relation to size of lost land (ha), types of crops that were 
formerly cultivated on the lost land, average harvests per hectare per year and selling prices 
for all crops by then. This helped to check the self reported biases through comparison of 
their crop harvests and estimated loss of household income. Furthermore, information in 
relation to crop productivity and their respective prices obtained from other sources of data 
(mentioned in step 3 above) helped to adjust some PLHI estimations. 
 
3.5.4: Counterfactual analysis 
The counterfactual analysis against which compensation payments can be set is the situation 
that would have prevailed in the absence of the development projects. The counterfactually 
relevant aspects and the basis for compensation (i.e. the performance of agriculture and 
provision of community services) were derived from surveys carried out in the study areas 
and informed by reviews of prospects in the rural and agricultural sectors in Tanzania. In 
arriving at appropriate counterfactual inferences, predictions of possible situations that might 
have turned out differently in the ‘without’ project situation in each village case was carried 
out (Section 5.4.3). The future ‘without’ project could be different from the present, and this 
was taken into account. For example, deterioration of soils in the ‘without’ situation would 
call for a reduction in compensation, because income loss would be less and if yields are 
predicted to increase due to improved technologies compensation might be greater. However, 
justification for either less or higher compensation payments was established in recognition 
of property rights and compensation entitlements. 
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3.6 Critique of the research methodology 
Obtaining accurate results in research is always challenging, particularly when human beings 
are used as sources of information (Sharon, 1999 and Neuman, 2003). Sometimes the quality 
of responses is affected by biases in selecting research methods, samples and measurements. 
Neuman (2003) suggests a thorough conceptualisation of research constructs, establishing 
appropriate levels of measurements and pre-testing as effective methods of improving both 
reliability and validity aspects of research quality. Major limitations of this study are 
associated to sensitivity of the research topic, practical definition of compensation and use of 
case study in terms of data collection and generalisation of the findings (Figure 3.4). 
 
To some extent, confidentiality affected availability of information relevant to the study. In 
some instances some information in relation to compensation schemes and project economic 
performances were branded ‘confidential’ or ‘top secret’. For example, feasibility study 
report of one project case was not made available for the same reasons and this limited 
comparison to be done between the two project cases. Furthermore, the study expected to 
have relevant special documents such as project monitoring reports or environmental 
monitoring reports explaining also the post-compensation issues. Both types of reports 
existed but none explained or even mentioned conditions after compensation. It was 
identified as a serious oversight in the process of development. This hindered the study from 
getting important information in order to compare with the collected primary data on 
assessment of the post-effects of compensation schemes. The study however, depended on 
quality information collected and counterchecked through triangulation of methods. 
Secondary data by World Bank studies in other developing countries were also put in use to 
suit the need. The proposed framework has recommended monitoring of post-compensation 
effects as part of the compensation procedures.  
 
The use of case study approach has inherent methodological problems associated to 
generalisation. The main output of this study is a framework for compensation in the context 
of developing economy. The country case was carefully selected to minimise distinctive 
effect. Despite the existing differences between developing countries, Tanzania has most of 
the socio-economic and well-being attributes of poor countries. The project cases were also 
carefully selected for the study to make use of all information from comparing and 
contrasting the ownership and nature of projects. Project ownership in many developing 
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countries is either by the State, private sector or both. However, the compensatory framework 
developed based on information collected from multi-storey layers of cases, using a 
combination of methods and analysed using an integrated conceptual framework presents 
potential approach towards framing the compensation challenge in the context of 
development.  
 
Comparing financial and time resources, the research project suffered most from the shortage 
of time. Not only the time for collection and analysis of data, but also for applying the 
developed framework elsewhere in order to enhance its generalisation. Knowing that time 
was not adequate, the criteria for framework design were established and critically used to 
evaluate the developed framework in order to increase its robustness and versatility (Section 
7.3). 
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Figure 3.4: Linkages between research objectives, methods and study outputs 
Literature review 
 
Exploratory visit 
Identified different compensation systems and approaches used 
in both developed and developing countries and linked them to 
key issues of sustainable development. 
Applied the conceptual and analytical framework in both the 
synthesis and analysis of the collected information. 
Proposed a compensatory framework for developing economies. 
Suggested a researched definition of compensation influenced by 
development projects. 
Demonstrated the application of Coase theorem in developing 
economies and suggested necessary adjustments. Determined 
policy implications and put forward relevant recommendations. 
Based on Coase theorem , concepts of sustainable livelihoods 
and ecosystem functions developed the conceptual framework 
for assessing and analysing compensation influenced by 
development projects. Established criteria for selecting project 
case studies, village cases and affected household cases. 
Confirmed data needs, sources, methods for collection and 
analysis Project Case Studies 
Household Cases 
Focus group 
discussions 
Surveys
Key Informants 
Objectives Methods Study outputs  
Established characteristics of key stakeholders and issues of 
concerns related to compensation practices in developing 
countries, focused on Tanzania as the case study. 
Objective 1: To identify and describe 
key stakeholders, their interests in and 
influence on process and outcomes of 
compensation systems 
Objective 2: To identify and explain 
compensation systems commonly 
used, and determine their potential 
suitability for sustainable 
development 
Objective 3: To identify and explain 
effects of existing compensation 
systems on livelihoods of affected 
parties and their implications on 
sustainability issues 
Objective 4: To propose a form of 
compensation suitable for a 
developing economy context. 
Objective 5: To apply and critically 
evaluate relevance and potential of 
Coase Theorem in understanding 
project-based compensation systems 
in a developing economy context. 
Literature review confirmed 
study questions and 
boundaries 
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3.7 Key messages 
The following key messages arise from this chapter:  
i) The challenge of integrating together information of different nature collected using 
different methods shows the importance of having the conceptual and analytical 
framework like in this study. This links well the study objectives, methods and expected 
outputs of the study (Figure 3.4). 
ii) The conceptual and analytical framework simplifies the task of identifying gaps in both 
theory and practice and possible contributions of this research project. 
iii) The methodology is both central and critical part of any research work. Research design 
is a challenging task but if properly done step by step while considering all ethical issues 
pertaining to research provides a roadmap to quality research work as it improves all 
aspects of validity and reliability. 
iv) Carrying out self-critique while planning and conducting the rest of research activities 
builds an internal evaluation mechanism within the process and consequently enhances 
the quality of research outputs. 
v) Triangulations of research methods, tools and sources in relation to both data collection 
and analysis when applied in an appropriate order has potential of providing a lot of 
quality information. 
vi) Depending on the nature of research project, triangulation has potentials of saving both 
time and financial resources in research projects. 
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Chapter 4 COMPENSATION PRACTICES IN TANZANIA 
 
Chapter four focuses on stakeholder roles and perceptions on the performance of country-
level compensation regimes in relation to development projects in Tanzania. The perceptions 
were collected from government officials, project officers, consultants, researchers and 
actors of the civil society organisations using interviews and discussions held during 
exploratory visits. It should be noted that views and perceptions from the affected parties and 
host communities are presented in chapters five and six. The exploratory interviews and 
discussions were held to identify key issues and potential stakeholders of compensation 
practices in Tanzania. The exploratory interviews and discussions also helped to identify key 
components of the conceptual framework and confirmation of the study objectives, data 
requirements, sources and methods of collection and analysis (presented in chapters two and 
three). The chapter also reports views and perceptions of both the project developers and 
service providers collected using questionnaire surveys, a year later after exploratory visits. 
The surveys helped to confirm compensation stakeholders, their roles, interests in and 
influence over various compensation issues in the country. Furthermore, the surveys have 
also enabled the study to critically review key issues of the current compensation processes 
and establish possible links to the Coasian bargain framework. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Methods used to assess compensation practices in Tanzania 
 
4.1 Development projects in Tanzania 
UNEP/SMAP (2006) defines a project as a finite activity undertaken to create good(s) or 
service(s) which brings about beneficial change(s) to a certain group of people, society or 
both. Early processes of projects involve proposing, selecting workable ideas and 
transforming them into clearly defined objectives, actions and requirements in responding to 
a particular need (O’Brien, 2007). According to Neefjes (2000), a project can be regarded as 
an instrument that leads to effective and efficient management of planned activities, resources 
and people in order to achieve agreed goals. 
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Several ways exist in which projects can be categorised. Projects can be put into three main 
groups such as development, conservation and research projects (Mahanty, 2002). Projects 
can further be categorised based on their purposes, needs and sizes (Elibariki (2007). 
According to NEMC (2004), the size of the project can be expressed in terms of its inputs and 
outputs or total financial investment capital. However, based on land requirements, purposes 
of projects give a more meaningful and useful categorisation of projects as far as matters of 
compensation and rural livelihoods are concerned. This assumes that the main impact 
pathway is through land and, therefore development projects in rural areas can be grouped 
into two, namely, ‘land-based’ and ‘non-land-based’ projects. 
 
Land-based projects are area development in which contiguous units of land are used for new 
purposes especially associated with production, settlement or possibly protection of water 
catchments, wildlife and habitats. This group constitute more than 95% of all projects, and 
are largely owned and operated by the State, foreign companies or as a joint venture between 
the state and foreign investors. For such projects to become operative, they usually involve 
massive relocation of land inhabitants and their activities.  
 
On the other hand, the non-land-based are mainly linear development activities associated 
with infrastructure such as roads, rails, pipelines, power distribution lines and flood control 
defence (dykes). These projects take relatively small amount of land from the affected 
communities compared to the land-take projects. However, total land taken by the entire 
length of infrastructure such as the road, railway or pipeline is as larger as plantations (land-
take projects). With this category of projects, an effect of land loss is distributed among many 
village communities where the project passes through. The non-land-take projects have 
greater chances of minimising relocation of people if not avoiding it completely. 
 
4.2 Identification of stakeholders in compensation system in Tanzania 
This section presents findings of the identification of stakeholders involved in compensation 
processes in Tanzania. This was the first step of the stakeholder analysis carried out with 
emphasis on describing potential ways of engaging stakeholders in improving performances 
in both compensation practices and development projects. Potential stakeholders of 
development and compensation processes were identified using information collected using 
interviews and discussions held with different actors during exploratory visits in the study 
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area. Organisations visited and their number in brackets included government offices (10), 
development and conservation projects (13), civil society organisations (4), consulting firms 
(2) and freelance consultants (2). A list of potential stakeholders was established and placed 
into three major groups based on their roles (Table 4.1).  
 
Table 4.1: Description of stakeholders in development/compensation processes in Tanzania 
Stakeholder 
groups 
Description 
Project 
developers 
(PDs) 
• Can be a foreign, local or jointly owned project, investment or a company 
• Can be government departments/organisations, private firms or jointly owned 
project/investment/company 
• Has relatively high financial and project managerial powers 
• Directly concerned with the project and compensation process 
Affected 
parties  
(APs) 
• Can be individuals, households, groups or host communities 
• Among the losses faced include loss of land to projects. 
• Potential recipients of compensation payments 
• Typically a marginalised group during development and compensation processes. 
• Directly affected by the development and compensation processes 
Service 
providers  
(SPs) 
• Represents a range of expertise available for hire as consulting firms or freelance 
consultants.  
• Includes central and local government departments, academic and research institutions 
and, civil society organisations. 
• Normally carry out feasibility studies, baseline surveys, valuations for compensation and 
environmental studies such as impact assessments, monitoring and audits. 
• Usually are the first agents to interact with the affected parties. 
• Involved directly/indirectly in the development and compensation processes. 
Source: Exploratory visit, 2006 
 
The synthesised information on roles, interests, resource inputs and capacity gaps of 
stakeholders collected during exploratory interviews and discussion are presented in 
Appendix 4.1 and discussed with other results of the second step of stakeholder analysis (i.e. 
stakeholder classification) in next Section 4.3. 
 
Secondly compensation stakeholders were confirmed through analysis of information 
collected using surveys that involved the project developers and service providers (Section 
4.2.2). Other purposes of carrying out stakeholder analysis included to identify relations and 
tensions between key stakeholders which could respectively be improved, as they are 
potential sources of conflicts and risks in the compensation processes.  
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4.3 Classification of compensation stakeholders in Tanzania 
Both the DFID (2003) and Gawler (2005) consider the stakeholder importance or interests in 
and influences over development or compensation processes quite useful in classifying and 
determining levels of interaction among key stakeholders. Stakeholder classification was 
therefore considered important in this study as a method of identifying relationships, tensions 
and associated potential risks between stakeholders, and which, can be used to determine 
possibilities of stakeholder engagement in the Coasian or non-Coasian bargaining framework 
during compensation schemes. Moreover, further analysis of the above-mentioned 
possibilities can prompt identification of gaps and suggestions of their adjustments at both the 
compensation process and policy levels. 
 
The stakeholder classification was carried out based on the information collected during the 
questionnaire surveys that involved the project developers and service providers. Prior to 
classification of stakeholders, information from the afore-mentioned surveys were also used 
to confirm compensation stakeholders from a list of potential stakeholders suggested during 
the exploratory visits (section 4.2). Information on stakeholder ‘importance or interest’ and 
‘influence power’ were analysed as explained in section 3.5.2(ii) and presented in Appendix 
4.1. The allocated relative weights were finally put into a classification matrix which was 
firstly developed by Lindenberg and Crosby (1981), used and developed further by Eden and 
Ackerman (1998) and more recently applied in natural resource management by (Reed et al., 
2009). Stakeholders were grouped into four main groups as shown in Figure 4.2 and 
discussed below. 
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Affected parties/host 
communities Village Government Authority
Ward Government Authority Project developers
Consultants
National Environment 
Management Council
District Government Authority
Chief Government Valuer
Civil Society Organisations
Contractors
Influence
In
te
re
st
 
Figure 4.2: Classification matrix of stakeholder interests in and influence over compensation 
systems in Tanzania 
 
4.3.1: Key players  
This is a group of high or very importance in and high or very high influence on 
compensation matters, which included project developers, National Environment 
Management Council, District government authorities and consultants. 
 
i) Project developers 
In the Tanzanian context, project developers are predominantly government departments and 
foreign private companies. Interests of project developers were identified as a desire to 
maximise benefits and avoidance of liabilities during operation. Appendix 4.1 shows that 
project developers have very high interest (weight=4) and, also command a relatively very 
high level of influence (weight=4) in development or compensation issues in Tanzania. Both 
their importance and influence were associated with their financial capability and their 
experience in running development activities. Exploratory interviews and discussions pointed 
out that project developers have high power of influence because they are supported and 
favoured by the new policy-legal frameworks in Tanzania. This was clearly demonstrated by 
the major reforms of policy and legal frameworks between 1990 and 2005 to create 
‘attractive environment for investments’ which included ‘free’ land and tax exemption. 
Subject 
Crowd 
Key player 
Context setter 
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Parallel to those reforms, the government also established the Investment Promotion Centre 
(currently known as Tanzania Investment Centre) to promote and attract more investments 
through providing potential developers with relevant information (URT, 2008b).  
 
ii) National environment management council 
The National Environment Management Council is a Tanzanian based national 
environmental agency established by the Parliamentary Act No. 19 of 1983. National 
Environment Management Council is charged with responsibilities of enforcing the 
Environmental Management Act No. 20 of 2004 to safeguard the environment, health and 
lives of people against environmental disruptions that may result from both human and 
project activities. The above environmental legislation requires National Environment 
Management Council to promote sound environmental management practices in the country 
through institutionalisation of the environmental impact assessment. According to NEMC 
(1997) and NEMC (2004), if compensation has been recommended as one of the mitigation 
measures during the reviews of environmental impact assessment, a proponent is required to 
undertake social impact assessment. Burdge and Vanclay (1996) found social impact 
assessment an effective tool for collection of baseline information needed for planning, 
implementation and monitoring processes of development projects and compensation 
schemes that involve massive relocation of people. 
 
Interests of the National Environment Management Council included the protection of public 
welfare and promotion of sustainability. Both the importance and influence of National 
Environment Management Council were gauged very high (weight=4). Interests and roles 
National Environment Management Council were found to be central to goals of 
development projects and compensation schemes. In this case, National Environment 
Management Council is a watchdog and custodian of people’s livelihoods and environment. 
On the other hand, the Environmental Management Act No. 20 of 2004 gives National 
Environment Management Council legal powers to deal with development projects in relation 
to environment. Environmental regulations state that when compensation is found to be 
inevitable, it should be done in accordance with the Environmental Management Act No.20 
of 2004, Land Acquisition Act No.43 of 1967, Land Act No.4 of 1999 and the Village Land 
Act No.5 of 1999 (URT, 2005e). Therefore, National Environment Management Council 
shares legal powers with the Ministry of Lands to ensure compensation disputes are settled 
before the developer acquires environmental clearance certificate, land and other licences. 
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Possibilities of minimising compensation disputes exist within this set-up of issuance of 
environmental certificate and other important permits and licences. National Environment 
Management Council is a potential collaborator (actor) in dealing with compensation 
influenced by development projects.  
 
In order to fulfil these obligations, National Environment Management Council should ensure 
effective enforcement of environmental law including institutionalisation of environmental 
impact assessment. However, levels of enforcement and support mechanisms remain as 
critical issues for National Environment Management Council’s achievements in promoting 
sustainable development. Operations of National Environment Management Council are 
limited by a number of factors including that of having no offices located near the rural areas 
where big investments target. National Environment Management Council’s operations could 
have been more effective if it was operating from the district5 level. Alternatively, National 
Environment Management Council could have decentralised its operations through opening 
offices in all five (5) zones if the district offices are costly to run. 
 
iii) District authorities 
The Office of District Commissioner oversees both the plans and preparations for the 
implementation of a compensation scheme and pass recommendations to the Chief 
Government Valuer for final approval. In addition, the District Commissioner’s Office has a 
responsibility of ensuring that the affected parties are involved in the process of determining 
their compensation payments and all laws and regulation are adhered to (personal 
communication with the District Commissioners of Mkuranga and Kilombero districts, June 
2006). District Commissioner’s importance and influence over compensation matters were 
ranked very high (weight=4) and high (weight=3) respectively. District Commissioner’s 
power of influence over compensation matters at the grassroots level is provided by Land 
Acquisition Act No. 43 of 1967. District Commissioners operate down to the grassroots 
through the Ward and Village Executive Officers.  
 
iv) Consultants 
This group represent a range of experts that provide specialist services, especially technical 
assistance. Their expertises are available for hire as freelance consultants or consulting firms 
                                                 
5 Total numbers of districts in Tanzania mainland and Zanzibar currently stand at 117 and 10 respectively. 
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and are usually hired by developers or regulators. They are responsible for providing both 
scientific and technical advice with respect to the proposal at hand. Normally, these are the 
first people to interact with the host communities when undertaking feasibility studies or 
searching appropriate areas for the project. In regard to compensation, consultants are 
responsible for carrying out baseline surveys, valuations (as private valuers), dispute 
mediation, monitoring and other assignments of similar nature. Their importance in and 
influence over the processes of development and compensation in Tanzania were both 
weighted high (weight=3). 
 
Information asymmetry is an issue of great concern if compensation has to be sorted out 
through the Coasean bargain framework. The affected parties and host communities in rural 
areas are always on information disadvantage compared to the developer’s side. The affected 
parties and host communities need a special attention through empowerment and facilitation 
during negotiation processes. The exploratory interviews and discussions held with different 
officials indicated that consultants affect information exchange between developers and 
affected parties and host communities, unintentionally and sometimes intentionally. 
Unintentional impairment of information exchange happens when consultants lack expertise 
required to deal with the nature of challenges faced in the field such as cultural aspects, 
mistrust, elitism, conflicting resource rights and so many others. An intentional disruption of 
communication is associated with personal interests the consultants may have. Kunreuther 
and Easterling (1996) found both qualifications and experience of consultants in relation to a 
project proposal to be very important aspects for establishment good rapport and relationships 
with host communities. 
 
Service providers reported a similar problem that it has become common during 
compensation processes to have a number of agents, often members of the elite groups acting 
as intermediaries between developers and affecting parties and host communities. 
Apparently, such de facto experts6 are not formally recruited by project developers, 
consulting firms or the affected parties and host communities. They often operate informally 
for their own short term monetary benefits. In such a situation, they deliberately distort 
                                                 
6 This is a group of opportunists (commonly known as “vishoka” in Swahili) who know well the weaknesses of 
all stakeholders including the government and capitalise to make money out on every weak point identified in 
the compensation process. Some of them happened to work with the government machinery in the past. 
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information, bring confusion and put affected parties and host communities at great risks of 
losing (part of) their compensation payments. 
 
4.3.2: Subjects 
This group comprises of stakeholders with high or very high importance but low or very low 
influence on compensation matters. Figure 4.2 shows stakeholders falling under this category 
are the affected parties and host communities, Village and Ward government authorities and 
all directly associated with people at local levels. High interests of these stakeholders show 
their importance in compensation scheme is high as well. However, this group is a 
marginalised one with the least power of influence over the compensation matters in 
Tanzania. 
 
i) Affected parties and host communities 
An affected party refers to the affected individuals and households whereas an affected host 
community refers to all members of the community in relation to losses incurred as a 
community. The affected parties are potential hosts of the proposed projects and are directly 
affected by development projects as they lose use rights of land, other stocks of assets and 
flows of services. Larger lands targeted by big development projects are found in rural areas 
where most of these lands are occupied and used by either individual community members 
(households) or by communities as a common resource under customary land rights. In terms 
of security and entitlements to compensation, the land legislation recognises both the 
recorded and unrecorded customary land rights as equal as granted land rights of occupancy 
(URT, 1999b). Section 4.4.1(ii) discusses more land tenure issues. In this case however, the 
affected parties and host communities are potentially important stakeholders as they do have 
occupancy and use rights connected to land and other natural resources around. Further to 
that they have knowledge of their local environment that can be tapped and used by the 
project or incorporated into baseline data. The affected parties also include other groups of 
individuals such as land or property occupants who directly or indirectly suffer from changes 
in assets, flows of services, incomes and expenditures. These affected parties are currently 
considered by the legislation to have no right to compensation. However, the World Bank 
funded development projects have also compensated property occupants for transport costs 
and disturbance involved during relocation. 
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The affected parties and host communities showed an interest in socio-economic 
development and maintenance of people’s livelihoods. They also indicated expectations of 
socio-economic development, employment, compensation payments and other supports they 
may have from development projects. Based on their principal roles and interests, the 
importance of affected parties and host communities was weighed very high (weight=4). 
Many respondents in service providers’ survey indicated that if customary rights of land 
occupancy of the affected parties and host communities are adequately enforced using the 
current legislation (Section 2.5.4.1), this would impact on the compensation processes 
positively. It would influence change of their attitude, improve relationships, build trust and 
subsequently reduce compensation disputes. 
 
Despite the fact that affected parties and host communities have potentials to provide basic 
resource inputs required by development projects, such as land, other natural resources, 
labour and security to project activities, this group of stakeholders was gauged with a very 
low level of influence (weight=1). Experiences from many projects in Tanzania as observed 
by, Mwalyosi and Hughes (1998), Hernandez (2003), Mwalyosi (2004), Kideghesho and 
Mtoni (2008a), like elsewhere worldwide, WB (1993), Muntemba (1996), Gawler (2005), 
Mathur (2008) and Pearce and Swanson (2008) show that host communities are less 
empowered and marginalised compared to other stakeholders. They often lack relevant 
information, strong leadership and the majority are poor people. Furthermore, the affected 
parties and host communities lack recognition and capacity to participate on an equal basis 
with other stakeholders. Special efforts are required to ensure that their involvement grows 
beyond the consultative and collaborative processes currently being practised by many actors. 
Söderbaum (2009) recommended the search for paths towards sustainable development 
which should open more dialogue among all stakeholders to participate actively while 
emphasising respect and consideration of all contributions. 
 
In making sure that compensation goal is attained, the affected parties and host communities 
need empowerment. Special efforts are required to enhance their participation through 
training and information giving. Local people should also mobilise themselves to establish 
their own simple information centres (mini libraries) with both old and up-to-date 
information. These would provide the rural community members with various news and 
relevant information such as agriculture, natural resources and development, to mention few. 
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ii) Village government authority 
The Village authority is led by the Village Chairman as an elected leader and Village 
Executive Officer a recruited leader. Both leaders have been involved in compensation 
processes at the grassroots level in different ways. Project developers depend on their help 
and support in organising meetings, identification and verification of the affected parties. 
Some project proponents involve them in the coordination of valuation exercise in the field 
(identification of farm owners and boundaries) and other projects have been co-opting them 
in the dispute resolution teams. 
 
The interests of village government authority were found to focus on increase of budget for 
the improvements of different services such as education, health, water, roads and market 
infrastructures. The Village authority’s importance was reported to be very high (weight=4), 
but their power to influence many decisions including those made during compensation 
processes was scaled low (weight=2). Exploratory interviews held with service providers 
revealed that sometimes leaders at village level implement directives from their respective 
higher authorities regardless of the consequences likely to happen. When implementation 
involves giving away village lands to developers it has negative implications on people’s 
production systems, as land is critical asset to rural livelihoods. This is normally a precursor 
to negative attitudes and sentiments with the project. Under such a situation, never expect to 
have a compensation scheme free from disputes.  
 
iii) Ward government authority 
Ward level government authority is made up by the Ward Councillor as an elected leader and 
the Ward Executive Officer as recruited leader. Although their roles were found to be similar 
to those of the Village leaders, the Ward leaders and the Ward Councillor in particular plays 
great role of linking the grassroots and the District authorities. On behalf of the District 
authorities, the Councillor oversees the implementation of compensation scheme. The 
importance in and influence over compensation matters by the Ward authority were ranked as 
very high (weight=4) and low (weight=2) respectively. 
 
4.3.3: Context setters 
This is the group of low to very low importance in and high to very high influence over 
compensation matters. The chief government valuer was the only stakeholder classified under 
this group. The chief government valuer represents the ministry responsible for land and 
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compensation matters in Tanzania, and is the overall overseer of the compensation processes 
in Tanzania. The chief government valuer was reported to have low importance in (weight=2) 
but strong influence (weight=4) on the process of compensation. Interests of the chief 
government valuer included promoting investments, enforcement of land legislation and 
resolution of land and compensation disputes. The mechanism of dispute resolution is a very 
important component of any compensation scheme or process, especially when it is designed 
to operate on site in order to avoid costly litigation processes. Somehow the classification 
results (Figure 4.2) look strange, as the chief government valuer, the overall in-charge of 
compensation matters in the country appears to be not a key player because of low interests. 
Perhaps, the views collected during exploratory interviews held with different stakeholders 
can provide insights to why the chief government valuer was classified with low interest. 
 
It was indicated that the chief government valuer operates very far from the project sites and 
therefore coordination of compensation matters depends largely on feedback from either the 
district actors and project developers or their representatives, usually consultants. According 
to many respondents, this mode of operation was viewed inadequate as it gives loopholes for 
the elites to get into (and even dominate) the compensation processes and deliberately impair 
communication between project developer, authorities and affected parties for their own 
interests. This was confirmed by respondents as a major source of compensation disputes.  
 
Apart from having great interests and strong influence, the overall overseer of the 
compensation process is also required to operate from or very close the project site especially 
when compensation processes are continuing. Alternatively, there is need to establish strong 
link with District-based authorities in order to improve coordination performance of 
compensation systems. This would involve empowering district authorities in terms of 
capacity and other resources. 
 
4.3.4: Crowd 
This is a group of stakeholders with very low or low importance in and very low or low 
influence on development and compensation processes. Two stakeholders (i.e. contractors 
and civil society organisation) were classified under this group. 
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i) Contractors 
In the context of development and compensation, a contractor is a person or organisation that 
is commissioned by the developer to carry out tasks or supply the goods and materials 
required. Contractors have also been involved in compensation schemes. For example, when 
compensation includes in-kind payments to the affected parties and host communities, 
contractors carry out some tasks or activities. Although their service is not required 
throughout the process, it remains critically important in making compensation schemes 
successful. Their interests were identified as profit maximisation through accomplishing tasks 
within time limits. Their importance in and level of influence over development and 
compensation matters were both gauged low (weight=2). From the generic point of view, 
stakeholders in this group (crowd) appear to pose less risk to the processes of development 
and compensation. However, other service providers indicated that monitoring of contractors’ 
actions, work performance and quality of their workmanship is necessary, as many contracts 
have turned into sources of disputes. 
 
ii) Civil society organisations 
Civil society organisations include the non government organisations, community based 
organisations, religious and activist or pressure groups. The exploratory interviews and 
discussions and, the surveys that involved project developers and service providers indicated 
that the civil society organisations can in particular help to sensitise the disadvantaged people 
on the wake of their rights. More importantly the civil society organisations can help to 
mediate compensation disputes in a way that reduces the higher transaction costs that are 
incurred if case complaints are taken to courts of law. Appendix 4.1 shows that both the 
importance in and influence over development and compensation processes of the civil 
society organisations were weighted low (weight=2). 
 
Respondents of the surveys showed that the civil society organisations in Tanzania are still 
new movements to the majority and need guidance to ensure their growth towards benefiting 
the communities. Likewise, the majority of officials and experts involved in the exploratory 
interviews and discussions doubted the capability and keen interests of civil society 
organisations in helping rural communities to deal with life challenges, as most of the civil 
society organisations were urban-based, elite-owned and donor-dependant. Similarly, Shivji 
(2004) found that the civil society organisations in Tanzania, the non-governmental 
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organisations in particular are not responding to public interests because are donor-driven, 
typically top-down, not membership-based and are mainly accountable to small groups of 
elites.  
 
However, in the area of development and compensation in developing nations, a lot of niches 
exist for the civil society organisations. What is needed is for the civil society organisations 
to reform their organisational set-ups, make them more constituency or community-based and 
engage in defending public or people’s interests. For example, the civil society organisations 
can help in preparing, sensitizing, mobilizing and engaging the affected parties into 
participation and negotiating processes for better ways of having the project in their areas and 
how to benefit from compensation schemes. The community-based civil society organisations 
that know well their communities stand a better chance of becoming good mediators in case 
of disputes of any nature. It was noted that few good examples of people-centred civil society 
organisations such as Lawyers Environmental Action Team exist and show great potential of 
assuming worthwhile roles in development and compensation processes in the country (Box 
4.1). 
 
4.3.5: Other stakeholders 
A number of project developers and service providers who responded to the questionnaire 
surveys identified the World Bank and media as stakeholders of development and 
compensation processes in Tanzania. Interviews and discussions with officials of visited 
projects (listed in Appendix 4.2) showed that as well as being a financier, the World Bank has 
been providing environmental safeguard and compensation guidelines. Respondents regarded 
the media as a pressure group and a very important stakeholder that facilitates transparency 
through disclosing hidden interests and plans of other stakeholders. 
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4.4 Perceptions of stakeholders on compensation systems in Tanzania 
Perceptions of project developers and service providers provided the base for evaluating 
various aspects of compensation schemes in regard to policy, planning, valuation, forms or 
types, implementation and monitoring as currently practised in Tanzania. 
Box 4.1: Lawyers Environmental Action Team (LEAT) 
 
LEAT is a civil society organisation registered in 1994 to carry out policy research, advocacy, and selected 
public interest litigation. Its member attorneys (lawyers) are concerned with environmental sustainability and 
democratic governance in Tanzania. The team works with the foresight that “change is a slow and agonizing 
process and that patience and persistence eventually prevails”. With less than perfect working conditions and 
meagre financial resources, LEAT has managed to accomplish many in a decade time. LEAT has actively been 
involved in demanding for legal rights of forcibly evicted small-scale miners and several rural community 
members in Geita, Kahama, Tarime and Nzega districts. In some of these cases, many were relocated without 
compensation and few were paid little compensation. LEAT has been facilitating reconciliation through 
mediation process between the conflicting parties in a very cost-effective way. For example, up to June 2006, 
LEAT had mediated 18 land, resource and compensation related disputes and also resolved 5 disputes of the 
same nature through court litigation. Its lawyers have been focusing not only on resolving conflicts but also on 
making sure parties build partnership for the sake of promoting safety, security and sustainability in their 
community.  
 
Key roles played by LEAT include: litigates public interest suits; advocates local or indigenous people's rights 
to their natural resources, fair compensation and other human rights; creates environmental awareness through 
outreach programs and education to sensitize people on their legal environmental rights; helps into formulation 
of new environmentally linked policies and laws such as Land Act No.4 of 1999, Village Land Act No.5 of 
1999, Environmental Management Act No. 20 of 2004 and their respective regulations and; collaborates with 
lawyers, human right activists, journalists, scientists, researchers, teachers, volunteers, and whoever with a deep 
environmental concern to fight problems of environmental injustice, abuse of human rights, and destruction of 
natural resources. 
 
It was interesting to note that nearly all LEAT staff mentioned boldly that their successes come from carefully 
researched information. There was also an indication that constant pressure LEAT has been exerting on the 
government in different court cases has challenged the government to enact policy-legal research units in two 
principal ministries that had none before. Recently (in early 2000s) the government established a division of 
policy planning and research to improve performance in the ministry responsible for external and foreign affairs 
and, judiciary, union and constitution affairs. LEAT has the following future plans and strategies in increasing 
their highly demanded services all over the country and also cutting down operation costs: 
(i) Open regional offices to take their services close to the resource-disadvantaged people such as the 
communities affected by conservation and mining projects. 
(ii) Recruit more lawyers through providing places for both internship and externship to fresh 
graduates with the aim of sensitizing them on human rights issues. 
(iii) Promotion of policy planning and research within sectors in order to increase level of people-
centred planning within the government machinery. 
 
LEAT’s way of operation and its future plans give constructive ideas potential for improving compensation 
process in Tanzania, especially in resolving disputes in a cost-effective manner and dealing with social 
problems in a proactive way (importance of research on policy matters). It was however, noted that LEAT was 
operating in one major threat of losing professional credibility as some of its staff are gradually staging on 
political arena. This has potential risks of turning whatever good professional advice into incredible useless 
political debates. 
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4.4.1: Perceptions on policy-legal matters of compensation in Tanzania 
While through policy formulation a problem is analysed, strategies are set, resources are 
mobilised and overall guidance of policy implementation is designed, the legislation is used 
to sanction and regulate the practices of different actors in the entire process. Therefore, 
policy and legal statements are equally important in shaping and influencing different aspects 
of both the development and compensation regimes. Despite the inconsistencies and 
overlapping mandates policy and legal frameworks have in Tanzania, the respondents 
identified three major inadequacies in regard to compensation as follows: 
 
i) Emphasis on compensation matters 
Service providers expressed their concern that the recent policy reforms that took place in 
1995 – 2005 promoted investments but did not provide a clear framework (guidance) for 
addressing compensation issues in relation to development activities. It was noted that the 
reviewed sectoral policies (listed in Appendix 4.3) require development projects to undertake 
environmental impact assessment. This was a commendable effort towards sustainable 
development by the government. The Reviews however, showed that only the Land, Mining 
and Forestry sectors mention compensation as a policy issue that need attention. Considering 
the fact7 that every three out of the approved five development projects resettle people and 
their activities, the above omission was viewed as a big challenge to sustainable development 
in the country, as far as the importance of policy is concerned.  
 
Currently, the World Bank has been trying to bridge this policy gap by requesting all 
implementers of projects funded by the World Bank to prepare ‘resettlement and 
compensation policy framework documents’ well in advance before the project starts. Efforts 
by the World Bank have demonstrated the importance of having sectoral policies addressing 
and guiding resettlement and compensation matters worldwide (Van Wicklin, 1998). For 
instance, it was revealed that most of the compensation schemes prepared and implemented 
under the World Bank directives provide comprehensive compensation to the affected parties 
compared to those prepared under national or government based policies. A number of 
project officials interviewed during exploratory visits pointed out two major differences that 
exist between the above-mentioned two compensation schemes as (i) approaches used (i.e. 
                                                 
7 Personal communication with the Acting Director General of Environmental Agency (National Environment 
Management Council, May 2006. 
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involvement of affected parties and communities) and, (ii) the bases for determination of 
compensation eligibility and entitlements. These differences confuse the affected parties as 
they do not know which compensation system is supported by government regulations. 
Therefore, common approach and guided practices in compensation are needed for fair and 
equitable distribution of benefits and costs among the gainers and losers. Thus the guiding 
principles which are essentially rules that ensure important aspects of the process such as 
participation of key stakeholders, transparency in the process, negotiations and cost-
effectiveness would help to guide both the planning and implementation of compensation 
schemes. 
 
Theoretically, there is a maximum payment from the developer’s view and there is a 
minimum receipt from the affected party’s view. In other words developers want to pay as 
minimum as possible and the affected parties want to receive as maximum as possible. This 
shows the need for the two sides to engage in negotiations. Section 2.5.4.1 indicates that the 
framework for negotiation is legally defined by the regulations to implement the Village 
Land Act, 1999. But there are problems associated with uncertainties of benefits and costs 
that affect equitable distribution, biased power relations that affect involvement of key 
stakeholders, affected parties and host communities in particular and lack of well defined 
entitlements that affect both performance and efficiency of an entire compensation scheme. 
In view of maximisation of overall welfare, the criteria such as equity, sustainability, cost-
effectiveness, administrative and political acceptability as presented in the conceptual 
framework (Figure 2.9) would help in assessing efficiency and performance of the 
compensation arrangements. 
 
It should be noted that compensation is a livelihood issue and linked to sustainability of many 
aspects. Policy statement is therefore very important, as it gives information about the 
problem and how to go through in resolving it and sometimes in a proactive way. Moreover, 
policy statement appears in a plain language that many ordinary people can easily understand. 
As the policy environments in many developing countries have been acting in favour of 
development projects for decades, it is therefore equally important to safeguard interests of 
local communities including compensation matters using policy-legal frameworks.  
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ii) Security of tenure 
According to URT (1999a & 1999b), land and land-based compensation issues in mainland 
Tanzania are regulated by Land Acts8 (Nos. 4 & 5 of 1999) and Land Acquisition Act No.43 
of 1967 (Section 2.5.4). Land in Tanzania is classified into three categories namely ‘general 
lands’ (under the State), ‘village lands’ (under village authorities) and, ‘reserved lands’ 
(under forestry and wildlife protection authorities). Economic activities are only allowed on 
general and village lands (URT, 1999a & 1999b). However, the Land legislation states all 
lands in Tanzania is public and remain vested in the Head of State (President) as trustee for 
and behalf of the citizens of Tanzania (Ibid.) and therefore any land can be compulsorily 
acquired by the government (government influence) for public interests. 
 
Clearly defined property rights are one of the pre-requisites for applicability of Coase 
theorem and determination of compensation eligibility and entitlements. Views and 
perceptions from exploratory interviews and discussions were used together with documented 
information to determine whether property rights in Tanzania are clearly defined. Four 
conditions for efficient resource allocation by Tietenberg’s (1996) outlined in Section 2.2.3 
were used to check whether property rights are clear or not and results are presented in Table 
4.2 below. 
 
Table 4.2: General characteristics of property rights in Tanzania  
Tietenberg’s 
(1996) criteria 
Assessment results 
Characteristics Level of achievement 
 
 
 
Universality 
• The State own all lands in Tanzania 
• The village government own all village lands 
• Most of the villagers possess occupancy and use lands through 
customary rights. 
• Costs and benefits in relation to customary land rights are not 
completely specified 
 
 
LOW 
 
Exclusivity 
• Lands are used exclusively by households through customary 
rights 
• In rural areas some lands are commonly used 
 
LOW 
Transferability • Transferability of the known rights of use is possible MODERATE 
 
 
Enforceability 
• According to Land legislation customary and statutory land 
rights of occupancy are equal in terms of security and 
entitlements to compensation. 
• Boundaries separating village lands from general lands, 
protected lands and lands owned by other villages are not 
clearly defined. 
 
 
LOW 
 
                                                 
8 Land Act No.4 , 1999 and Village Land Act No.5, 1999 
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The land legislation states that both the customary (recorded and unrecorded) and granted 
rights of occupancy are equal in terms of security and entitlements to compensation (URT, 
1999b). However, the project developers’ and service providers’ surveys identified customary 
land users face land insecurity problems associated with physical boundaries and unclear type 
of land ownership (Table 4.2). Lack of clearly defined physical land boundaries between a 
village and other villages; and general lands; and protected areas was also perceived, 
contributing to insecurity of customary land rights in Tanzania. This has caused a number of 
land boundary crises between villages (Shivji, 1998; Mtoni, 1999) and between villages and 
conservation authorities (Kideghesho and Mtoni, 2008a). The Village Land Act, 1999 
requires all lands under customary use rights to be recorded in the special village land 
register. This exercise however has been delayed because of the above-mentioned boundary 
problems. If boundaries are clearly established would at least allow customary land users to 
be registered and therefore enhancement of tenure security and, perhaps this would facilitate 
the customary entitlements become specified and visible. In short, lack of village land use 
plans and delays in registration of customary land rights have jointly caused difficulties in the 
determination of compensation entitlements of the affected parties in rural areas. This is one 
of the major compensation problems in Tanzania as it causes many to lose access to land 
without or with little compensation. 
 
Ownership ambiguity over the village lands created by the current legislation makes 
villagers’ land insecure. The land legislation states that Village lands are owned by the 
Village authorities and all lands in Tanzania including village lands are owned by the State. 
According to respondents it has been easier for the government to alienate lands under 
customary rights than those used through granted rights of occupancy. The process of 
revoking a title deed is a complicated process in which its authorisation involves the 
Commissioner for Lands, Minister responsible for Lands and finally the Head of State. 
Unlike granted rights of occupancy, a group of affected customary users can easily lose their 
rights of using the land through actions by ordinary land officials so long as they get an 
approval of the Commissioner for Lands. In this regard even recorded customary land users 
are less secure compared with granted rights of occupancy, as rural people can be particularly 
affected by compulsory acquisition orders due to low levels of awareness and understanding 
of their legal rights. 
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iii) Common resources 
Many and different common resources such as grazing lands, natural forests and water 
sources exist in rural areas. Both access to and uses of common resources have great 
contribution to rural people’s livelihoods. But neither policies nor legislation state whether 
losses in relation to common resources used through customary rights should be recognised 
and compensated for their losses. Only one project (Table 4.3) was reported to have special 
arrangements in place for compensating the host communities for the losses of both access to 
and use rights of common resources through ‘benefit sharing schemes’. Through the same 
arrangements the project developer and community members jointly conserve and develop 
further the remaining common resources for the benefits of both the present and future 
generations. These initiatives go beyond the current policy and legal requirements in relation 
to compensation in Tanzania. 
 
4.4.2: Perceptions on compensation process in Tanzania 
This section presents the views on the process of compensation schemes in Tanzania as 
reported and discussed by different stakeholders. Aspects of administration, planning, 
valuation, types (forms) of compensation, implementation and monitoring are discussed with 
a view of suggesting possible ways of improving compensation practices. Table 4.3 shows 
the number of projects visited and their involvement in various aspects of compensation. 
 
Table 4.3: Involvement of project developers in various compensation aspects revealed 
during interviews with project officials 
 
Selected aspects of compensation process 
Responses from project 
respondents (N=13) 
(multiple responses applied) 
Count Percent (%) 
Projects with documented plan of compensation scheme 5 39 
Projects that had their own dispute resolution systems 6 46 
Projects had compensation disputes settled in the court of law 4 31 
Projects offered training/advisory services to affected parties before payments 1 8 
Projects paid monetary compensation 13 100 
Projects paid through bank/cheque system 7 54 
Projects paid compensation through instalments 3 20 
Projects paid compensation within 6 months after valuation 7 54 
Projects paid full or part of compensation as in-kind payments 1 8 
Projects happened to provide in-kind supports to host communities  13 100 
Project practicing “benefit sharing schemes” 1 8 
Project with programme for compensation scheme monitoring  1 8 
(Source: Exploratory visits, 2006) 
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i) Administration of compensation process 
According to the Village Land Regulations of 2001, the current process of compensation in 
Tanzania formally starts by the claimant assisted by an authorised officer (normally district 
land officer) to initiate compensation claim using special forms. A claim for compensation 
has to be submitted to the Chief Government Valuer positioned within the Ministry of Lands 
for verification. The Chief Government Valuer is also responsible for ensuring the 
compensation process is done according to laws and regulations. A compensation claim has 
to be endorsed by the Commissioner for Lands and finally be approved by the Minister 
responsible for Lands. In case of disagreement on the compensation claim, the Minister 
would appoint a person to act as a mediator. Where mediation fails to assist parties reach an 
agreement or where parties or one of them is unwilling to refer the compensation claim to a 
mediator, the claim shall be referred to a Court of Law. 
 
The most obvious shortcoming of the above-mentioned set-up is perhaps the decision 
making-process that is centralised at the national level and completely detached from the 
local stakeholders who initiated the process (claim). The distance and gap of communication 
(feedbacks) between the district and national levels create loopholes for elites to pursue their 
interests including corruption and other misconducts. For example, URT (2002) reports on 
the affected farmers’ complaints in Iringa region about the way their compensation claims 
were handled, as no information of any sort was provided to them during the process. During 
the surveys, both the project developers and service providers reported that an increase of 
compensation disputes was largely contributed by lack of information, participation, 
transparency and clarity in the process (Table 4.4). All these factors lead into asymmetry of 
information where most of the relevant information is known to the developer’s side unlike to 
the other affected side. This causes inefficiency in decisions and outcomes of whatever 
market transactions including Coasian bargaining for compensation. According to Dixit and 
Olson (2000), information asymmetry creates transaction imbalance of power which can 
sometimes cause skewed decisions that are costly. 
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Table 4.4: Potential sources of compensation disputes in Tanzania as perceived by project 
developers and service providers 
 
Sources/Factors 
Number of respondents and scores  
(N=62) 
Total 
Score 
(TS) 1st Rank 2nd Rank 3rd Rank 
Count Score* Count Score* Count Score* 
Lack of participation, information, 
transparency and feedbacks 
26 78 18 36 12 12 126 
Lack of clear property rights and clear 
entitlement to assets and compensation 
7 21 21 42 12 12 75 
Unnecessary bureaucracy 10 30 7 14 21 21 65 
Lack of clear compensation procedures 
and guidelines 
13 39 6 12 8 8 59 
High expectations and unjustifiable claims 
from the affected parties  
6 18 10 20 9 9 47 
Source: PDs’ and SPs’ Surveys, 2007 
Legend:  Weight allocated: (1st Rank = 3); (2nd Rank = 2); and (3rd Rank = 1). 
*Score = Number of respondents (Counts) times weight allocated to each rank. 
 
The discussions with service providers during exploratory visits, generally, concluded that 
compensation process in Tanzania is inconsistent, as project developers approach it 
differently. For example, many respondents explained that the above-mentioned 
inconsistency is manifested in many forms including a project can treat affected people from 
one community differently while their losses are almost of similar nature. Moreover, a project 
can administer compensation scheme differently in different communities. One consultant 
claimed to have learned a big lesson from compensation experience that “compensation laws 
and regulations in Tanzania can change over night simply because compensation means 
money”. Literally, the message he was putting across was that compensation practices do not 
follow laws and regulations because of both personal interests and conflicting interests 
among the actors. As discussed above (section 4.4.1), unclear property rights and 
compensation entitlements also contribute into laxity in enforcement of the existing 
compensation laws and regulations. These results are consistent to Sebenius’ et al. (2005), 
findings which revealed that relocation and compensation schemes in developing countries 
are carried out in tohu vavohu (a Hebrew term meaning “messy and disorganised”) for the 
same reasons. Consistency in using the principles and criteria set for the determination of 
compensation the affected parties and host communities deserve, creates a sense of fairness 
and legitimacy and according to Sebenius et al. (2005) is perhaps the most important part of 
the administration of compensation process. 
 
ii) Planning a compensation scheme 
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Planning guides both the implementation and monitoring of both projects and compensation 
schemes (ADBAfrica, 2003 and ADBAsia, 2007). To be able to pay adequate attention to several 
aspects like livelihoods of the affected parties and host communities, sustainability matters 
that may come out especially after compensation, early planning is necessary. Respondents 
reported a number of issues of concern regarding planning process including: 
 
Haphazard implementation of compensation schemes has been a big problem in development 
processes in developing nations. Interviews with service providers revealed that project 
developers contribute significantly to this problem, as majority of them view compensation 
scheme, as a liability and tend to look for whatever means of not paying or paying little 
compensation. These are projects that implement compensation without record keeping 
(documentation of both the compensation process and payments). For instance, out of 13 
projects visited during the exploratory visits, only five (39%) had complete resettlement and 
compensation policy documents and, these were all World Bank funded projects (Table 4.3). 
Although many development-based policies and legislation require the affected parties and 
other key stakeholders to be involved from the early stages of project planning, many 
developers carry out consultation with village and community leaders of potentially affected 
parties and host communities. This cannot influence decision-making processes as intended 
and such inadequacy in communication between decision makers and affected parties is one 
of the root-causes of compensation disputes and problems. Section 4.4.2(iii) discusses causes 
of lack of effective stakeholder participation. 
 
iii) Participation 
Active participation of key stakeholders in planning and designing of both the development 
projects and compensation schemes can enable stakeholders to express and safeguard their 
rights and interests (Zuindeau, 2006). Rawles (2002) argues that in order for a compensation 
process to have active involvement it has (i) to be open to the affected parties and host 
communities and consider their deliberations; (ii) to be guided by clear and reasonable 
criteria; (iii) to involve experts with critical roles to the process; (iv) to demonstrate validity 
of chains of reasoning involved and; (v) no prearranged outcomes. These participation 
principles are compared with perceptions of respondents and actuality as follows: 
 
Table 4.5 shows that project developers who tried to involve other stakeholders, their 
planning processes had a number of inadequacies as pointed out by the service providers. For 
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example, the majority respondents (71%) involved in the service providers’ survey indicated 
that participation in compensation processes is always limited to experts and leaders at 
district and village levels (Table 4.5). Despite the fact that legislation, administrative 
procedures and development policies in Tanzania emphasize the involvement of key 
stakeholders, participation of the most important groups is the most neglected aspect. 
Mwalyosi and Hughes (1998) and Mwalyosi (2004) reported that very few development 
projects were found to involve the affected parties and communities during environmental 
impact assessment and compensation processes respectively. 
 
Table 4.5: Issues of concerns in relation to planning of compensation schemes as perceived 
by service providers 
Issue of concern (factors) Respondents (N=38) 
Count* (%)of what?  
Planning with leaders and experts only 27 71 
Lack of transparency and feedback to other stakeholders 25 66 
Late communication of information about the project 24 63 
Lack of baseline information 21 55 
Project officials and experts control levels of participation 18 47 
Late planning or late involvement of affected parties and host 
communities 
8 21 
Source: SPs’ Survey, 2007  * Multiple responses 
 
Earlier discussions in Sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 showed that such communication problems are 
likely to affect compensation processes, participation in particular. It would be difficult to 
apply Coasian bargain process in such a state of asymmetry of information, unless some 
measures are taken. Conditions or criteria should be set by stakeholders in order to control 
factors affecting communication during stakeholder involvement (Friedman and Miles, 
2006). Service providers reported lack of transparency and lack of feedback to key 
stakeholders (66%) and late communication (63%) were among the factors limiting 
participation (Table 4.5). It was however, revealed during exploratory discussions that these 
factors significantly affected information flow and was mainly caused by a tendency of some 
project officials and functional officers that tend to protect their interests through classifying 
relevant information as confidential.  
 
On the other hand, involvement of stakeholders often take place at discrete points involving 
few selected stages, very late or inputs from stakeholders not considered during decision-
making processes. Participation done in this way is meaningless and project developers 
practicing it are not getting the best of participation. For the compensation processes to 
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benefit more from participatory process, the affected parties and host communities should be 
involved from earlier stages of project design. This makes their participation in further stages 
including planning for compensation schemes easier and effective in influencing decision-
making processes (ADBAsia, 2007).  
 
The majority respondents (55%) also indicated that lack of baseline information caused by 
inadequate baseline studies affects compensation planning process and subsequent 
participation of stakeholders. Both project developers’ and service providers’ surveys 
indicated that difficulties exist in development and compensation systems in obtaining 
information about procedures, guidelines, checklists, fact sheets and other helpful data in 
Tanzania. Pallangyo (2007) also reported the same problem that project developers in 
Tanzania do not know exactly where to go for their information needs. It is however, 
important for all stakeholders, particularly service providers to cooperate in the collection and 
documentation of relevant findings into different forms in order to facilitate development and 
compensation processes. 
 
A special strategy is required to ensure that all stakeholders get relevant information they 
need in the right time. The strategy should deal with all factors affecting communication 
including those related to ignorance and culture in order to promote information flow among 
stakeholders. ADBAsia (2007) reported that Slovakia enacted Environmental Impact 
Assessment Act in 1994 which established consultative information centres to provide the 
public with more information about development, proposed projects and environment. 
Kunreuther and Easterling (1996) support the importance of especially helping the affected 
parties and host communities to acquire the right information about the proposal for them to 
have an active opportunity to discuss and contribute in the project design and plans. 
 
Exploratory interviews and discussions with different respondents showed that large numbers 
of experts who participate in the implementation of compensation schemes is an issue of 
great concern. However, as noted in the previous findings (Table 4.1 and Figure 4.2) and 
discussions in sections 4.2.2(ii) and 4.2.3(ii), experts are required to facilitate and guide 
participation of the affected parties and host communities. In order to minimise potential 
disputes in compensation processes, few experts only with critical roles have to participate. 
Negotiation process can be adopted and promoted as a strategy for dual purposes. First, 
negotiation tends to bring the matter or problem to the attention of only two disputing sides 
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(parties), as key players and thus it has potentials of reducing intrusion of elites attracted by 
their personal interests. Negotiation can also help to improve effectiveness of participation 
which is currently limited to information-giving and consultation. 
 
Large proportion (47%) of service providers mentioned that in most cases, project officials 
and experts use different means to control levels of participation such as selecting 
stakeholders to involve and not to involve or involve leaders. To ensure full stakeholder 
participation, stakeholders’ contributions have been considered during decision making 
process and in order to avoid pre-arranged outcomes, it was suggested that project developers 
demonstrate how the key stakeholders, affected parties and host communities in particular 
have been actively involved in the compensation process. This can be done by showing 
contributions or inputs from key stakeholders in all main decisions made. 
 
iv) Valuation 
Before compensation is paid, losses are identified, verified, assessed, quantified and given 
monetary values by experts during valuation. The estimated amount of compensation 
payment is not exactly equal to the quantified losses, as a number of factors are involved 
during valuation process (Adewale, 1989). Valuation for compensation for land, structures 
and crops in Tanzania is done according to the Land Act, 1999 and Village Land Act, 1999 
which advocate for a “full, fair and prompt compensation based on the market value” (URT, 
2001). The market value of the real property should be derived by sales comparison 
approach9, income approach or replacement cost approach where an asset is of special nature 
(Ibid.), such as farmland which is not easily saleable in rural areas. The adequacy of 
compensation could be achieved through the assessment of the affected assets and flows of 
services based on their current market prices and also considering a period to re-
establishment of the affected assets and services. This is suggested in the National Land 
Policy and given a legal effect by the Land Act, 1999 and Village Land Act, 1999. Valuation 
guidelines by development banks in both Africa and Asia support the use of market value of 
the real property (assets) arrived at by the use of either sales comparison approach, income 
approach or replacement approach (ADBAfrica, 2003 and ADBAsia, 2007).  
 
                                                 
9 Sales ccomparison approach is the valuation method that relies on market information to value assets (land in 
particular) on basis that a recent sale from a willing seller to a willing buyer of an asset (the comparable asset) 
can best reflect the value of a similar asset (the subject asset) in the vicinity (ADBAsia, 2007). 
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Despite the fact that the legislation in Tanzania recognise the importance of compensating 
community-based losses such as losses of communal grazing lands, forests and so many 
others, the study revealed that the practices recognise only individual losses. The results of 
the survey that involved the service providers show valuation stage of compensation faces 
substantial shortcomings caused by a number factors presented in Table 4.6. These factors 
can be grouped into two main categories namely, those factors leading to (i) undervaluation 
and, (ii) inconsistence. 
 
Table 4.6: Factors making valuation inappropriate and unjust as perceived by service 
providers in Tanzania 
 
Factors made valuation perceived inappropriate and unjust 
Respondents’ responses (N=38) 
(multiple responses applied) 
Count Percent (%) 
Assets undervalued (low rates applied) 33 87 
Some values/qualities of assets (e.g. profit loss) were not considered 31 82 
Land and annual crops were not valued 29 76 
Some assets were not counted accurately (estimation applied) 23 61 
(Source: SPs’ Survey, 2007) 
 
Undervaluation 
Undervaluation of assets during estimation of losses encountered by affected parties and host 
communities was perceived as the first big problem in Tanzania (87%) by service providers 
(Table 4.6). The causes behind undervaluation were identified as low rates of compensation 
and some values or qualities of some assets such as permanent crops are not considered. 
Perhaps, the outdated low rates of compensation are the leading cause of the widespread 
undervaluation problem in Tanzania. For example, in the case of agricultural crops, it was 
noted from the discussion held with the Chief Government Valuer in May 2006 that the crop 
valuation rates in most parts of the country were last updated in 1992. It was not clear as to 
why compensation rates were not reviewed frequently. 
 
Table 4.6 shows respondents also expressed undervaluation caused by not considering some 
values and qualities of some assets, permanent crops in particular (82%). For example, it was 
reported by service providers that valuation of trees and permanent crops are valuated like 
annual crops and their cumulative future values lost for their productive life are not taken into 
consideration. Moreover, respondents claimed that both ages and stages of permanent crops 
were rarely considered. Estimation of cumulative future values of permanent crops needs 
quality market data and computation involves rigorous iterations that may as of necessity use 
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of computer and special software. Learning from the past valuation practices in developing 
countries with developed countries such as United Kingdom and Italy, valuers in the former 
lack the necessary capacity to carry out valuation efficiently. Studies by ADBAfrica (2003); 
McDaniels and Trousdale (2005) and ADBAsia (2007) concluded that lack of dynamic 
research-based knowledge and techniques among valuers affect various valuation processes 
in developing countries. Therefore, enhancing valuation capacity of government valuers who 
in most cases carry out compensation valuations would improve their performance and 
capability to overcome valuation challenges using different approaches and methods. 
 
Inconsistence 
Inconsistence in compensation or valuation occurs when affected parties and their losses 
receive partial treatment from the same compensation scheme or when compensation laws, 
rules and criteria are applied differently by different compensation schemes (Sebenius et al., 
2005). Inconsistence in valuation was perceived by service providers as another major 
problem in Tanzania (76%). According to exploratory interviewees, inconsistent treatments 
of the affected parties happen due to negligence and incompetence and, according to service 
providers, inconsistence is mainly caused by dishonesty and manipulation. The former 
findings concur with Cernea’s (2008) findings from studying the World Bank projects in 
developing countries in which it was revealed that valuers and implementers deliberately 
manipulate valuation inventories and computation of compensation. This can be done in 
different ways by excluding tangible measurable assets and lowering their quantities and 
qualities. 
 
v) Implementation 
Implementation stage of the compensation process includes three main components, namely 
coordination, support mechanisms and compensation payments. The surveys that involved 
project developers and service providers as respondents revealed the following issues. 
 
Coordination 
Coordination of compensation scheme by government authorities includes responsibilities of 
overseeing all actions from the beginning to an end of the compensation process. 
Coordination performance of compensation schemes in Tanzania is so important, as it is done 
at two distant levels (i.e. national and grassroots levels). Interviews held with district, ward 
and village authorities indicated that uneven distribution of responsibilities in coordinating 
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compensation schemes exist in the current arrangement. The local authority officials at 
district level in particular felt they are currently doing a lot compared with the coordination 
done at national level while there is no financial allocation to cater for that purposes (Section 
4.3.3). District officials reported that some tasks such as verification of losses and 
compensation payments allocated to every affected party are not accomplished properly due 
to lack of funds and staff. In the discussions held with one of the District Commissioners it 
was indicated that coordination of compensation schemes in rural communities is extremely 
difficult and costly, as projects touch the only means of people’s livelihoods (i.e. land). 
Essentially, an issue of concern in coordination of compensation scheme was strongly linked 
to transaction costs. The first five leading factors in increasing transaction costs during 
compensation schemes in Tanzania are ranked and presented in Table 4.8 and almost all take 
place at grassroots level (Section 4.4.5). 
 
As suggested earlier (Section 4.3.3), there is need to empower local authorities in terms of 
capacity and financial resources for them to take responsibility of coordinating most of the 
activities and outcomes of compensation schemes. This should include providing local 
authorities with more sources of revenues, as most of the compensation activities take place 
at grassroots levels. Chambers’ (2009) opinion supports this idea when observes that if 
adequate financial sources at local level organisations are ensured, the overall coordination of 
various development matters are likely to experience lower administrative and procedural 
burdens and thus low operational costs. 
 
Support mechanisms 
Support mechanisms in regard to compensation scheme are well-defined systems or teams 
with procedures established to provide necessary services to affected parties such as resolving 
complaints or disputes, advisory services and so many others. 
 
Compensation schemes need to have clear mechanisms in place to handle potential disputes. 
Table 4.3 learned from exploratory interviews held with project officials that six projects out 
of 13 visited had dispute resolution teams and four projects settled compensation disputes in a 
court. However, discussions with service providers during exploratory visits indicated that 
compensation schemes lack the mechanism to handle and resolve disputes. The complainants 
have been normally advised to take their complaints either to the Village Government, Ward 
Executive Office, Police Forces or the District Court. All these channels including dispute 
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resolution team and special mediation have been emphasised by the law regulating 
compensation in Tanzania (URT, 1999b). However, project developers’ survey indicated that 
all respondents prefer compensation complaints or disputes be settled outside of court system, 
as normal litigation processes have proved to be time consuming, expensive and causing 
delays to the project schedules. Discussions held with service providers indicated that for one 
reason or another, a side that lose the court case usually end-up with unsatisfactory outcomes 
which in turn create ill feelings which lead to unpleasant relationship with the other side. This 
is contrary to the outcomes provided by either negotiation or mediation where in most cases 
mutual agreement is emphasised. If a compensation scheme is to create good relationships 
amongst stakeholders, its process should integrate a simple, accessible and transparent system 
for resolving disputes efficiently (Box 4.1). 
 
Some service providers mentioned about the importance of provision for training and 
advisory services before affected parties receive their compensation payments. This service 
was not a common arrangement, as only one out of the thirteen projects visited (Table 4.3) 
gave advice to the affected parties on how to keep, handle and spend their compensation 
money wisely. However, such a practice has potentials of promoting safety and security in 
the community when compensation involves cash payments, especially in rural areas where 
bank services are located far. 
 
Compensation payments 
Two main issues were raised as far as compensation payments are concerned. Table 4.3 
shows that only seven out of thirteen projects paid compensation in time (i.e. within 6 months 
after their valuations ended) and, three out of thirteen projects paid through instalments. The 
delayed payment was reported as a major source of unanticipated problems for the affected 
parties who had stopped farming their land once valuation was concluded. There is a feeling 
among the affected parties in particular that delayed payments and payments made in 
instalments are inappropriate especially given uncertain market conditions and high levels of 
inflation in developing economies. Such compensation payments fail to recover the original 
levels of loss. Referring to the willingness to accept compensation Regulations to implement 
Village Land Act, 1999 directs compensation to be paid within 6 months of valuation, 
otherwise the current bank interest rates should be applied (URT, 2001). Other developers 
face difficulties with their financiers that lead to disbursing compensation payments by 
instalments. This is contrary to Land Acquisition Act, 1967 which emphasizes that all amount 
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of compensation should be paid promptly and in full. With regard to problems associated 
with delayed and instalment payments of compensation, the laws safeguard interests of the 
affected parties, but the prescribed methods for making payments are not fully enforced (see 
section 4.4.3(ii)). Thus it is often the implementation of the existing legal framework that is 
lacking and leads to compensation failure. 
 
vi) Monitoring of compensation schemes 
An Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) system in Tanzania requires monitoring of 
socio-economic parameters including post-compensation outcomes to be carried out as an 
integral component of environmental monitoring programme of the entire project (NEMC, 
1997 and URT, 2005e). Despite the above-mentioned legal requirement for monitoring, it 
was learned from the documented information and different respondents including project 
developers and service providers that there has been little monitoring of compensation 
schemes in Tanzania. Table 4.3 indicates that only one project out of the thirteen projects 
visited during exploratory study had been monitoring post-compensation outcomes as part of 
its environmental monitoring. 
 
However, it is argued in this study that meaningful monitoring in relation to compensation 
schemes is the one that aims at avoiding undesired compensation outcomes from happening 
(choice of suitable measures). According to Sonnenberg and Münster (2001), monitoring 
should focus on the post-compensation era, as indicators of socio-cultural and sustainability 
aspects or parameters take months and years to be verified whether there is improvement or 
deterioration. Monitoring should therefore start with compensation processes and continue to 
follow-up the post-compensation outcomes (effectiveness to be determined). This can 
effectively be carried out by project developers in collaboration with other stakeholders, 
including the affected and host communities. On the other hand, assessment of whether 
compensation schemes have met their objectives or not, can be measured using evaluation 
indicators for the influenced effects or impacts and should be done by a third party. It is 
worth noting that if both monitoring and evaluation of the compensation schemes are done as 
required it would provide opportunities to learn from the past experience with the aim of 
improving future planning of compensation schemes. 
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4.4.3: Perceptions on types and forms of compensation 
Compensation payments can take a variety of forms as presented in section 2.5.2. 
Compensation in Tanzania like in other developing countries is delivered in cash and in few 
cases in-kind. However, discussions and interviews held with different project officials and 
service providers during exploratory visits showed that the interest of project developers is 
gradually shifting towards supporting affected and host communities through in-kind 
payments. Respondents of the surveys that involved project developers, service providers and 
household heads, suggested three major types of compensation that have potentials of 
enhancing livelihoods of the affected rural people and also promote sustainability. Table 4.7 
shows the overall ranked preferences by respondents (N=182) involved in all three surveys. 
Advantages and disadvantages for each type of compensation payments are listed in 
Appendix 4.6. 
 
Table 4.7: Preferences on types of compensation as suggested by respondents involved in all 
three surveys. 
Types/Forms of compensation Number of respondents and scores (N=182) Total 
Score 
(TS) 
1st Rank 2nd Rank 3rd Rank 
Count Score Count Score Count Score 
Monetary payments 111 333 44 88 56 56 477 
Shareholders (benefit sharing scheme) 36 108 70 140 69 69 317 
In-kind payments 35 105 68 136 57 57 298 
Source: Surveys, 2007 
Legend:  Weight allocated: (1st Rank = 3); (2nd Rank = 2); and (3rd Rank = 1). 
Score = Number of respondents (Counts) times weight allocated to each rank. 
 
i) Monetary payments 
Table 4.7 shows that the majority respondents preferred most monetary compensation 
(TS=477). An over reliance on cash compensation was also noted in all thirteen projects 
visited during the exploratory study (Table 4.3). Project developers find it much easier to 
administer monetary compensation than any other forms of compensation and most of the 
affected parties prefer cash over in-kind compensation as it gives them freedom in 
exchanging cash for desired commodities. Perhaps that is why Sebenius et al. (2005) found 
that to many people, compensation simply means money. According to disadvantages listed 
by respondents in Appendix 4.6, compensation paid in cash is administratively more difficult 
to handle. However, the recipients perceive that the risks of handling cash are high, they 
would likely switch to another option such as bank payments. 
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ii) Benefit sharing schemes (shareholders)  
Table 4.7 indicates respondents ranked benefit sharing through shareholding the second most 
suitable type of compensation (TS=317). Benefit sharing schemes are best suited for projects 
that displace a big number of people. The schemes as pioneered by World Bank in Brazil, 
China and Columbia operate under the principle of improving the destructed livelihoods 
(Tamondong, 2008). Essentially, the purpose of benefit sharing schemes is to channel the 
benefits generated by development projects to the affected parties and host communities on 
top or instead of the monetary compensation payments. According to Van Wicklin (1998), a 
typology of benefits under benefit sharing scheme can be developed from project outputs to 
include both the in-kind benefits (i.e. services and facilities) and revenue-based gains. For the 
benefits to have impact on the reconstruction of livelihoods of the affected parties, Égré et al. 
(2008) recommend benefits be channelled through their host communities. Improving the 
lessons learned from examples of in-kind compensation and the Social Fund Scheme by teak 
(KVTC) project in Tanzania, benefit sharing schemes have multi potentials that include:- 
 
i) Benefit sharing has features of continuity that take care of future generation hence 
promotion of intergenerational equity as explained in section 2.3.6. 
ii) Intragenerational equity demands that compensation paid be distributed fairly 
within the same generation (McLeod, 2000). Gains channelled to a host 
community in the form of services and facilities such as support to education, 
health, water supply, to list a few, benefit all community members and 
subsequently ensure intragenerational equity. 
iii) Benefit sharing scheme using in-kind payments can help to minimise the 
exploitation of compensation systems by elites. 
iv) Benefit sharing scheme can be applied as a blanket compensation for losses that 
are difficult to quantify such psychological effects and social distractions. 
 
Inspite of over two decades of experience of benefit sharing schemes since the World Bank 
initiated them for the first time in 1987, few projects have been practicing them (Ibid.). Table 
4.3 shows that out of the 13 projects visited during the exploratory phase, only one project 
(Kilombero Valley Teak Company “KVTC”) was found practising benefit sharing schemes 
in Tanzania (Appendix 4.4). Evidence from Brazil, Columbia and China show that the 
number of projects practising benefit sharing schemes has increased following the 
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incorporation of benefit sharing schemes in national policies and legislation (Van Wicklin, 
1998; Égré et al., 2008). Similarly, in Canada and Japan, benefit sharing schemes are 
mandatory when forced relocation is inevitable (Égré et al., 2008; Nakayama and 
Furuyashiki, 2008; Trembath, 2008). However, this study argues that the commitment of 
project developers and joint creativity in using available resources with the host communities 
are crucial aspects required to make benefit sharing schemes successful. More studies are 
needed to identify cost-effective ways of sharing both benefits and costs and to explore the 
roles of stakeholders in benefit sharing schemes for developers and governments in 
particular. 
 
iii) In-kind payments  
Although in-kind payments are distinct from benefit sharing schemes (Sections 2.5.2.2 and 
2.5.2.3), the two have commonalities in their purposes and approaches as in-kind payments 
are found to be integrated within benefit sharing schemes. In-kind payments are usually made 
by project developers to provide assistance to the affected parties and host communities. 
According to Kunreuther and Easterling (1996), in-kind compensation payments can be in 
terms of services, infrastructures, facilities and preferential employment. Table 4.6 shows that 
in-kind payments were collectively ranked third position (TS=298). All thirteen (13) projects 
visited during exploratory visits helped their host communities through in-kind support, but 
there was only one project that regarded this kind of support as an extended form of 
compensation payments. This indicates that few project developers appreciate the potential of 
or understand well compensation and other forms of compensation payments apart from cash. 
Many project developers have shown little interest in exploring better ways of implementing 
compensation schemes that establish and maintain good relationships with the affected 
parties and host communities. 
 
4.4.4: Perceptions on transaction costs involved in compensation schemes 
The costs involved in working out different stages of a compensation scheme from 
information search, planning, valuation, resolving disputes, negotiation, preparation of 
agreements, implementation, enforcement and monitoring are collectively referred to as 
transaction costs. If the transaction costs of a compensation scheme tend to increase 
unnecessarily, the possibility exists where the transaction costs may exceed the expected 
benefits and this may in turn prohibit the start of negotiation between the project developer 
and affected parties and host communities and thus affecting the entire compensation scheme. 
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Hence, finding out early the possible transaction costs and their causes and trends is very 
important in trying to identify ways of minimising transaction costs. Table 4.8 shows the 
ranked factors that contribute to high transaction costs in compensation schemes in Tanzania, 
as perceived by project developers and service providers. The first five factors were; conflict 
of interests (TS=151); handling of complaints and disputes (TS=125); excessive numbers of 
actors involved in the process (TS=109); charges by middlemen and other charges (TS=99) 
and; unclear types of land ownership (TS=64).  
 
Table 4.8: Factors contributing to high transaction costs in compensation schemes in 
Tanzania as perceived by project developers and service providers 
 
 
Factor 
Number of respondents and scores 
(N=62) 
Total 
Score 
(TS) 1st Rank 2nd Rank 3rd Rank 4th Rank 5th Rank 
Score Score Score Score Score 
Conflict of interests (15)75 (5)20 (14)42 (4)8 (6)6 151 
Handling of complaints and appeals (8)40 (11)44 (6)18 (7)14 (9)9 125 
Number of parties involved in compensation (5)25 (6)24 (11)33 (7)14 (13)13 109 
Middlemen and “other” charges (4)20 (9)36 (10)30 (5)10 (3)3 99 
Unclear types of land ownership (4)20 (2)8 (4)12 (10)20 (4)4 64 
Litigation/court processes (3)15 (4)16 (3)9 (2)4 (10)10 54 
Repeated actions to reduce uncertainties (3)15 (6)24 (2)6 (4)8 (1)1 54 
Developers’ WTP compensation (4)20 (4)16 (1)3 (4)8 (2)2 49 
Types of natural resources and assets involved (5)25 (1)4 (3)9 (3)6 (2)2 46 
Affected parties’ WTA compensation (3)15 (4)16 (2)6 (1)2 (1)1 40 
Source: PDs’ and SPs’ Survey, 2007 
Legend:  Number of respondents are shown in brackets 
Weight allocated: (1st Rank = 5); (2nd Rank = 4); (3rd Rank = 3); (4th Rank = 2); and (5th Rank = 1). 
Score = Number of respondents (count) times weight allocated to each rank. 
 
Respondents felt that the mandates of government-based organisations and agencies 
responsible for management of environment, natural resources and lands, including 
compensation matters, overlap and this was identified as a source of conflicts. The mining 
sector was cited as an example where policy and legislation contradict other sectoral policies 
and laws. It was further revealed from exploratory interviews that the nature of most of the 
compensation disputes was linked with conflict of interests by government organisations. 
This showed signs of institutional failure in coordinating and settling conflicts arising in 
various sectors. This has increased transaction costs, as most of the compensation disputes 
are settled in courts of law. It was further learned from the cost scale established by the Legal 
Environmental Action Team (Box 4.1) that cost of resolving compensation disputes is lower 
during negotiation, moderate in mediation process and higher if litigation is involved. 
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The transaction costs of compensation were perceived to be high, as the compensation 
processes involve large number stakeholders. This is often due to lack of coordination of 
compensation matters as discussed in section 4.3.2(i). However, the study by Hackl et al. 
(2007) found that a greater number of parties in compensatory bargain process was 
beneficial, as it increased the diversity of ideas and subsequently influenced the quality of 
bargained outcomes in terms of effectiveness. Cost-effective coordination can potentially 
filter-out opportunistic and undesirable actors or parties like middlemen that are pursuing 
personal interests and, perhaps helping to identify an optimal number of participants, 
especially, regarding representatives for affected parties. The affected parties are better able 
to appoint representatives to defend their present and future interests where social cohesion is 
strong among community members. According to Barrow and Murphree (2001) social 
cohesion has a great role in community life in rural areas, especially when community 
members are faced with resettlement and compensation. Unfortunately, section 5.2.5 reports 
on decline of social cohesion due to modernisation and ‘divide and rule’ strategies as applied 
by the majority of the project developers. Empirical studies by Harris (2002) and Hackl et al. 
(2007) suggest that both self-organisation and cost-and coordination of responses by 
concerned parties could potentially help to reduce transaction costs. However, at 
empowerment in terms of sensitisation and training is necessary for the rural affected parties 
to get organised in relation to the nature of the project and issues at hand. On the other hand, 
it is recognised that unclear property rights as discussed in section 4.6.1(ii), contributes into 
compensation disputes and hence extra costs in resolving them. 
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4.5 Key messages 
The following are the key messages arising from the review of Tanzanian compensation 
regimes associated with development projects, as perceived by project developers, service 
providers and government actors. 
 
Compensation stakeholders: 
The majority compensation stakeholders in Tanzania have great interests in compensation but 
the following have strong influence over compensation processes, Project Developers, 
Environmental Agency, Chief Government Valuer, District Commissioner’s Office, and 
Consultants. The affected parties and host communities, Civil Society Organisations, 
Contractors, Village and Ward Government Authorities possess low power of influence. Lack 
of active participation of key stakeholders increases marginalisation of the affected parties 
and host communities in compensation processes. Elite intruders that are attracted to 
compensation processes or schemes by money and other short term interests affect 
compensation payments of the affected parties and subsequently lead into compensation 
disputes. More complicated compensation disputes result from an event where some key 
stakeholders mix professional matters and political interests. This also has potential risks of 
turning down an incredible professional image into useless propaganda and subsequently 
deters development processes.  
 
Project and compensation information: 
Possibilities exist for the project developers and affected parties and host communities to 
negotiate on compensation payments, but the later group is disadvantaged in terms of very 
important information about both the development projects and compensation schemes. 
Dissemination of relevant project or compensation information in Tanzania is a responsibility 
of project developers and depends on their efforts and resources. This system contributes to 
information asymmetry during participation processes and is likely to affect negatively the 
negotiation processes during compensation. 
 
Compensatory policy, legislation and practices in Tanzania: 
The study found that the legal basis for compensation is reasonably comprehensive in 
principle, but seems to be not applied in practice. Perceptions of service providers and project 
developers collected during the surveys revealed that the Tanzanian compensation systems 
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have several shortcomings including lack of clear compensation procedure, criteria, 
principles, guidelines and checklists; unclear property rights and compensation entitlements 
and; lack of involvement of key stakeholders. 
 
Property rights and compensation entitlements: 
Most of the affected parties in Tanzanian rural areas occupy and use land through 
unregistered customary rights. Customary land tenure rights remain insecure until 
hypothetical land boundaries that separate village lands from general, public and protected 
lands become visible and permanent. Based on Tietenberg’s (1996) universality, exclusivity, 
transferability and enforceability criteria, land tenure regimes in Tanzania are unclear. Both 
unclear property rights and compensation entitlements are among the potential major sources 
of compensation disputes in Tanzania. 
 
Transaction costs in compensation regimes in Tanzania: 
Conflict of interests, complaint resolution, intermediary parties or agents and, unclear 
property rights are sources of compensation disputes and leading factors that contribute to 
unnecessary transaction costs during compensation processes. Experience has indicated that 
transaction costs of resolving compensation disputes increase from negotiation process (low - 
moderate), mediation process (moderate - high) and litigation process (high - very high). 
 
Monitoring: 
Compensation schemes in Tanzania lack monitoring and evaluation. Monitoring carried out 
jointly with project developer and other stakeholders, affected parties and host communities 
in particular helps to track both the implementation process of compensation scheme and 
post-compensation outcomes. Monitoring would ensure suitability of measures taken and 
their effectiveness too. Monitoring of compensation schemes can help to document successes, 
failures and challenging experiences encountered during valuation, implementation and post-
compensation era. This would strategically help to develop or improve compensation 
procedures, guidelines and checklists through action-research. For example, using monitoring 
findings, project developers and the affected parties and host communities can jointly prepare 
guidelines to serve as ‘code of practice’ for contractors to carry out various tasks including 
implementation of in-kind compensation. 
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Chapter 5 ASSESSMENT OF POST-COMPENSATION OUTCOMES 
 
This chapter presents and discusses the results of the post-compensation outcomes collected 
using key informant interviews, household cases and focus group discussions as verified 
during the household survey (Figure 5.1). The Chi square (χ2) and t-tests were carried out to 
determine the qualitative and quantitative significant differences respectively between 
M’baya and Idete village cases. The synthesised qualitative information on changes and 
implications on household livelihood assets and ecosystem functions provided evidence for 
arguments when significant results were discussed. The chapter also presents and discusses 
various benefits and costs of projects and compensation schemes implemented by the 
developers of gas pipeline and teak projects in M’baya and Idete villages respectively. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Methods for assessing post compensation outcomes 
 
5.1 Description of main respondents in the studied village cases 
The primary information on compensation schemes by project case studies was collected 
from seven key informants, seven focus group discussion meetings, twelve in-depth 
household cases and three questionnaire surveys. A total of 120 households in two village 
cases participated in the verification survey. Households involved in in-depth (rich) 
household interviews and verification survey were the main respondents in this research since 
their contributions in terms of information were relatively great and central to the research 
questions. While the key informant interviews provided useful information in guiding the 
study from the beginning of data collection, focus group discussion meetings were used to 
clarify some issues during data collection. 
It is recognised that possible bias exists following the study to substantially rely on evidence 
and other information collected from the affected parties. This effect was however minimised 
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through seeking clarification and repeated verification of information from the non affected 
parties during key informant interviews and focus group discussions. Another possible bias is 
that the sample omitted coverage of some potential respondents. Some of the affected parties 
in both village cases had moved away from the studied villages because they had lost all their 
landholdings as a result of the projects. In regard to this, two and three affected parties who 
had moved from M’baya and Idete respectively to the neighbouring villages were traced and 
interviewed. 
 
5.1.1: Respondents involved in the in-depth household study 
The study involved 4 household cases compensated by SONGAS project in M’baya village. 
In relation to KVTC teak project, a total of 8 households (4 compensated and 4 
uncompensated) participated in household in-depth study in Idete village. In both village 
cases, most of the interview sessions held with household cases were attended by husbands 
and their wives. Respondents were not asked to have that arrangement but perhaps they found 
the subject matter interesting and important as they decided to spare their precious time to 
attend all three interview sessions, where each lasted for 2 – 3 hours. Respondents were asked 
to describe various changes in household assets and outcomes at both household and 
community levels due to development projects, compensation schemes in particular. General 
analysis of household case studies confirmed that affected parties between village cases were 
treated differently and thus compensation impacts may vary considerably depending on the 
nature of both the people’s livelihood activities and project activities. 
 
5.1.2: Characteristics of respondents involved in the verification survey 
Population and demographic factors carry important information on production and 
consumption trends either at household or community level, which are linked to their socio-
economic, socio-cultural and ecological features (Flyvbjerg, 2001). The same factors if 
measured properly can explain variations in compensation processes, payments and outcomes 
between and within affected parties and host communities. 
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i) Gender of household heads 
Gender is a determinant of use and control of resources at both household and community 
levels. Due to gender imbalance, male and female headed households in many communities 
in developing countries tend to experience temporary and permanent negative effects of 
compensation respectively (ADBAsia, 2007). Of the total number of (120) surveyed 
households, 91 (76%) were male-headed and 29 (24%) were female-headed. Idete’s female 
respondents were slightly higher (16 {27%}) compared to M’baya’s (13 {22%}), but no 
significant difference (p=0.522) was observed (Table 5.1).  
 
Table 5.1: General characteristics of respondents participated in the verification survey 
 
Variable 
 
Category 
Percentages of respondents (%) Pearson 
Chi-square 
(χ2) 
 
p-Value M’baya 
(N=60) 
Idete 
(N=60) 
Totals 
(N=120) 
Gender of Female 22 27 24 0.409  
respondents Male  78 73 76 (df=1) 0.522 
Age of  Youth (18 - 35 years old) 3 25 14   
respondents Adult (36 – 55 years old) 42 52 47 18.265  
 Old/elder (>55 years old) 55 23 39 (df=2) 0.000 
Education  Primary level education 47 80.0 63   
level of Secondary level education 8 2 5 14.667  
respondents Informal education 45 18 32 (df=2) 0.001 
Household  Small family (1 – 4 people) 12 30 21   
size in groups Moderate family (5–6 people) 30 38 34 10.190  
 Large family (7 and above) 58 32 45 (df=2) 0.006 
Household  Short stay (up to 20 years) 32 50 41   
duration of  Long stay (21 – 40 years) 45 45 45 9.587  
stay in village Very long stay (>40 years) 23 5 14 (df=2) 0.008 
 Growing permanent crops?      
 YES 58 10 34 31.156  
 NO 42 90 66 (df=1) 0.000 
Farming systems Growing semi-permanent crops?      
practiced in the YES 55 40 47 2.707  
village cases NO 45 60 53 (df=1) 0.072 
 Growing annual crops?      
 YES 37 90 63 36.746  
 NO 63 10 37 (df=1) 0.000 
Source: Verification Survey, 2007 
 
Both cultural and religious based factors have great influence on men-women relationships in 
many rural communities in developing countries. Gradually, the great influence of males over 
all affairs in many communities is decreasing as many community members recognise the 
importance of gender balance in development issues. This was shown by every household 
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case in M’baya mentioning something interesting about gender aspects in association with 
compensation. For example, Mzee10 Omega (Appendix 5.3) in his conversation mentioned 
that his wife kept him informed of the progress of SONGAS compensation while he was 
hospitalised and she put in great efforts during the construction of their new home. Mr. 
Kisikisi (Appendix 5.4) pointed out that participation should start at home. Similarly, Mzee 
Msasa (Appendix 5.5) emphasized on what he believed that “more successes would be 
achieved if women get involved in planning, decision-making and implementation of 
household activities – because women are very good at close monitoring”.  
 
Mr. Ustaadhi (Appendix 5.6), another household case from M’baya expressed his concern 
that most of the compensated people who lost or misused their compensation money did not 
involve their wives in planning and spending. He went further onto suggesting that gender 
balance be considered important and community members need sensitisation programme on 
this aspect. 
 
ii) Age of household heads 
Age of household head is linked to accumulation of household assets such as land, labour, 
experience and so many others linked to household livelihood. It can also suggest a scale of 
disruption likely to be caused by compensation. Minimum and maximum ages of respondents 
were 21 and 85 years respectively with an overall mean of (52 ± 1.4). Ages of respondents 
were grouped into youth (18 – 35 years old), Adult (36 – 55 years old) and old/elder (>55 
years old) based on the country’s laws. According to URT (2005d), 18 years is a lower limit 
of teenager’s age to be regarded as a youth and to have the legal rights to vote and make 
decisions regarding his/her marriage. The age of 35 is the upper limit of youth and 55 is an 
age where someone is considered as an old person and willingly he/she can retire from work 
(Ibid.). 
 
At Idete there were higher (p<0.001) proportions of adults (52%) and youth (25%), than the 
proportions of 42% and 3% in M’baya respectively (Table 5.1). However, larger proportion 
(55%) of elderly respondents was interviewed in M’baya compared to (23%) of Idete. 
                                                 
10 Mzee is a Swahili title given to elderly males indicating respect to their age. 
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Figure 5.2: Respondents’ age distribution structure by village cases 
 
However, the significant difference observed was largely influenced by the numbers of 
elderly and youth respondents. This can partly be explained by the fact that M’baya is an old 
village that has existed since the German colonial rule by the name of ‘Kiloweko’ while Idete 
village started 1975. 
 
iii) Education background of respondents 
Both formal and informal types of education play an important role in life, as both tend to 
facilitate increase of people’s knowledge, skills and general awareness on various life matters 
including development and compensation aspects. Education can also promote participation 
in development and compensation processes. Table 5.1 presents results of education levels 
(i.e. primary, secondary and informal) of respondents which showed significant difference 
(p=0.001) between villages. Idete had higher percentage (80%) of respondents with “primary 
level” than M’baya’s 47%. While M’baya had higher proportions of respondents with 
“informal” (45%) and “secondary” (8%) levels, Idete had 18% and 2% respectively. 
 
All four (4) household cases interviewed at M’baya expressed their concerns that many 
households in the Coast region have not put as much emphasis on education matters 
compared to other regions. They perceived that inadequate compensation received from 
SONGAS was linked to illiteracy and lack of education. They further pointed out that they 
noted that compensation that was paid did not cover all losses adequately, but they did not 
know where to go for help. However, this notion was not supported by the results from Idete 
where an overwhelmingly majority (82%) had formal education and yet many of them were 
not compensated at all. Moreover, those who were compensated received less compensation 
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per hectare of land lost compared to those compensated in M’baya. The study tends to agree 
with the fact that education level of affected parties could be one reason for inadequate 
compensation received, as education expands awareness and knowledge on various life 
matters. However, for the affected parties to secure fair compensation, more factors exist. 
 
iv) Household size 
Apart from showing a total number of family members, household size also shows 
composition of household in terms of dependants, labour force and other social groups, as 
they are linked to property (land), production, consumption and needs. Household sizes were 
put into three groups namely “small family” (1-4 people), “moderate family” (5-6 people) 
and “large family” (7 people and above). At M’baya, there were significantly (p=0.006) 
many respondents (58%) with larger families compared to Idete’s respondents (32%). But 
Idete had relatively higher proportions of moderate (38%) and small (21%) size families than 
the respective proportions (30%) and (12%) of M’baya. The observed differences in larger 
and small family sizes can partly be explained by religious influence on the two communities. 
The majority of M’baya’s people are Muslims and their large families are likely to be 
influenced by Islamic faith where a man is allowed to marry up to four wives. At Idete 
Christianity is dominant and according to the Christian faith marriage is restricted to one 
husband and one wife. 
 
v) Household duration of stay in the village 
Duration of stay is linked to accumulation of experience and knowledge generation by 
household members in regard to their local environment. It also reflects previous investment 
in a property and scale of disruption (losses) caused by relocation. The period for which the 
household has continuously stayed in the village was categorised into “short stay” (up to 20 
years), “long stay” (21-40 years) and “very long stay” (above 40 years). Table 6.1 shows 
Idete had significantly (p=0.008) large proportions (50%) of “short stay” respondents than 
M’baya’s 32%. But M’baya showed extremely higher proportion (23%) respondents in the 
category of “very long” compared to 5% of Idete. Proportions of “long stay” respondents in 
both villages were the same (45%). Significant difference observed in duration of stay in the 
village cases is by the reasons explained in Section 5.1.2(ii) above.  
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vi) Livelihood activities of respondents 
Livelihood activities carried out by people that are likely to be affected by a project are 
critically important in determination of losses and basis for compensation. Respondents in 
both village cases practice crop production agriculture as a livelihood opportunity, but the 
farming systems in terms of types of crops grown were significant (p<0.001) in the studied 
villages (Table 5.1). When crops were categorised based on “perennial” and “annual” crops, 
many respondents (58%) in M’baya depend on permanent crops (i.e. coconut, cashew nut, 
mango and orange) for their livelihoods. Whereas the majority respondents (90%) in Idete 
grow annual crops such as rice, maize, legumes and horticultural produces. No significance 
(p=0.072) was observed in regard to cultivation of semi-permanent crops, though 55% of 
M’baya’s respondents grow cassava and pineapples and 40% of Idete’s respondents cultivate 
banana and sugarcane.  
 
Coconuts, cashew nuts, sugarcane, fruits, pineapples and horticultural crops are mainly raised 
for income earning, whilst rice, maize cassava, banana and legumes are grown for both food 
and cash purposes.  
 
5.2 Assessing changes in livelihood assets 
According to Carney (1998), livelihood comprises the capabilities, assets and activities 
required for a means of living. The livelihood at a household level critically depends on the 
capital assets (assets and flows of services) that the household possesses or is accessible to. 
Assessment of livelihood outcomes was done through comparing capital assets and flows of 
services in the two villages. The 2 villages were tested for variations. Evidence collected 
from household cases and other qualitative interviews and discussions were used to explain 
for the observed significant differences between the villages. Assessment involved five 
livelihood assets namely human, natural, financial, physical and social capitals. 
 
5.2.1: Human capital 
i) Age of household heads 
Table 5.2 shows that household heads of M’baya were significantly (p<0.001) aged (58.1 ± 
1.7 years) compared to those of Idete (45.9 ± 1.9 years). In addition to the reasons discussed 
under Section 5.1.2(ii), the old age in M’baya village is associated with the coconut crop on 
which the majority depend for their livelihoods. Traditionally, in coconut-based livelihood 
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communities such as M’baya, farmers own coconut farms up to the old age which does not 
allow them to carry out farm activities in turn leads them to transfer farm ownership to their 
descendants. Unlike to Idete village, that is why farm owners who were respondents in this 
study in M’baya were more aged than those in Idete. 
 
Table 5.2: Comparison of human capital indicators/variables between studied villages 
 
Tested variable 
 
Groups 
 
N 
 
Means 
Std 
Dev 
Lavene’s 
F & (p) values 
t 
& (df) values 
 
p-value 
Age of household heads 
(years) 
M’baya 60 58.1±1.7 13.2 F=0.741 
(p=0.391) 
4.707  
Idete 60 45.9±1.9 15.1 (df=118) 0.000 
 
Household size 
M’baya 60 7.4±0.4 3.1 F=3.211 
(p=0.076) 
3.305  
Idete 60 5.7±0.3 2.3 (df=118) 0.001 
Number of children  
(0 – 17 years) 
M’baya 60 3.8±0.3 2.3 F=1.189 
(p=0.278) 
1.798  
Idete 60 3.1±0.3 2.0 (df=118) 0.075 
Number of young people  
(18 – 35 yrs) 
M’baya 60 1.8±0.2 1.8 F=8.737 
(p=0.004) 
2.244  
Idete 60 1.2±0.1 1.1 (df=100) 0.027 
Number of adult people  
(36 – 54 years) 
M’baya 60 0.9±0.1 0.9 F=0.958 
(p=0.33) 
-0.529  
Idete 60 1.0±0.1 0.8 (df=118) 0.598 
Number of elderly people 
(≥55 years) 
M’baya 60 1.0±0.1 0.8 F=0.246 
(p=0.621) 
3.550  
Idete 60 0.5±0.1 0.8 (df=118) 0.001 
Number of dependants  
(0–17 yrs & >55 yrs) 
M’baya 60 4.8±0.3 2.5 F=7.033 
(p=0.009) 
3.062  
Idete 60 3.6±0.2 1.8 (df=108) 0.003 
Household labour force 
per hactare of land farmed 
(N/ha) 
M’baya 60 1.8±0.4 2.8 F=5.839 
(p=0.017) 
0.961  
Idete 60 1.4±0.2 1.2 (df= 81) 0.339 
Household dependant – 
labour force ratio 
M’baya 60 2.2±0.3 1.9 F=8.671 
(p=0.004) 
1.762  
Idete 60 1.7±0.2 1.1 (df=80) 0.082 
Duration of stay in the 
village (years) 
M’baya 60 30.8±2.5 19.4 F=6.721 
(p=0.011) 
2.270  
Idete 60 23.9±1.7 13.4 (df=104) 0.025 
Time worked on the lost 
land “Land occupancy” 
(years) 
M’baya 38 39.3±3.7 23.1 F=33.421 
(p=0.000) 
5.144  
Idete 55 18.4±1.6 11.8 (df=51) 0.000 
Proportion of compensation 
(%) invested in education  
M’baya 38 6.7±1.6 9.2 F=0.184 
(p=0.670) 
0.475  
Idete 13 5.2±3.0 10.4 (df=45) 0.637 
Source: Verification Survey, 2007 
 
ii) Household size and composition by age 
On average, household size was highly significant (p<0.001) for M’baya’s households 
showing a higher mean (7.4 ± 0.4) than that of Idete (5.7 ± 0.3) (Table 5.2). Households in 
the studied areas utmost composed of four age groups and were found to be significant 
between villages as follows: children (0 – 17 years), (p=0.075); youth (18 - 35years) 
(p=0.027); adults (36-54 years) (p=0.598) and; elders (55 years and above) (p=0.001). 
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The elderly, youth and children age groups at M’baya showed higher mean values than Idete. 
According to the interviews held with household cases in M’baya, the observed longevity 
among the elders in M’baya is linked to the coconut produce. Mzee Msasa11 claimed that 
people in the coast for decades have been consuming dishes prepared with coconut oil and 
drinking both coconut local brew (mnazi) and natural juice (dafu) and the community was 
therefore saved from suffering many diseases including diabetes. The health benefits of 
coconut oil are supported by many research findings (Fife, 2006; Corrêa et al., 2008; 
Gunathilake and Abeyrathne, 2008). Further to health benefits, Mr. Ustaadhi explained that 
coconut as important crop as it ensures steady flow of household income throughout the year 
and thus loss of coconut trees has a considerable impact on welfare in coastal communities. 
 
iii) Household labour force 
Labour force is a critical factor of production and at household level, labour force (measured 
by number of family members able to work) is an important livelihood asset. Household 
labour force in rural areas is highly linked to land occupied or used by a household and any 
land alienation even with compensation may adversely affect household labour productivity 
and livelihood.  
Despite considerable contributions of children and elderly people, the youth and adult groups 
provide most of the required labour force (workforce) at a household level. Table 5.2 shows 
that M’baya had relatively greater mean (1.8 ± 0.4) of household labour force per hectare 
currently farmed than Idete village (1.4 ± 0.2). However, the difference was not significant 
(p=0.339). 
 
Apart from having higher average number of workforce per hectare, M’baya seems to have 
low use-efficiency of household labour per hectare as compared to Idete based on the nature 
of their farming systems. Farmers in M’baya practice mixed cropping of permanent, semi-
permanent and annual crops. Here labour is saved in different ways including no annual farm 
preparation, reduced weeding as the nature of crops raised are not too involving (less labour-
intensive crops). While at Idete where annual crops (rice, maize and horticultural crops) are 
raised, intensive labour is required to carry out all farm operations on annual basis. Rice is a 
                                                 
11 “Watu wanasemasema mnazi na dafu vinaleta busha, mimi nasema uongo huo. Sisi watu wa Pwani 
kwa miongo mingi tumekuwa tunatumia vinywaji hivyo kila siku na faida yake kubwa ni kuwa hatuugui 
magonjwa mengi kama ya kisukari, viungo vya mwili kutofanya kazi vizuri, n.k. Kusemakweli kwa watu 
wa umri wangu na wazazi wetu huko nyuma tumekuwa na maisha marefu sababu ya zao la mnazi” 
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very important crop to farmers in Idete, as it is produced for both food and cash purposes and 
has almost no storage pests. (FAO, 2002) supports the fact that rice lands are characterised 
with higher income earnings and intensive labour-absorptive nature. Research findings 
coordinated by FAO have also revealed that the mixed cropping farming systems have more 
advantages compared to its disadvantages of water and nutrients competition which affect 
other crops (FAO, 2004). Studies by El-Ghonemy (1990) caution about labour redundancy 
caused by ad hoc land reforms and changes in land uses is now becoming a big threat to rural 
livelihoods as it affects both the farming systems and types of crops to be grown. Main crops 
such as coconuts for M’baya and rice for Idete, including their mixed farming systems and 
employed labour force are potential sources of loss that need careful scrutiny by 
compensation schemes. 
 
iv) Land occupancy 
The land occupancy in this study is the term used to refer to the time (in years) a household 
has spent working in its farmland before losing it to the project. Land occupancy was found 
to be important in knowledge generation and accumulation of experience in relation to their 
varied local environments. 
 
At M’baya, respondents had significantly (p<0.001) higher mean value (39.3 ± 3.7) of land 
occupancy than that of Idete (M=18.4 ± 1.6) (Table 5.2). Also, when the occupancy was put 
into groups of short (up to 20 years), long (21 – 40 years) and very long (above 40 years), 
M’baya had extremely (p<0.001) many respondents (44.7%) with very long land occupancy 
than Idete (3.6%). M’baya and Idete villages respectively had (26.3%) and (60%) proportions 
of short occupancy (Table 5.3). 
 
The observed difference between the villages can partly be explained by their historical 
backgrounds and the nature of their farming systems (Appendices 5.1 & 5.2). Although 
M’baya’s history goes back to the Germany colonial rule in the early 1900s, the main 
livelihood crops such as cassava, coconuts and cashew nuts were respectively, introduced in 
the coastal areas of Tanganyika earlier by the Portuguese (14th century), Arabs (17th century) 
and German (19th Century) (Johnson et al., 1971). From that period, the Swahili farmers 
evolved different systems locally and attained its current stability as a mixed cropping of all 
permanent, semi-permanent and annual crops. Evidences from household cases show that this 
type of farming evolved locally incorporating traditional knowledge and cultural values with 
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minimum influence of modern agricultural extension services. For example Mr. Ustaadhi 
gave a remark that “Approaches used by social and extension workers are not effective 
because their mind set does not recognise local people’s traditional knowledge systems” 
(Appendix 5.6). 
 
According to focus group discussion held with Village leaders, Idete village started as a 
farming camp 1969 with five households and by 1975 the number of households had grown 
to 250. Following the implementation of structural adjustment policies by the World Bank 
and International Monetary Fund in mid 1980s, the government of Tanzania was forced to 
remove subsidies in agricultural inputs, fertilizers in particular. This led to a number of 
smallholder farmers from the nearby regions (i.e. Ruvuma, Iringa and Rukwa) to move 
around looking for fertile lands where they could have farmed without using artificial 
fertilizers. Over 500 households settled in Idete in the late 1980s and kept on exploring the 
land and came out with a good local land use plan based on agronomic requirements of 
different types of crops. Fertile valleys and highlands were identified and allocated proper use 
in terms of agricultural produces. Highlands were used for settlements, permanent fruit trees 
and annual crops and lowlands (valleys) were for mixed cropping of annual horticultural and 
semi-permanent crops (banana and sugarcanes). Distant fertile highlands were demarcated 
and used for fallow cultivation of annual crops (maize and legumes). Mascarenhas (2005) 
reported strong links between livelihood systems and natural assets, historical and cultural 
integrity and dynamism of the knowledge base found in an area. KVTC project targeted the 
same lands as fertile and suitable for teak plantation (KVTC, 1991). KVTC demarcated and 
leased the land in 1992, and farmers were forcibly relocated in 2006. 
 
Respondents mentioned three major aspects that happened to interfere with their evolution of 
traditional farming, livelihood and related knowledge systems namely (i) government policies 
such as monoculture (plantations and estates), unsuitable innovations and top-down 
approaches; (ii) implementation of villagisation12 policy; (iii) loss of land and access to 
important natural resources caused by big development and conservation projects with both 
national and international interests. 
                                                 
12 Villagisation policy as is commonly known as ‘operesheni sogeza’ (in Idete) and ‘operesheni vijiji’ (in most 
parts of Tanzania) was implemented country wide, and many households were relocated to the earmarked 
settlements literally known as socialist villages (vijiji vya ujamaa) to facilitate service delivery to villagers. 
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5.2.2: Natural capital 
Under natural capital, the asset that is most linked to compensation schemes was land. Land 
is a major and basic factor of production for the rural based economy in which the study was 
able to trace historical events and inequalities in land matters in both village cases as reported 
below. 
 
i) Land ownership and acquisition 
In Tanzania, compensation for losses of various asset stocks and flows of services is linked to 
ownership, occupancy and/or use rights of land. If someone loses it, he/she become ineligible 
for compensation. All land in Tanzania is owned by the State (URT, 1999a). Most of the land 
in both villages is accessed and used under customary rights (Table 5.3). It was further 
learned from key informants that big farms (with title deeds) owned by nearby elite urbanites 
exist in both villages. There was a general feeling of land insecurity in the study areas as 
respondents perceived the process of land registration as too costly for rural people to afford. 
Without mentioning the exact amount required, the majority pointed out that the costs 
involved in cadastral surveys were too high for villagers to afford. They also complained that 
the process of land registration had been bureaucratic and centralized in the ministry 
headquarters (Dar es Salaam) and thus inaccessible to farmers in rural areas. Despite the new 
land legislation recognising customary land rights, rural people lose their lands due to lack of 
necessary information on the rights, duties and entitlements they have, especially when it 
involves transferring their land occupancy to other parties. This was also reported by Odgaard 
(2002) and Morris et al. (2006) who observed that local communities face difficulties in 
challenging the authorities and big companies pursuing corporate economic interests in 
developing nations, especially in land acquisition processes. 
 
Table 5.3: Means of acquiring land by village cases against other areas in Tanzania 
 
Mode of acquiring land 
Percentage (%) of respondents 
M’baya 
village 
(N=60) 
Idete 
village 
(N=60)
Overall 
Population 
(N=120)
Rutasitara’s, (2005) 
(N=4889) 
Mtoni’s, (1999) 
(N=120) 
Inheritance  63.3 23.3 43.3 42.7 23.4 
Allocation by village councils 5.0 30.0 17.5 21.7 45.0 
Self allocation (bush clearing) 0.0 26.7 13.4 18.0 18.3 
Purchase 26.7 13.3 20.0 12.1 13.3 
No land 5.0 6.7 5.8 5.5 0.0 
Sources: Verification Survey, 2007; Rutasitara (2005) & Mtoni (1999). 
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Rural landlessness recorded in 7 households (5.8%) was an issue of great concern (Table 
5.3). This however, was contrary to what Rukuni (1994) concluded in his findings that 
landlessness would not be a problem in most of African rural communities where land is 
largely characterised with attributes of inclusiveness rather than exclusiveness. It is true that 
African rural communities embrace ‘extended families’ where the family-related-people tend 
to come close to each other where a problem of one family member (including need for land) 
is felt and dealt with by all family members. Unfortunately, such social cohesion is gradually 
eroding following scarcity of land and also land has become a tradable commodity. With the 
trend of decreasing household acreage (less than 2ha) in many developing countries, 
researchers predict dramatic increase of landless people in rural areas (Rutasitara, 2005; 
Mascarenhas, 2005). Landlessness signals worse scenarios for both rural and urban 
communities and the most probable risks associate with it include food insecurity and 
increased poverty. 
 
ii) Household landholdings 
All interviewed households with the exception of 3 from M’baya and 4 from Idete own land 
ranging from 0.2 to 12.0 ha. In terms of significance, Table 5.5 shows that households in 
M’baya had significantly (p=0.024) larger mean land size (2.88 ± 0.33 ha) than Idete (1.9 ± 
0.3 ha). When landholdings were categorised into ‘small holdings’ (<2ha), ‘medium 
holdings’ (2 – 4 ha) and ‘large holdings’ (>4 ha), it also showed the same level of 
significance (p=0.021) (Table 5.4). The majority of respondents in Idete (62.5%) and M’baya 
(42.1%) had small landholdings of less than 2 ha. M’baya’s proportion of respondents with 
lands larger than 4 ha (17.5%) was relatively greater than that of Idete (3.6%). 
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Table 5.4: Comparison of land related aspects in study areas 
 
Variable 
 
Category 
Percentages of respondents (%) Pearson 
Chi-square 
(χ2) 
 
p-Value M’baya 
 
Idete 
 
Totals 
 
Land currently   (n=57) (n=56) (n=113)   
occupied/used  Small size (<2 ha) 42.1 62.5 52.2   
by households Medium size (2 – 4 ha) 40.4 33.9 37.2 7.757  
 Large size (>4 ha) 17.5 3.6 10.6 (df=2) 0.021 
Land lost to the   (n=38) (n=55) (n=93)   
projects Small size (<2 ha) 95.0 72.7 82.1   
 Medium size (2 – 4 ha) 5.0 14.5 10.5 8.495  
 Large size (>4 ha) 0 12.7 7.4 (df=2) 0.014 
Household  (n=38) (n=55) (n=93)   
experience with Short (up to 20 yrs) 26.3 60.0 46.3   
lost land Long (21 – 40 yrs) 30.0 36.4 33.3 24.467  
 Very long (>40 yrs) 44.7 3.6 20.4 (df=2) 0.000 
Land renting-in   (N=60) (N=60) (N=120)   
by households YES 10.0 35.0 22.5 10.753  
 NO 90.0 65.0 77.5 (df=1) 0.002 
Severity of land loss  (n=38) (n=55) (n=93)   
effect (Ratio of land Extremely severe (<0.50) 10.5 63.6 42.0   
used after to land  Severe (0.50 – 0.75) 47.4 30.9 37.6 31.510  
used before comp.) Less severe (>0.75) 42.1 5.5 20.4 (df=2) 0.000 
Source: Verification Survey, 2007 
 
Land shortage 
One of the critical implications for compensation in rural areas is land shortage. Land 
shortage is a growing problem challenging both the livelihoods of rural communities and 
sustainability aspects. The land shortage in the studied village cases is caused by outsiders 
including individual big farmers, organisations, development and conservation projects 
alienating big lands from villages and farmers (Appendices 5.27 and 5.28). Idete was a 
typical example village that has been affected by the above mentioned aspects. According to 
a focus group discussion that involved young farmers at Idete, during the period of 1980 – 
1993, Idete Prisons has constantly been expanding its boundaries inside the village land to 
possess over 6,000 ha and this has caused serious resentments. From 1984 to 1991, a private 
company called MIFURA and several individual big farmers obtained over 600 ha of land 
from Idete without the consent of the villagers. Both the establishment of Udzungwa national 
park in 1991 and subsequently demarcation of a buffer zone area incorporated large village 
land (over 5,000 ha) in the northern parts of the village. In 1992, the village encountered 
another loss of over 4,000 ha of land to Kilombero Valley Teak Company (KVTC) project. 
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Land uses and estimated total areas affected by the teak project in Idete included; agriculture 
(about 100 ha), farm settlements (about 18 ha), natural forests (about 2,800 ha) and open 
rangelands (over 1,000 ha). 
 
At M’baya land shortage is largely influenced by demographic factors coupled with cultural 
values of land inheritance that leads into land fragmentation. Average household size of 
M’baya (7.4 ± 0.4) is 1.5 times greater than the national household size of 4.9 (URT, 2003). 
Land shortage is most felt when household landholdings are compared with their respective 
household sizes. For instance, comparing mean values of household landholdings (2.88 ha) 
and household sizes (7.4 people) in Table 5.5, land fragmentation for each child (excluding 
the 2 parents) is 0.5ha. Land loss in densely populated areas is particularly challenging. 
Evidence shows that the location of M’baya being very close (i.e. 40 km) to the capital city 
Dar es Salaam, partly contributes into the land shortage. The number of city dwellers having 
farms in M’baya has increased from 1 (1982) to 34 (2007) and, have been buying lands 
ranging from 2 ha up to 50 ha. Apart from contributing to land shortage, it puts the future of 
children of M’baya at stake. However, SONGAS project in M’baya village has affected over 
51 ha of agricultural farmlands, 4.2 ha of settlements and 8.6 ha of communal grasslands. 
 
Table 5.5: Comparison of natural capital indicators or variables between studied villages 
Tested variable Groups N Means 
(±SE) 
Std 
Dev 
Lavene’s 
F & (p) values 
 
t-value 
 
p-value 
Land occupied/used by 
household (ha) 
M’baya 57 2.9±0.3 2.5 F=3.728 
(p=0.056) 
2.297  
Idete 56 1.9±0.3 1.9 (df=111) 0.024 
Land rented-in by households 
(ha) 
M’baya 6 0.8±0.1 0.3 F=4.084 
(p=0.054) 
-0.565  
Idete 21 0.9±0.1 0.5 (df=25) 0.577 
Land rented-out by households 
(ha) 
M’baya 2 1.0±0.2 0.3  
-- 
0.577  
Idete 1 0.8±0.0 -- (df=1) 0.667 
Household land lost as a result of 
the project (ha) 
M’baya 38 0.8±0.1 0.7 F=10.240 
(p=0.002) 
-4.900  
Idete 55 1.8±0.2 1.3 (df=84) 0.000 
Land used after the project to 
land used before the project ratio 
M’baya 38 0.6±0.0 0.5 F=11.357 
(p=0.001) 
-5.052  
Idete 55 0.4±0.0 0.7 (df=64) 0.000 
Proportion of compensation used 
in buying land (%) 
M’baya 38 11.6±3.6 21.4 F=3.149 
(p=0.083) 
-1.452  
Idete 13 23.4±9.1 31.7 (df=45) 0.154 
Source: Verification Survey, 2007 
 
iii) Severity of land losses 
Change in the land occupied or used by households before and after the project was one of 
the indicators used to assess the impacts of compensation on people’s livelihoods. The land 
occupied or used now (after the project) compared with the land occupied or used before by a 
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household gives a ratio (LUnow/LUbefore)13 which is a relative measure of land loss. The ratio 
was used to determine severity levels in which households suffered from land loss caused by 
development projects. Table 5.4 presents results of LUnow/LUbefore ratio when was categorised 
into 3 levels of severity namely, ‘extremely severe’ (LUnow/LUbefore <0.5) ‘severe’ 
(LUnow/LUbefore = 0.5 – 0.75) and ‘less severe’ (LUnow/LUbefore > 0.75). The LUnow/LUbefore 
ratio showed a significant difference (p<0.001) between studied villages. At Idete, the 
majority proportion of respondents (64%) was affected ‘extremely severe’ by land loss as 
compared to M’baya’s proportion (11%). But M’baya had large proportions of its 
respondents affected severely (47%) and less severely (42%) compared to the respective 
proportions of Idete (i.e. 31% and 6%). 
 
The observed difference in levels of severity in regard to land loss can largely be explained 
by the nature of the two project cases. The teak project is a land-taker by nature and in the 
process of acquiring 4000 ha of land in Idete village, over 68 households lost their farms and 
homes and 4 out of 60 households involved in the survey lost all their lands. According to an 
environmental impact assessment report (ODA, 1991), interviews held at Idete showed that 
their village was seriously facing land scarcity caused by contiguous protected areas, 
expansion of Prisons’ farms and immigrants from other regions. Surprisingly, the land 
acquisition process continued without even undertaking further studies as recommended by 
environmental impact assessment report. 
 
Unlike Idete, the farms of affected parties at M’baya were impacted differently by the gas 
pipeline project. SONGAS project wanted a strip of land 60 m wide and 5 - 6 km long from 
M’baya village. Responses by key informants in the village concurred with the contents 
found in the project documents (URT, 1997b & 2000) that the project followed closely the 
World Bank’s guidelines in order to minimise the negative effects to local people. The 
majority of the affected parties in M’baya lost land ranging from (25 – 50%) of their 
remaining lands and 7 households remained with less than 0.2 ha after the way-leave were 
bought plots for relocating their homes. The affected parties in all affected villages including 
M’baya were also allowed to cultivate both semi-permanent and annual crops on their lost 
lands. However, loss of income due to loss of permanent crops (i.e. coconuts and cash nuts) 
remained a serious concern reported and discussed at length in Section 5.2.3. 
                                                 
13LUnow=Land used or occupied by affected households after implementation of the project; LUbefore=Land used 
or occupied by affected households before introduction of development project. 
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Land renting 
Land renting is another indication of both severity of land loss and land shortage. Table 5.4 
shows that Idete had significantly (p=0.002) many respondents (35%) than M’baya (10%) 
who rented-in land. However, no significant variation (p=0.557), was observed on the 
average land sizes rented-in by households in Idete (0.9 ± 0.1 ha) and M’baya (0.8 ± 0.1 ha) 
(Table 5.5). While land renting in M’baya did not appear to be a common practice, at Idete it 
was only possible by renting-in land from neighbouring villages provided a renter had good 
references in the other village. Land for rent in Idete was not possible because most of the 
households (96%) had acreage ranging from 0 – 4 ha. And those willing to rent-out their 
lands would always commit to either a very distant or peripheral located lands, where crop 
predation by wildlife such as baboons, monkey and elephants was identified as a big problem. 
 
Generally, an hectare of farmland was rented-in for TZS14. 30000.00 – 50000.00 (13.05 – 
21.75 GBP) a year. Idete villagers rent-in land from neighbouring villages of Kisegesi and 
Miwangani at a slightly cheaper rate of TZS. 20000.00 (8.70 GBP) per hectare per a year. 
Idete’s land renters walk relatively longer mean distance (3.5 ± 1.4) km compared to M’baya 
(1.1 ± 0.3) km from their home to where rented-in lands are located (Table 5.5). During the 
entire farming season, farmers spend 4-6 hours a day walking to and from their distant 
rented-in farms. Directly, this reduces effective time of production in the field and, indirectly, 
it lowers daily farmers’ labour output due to body exhaustion and fatigue caused by walking 
long distances. Also distant farms incorporate high risks associated with crop losses that may 
happen due to theft and outbreaks of bush fires. Despite risks and uncertainties attached to the 
far located farmlands, at Idete, farmers found it worth to rent-in land far away from teak 
plantations, since they harbour big populations of crop predatory wildlife. Household cases at 
Idete reported that it was not possible for the affected parties or households to buy land that 
was averagely sold at TZS 1000000.00 (435.00 GBP) per hectare because of financial 
limitations. The sale price for land was found to be more than twenty (20) times higher 
compared to the annual rental value due to high demand exceeding land availability. 
                                                 
14 During time of fieldwork (May – July, 2007), 1 GBP = 2,300/= TZS. 
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5.2.3: Financial capital 
Financial capital includes stocks of financial assets and flow of financial revenues (cash) 
which are available to people and provide them with different livelihood options. Financial 
capital plays an important role of enabling other types of capitals such as natural, human and 
physical capitals to be owned and traded. However, this study was interested mostly with 
changes that happened on status of financial capital at household level following the 
introduction of development projects and their compensation schemes. Data collected 
included household revenues, household agricultural based losses due to land loss and 
compensation payments received. Other liquid financial sources such as credit, pension, 
savings, remittances and off-farm income generating activities in the studied villages were 
found not to be relevant to compensation, thus excluded from this study. 
 
i) Estimated income losses of crops 
Household annual loss of income per hectare of lost land was estimated for all main annual, 
semi-permanent and permanent crops. Household annual loss of income and amount received 
as compensation were used to compare flows of household financial resources in the studied 
village cases. As most of the respondents (typical rural farmers) did not keep records of their 
sales and incomes, the estimation approach was adopted to workout household annual loss of 
income from the average harvest of each crop and its prevailing price in the nearby market. 
 
Annual crops 
Annual crops include all crops grown and harvested within one farming season cycle (within 
a calendar year). In regard to average annual income loss of annual crops per lost hectare of 
land, Idete had a significantly (p<0.001) higher mean value (1.7 ± 0.2)106 TZS/ha than (0.3 ± 
0.1)106 TZS/ha of M’baya (Table 5.6). 
 
Table 5.6: Comparison of financial indicators/variables between studied villages 
Tested variable Groups N Means 
(±SE) 
(000 000) 
Std Dev 
 
(000 000) 
Lavene’s 
F & (p) values 
t-value 
 
p-value 
Estimated loss of annual 
crops (TZS/hh/yr) 
M’baya 22 0.3±0.1 0.3 F=2.982 
(p=0.088) 
-4.055  
Idete 54 1.7±0.2 1.4 (df=74) 0.000 
Estimated loss of s/permanent 
crops (TZS/hh/yr) 
M’baya 33 0.3±0.1 0.3 F=4.349 
(p=0.042) 
1.243  
Idete 24 0.5±0.1 0.4 (df=53) 0.219 
Estimated loss of-permanent 
crops (TZS/hh/yr) 
M’baya 35 1.1±0.3 1.7 F=4.394 
(p=0.043) 
3.950  
Idete 6 0.3±0.1 0.2 (df=36) 0.000 
Compensation received 
(TZS/hh) 
M’baya 30 2.0±0.4 2.2 F=15.854 
(p=0.000) 
5.099  
Idete 13 0.3±0.1 0.3 (df=30) 0.000 
Source: Verification Survey, 2007 
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The difference observed is likely to be influenced by several factors including the type of 
crops cultivated, market prices and agronomical reasons. M’baya’s farmers (36% of 
respondents) largely grew legumes peas for their own food consumption and little for sale 
locally within their village or ward. However, household cases and key informants disclosed 
to why the coastal villagers including M’baya keep on cultivating low priced peas and 
cassava for a special purpose. They mentioned that peas, cassava and cassava leaf vegetable15 
cushion families against food insecurity, as their annual traditional dances16 tend to exploit 
and exhaust all household savings. While at Idete, a large proportion (over 90%) of its 
population grow annual crops such as rice and horticultural crops that are sold at nearby and 
distant markets which offer competitive prices. Idete’s loss of income in association with 
annual crops was relatively large because before the teak project, farmers had good valley 
lands that kept moist soils throughout the year. This allowed them to grow rice and maize 
twice a year. Using the same valley lands they also harvested horticultural produces 3 – 4 
times a year. In other words, the livelihoods of people of Idete were found to be strongly 
linked to annual crops and fertile valleylands (unique valleys) (Photo 5.1). 
 
 
Photo 5.1: Part of the remaining fertile valleylands in Idete village 
                                                 
15 Commonly known as kisamvu in Swahili 
16 Commonly known as mdundiko in Swahili 
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Semi-permanent crops 
These are crops which take more than a year to yield harvests. They include cassava, 
pineapples and other like banana and sugarcane keep on yielding harvests for long period of 
time. On average, Idete’s respondents lost more (0.5 ± 0.1)106 TZS/ha than M’baya’s 
respondents (0.3 ± 0.1)106 TZS/ha in regard to annual income by semi-permanent crops 
(Table 5.6). It should be recalled that SONGAS allowed M’baya’s affected parties to 
continue using their former lands to raise non-permanent crops. However, it was noted that 
some farmers were not using this opportunity. For instance, during the interviews, Mr. 
Ustaadhi (one of the household cases at M’baya) said “a farm with no coconut trees is 
wastage of labour and he was so astonished others do not realise it”17. This was not 
consistent with other respondents who confirmed the practice of growing cassava, legumes, 
pineapples, passions and water-melon were still profitable so long as theft of the latter three 
crops does not happen. 
 
Permanent crops 
Permanent crops contribute significantly to many rural livelihoods in developing countries. 
Permanent crops take years to reach maturity and yield for many years and are therefore 
among the high-valued assets by affected parties during compensation. For example, a 
coconut tree takes seven to ten years to have the first harvest and according to household 
cases in M’baya, a coconut tree can keep yielding (income) for up to 100 years. In regard to 
the loss of income due to permanent crops per hectare of lost land, M’baya recorded a 
significantly (p<0.001) higher mean (1.1 ± 0.3)106 compared to (0.3± 0.1)106 of Idete (Table 
5.6). The observed difference can partly be explained by the fact that few respondents (10%) 
in Idete had 1 – 4 trees of fruits (oranges, mango, palm and other citric trees) while at 
M’baya, 58.3% of respondents had at least half an acre (0.2 ha) of mixed perennial crops (i.e. 
coconut, cashew nuts and mango trees). The majority of M’baya’s households were found to 
have orchards and few households had few fruit trees around their homesteads. The 
livelihood of M’baya’s people is built on mixed cropping and is to say the least, heavily 
dependant on permanent crops. 
                                                 
17 “Siwezi kuwa mjinga sampli hiyo wa kulima ardhi isiyokuwa yangu na huku nikijua wazi bila mnazi ni 
kuupoteza nguvukazi na hasara hii, wengine hawaioni ati!!” 
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ii) Compensation paid 
Although most of the affected parties in both villages discussed the amount of compensation 
received associating it with the land lost, the compensation paid was not computed based on 
land sizes lost by the affected households. While household cases in M’baya reported to have 
received compensation for losses of permanent crops and structures, while Idete’s affected 
parties were compensated for permanent crops only. On average, M’baya’s affected parties 
received a significantly (p<0.001) higher (approx. to 7 folds) compensation per hectare (2.0 ± 
0.4)106 TZS compared to the one received by Idete’s affected parties (0.3 ± 0.1)106 TZS 
(Table 5.6). 
 
The way compensation process and land rights were handled in two villages contributed to 
the observed difference of compensation payments between the studied villages. Firstly, in 
M’baya the affected parties were considered as legitimate occupiers of their respective 
farmlands unlike to those of Idete where the affected parties were regarded as squatters. The 
compensation scheme by SONGAs project in M’baya was prepared and implemented based 
on World Bank’s Operative Directive (OD 4.30) on involuntary resettlement and 
compensation matters. At some stages of the implementation, the process at least involved 
consultations with village government leaders and villagers. According to the project 
resettlement plan documents, URT (1997b & 2000), SONGAS planned to compute 
compensation of the affected assets using government rates. Despite complaints reported, the 
affected parties in M’baya received compensation payments calculated based on market rates 
which by then were approximately three times more than the government rates (Innocent, 
2004). The majority respondents at M’baya complained for uncompensated land and loss of 
profit from their permanent crops.  
 
At Idete, it seems that the KVTC project had a plan from the beginning to focus on assisting 
the host communities through community development and services rather than paying 
compensation to the few individual affected parties. Following a 14 year (1992 – 2006) land 
dispute between the project and affected parties, the KVTC decided to compensate permanent 
and semi-permanent crops and thus few (13) affected parties qualified to get compensation. 
The compensation process took about 3 months and left the majority affected parties (about 
70) uncompensated and the compensated ones unsatisfied with the amount received, as 
annual crops and lands were not compensated for. From the developer’s point of view, 
affected parties had no formal entitlements to land and there was a concern that paying 
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compensation to those claiming squatter’s rights could set a dangerous precedent. 
Compensation paid was regarded as a token provided on humanitarian basis. 
 
5.2.4: Physical capital 
According to Carney (1998), physical capital refers to basic infrastructure such as shelter, 
transport, water, energy supplies, communication and equipment and, means used in 
production in connection to their livelihoods. Table 5.7 shows the results of how households 
spent their compensation in acquiring some basic physical assets. Overall, there were only 2 
respondents from M’baya who managed to buy houses, few renovated (improved) their 
homes and others also bought radios, wheelbarrows, bicycles, knapsack pumps and other 
agricultural hand implements. The acquired physical assets however were categorised into 
two main groups as presented in Table 5.7 below. Idete had relatively higher proportion of 
respondents (30.0± 10.7)% who bought or improved their homes (houses) using 
compensation money than M’baya (19.7 ± 4.4)%. However, for respondents who bought 
other physical assets, Idete shows a relatively low proportion (13.0 ± 5.4)% as compared to 
M’baya (20.9± 5.4)%. 
 
Table 5.7: Comparison of physical capital indicators/variables between studied villages 
Tested variable Groups N Means 
 
Std Dev 
 
Lavene’s 
F & (p) 
values 
t-value 
 
p-value 
Proportion of comp used to 
buy/improve home/house (%) 
M’baya 38 19.7±4.4 26.3 F=2.038 
(p=0.160) 
-1.356  
Idete 13 33.0±10.7 37.2 (df=45) 0.182 
Proportion of comp used to buy 
other assets (%) 
M’baya 38 20.9±5.4 31.9 F=2.433 
(p=0.126) 
0.812  
Idete 13 13.0±5.4 18.7 (df=45) 0.421 
Source: Verification Survey, 2007 
 
5.2.5: Social capital 
According to Barrow and Murphree (2001), social cohesion as important component of social 
capital refers to a sense of common identity and interest which serves to bring people 
together. It arises from a shared history and culture and acts as social glue which persuades 
people, in spite of their differences, to act collectively to enhance mutual interest. Household 
cases reported a decline of social cohesion among community members in their respective 
communities, caused by both development projects and other factors. Respondents were able 
to identify the general causes of the deterioration of social relations among community 
members which included modernisation that has led many people to concentrate on their 
nuclear families as opposed to extended ones.  
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Many respondents in both villages raised a serious concern that development projects 
approach host communities with ‘divide and rule’ tactic in order to achieve their interests. 
For example, household cases and key informants mentioned that there was strong opposition 
to project (in Idete) and controversies in compensation payments (in M’baya). Regardless of 
this recognition, project developers normally do whatever they can, to prevent the affected 
parties from getting full support of their village leaders, influential and educated people. 
However, this can be regarded as a normal situation, as Nakayama (1998) found in many 
studied Asian and African community cases that villagers tend to cast doubts on their leaders 
during emergencies like compensation. 
 
The declining social cohesion in M’baya was also associated with the decreasing number of 
the big mango trees (magnifera indica) in the community as mentioned by household cases. It 
is a very interesting and sensible social-construct story expressed by Mr. Kisikisi (one of the 
household cases) of M’baya village (Box 5.1)  
 
 
 
 
 
Box 5.1: “Dodo mango tree a symbol of social relations in coastal communities” 
 
“The society of M’baya continues to face a huge loss of social values such as social cohesion that was 
embedded in big mango trees/fruits”. This was a serious social concern from Mr. Kisikisi aged 51 years 
and head of the household of 6 people. 
 
In the past, a minority who had no mango trees were allowed to gather mango fruits that have fallen on the 
ground from any mango tree. Of course very few mango owners climbed such big mango trees with wide 
branches. Instead people were accustomed to picking mangoes that have fallen on the ground by the 
influences of wind and bats. This traditional system allowed a gatherer to carry any amount of mangoes 
his/her hands could hold at once (i.e. no bags/vessels) free of charge and this went without asking. The 
community by then supported this arrangement by the commonly adopted slogan that “Why destruct our 
social relations while a mango is a seasonal fruit?” This mango-based social relation brought people (i.e. 
individuals/families) closer to each other. 
 
According to Mr. Kisikisi, SONGAS project has significantly reduced this social arrangement as it 
destroyed more than 150 mango trees (Maginifera indica) in M’baya village. He went on to claim that 
over the past 10 year period, the attitude of M’baya people towards this mango-based social arrangement 
has changed to worse. From his point of view, he identified both the SONGAS project and compensation 
paid to the affected parties as a leading factor in the disruption of social relations between households and 
individuals and subsequently weak social cohesion. Some mango tree owners reached a point of telling the 
mango gatherers who were compensated for losses of their assets including mango trees, “there are no 
free mangoes, buy, otherwise go and eat your papers” - meaning compensation money”. However, Mr. 
Kisikisi also mentioned other factors that have been constantly contributing in the destruction of the 
mango-based social relations as, (i) urbanisation that turns everything including mango fruits into market 
commodities. Majority of mango owners are currently restricting people from having few mangoes 
because of money and (ii) other mango owners have replaced varieties of dodo by new bled shorter and 
early maturity varieties which do not suit the mango-based social arrangement anymore. 
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It was further discovered that in M’baya, the coconut crop carries socio-cultural values from 
one generation to another and this is hinged on respect and inheritance. From social point of 
view, the coconut farm is a symbol of wealth and depending on the farm size, a farm owner is 
in a better position to command respect within his/his family and the society at large. 
According to household cases in M’baya, since coconut trees live longer (more than 70 
years), societies living in the Coast strip in Tanzania value coconut farm as inheritable asset, 
expecting valuers to recognise this value during compensation. 
 
5.3 Local perceptions of status of ecosystem functions and values 
Respondents’ perceptions of whether ecosystem functions were at increase, decrease or 
remain unchanged helped to assess the status of various ecosystems in both study areas. 
Respondents had to compare the times with (after) and without (before) projects.  
 
5.3.1: Changes in land availability 
Across the village cases, over 82% of respondents described the changes in land availability 
as ‘decreased’ (Table 5.8). Land unavailability problem was significantly (p=0.033) 
perceived bigger in Idete (85%) compared to M’baya (78%). Considerable proportions of 
respondents in M’baya (20%) and Idete (7%) perceived land availability was at ‘increase’ in 
their villages. A number of issues and factors leading to differences between the village cases 
in regard to land shortage have been discussed in section 5.2.2. However, other respondents 
argued that land was available, but was selling at very high prices for poor people to afford. 
For example, in Idete, depending on land suitability, the current market values of one hectare 
of farmland ranges between 450,000/= – 600,000/= TZS. Before the project, prices for one 
hectare were between 50,000/= 120,000/= TZS. At M’baya, one hectare is valued at more 
than 2 million TZS, partly due to high demand relative to land available near to the capital 
city. Depending on the farming system practised, the land shortage due to high demand 
relative to land available challenges production systems differently in each village and were 
also caused by different factors, including the demands for land by the projects studied. The 
analyses on this problem in M’baya and Idete revealed that SONGAS and KVTC 
development projects were not the only cause of land pressure but other factors exist such as 
conservation projects (in Idete) and land buyers and speculators from the capital city (in 
M’baya). Section 5.2.2(ii) presents details of these factors and Appendices 5.27 and 5.28 
summarise them in the form of flow chart. Major negative outcomes of this problem reported 
 Paul Mtoni  Cranfield University, 2010 
 
147
by respondents in both village cases included reduced household food production and 
decreased household annual incomes. 
 
5.3.2: Changes in soil fertility 
Table 5.8 shows that 74% of overall respondents were aware that their lands were constantly 
losing soil fertility. In Idete, a significant higher proportion (p<0.001) of respondents (88%) 
reported the decrease of soil fertility in their farms compared to M’baya’s proportion (60%). 
Proportions of 22% and 12% from M’baya and Idete respectively noted that the soil fertility 
was ‘unchanged’ in their farms. While no one (0%) at Idete reported ‘increase’ of soil 
fertility, 18% of M’baya’s respondents perceived ‘increase’ of fertility in their farms. Despite 
the type of mixed cropping system practiced in M’baya having potentials of maintaining soil 
fertility, most likely the proportion of respondents were among the few good farmers who 
observe agronomic advices carefully. For instance, soil fertility can be promoted or 
maintained for substantial period of time if leguminous crops are mixed with other crops and 
if crop residues remain in the field after harvest. This has been discussed in Section 5.4.3 as 
counterfactual implications in M’baya. Appendix 5.27 shows the analysis of loss of soil 
fertility reported in M’baya village and that this is associated with reduced mixed cropping 
practices. Many affected farmers reported that farmlands affected by the SONGAS pipeline 
are not as productive as before and thus count them as lost lands.  
 
Table 5.8: Respondents’ perceptions after introduction of projects in village cases 
 
Variable 
 
Category 
Percentages of respondents (%) Pearson 
Chi-square 
(χ2) 
 
p-Value M’baya 
(N=60) 
Idete 
(N=60) 
Totals 
(N=120) 
Changes in land availability Increased 20 7 13   
(Production/Provision Decreased 78 85 82 6.830  
functions) Unchanged 2 8 5 (df=2) 0.033 
       
Changes in soil fertility Increased 18 0 9   
(Support and regulation Decreased 60 88 74 16.047  
functions) Unchanged 22 12 17 (df=2) 0.000 
       
Changes in traditional knowledge Increased 46 27 36   
and innovation systems (Cultural Decreased 27 49 38 6.703  
and information functions) Unchanged 27 24 26 (df=2) 0.035 
       
Changes in natural forests and Increased 7 43 25   
woodlands Decreased 90 48 69 24.949  
(Habitat and carrier functions) Unchanged 3 9 6 (df=2) 0.000 
Source: Verification Survey, 2007 
 
In Idete, farmers use fallow and shifting cultivation to maintain soil fertility. This practice is 
currently limited by land shortage caused by demographic, conservation and development 
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factors (Appendix 5.28). However, a large area of village land has been acquired by the 
Prisons department (over 6,000 ha), Udzungwa national park (over 5,000 ha), KVTC project 
(over 4,000 ha), MIFURA and other individual farmers (over 600 ha). Generally, villagers in 
Idete tend to see the Teak project developer as the main cause of the problem as it was the 
most recent case of land acquisition in their village. 
 
5.3.3: Changes in traditional knowledge and innovation systems 
Perceptions of changes in traditional knowledge and innovation systems was significantly 
different (p=0.035) between the village cases (Table 5.8). M’baya’s respondents 46%, 27% 
and 27% again perceived changes in traditional knowledge and innovation systems 
respectively to have ‘increased’, ‘decreased’ and remained ‘unchanged’. In Idete, respective 
proportions of respondents were 27%, 49% and 24%. 
 
Despite unsatisfactory performance of traditional knowledge systems, respondents confirmed 
its existence and importance in their main livelihood activities. More information is discussed 
in Section 5.2.2(iv). Most respondents in M’baya have informal education and hence perceive 
the underway efforts of promoting and supporting formal education in their village and ward 
comprehends their informal knowledge and innovation. The majority of respondents in Idete 
perceived the disassociation from their land as a big loss as far as traditional skills and 
knowledge are concerned. For example, one of the household cases in Idete (Mzee 
Washamba Washamba in Appendix 5.13) asked “In this state of almost landlessness, how 
can I teach my children the skills and innovative principles of doing special tasks that I have 
been carrying out in my farm which has been taken away?” Mzee Washamba (80 years old) 
who migrated from Ruvuma region lost his farmland (1.4 ha) to the teak project. He had been 
cultivating this land since 1970 and he claimed the land was unique and specially chosen and 
was acquired through bush clearing. According to him, its landscape posed several challenges 
that required him and his children to adopt practices such as pit18 and ridge cultivation to 
ensure that their farm retained sufficient moisture throughout the year in order to allow dry 
season farming. 
                                                 
18 Pit cultivation also known as ngoro is commonly practiced on hilly lands in Ruvuma region (Southern 
Tanzania). The practice avoids soil erosion and conserves soil moisture and nutrients for long periods of time. 
But it is labour intensive and requires specialized skills. 
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5.3.4: Changes in natural forests and woodlands 
Generally, 83 (69%) out of 120 respondents across both village cases felt carrier and habitat 
functions of the natural environment were deteriorating in their communities. Compared to 
Idete’s respondents (48%), M’baya had significantly (p<0.001) and extremely higher 
proportion of respondents (90%) who reported “decreased” status of natural forests and 
woodlands. It was noted that 43% and 7% respondents at Idete and M’baya respectively, 
perceived the status was at “increase”. 
 
The high level of deterioration of natural forests and woods is more obvious in M’baya. 
However this was not related to SONGAS project but consequences of urbanisation of the 
processes in Dar es Salaam city and Mkuranga town. For decades now, over 90% of urban 
population had been relying on woodfuel for cooking and their demand for energy have 
impacted negatively to the nearby natural forests including M’baya. It was also reported that 
charcoal makers have cleared off all big trees and they have recently resorted into big mango 
trees and shrubs. 
 
Mixed perceptions in Idete that natural forests and woodlands were at increase and decrease 
are very interesting and both perceptions make sense especially when linked to discussions 
held with household cases, key informants and focus group participants. The increased 
quality can be explained by key informants’ and focus group discussion participants’ views 
that destructive activities on natural resources base (e.g. outbreaks of bush fires, illegal 
hunting of wildlife and logging) have significantly been reduced by the efforts led by KVTC 
project. Household cases and other respondents acknowledged the above efforts but criticised 
the idea of replacing native tree species by teak trees (plantations). They thought that the 
latter have negative implications to the natural environment such as loss of native trees 
species that have been replaced by teak trees; declining bee colonies due to the reduced 
miombo woodland forests which provided most of their nectar; application of herbicides 
affect other vegetations and; destruction of watersheds (water sources).  
 
Local people’s perceptions on deterioration of natural environment were found to be 
consistent with many research findings done in the area. Kilombero valley is a home to many 
wildlife including an endemic and threatened puku or southern kob, Adenota vardoni (ODA, 
1992). The study by Jenkins et al. (2002) found that the loss of miombo forests have 
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significantly affected larger species of antelopes such as sable (Hipppotragus niger) and 
waterbuck (Kobus ellipsiprymnus) and recommended further studies be undertaken to 
determine levels of habitat use by antelopes in and around maturing teak plantations. Bowkett 
et al. (2007) concluded that little is known about habitats, abundance and distribution of 
many species of wildlife such as African forest antelopes and duikers and noted that 
increasing human activities in Kilombero valley threaten these wildlife. To ensure sustainable 
livelihoods and development in Kilombero valley, Kangalawe and Liwenga (2005) and 
Harrison (2006) called for integrated efforts to address land use conflicts among local 
communities, conservation and agriculture sectors including sugarcane and teak plantations. 
 
5.4 Benefits and costs of project cases 
Development projects usually have well intended stated goals and objectives. However, 
projects often make some people benefit and others lose. Respondents were asked to mention 
and rank benefits and costs attributable to activities of project cases. Knowing the reality that 
individuals are likely to perceive benefits and costs differently (Gregory et al., 1991 and 
Kideghesho and Mtoni, 2008a), a suggested way of aggregating their feelings using 
numerical magnitude as (shown in Section 3.5.2) is possible. 
 
5.4.1: Benefits and costs in M’baya village 
Respondents of the verification survey in M’baya identified the following benefits and costs, 
as associated with SONGAS project. 
 
i) Benefits 
Respondents’ ranking in M’baya village appreciated the first three benefits accrued from the 
gas project as improved community services (TS=149); transmission of electricity line 
(TS=72) and; new houses or improved homes (TS=9) (Table 5.9). 
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Table 5.9: Benefits and costs of the SONGAS project perceived by residents of M’baya  
 
Benefits and costs 
Number of household and scores (N=60) Total 
Score 
(TS) 1
st Rank 2nd Rank 3rd Rank 
Count Score Count Score Count Score 
B
en
ef
its
 
(g
ai
ns
) 
Improved basic community services 46 138 5 10 1 1 149 
Transmission of electricity within 
the village 
5 15 28 56 1 1 72 
Acquired new house or improved 
home 
2 6 1 2 1 1 9 
Cash/money from compensation 2 6 0 0 1 1 7 
Temporary employment 0 0 1 2 3 3 4 
C
os
ts
 
(L
os
se
s)
 
Increased land shortage and decline 
of soil fertility problems 
28 −84 17 −34 16 −16 −134 
Reduced income from perennial 
crops 
20 −60 27 −54 16 −16 −130 
Hazards and risks associated to gas 5 −15 7 −14 10 −10 −39 
Relocation disturbances 6 −18 3 −6 3 −3 −27 
Source: Verification Survey, 2007 
Legend:  Weight allocation: (1st Rank = 3); (2nd Rank = 2); and (3rd Rank = 1). 
Score = Number of respondents (HHs) times weight allocated to each rank. 
 
Basic community services 
The benefits accrued under this category included support to improve education, health and 
water supply facilities in the village. SONGAS has been funding the improvement of 
classrooms, desks, furniture and teachers’ houses in M’baya primary school and recently the 
developer has donated 49 million TZS for that enabled the construction of Tambani Ward 
secondary school located in M’baya (Photo 5.2). SONGAS has been supporting the village 
dispensary (i.e. improvement of buildings, facilities and health campaigns) in terms of quality 
services delivery so that it gets upgraded to the health centre status. Respondents however felt 
that the developer has been reluctant if not slow in fulfilling this promise. The village also got 
a shallow borehole for clean water supply. All respondents were dissatisfied with the 
location, specifications and workmanship of the borehole (Appendix 5.29). Villagers blame 
both their village leaders and the project developer, for failing to keep a close supervision to 
the contractor’s work. 
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Photo 5.2: Part of the construction of Tambani Ward secondary school located at M’baya and 
supported by SONGAS project. 
 
Transmission of electricity 
The gas project developer also promised to distribute electricity in M’baya village and free 
installation of electricity to 50 homes. Again, the implementation of this promise faced two 
big challenges viz. (i) the contractor for the construction of the transmission line destroyed 
other farmers’ crops (photo 5.3) without informing them. The District Commissioner of 
Mkuranga district suspended the construction of the transmission line and resolution of 
compensation claims were still going on and, (ii) the distribution of the 50 application forms 
for free installation of electricity caused misunderstandings between villagers and their 
village leaders, as many felt that those who got the application forms were favoured. 
However, this benefit scheme involved a number of mistakes including lack of involvement 
of villagers in setting the criteria for selecting the beneficiaries. In addition, they wanted to 
know why only 50 and not all, the affected parties in particular. 
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Photo 5.3: Coconut and fruit trees cut down by contractor without informing the owners at 
M’baya village. 
 
New house and improved home 
The Majority of M’baya’s affected parties used their compensation to improve the walls and 
roofing of their houses and a few bought or constructed new houses. 
 
ii) Costs 
Table 5.9 shows ranking of the first three big losses encountered as a result of the project. 
These were land shortage and declining soil fertility (TS= −134); reduced income from 
perennial crops (TS= −130) and; gas hazards and risks (TS= −39). 
 
Land shortage and declining soil fertility 
Sections 5.2.2(ii), (iii) and 5.3.1 and 5.3.2 describe the losses associated with this cost. 
 
Reduced income from perennial crops 
Loss of income earned from permanent crops is discussed in 5.2.3(i). Focusing on coconut as 
an example, one of the household cases in M’baya (Mr. Kisikisi) clearly outlined how loss of 
profit and other benefits associated with consumption of coconut products are realised 
(Appendix 5.4). His arguments make sense and logically shows the compensation paid (TZS. 
25,000/= per coconut tree) only covered the costs for seeding materials and perhaps a care for 
the first 3 years. Based on the fact that coconut trees take 6-9 years to reach maturity, Mr. 
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Kisikisi posed the question where is compensation for loss of income he used to earn every 
year (TZS. 20000/=) 
 
Gas hazards and risks 
Respondents claimed to have known about the hazards and risk associated with their 
community lives after seeing the caution signposts erected along the way-leave (Photo 5.4). 
The majority respondents, especially those living close to the gas pipeline worry much about 
safety in regard to health risks and fire hazards likely to occur in case of gas leakage. 
Household cases interviewed in M’baya expressed much worries and fears that disturb their 
psychological peace of mind. They also perceived that risks and hazards potentially affect 
(reduce) values of properties. This is inline with conceptualisation of Payne et al. (1987); 
McClelland et al. (1990) and Gregory et al. (1991) who noted that fears and worries are 
typical examples that can cause loss of welfare which needs to be compensated for. 
 
 
Photo 5.4: One of the signposts by SONGAS project at M’baya displaying a warning 
message that “DANGER the gas pipeline passes underneath” 
 
5.4.2: Benefits and costs in Idete village 
Benefits and costs associated with KVTC project were identified and ranked by respondents 
who participated in the verification survey at Idete village as follows; 
 
i) Benefits 
Table 5.10 shows that benefits gained in Idete from KVTC project included improved basic 
community services and humanitarian aids as first (TS=158); temporary employment as 
second (TS=39) and; increased revenue to the village government as third (TS=28). 
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Table 5.10: Benefits and costs to people of Idete as influenced by the teak project 
 
Benefits and costs 
Number of household and scores (N=60) Total 
Score 
(TS) 
1st Rank 2nd Rank 3rd Rank  
Count Score Count Score Count Score 
B
en
ef
its
 
(g
ai
ns
) 
Improved basic community services 
and humanitarian aids 
43 129 12 24 5 5 158 
Temporary employment 3 9 10 20 10 10 39 
Increased revenue of the village 
government 
5 15 4 8 5 5 28 
Increased awareness on HIV/AIDS & 
environmental management issues 
2 6 8 16 4 4 26 
Acquired new/improved home 2 6 5 10 6 6 22 
Missing (No benefits/No more than 
that)take out  
5  21  30   
C
os
ts
 
(L
os
se
s)
 
Land shortage and loss of fertile 
arable lands 
39 −117 14 −28 17 −17 −162 
Loss of natural forests and 
destruction of water sources 
14 −42 13 −26 8 −8 −76 
Reduced income from agricultural 
and horticultural crops 
5 −15 15 −30 13 −13 −58 
Increased crop predatory 1 −3 8 −16 5 −5 −24 
Inadequate/no compensation and 
Relocation disturbances 
1 −3 7 −14 2 −2 −19 
Missing (No costs/No more than that) 0  3  15   
Source: Verification Survey, 2007 
Legend:  Weight allocation: (1st Rank = 3); (2nd Rank = 2); and (3rd Rank = 1). 
Score = Number of respondents (HHs) times weight allocated to each rank. 
 
Improved basic community services and humanitarian aids 
So far the teak project through KVTC has supported Idete village in a number of service-
based activities such as construction of earth roads, village market, nurse’s house, and 
classrooms in both primary and secondary schools (Photo 5.5). It has also provided the 
village with food during the food shortage in 2004/05 and continuously provides orphans 
with food, clothes and school needs. KVTC has special and unique arrangements in place, 
where funds are channelled to all villages including Idete through ‘social fund’ and ‘annual 
bonus of contracts to foster community based services and development (Appendix 4.4). 
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Photo 5.5: Part of the classrooms of Idete Ward secondary school located at Idete village and 
partly supported by KVTC teak project. 
 
Like M’baya, respondents of Idete complained with regard to the implementation of 
beneficial activities or the use of money received through social fund and annual bonus of 
contracts (Appendix 4.4). These included (i) villagers are not involved in the identification of 
needs and prioritisation of activities for funding, planning and implementation; (ii) the eight 
contracts were prepared by one side (the project developer); (iii) amount set as social fund is 
too little compared to land taken; (iv) the process of approving activity proposal and making 
money available to the village authority takes a lot of time of village leaders (KVTC 
bureaucracy) and; (v) road construction destroyed crops and properties without information 
nor compensation. All of the above complaints reveal a problem associated with lack of 
involvement of host community members in various important issues such as planning and 
implementation of their development activities. 
 
Temporary employment 
KVTC has provided preferential employment to host communities including Idete through 
the eight contracts, in which villagers work under supervision of their village government 
leaders. According to many, this arrangement has helped them significantly, especially during 
the dry season when their farm activities have decreased. However, respondents disliked the 
following in regard to the arrangement, (i) delays in paying their wages in which it takes 5 – 
8 months to get their wage after completion of an assignment; (ii) wages have remained 
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unrevised since 2003 and; (iii) KVTC’s decision of introducing a new system of using 
contractors denies host villagers the preference to work, as contractors bring labourers from 
elsewhere. All these issues are related to inefficiency of the system that is jointly made-up by 
KVTC’s staff, Village leaders and concerned labours.  
 
Increased revenue to the village government 
According to the eight contracts between KVTC and Village government authority, the 
former is entitled of annual bonus that caters for administrative and supervisory charges and 
is disbursed when implementation of all specified activities is done according to all eight 
contracts. Otherwise, reduction policy applies. Village leaders found the arrangement good 
but they were unhappy with delays in issuing payments. They also wanted rates to be 
reviewed in order to reflect the actual expenses incurred by village government and 
contractors in carrying out the contracted tasks. 
 
ii) Costs 
Table 6.10 indicates the way losses were ranked in Idete. Land shortage and loss of fertile 
arable lands was ranked first (TS= −162), loss of natural forests and destruction of water 
sources ranked second (TS= −76) and reduced income from agricultural and horticultural 
produces ranked third (TS= −58). All these costs have been discussed in Sections 5.2.2(ii), 
(iii) and 5.3.1; 5.2.3(i) and 5.3.4. 
 
5.4.3: Counterfactual analysis of gains and losses in the village cases 
Compensation payments were made to the villagers in M’baya and Idete in recognition of the 
losses incurred as a consequence of the development projects. The counterfactual analysis 
against which compensation payments can be set is the situation that would have prevailed in 
the absence of the development projects. This could take a variety of forms namely, (i) a 
continuation of the pre development situation, (ii) some change involving either an 
improvement or deterioration in social, economic and environmental conditions. In principle, 
compensation payments should recognise the change in welfare of the affected parties that is 
attributable to project development compared to the ‘without’ project development situation. 
The main basis for compensation in the studied villages namely, (i) the performance of 
agriculture and, (ii) the provision of community services such as education, were used as the 
basis for counterfactual analyses. In addition, the land rights and trends of both the 
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demographic and distribution factors in the two village cases, the analyses predicted different 
future situations that would have occurred in each village if the project did not happen. 
 
At M’baya, villagers had more rights to their farmlands they and hence entitlement to 
compensation. Their future incomes from their farmlands, permanent crops in particular 
would have been as higher as compared to what happened after the project. The farming 
system in M’baya village as presented in Section 5.1.2(vi) and 5.2.3(i) is dominated by mixed 
cropping where semi-permanent and permanent crops such as coconut, cashew nut and fruit 
trees. If this cropping system continued without project interference, agricultural based future 
incomes of the affected households would have been higher than now because they could 
have kept improving their mixed cropping of permanent, semi-permanent and annual crops 
constantly using modern farming techniques. For instance, affected parties could have earned 
more income from improved varieties of both the permanent and semi-permanent crops 
grown in their mixed farming system in M’baya. This might have been a case for more 
compensation for those negatively affected because losses were higher than under the current 
situation. 
 
Unlike M’baya village, affected parties in Idete were regarded as squatters because the 
majority of the villagers migrated from neighbouring regions (Section 5.2.1(iv)). The 
counterfactual analysis indicates that if KVTC project did not happen, conditions facing land 
occupants and the performance of faming could have deteriorated over time (Table 5.10). The 
reported trends of migration of farmers looking for fertile farmlands and livestock herders 
looking for pasture and water would have possibly increased land use disputes over the land 
now occupied by the teak project. This is because Idete village has no village land use plan in 
place to help regulate the rival land uses. Without the KVTC project in Idete, the population 
pressures would have mounted and sentiments between farmers and herders might have 
resulted into serious conflicts like in Kilosa district and Ihefu wetlands in Mbarali district 
(Benjaminsen, et al., 2009). This could have generally reduced agricultural production and 
yields on marginal soils, as the soil fertility and land arability could have deteriorated. 
 
In addition, it should be noted that in the north, Idete village borders Udzungwa national park 
and a number of forest reserves. If migration of farmers and herders was left to continue, the 
resource use conflicts could mount and exert more pressure on the existing protected areas. 
This could prompt the government to relocate an entire community of Idete in order to 
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resolve the resource use conflicts and promote conservation activities. Perhaps, this could 
have been an end of Idete village. It is apparent that the affected parties in Idete village 
received reduced compensation payments in recognition of their limited entitlement and 
possibly uncertain future discussed above.  
 
5.5 Key messages 
The following are the key messages arising from the review of compensation outcomes at 
both household and community levels in relation to the studied project cases. 
 
Compensation implications on rural people’s livelihoods 
Project developers consider periods of land occupancy by households and possession of 
permanent crops or trees on land as important indicators of both property rights and 
compensation entitlements.  
 
Both studied village cases depend on agricultural crop production for their livelihoods. 
Agricultural production of all types of crops was declining and mainly caused by land 
shortage, decline in soil fertility, change in farming system, change of land use, and crop 
predation. Land shortage was reported by household respondents as a big issue of concern 
and its manifestations include small household acreage, labour redundancy, increasing land 
renting-in from other villages, persistent food shortage, decreasing income per capita and 
increased land disputes. Impairment of rural livelihood caused by development projects 
increases with “severity of land loss” which is the ratio of the land occupied or used after to 
the land occupied or used before the project. 
 
Social capital and people’s livelihoods 
Social capital was identified to be important in bringing people together, especially during 
problems or when a society faces challenges such as hosting a development project, 
relocation and compensation schemes. However, social cohesion and trust components of 
social capital were declining among community members in the studied village cases due to 
modernisation, growing rural poverty and development projects. Cultural, knowledge and 
information flow systems in both village cases are embedded on people’s livelihood activities 
and are linked to sacred places, landscapes and farming systems. Lack of land use planning in 
the studied villages also contributed to land disputes and impairment of their livelihoods.  
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Compensation and gender 
Gender equality in both development and compensation processes was highlighted by the 
majority household cases, as it improves many aspects of planning, decision-making, 
implementation and monitoring. Specific to compensation, gender equality was mentioned to 
have potentials for promotion of wise use of compensation payments (money), sharing 
benefit, safety, security and participation at both household and community levels. 
 
Ecosystem functions 
Respondents identified production, regulation, information and habitats as ecosystem 
functions of benefit to them. With the exception of information, the other three ecosystem 
functions were perceived to face a decrease or deterioration largely influenced by 
development projects. Land shortage, decline of soil fertility and deteriorating natural forests 
were specific adverse outcomes threaten livelihoods of the affected parties and host 
communities. Planning and implementation of compensation schemes that are done through 
involving the affected parties and host communities have great potentials of improving 
compensation outcomes including positive aspects of the project and minimising disruptions 
on people’s livelihoods and ecosystem functions. 
 
Benefits and costs of development projects 
Despite the reported pitfalls of delivering the promised benefits to the host communities, the 
general analysis of gains and losses at community level showed resultant benefits. This seems 
to suggest that provision of supports to community based services such as education is 
perhaps an effective way of compensating for the community-based losses and part of 
individual household losses in developing economies. However, written agreements between 
the project developers and host communities in relation to provision of benefit or any support 
are necessary. 
 
Counterfactual analysis of compensation entitlements and payments 
The counterfactual analysis indicates that the affected parties and other community members 
at M’baya deserved more compensation as their future incomes from their permanent crops 
would have been as higher as compared to what happened after the project. At Idete, the 
rivalry land uses (i.e. crop husbandry and animal husbandry) would have led the community 
to complicated conflicts and low farm productivity and hence low compensation. 
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Chapter 6 ASSESSMENT OF LOSSES AND COMPENSATION 
PAYMENTS 
 
This chapter presents the quantitative results of the household verification survey conducted 
in M’baya and Idete villages in relation to compensation schemes by SONGAS and KVTC 
project cases respectively. Among other aspects (as reported in chapter 5), the survey 
explored components and elements of losses encountered by the affected parties and 
compensation payments received. Compensation payments received by respondents are 
compared with their perceived losses of household incomes and calculated total losses from 
the survey data (Figure 6.1). The chapter also presents variables that correlate with different 
types of losses which were further analysed using multiple linear regressions to help explain 
the variations in observed losses. 
 
 
Figure 6.1: Methods for assessing losses and compensation payments 
 
6.1 Stocks of assets and flows in the affected households 
A total of 120 households were interviewed during the verification survey in order to 
determine factors and components of losses encountered during compensation in the studied 
villages. Table 6.1 below displays descriptive statistics for the selected household assets and 
flows of services in the affected households (affected parties) related to both losses and 
compensation payments. With the exception of distance to rented farmland, income of annual 
crops and land lost in M’baya village has noticeably larger mean values in all reported 
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variables compared to Idete village. These statistics have been used in the discussion of 
results in different sections of this chapter. 
 
Table 6.1: Descriptive statistics for household assets and flows related to losses and actual 
compensation received in the studied village cases 
 
Household assets/flows 
M’baya Idete Overall 
N Mean ±SE SD N Mean ±SE SD Mean ±SE SD 
Age of household head (years)*** 60 58.1±1.7 13.2 60 45.9±1.9 15.1 52.0±1.4 15.4 
Household size (Number of family 
members)** 
60 7.4±0.4 3.1 60 5.7±0.3 2.3 6.6±0.3 2.9 
Household labour per ha (Number/ha) 60 1.8±0.4 2.8‡ 60 1.4±0.2 1.2 1.6±0.2 2.2‡ 
Land occupied/used (ha/hh)* 57 2.9±0.3 2.5 56 1.9±0.3 1.9 2.4±0.2 2.2 
Distance to rented land (km)** 6 1.1±0.3 0.8 21 3.5±1.4 6.6‡ 3.0±1.1 5.9‡ 
Income of annual crops (106 
TZS/hh19)*** 
22 0.3±0.1 0.3 54 1.7±0.2 1.4 1.3±0.2 1.3 
Income of s/permanent crops (106 
TZS/hh) 
33 0.3±0.1 0.3 24 0.5±0.1 0.4 0.4±0.1 0.4 
Income of permanent crops (106 
TZS/hh)*** 
35 1.1±0.3 1.7‡ 6 0.3±0.1 0.2 0.9±0.2 1.4‡ 
Land occupancy (years)*** 38 39.3±3.7 23.1 55 18.4±1.6 11.8 27±2.1 20.1 
Land lost (ha/hh)*** 38 0.9±0.1 0.7 55 1.8±0.2 1.3 1.5±0.1 1.2 
Perceived hh loss of income (106 
TZS/hh)** 
38 7.9±1.7 10.2‡ 55 3.5±0.4 2.9 5.3±0.8 7.2‡ 
Intangible losses (Weighted 
Number/hh)* 
60 7.4±0.3 2.5 60 10.4±0.4 2.8 8.9±0.3 3.1 
Perceived benefits (Weighted 
Number/hh)** 
60 6.9±0.4 3.1 60 7.9±0.5 3.7 7.4±0.3 3.5 
Calculated total loss (106 TZS/hh)** 38 8.8±1.9 11.9‡ 55 9.8±1.1 8.1 9.4±1.0 9.8‡ 
Actual compensation paid (106 
TZS/hh)*** 
30 2.0±0.4 2.2‡ 13 0.3±0.1 0.3 1.5±0.3 2.0‡ 
*** p< 0.001 
** p<0.01 
* p<0.05 
‡Standard deviation (SD) is greater than the mean value-indicating volatile conditions surround the measured parameter 
Source: Household Verification Survey (2007). 
 
6.2 Comparison of compensation payments and losses 
This section compares the actual amount of compensation received by the affected parties in 
the village cases with both the perceived losses of household incomes by respondents and 
calculated total household losses in order to explore relationships between the three 
parameters. It is worth noting that the major source of household incomes in both village 
cases is agricultural crops as presented in section 5.2.3(ii). Crop losses were initially 
estimated based on size of household farmlands lost to development projects (i.e. SONGAS 
in M’baya and KVTC in Idete). In discussion with respondents, estimation of crop yields 
(tonnes) per area (hectare) lost and then multiplied by area of farmland affected was USED to 
estimate losses of their household incomes. And finally, both the perceived losses of 
household annual incomes (PLHIs) and calculated total household losses were presented in 
                                                 
19 During fieldwork (April – July 2007) exchange rates were: 1GBP = 2300 TZS and 1USD = 1200 TZS 
 Paul Mtoni  Cranfield University, 2010 
 
163
terms of Tanzanian Shillings per household (TZS/hh). This facilitated the comparison of 
losses incurred by households with the compensation received. 
 
Losses per hectare of land and per household are equally important in the process of 
estimation of losses. Valuation of crops is considerably easier if approached using average 
annual yields and areas affected. Then, compensation for crops can be determined according 
to the market or equivalent value of the lost crops. Other losses need to be accounted for, 
such as loss or damage to affected structures using either market prices or replacement costs. 
Losses can be summed up together to provide a basis for compensation payments to 
individuals or households. 
 
Two different methods were used to analyse compensation payments and losses encountered 
by the affected parties. Graphs were used to compare actual compensation received with both 
the perceived loss of household annual income and calculated total household loss. The 
equivalence line in each graph was obtained by matching vertical and horizontal scales into 
“one-to-one” relationship to show whether the losses match compensation payments. The 
estimates of regression line of fit were used to establish relationships between compensation 
payments and losses. The relationships between variables were established using simple 
linear regression analysis (equation 6.1). 
 
y = a +bx……………………………………………………………… (6.1) 
Where:  
y = dependent variable (criterion) 
a = constant (intercept) 
x =independent variables (predictor) 
b = Coefficients of predictor 
 
An attempt was made to remove outliers that appeared not to belong to the two samples in 
order to improve the fraction of the variations in dependent variable explained by predictor 
variables. Estimates of perceived losses of household annual incomes and reported crop 
harvests of each respondent were examined with respect to the areas of their lost farmlands 
eventually compared with standard crop productivity data for the rain-fed subsistence 
agriculture, obtained from the Ministry of Agriculture and other secondary sources. This 
helped to identify 8 cases (27%) out of 30 of M’baya and 3 cases (23%) out 13 of Idete as 
extreme cases that were considered as outliers. When these cases were removed from their 
 Paul Mtoni  Cranfield University, 2010 
 
164
respective samples, the percentages of variation accounted in all predictions increased. 
Appendix 6.1 presents figures (6.2b, 6.3b, 6.4b, 6.5b, 6.6b and 6.7b) of improved prediction 
sets (lines of fit) that can be compared with their respective figures 6.2a, 6.3a, 6.4a, 6.5a, 
6.6a and 6.7a that predict lines of fit through treating all cases in each village case.  
 
However, the proportion of cases removed in each sample was high, which from the research 
point of view might not really be outliers but cases with valuable information. Therefore, the 
reported findings were obtained from the analyses including all cases, as there may well be 
important information contained in such extreme cases that is also worth interpretation. This 
is however an important methodological point to be considered in future studies in order to 
obtain rich information and better results through involving a number of extreme cases, if 
possible and, to have more analysis options. This suggestion is consistent with Flyvbjerg’s 
(2001) conclusion that atypical and extreme cases often reveal valuable information, as they 
involve unique factors and sometimes more variables and basic mechanisms in their 
situations compared with typical or average cases.  
 
6.2.1: Perceived losses of household annual income  
During interviews with household cases, losses of land and income flow were identified as 
the main losses encountered following project operations in their villages. Respondents of the 
verification survey were then asked to estimate their perceived losses of income flows at 
household level (PLHIs). Present values of future annuity of PLHIs at 15% discount rate of 
interest were calculated in each case, as explained in section 3.5.3. Figures 6.2a and 6.3a 
compare the amounts of compensation paid with the perceived losses of income by 
households in M’baya and Idete villages respectively. 
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Figure 6.2a: Perceived loss of household annual income and compensation received in 
M’baya village-paid by SONGAS project in 1997 
 
 
Figure 6.3a: Perceived loss of household annual income and compensation received in Idete 
village-paid by KVTC project in 2006 
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At M’baya, 38 out 60 respondents of the verification survey were compensated by SONGAS 
project, of which 30 were willing to report the amounts of compensation they received. 
Figure 6.2 shows that only the PLHIs for three (3) households matched with the 
compensation they received and all three were among the minimum income loss perceivers at 
M’baya. The perceived losses of income for the other 27 affected households (90%) were 
under the equivalence line, indicating their perceived losses of incomes were not fully 
compensated. On the other hand, the teak (KVTC) project compensated a total of 14 
households in Idete, of which 13 participated in the verification survey. The PLHIs for all 13 
households were under the equivalence line, of which eleven (11) clustered close to the line 
and two (2) were located very far from the line because of their relatively higher PLHIs 
(Figure 6.3).  
 
Table 6.2: Estimations of regression lines for the actual compensation received in the studied 
village cases. 
C
as
e  
 
Predictor variables 
 
Unstandardised 
Coefficients 
Standardised 
Coefficients 
(Beta ‘β’) 
 
t 
 
R2 
B SE 
M
’b
ay
a 
 
 
All cases 
Constant 1600000 560000  2.826**  
Perceived loss of hh income (TZS/hh) 0.04 0.04 0.202 2.092 0.04 
Improved 
(reduced 
cases) 
Constant -160000 715000  -0.223  
Perceived loss of hh income (TZS/hh) 0.32 0.11 0.575 2.812* 0.33 
 
All cases 
Constant 1300000 480000  2.661*  
Calculated hh total loss (TZS/hh) 0.08 0.03 0.436 2.561* 0.19 
Improved 
(reduced 
cases) 
Constant -120000 394000  -0.304  
Calculated hh total loss (TZS/hh) 0.42 0.07 0.816 5.655*** 0.67 
Id
et
e 
 
All cases 
Constant 134000 86000  1.558  
Perceived loss of hh income (TZS/hh) 0.04 0.02 0.545 2.156* 0.30 
Improved 
(reduced 
cases) 
Constant 93000 87000  1.068  
Perceived loss of hh income (TZS/hh) 0.07 0.02 0.737 3.087* 0.54 
 
All cases 
Constant 14000 70000  0.199  
Calculated hh total loss (TZS/hh) 0.02 0.00 0.806 4.504** 0.65 
Improved 
(reduced 
cases)  
Constant 20000 49000  0.401  
Calculated hh total loss (TZS/hh) 0.04 0.01 0.932 7.290*** 0.87 
***p< 0.001 
** p<0.01 
* p<0.05 
Source: Household Verification Survey (2007). 
 
Table 6.2 shows that the linear relationship between the PLHIs and actual compensation 
received was not significant in M’baya, but was significant in Idete (p<0.05). The importance 
of people’s perceptions varied widely in accounting for the results. The PLHIs explained only 
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30% (R2=0.30) of the variations observed in compensation received in Idete. However, the 
results indicate that for every PLHIs of 1 TZS an affected party or household at Idete 
received only 4 cents of TZS as compensation. The compensation paid at the rate of 4% was 
very low and did not offset the perceived loss of household incomes, leaving aside other 
losses. This confirms undercompensation the affected parties reported and discussed in the 
previous chapters. The study recognises the possibility that respondents exaggerate their 
estimates of perceived loss of household incomes to gain further personal compensation or at 
the community level. Such bias can be avoided through using standard data from secondary 
sources (such as crop or land productivity and market information) and to identify and omit 
observations with extreme values (outliers). Omission of outlier cases may be appropriate 
when the analysis involves large samples. In small samples, however, it is best to include 
them in the analysis, simultaneously confirming and understanding the reasons for extreme 
values.  
 
Despite the perceived undercompensation revealed above, actual compensation paid to the 
affected parties in both schemes showed a trend of increasing with the PLHIs. The B-
coefficients in both village cases for PLHIs were significant (p<0.05). This is shown by the 
positive slopes of the lines of fit and this is an important result, as it depicts the relationship 
between the PLHIs and actual compensation paid. The loss of household annual income 
perceived by the affected parties in both village cases was an issue of considerable concern. 
Their perceptions of loss suggest how much they thought they should receive as 
compensation to reinstate previous conditions of welfare or utility. Thus, it appears that 
financial amounts received did not fully compensate for the perceived value of the losses 
incurred according to the indifference curve theory presented in Section 2.4.4. In their view, 
in most cases, there was under compensation and as a result a reduction in welfare. 
Compensation amounts are also dependent on whether affected parties have existing (rather 
than potential) entitlements. For instance, it was revealed that the affected parties in M’baya 
had more entitlement than those at Idete and that this was the main reason why the teak 
project did not fully compensate for income lost from farming as the squatters did not have 
full entitlement. 
 
The indifference curve analyses for the two village cases show that the pioneer settlers in 
M’baya were assumed to have full entitlement to their land goods and services and therefore 
M’baya fits the category of WTA compensation provided by SONGAS project. Their 
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perceptions of losses in terms of how much they should be compensated to reinstate previous 
utility is measured using compensating variation as presented in Figure 2.6. Things were 
different at Idete, as the majority of the affected parties were assumed not to have full 
entitlement to the land’s goods and services. The affected parties in Idete village were 
compensated for the loss of permanent but not annual crops. They were compelled to accept 
lower of compensation payments because they had limited entitlement. 
 
6.2.2: Calculated total losses of households 
The net future income flows from permanent and semi-permanent crops that were formerly 
cultivated on the lost land were discounted and aggregated to determine a present value sum. 
From the present value sum, the value of land was estimated using income capitalisation 
approach as per ADBAsia20 (2007) and summed with losses of structures (houses and farm 
huts) to obtain the calculated total household losses (CTHLs) as outlined in Section 3.5.3. 
 
The value of each crop cultivated was measured using a combination of its relative proportion 
in a mixed cropped farm using a scale of (0, 0.25; 0.5; 0.75 & 1.0), number of times the crop 
is harvested in a year (i.e. 1, 2, 3…) and its average price per tonne (TZS/t) in the nearby 
market. Thereafter, crops were put into three groups (i.e. annual, semi-permanent and 
permanent/perennial crops) and the value for each category was worked out by summing up 
values of all crops falling in each group. Results showing incomes of rural households were 
strongly influenced by market prices of agricultural crops (Table 6.6). Crops such as coconut 
(for M’baya) and rice (for Idete) that are given higher importance by the affected parties need 
careful identification and maximum attention during compensation, valuation in particular. 
 
Figures 6.4 and 6.5 compare compensation paid with calculated total household losses in 
M’baya and Idete villages respectively. This provides a sharp contrast with the previous 
section which was based on the perceived losses. At M’baya, two (2) households appeared to 
be overcompensated, 25 households were undercompensated and for three (3) households, 
their compensation payments matched with their calculated losses. Analysis of compensation 
payments with CTHLs at Idete shows that all 13 affected households were under the 
equivalence line. While seven (7) households clustered close to the equivalence line, 3 (3) 
                                                 
20 ADBAsia’s policy guidelines for compensation and valuation in resettlement schemes draw successful practices 
and challenges from Cambodia, China, India and other developed countries such Great Britain, German and 
Italy. 
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households were located sparsely and far from the equivalence line and the other three (3) 
formed a cluster in between the former two groups. 
 
 
Figure 6.4a: Calculated total household loss and compensation received in M’baya village-
paid by SONGAS project in 1997 
 
 
Figure 6.5a: Calculated total household loss and compensation received in Idete village-paid 
by KVTC project in 2006 
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Like in PLHI above, the actual compensation received by the affected parties in both villages 
increased with the calculated total household losses (CTHLs). Table 6.2 shows that lines of fit 
for estimated linear relationship between CTHLs and actual compensation received in 
M’baya and Idete were significant (p<0.05) and (p<0.01) respectively. Idete’s predicted line 
accounted for more variation (R2=0.65) observed in actual compensation received than that 
of M’baya’s (R2=0.19), and both were positive. The estimated coefficients indicated that for 
every CTHLs of 1 TZS/hh in M’baya and Idete villages, actual compensation payments 
increased by 8 and 2 cents respectively. In other words, the affected parties in M’baya and 
Idete villages received payments for their calculated losses at 8% and 2% compensation rates 
respectively. 
 
Comparison of the actual compensation received with the CTHLs in both villages has 
indicated significant undercompensation for nearly all households. Two factors were 
identified as the main causes of undercompensation in both village cases. First, both project 
cases did not compensate for land losses at all. The actual compensation received covered 
losses related to permanent and semi-permanent crops only. SONGAS also compensated for 
structures while KVTC did not. 
 
Second, losses associated with agricultural crops were not fully compensated for. The 
projects paid compensation for losses of permanent and semi-permanent crops in different 
ways. For example, M’baya paid compensation using crop rates that were three times the 
market values at that time (Innocent, 2004), yet the affected parties felt some losses were 
uncompensated. At Idete, in 2006, the project developer compensated the affected parties for 
their crop losses using government crop rates that were 14 years old. The major sources of 
undercompensation were associated with the failure to recognise the present value of the 
annual crops and cumulative future values of permanent and semi-permanent crops. Another 
concern was the use of outdated compensation rates. This was revealed in the discussion held 
with the Chief Government Valuer in May 2006. It was learned from the discussion that the 
crop applicable rates for Dar es Salaam and Coast regions by then were last updated in July 
2002, and the other 19 regions in the country were still using the 1992 compensation rates. 
 
Despite the affected parties in both villages being undercompensated, the results show that 
M’baya’s affected parties received four times higher compensation than their counter parties 
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in Idete for every CTHLs of 1 TZS. This can be explained by two main factors. Crop 
production in M’baya is mainly permanent crops, while that of Idete is dominated by annual 
crops. Since in both compensation schemes annual crops were not compensated for, Idete’s 
affected parties suffered more from uncompensated losses as compared to M’baya’s affected 
parties. The second factor is based on the developer’s consideration. While M’baya’s affected 
parties were paid compensation using rates that were three times of the prevailing market 
values, the affected parties at Idete were regarded by the developers as squatters without 
formal entitlement to use the land. There is a possibility that their squatting did not give them 
rights to compensation for annual crops, but compensation received for permanent crops was 
paid based on recognition that they had made an investment. They were not compensated for 
land and annual cropping that they did not have an entitlement to. 
 
In attempt to reduce undercompensation, the valuation guidelines by ADBAfrica (2003) and 
ADBAsia (2007) put much emphasis on both the valuation approach and rates as important 
components of fair compensation. Both guidelines recommend compensation for permanent 
and semi-permanent crops to be based on cumulative future values of crops for their 
productive life. And if circumstances allow for the affected parties to be provided with 
replacement trees (crops), compensation therefore should also include future values lost, up 
until the time that replacement crops grow into full production. Regarding rates, the 
guidelines by ADBAsia (2007) recommend an average price of the three consecutive preceding 
years, obtained from the nearby market. According to household cases in M’baya 
(Appendices 5.3, 5.4, 5.5 & 5.6), the age and stage of permanent crops are important factors 
to be considered during valuation as well. 
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Photo 6.1: Mr. Ustaadhi (Appendix 5.6) of 
M’baya 3 village designated as A and A’ in 
Figures 6.3 and 6.4 respectively received the 
highest amount of compensation than all 
affected respondents. He used compensation 
money to buy a farm house located on the land 
totalling to 6 ha. The farm also contains mature 
coconut trees, cashew-nut trees, cassava and 
pineapples. 
Photo 6.2: Mzee Msasa (Appendix 5.5) marked 
as B and B’ in Figures 6.3 and 6.4 respectively 
was the lowest earners of compensation of 
M’baya village. He bought used corrugated iron 
sheets and improved his old house. He worries 
about his future life, as he is now old (82 years 
old by June 2007), dependant and having no 
coconut farm. 
Photo 6.3: Mr. Oxygen ‘first from right’ 
(Appendix 5.7) shown as C and C’ in Figures 
6.5 and 6.6 respectively was among the affected 
parties showed dissatisfaction with 
compensation paid for their losses at Idete 
village. He bought a plot of a quarter an acre on 
which he constructed a pole-and-mud house 
with grass thatch as shown in the Photo 6.3. 
This was the youngest family affected by 
KVTC project that participated in this study 
from Idete. 
Photo 6.4: Mr. Wageni ‘centre’ (Appendix 5.8) 
marked as D and D’ in Figures 6.5 and 6.6 
respectively reported his dissatisfaction with 
compensation paid at Idete. He bought 
farmland and built a house (at the back) but 
unable to finish it. As a church leader he was 
supported by his church members and relatives 
to attain this state. 
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The revealed undercompensation in studied villages, Idete in particular, appeared to arise due 
to a number of factors (Section 4.4.2) including the failure to fully implement the existing 
legal framework for compensation matters in rural areas (Section 2.5.4). Despite the majority 
affected pioneer settlers in Idete to have assumed property entitlements through customary 
land occupancy, they lacked legal recognition because their property rights were not 
registered. Long-term land users in rural areas in Tanzania like those in Idete village lack 
formalised titles that are officially recognised by the government due to lack of registration or 
documentation of their rights. Such people who dominate rural areas are considered as 
squatters or encroachers with no entitlements to compensation. The current land laws in 
Tanzania recognise the presence of land occupants through customary systems of tenure but 
the same laws do not recognise their rights to compensation for the losses likely to be 
encountered due to development projects. 
 
The challenge of ‘assumed’ property entitlements, for example, those associated with pioneer 
settlers so called ‘squatters’ should be dealt with using administrative measures. This should 
involve official documentation that register all particulars including names, size of land, date 
and mode of acquisition (inheritance, purchase or allocation) of all people occupying or using 
land through customary rights. For areas where no other claims of entitlements prevail, the 
outstanding occupants should also be provided with officially recognised papers to enhance 
security of their occupancy. This would potentially help to clarify both the property rights in 
rural areas and compensation eligibility in regard to affected parties. It would also potentially 
minimise compensation disputes and transaction costs involved. According to Coase theorem, 
this potentially sets a state where antecedent conditions could support mutually beneficial 
exchanges in accordance with the principles of Pareto-optimality. 
 
6.2.3: Comparison of the perceived income loss and calculated total losses  
Figures 6.6a and 6.7a compare the perceived losses of household incomes (PLHIs) with the 
calculated total household losses (CTHLs) in M’baya and Idete respectively, in order to 
identify possible relationships between the two variables. The figures also include the 45 
degree line of equivalence along which the two estimates converge. The lines of fit for 
estimated linear relationship between PLHIs and CTHLs in both village cases were 
significant (Table 6.3). At M’baya a constant term and B-Coefficient were significant at 
(p<0.01) and (p<0.05) respectively, whereas in Idete both were significant at (p<0.05). 
Idete’s predicted line explained more variation (R2=0.45) observed in perceived losses of 
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household incomes (PLHIs) as compared to M’baya’s (R2=0.21). However, M’baya had a 
higher estimated coefficient than that of Idete and this indicated that for every increase of 1 
TZS in CTHLs, the perceived losses of household incomes (PLHIs) in M’baya and Idete 
villages increased by 0.42 and 0.17 TZS respectively. 
 
Figure 6.6a: Calculated total loss against perceive income loss in M’baya village 
 
 
Figure 6.7a: Calculated total loss against perceive income loss in Idete village 
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Table 6.3: Estimations of lines of fit for the comparison of the perceived loss of household 
income with calculated household total loss as a predictor 
C
as
e  
Model 
 
Predictor variables 
 
Unstandardised 
Coefficients 
Standardised 
Coefficients 
(Beta ‘β’) 
 
t 
 
R2 
B SE 
M
’b
ay
a 
 
 
All cases 
Constant 6600000 2400000  2.780**  
Calculated household 
total loss (TZS) 
0.42 0.16 0.456 2.714* 0.21 
 
Improved 
Constant 120000 394000  0.304*  
Calculated household 
total loss (TZS) 
0.42 0.07 0.816 5.655*** 0.56 
Id
et
e 
 
 
All cases 
Constant 420000 1080000  0.386*  
Calculated household 
total loss (TZS) 
0.17 0.06 0.671 3.004* 0.45 
 
Improved  
Constant 230000 777000  0.296  
Calculated household 
total loss (TZS) 
0.37 0.09 0.834 4.272** 0.70 
***p< 0.001 
** p<0.01 
* p<0.05 
Source: Household Verification Survey (2007). 
 
The lines of fit in Figures 6.6a and 6.7b show that in general, the calculated household total 
losses is a better predictor of the perceived loss of household annual income. However, it was 
interesting noting that perceived loss of household annual income and calculated household 
total losses are better matched in M’baya than in Idete. Calculated household total losses in 
Idete are much higher than perceived loss of household income. This suggests that 
respondents do not actually perceive a loss from annual cropping, as they don’t think that are 
entitled to compensation for annual crops. Unlike to Idete, majority of the affected parties at 
M’baya think forward as they considered even loss of future incomes from their permanent 
crops. 
 
6.2.4: Losses at community level 
Section 5.4 discusses both the benefits and costs as ranked by the respondents of the 
verification survey (Tables 5.9 and 5.10). Interviews with householders also identified, 
among others things, losses that people suffered as a community. Pearce (1999) noted from 
the World Bank funded-projects that resettled affected parties resulted in costs associated 
with social conflicts at the community scale. These can compromise the intended benefits of 
a project and make compensation schemes unworkable. The losses faced by M’baya 
community included land shortage, decline of soil fertility, and hazards and risks associated 
with the gas pipeline. The Idete community experienced land shortage, decline of soil 
fertility, frequent food shortages, loss of access to natural resources and loss of water sources. 
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It is also worth noting that all the adverse changes of ecosystem functions and services 
identified and discussed in section 5.3 are a part of the community losses as well.  
 
According to Zaman (2002) and Mwalyosi (2004), there has been a tendency for project 
developers and authorities to either overlook or deliberately ignore losses affecting 
communities in their totality. Cernea and Guggenhein (1993) and Thabane (2000) argue that 
investors have been opting not to compensate for community losses because they are 
considered to be attributable to individuals. They often involve losses of public goods, borne 
by individuals as members of communities. This is an example of the tragedy of the 
commons, inflicted on a community by a third party from outside the community. Thabane 
(2000) found it easier and more effective to compensate for community losses when the types 
of losses have been confirmed and community members are involved in deciding on 
appropriate compensatory measures. According to Knetsch (1990); Gregory et al. (1991), in-
kind compensation has been predominantly used to offset potential direct and indirect effects, 
including risks and hazards of projects. Kunreuther and Easterling (1996) describe inkind 
compensation payments or awards that include preferential employment and financial or 
material supports for community based development activities and services provided by 
projects.  
 
Table 6.4 shows different forms of in-kind compensation and the estimated values (TZS/hh) 
which the village cases had received up to June 2007. M’baya and Idete received in-kind 
compensations worth 131.5 millions and 42.5 millions TZS respectively. Details of supports 
received in each village case are explained in section 5.4 
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Table 6.4: Estimated inkind compensation received by village cases 
 
Facility/service/parameter 
In-kind compensation  
(000 000 TZS) 
M’baya Idete 
Community water supply facility (borehole) 3.5 ─ 
Electrification project (including electrical installation of 50 house) 50.0 ─ 
Support to primary school (desks and office furniture) 1.5 ─ 
Support to the construction of the Ward secondary school 50.0 4.0 
Health and environmental awareness campaigns 16.0 6.5 
Social funds for community services (2003 – 2006) ─ 15.0 
Annual contractual bonus funds (2003 – 2006) ─ 2.5 
Income from preferential employment (2003 – 2006) ─ 10.00 
Other supports (food, education materials for orphans, etc.)  11.5 4.5 
Total value of inkind compensation 131.5 42.5 
Inkind compensation per household* 0.17 0.05 
*Numbers of households at M’baya and Idete by 2007 were 764 and 882 respectively 
Source: KVTC (2006); URT (2000) & Focus Group Discussions (2007). 
 
The discussion in section 5.4.3 supports the notion that in-kind compensation has potential to 
distribute benefits equitably among community members. As per discussion in section 
4.4.3(ii) & (iii), it is possible for the project developers to creatively develop further the 
current in-kind supports into a number of cost-effective ways of sharing project benefits with 
host communities. Simultaneously, this can help to improve relationships between developers 
and host communities. However, the majority of household cases in both village cases 
showed the need of engaging their respective developers in dialogues in order to find (i) ways 
to minimise losses incurred by the individual households and the host community (ii) 
appropriate compensation payments to individual households and a host community as a 
whole. Such negotiations would ensure that losses encountered by the affected parties and 
communities are minimised and the remnant losses are compensated for. 
 
6.3 Factors correlated with losses incurred by the affected parties 
Compensation schemes, as they have been widely adopted in the context of development, 
seek to redistribute benefits and costs between the gainers and losers. However, it is a 
challenge on how best to determine the losses suffered by losers. The legal framework for 
compensation in Tanzania (Section 2.5.4 and Appendix 2.2) provided basic theoretical 
information from which the relevant components or categories of losses incurred by the 
affected parties were identified as follows:- 
i. Loss of land (both quantitatively and qualitatively), 
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ii. Loss of income (mainly related to agricultural crops),  
iii. loss of structures (mainly houses and facilities) and, 
iv. intangible losses (which among others include loss of access to and use of natural 
resources; lack of peace of mind due to fears and worries caused by the perceived 
risks and hazards). 
 
Correlation analysis was carried out for variables (such as household size, size of land lost by 
affected households, values of annual and permanent crops, household workforce, amount of 
compensation received, …) considered possibly to have association with the above-
mentioned components of losses. The variables involved were part of the information 
collected from in-depth household cases, interviews of key informants and focus group 
discussions. It is however worth noting that there were few respondents (7 in M’baya) and (3 
in Idete) who were compensated for losses of their structures and buildings and these 
numbers did not support correlation analysis. It is worth noting again that about 38 affected 
parties in Idete claimed to have lost their farmlands and farm-based homes without 
compensation. 
 
6.3.1: Factors associated with loss of land in the village cases 
Land loss expressed in terms of size and measured in hectares (ha) per household (hh) was 
positively correlated with the distance (km) from home to where the rented land was located 
“RL-Distance” (0.601**; where ** denotes p<0.01). Land loss was also correlated with the 
number of total male members of the household “HH-Males” (0.274**) across the two 
village cases (Table 6.5). Appendix 6.4 shows total number of males in the household also 
correlated positively with household labour (0.527**) and perceived loss of household 
income (0.390**). Thus, larger households tended to perceive greater loss, and this was 
associated with greater loss of land. Both project developers did not regard land loss a basis 
for compensation, because they did not recognise the claim. 
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Table 6.5: Variables correlated with the loss of land in the village cases 
Type 
of  
factors 
 
Variables/Factors 
Pearson’s Coefficient of Correlation (PCC) 
M’baya Idete Overall 
 
Demographic 
factors 
Household size (N) “HH-Size” 0.443** 
(N=38) 
0.450** 
(N=55) 
0.248* 
(N=93) 
Number of male members of the household 
(N) “HH-Males” 
0.390* 
(N=38) 
0.411** 
(N=55) 
0.274** 
(N=93) 
 
Production 
Factors 
Household workforce (labour) per ha (N/ha) 
“HH-Labour” 
 0.430** 
(N=55) 
 
Distance from home to the rented land (km) 
after compensation “RL-Distances” 
 0.596** 
(N=21) 
0.601** 
(N=22) 
Distribution 
factors 
Benefits perceived and ranked by household 
heads (arbitrary weight) “HH-Benefits” 
─0.544** 
(N=38) 
─0.537** 
(N=55) 
 
 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
Source: Household Verification Survey (2007). 
 
The results show that the distance from affected parties’ homes to where land for rent was 
available increased with the size of land loss, meaning that where there were large areas of 
land for rent, this was very far from the homes of the affected parties. Typical examples were 
noted in Idete village where 21 affected households (respondents) rented lands from the 
neighbouring villages located at average distances of (3.5 ±1.4) km. (Table 6.1). Distance to 
farming land also was one of the factors used to describe land suitability in terms of 
production. The nearer the farm is located from home the more valuable it is, in terms of 
more time spent in production and on crop protection from both wildlife predation and theft. 
The findings are consistent to what Nombo and Niehof (2008) found that distant farming 
influenced by big sugar cane estates in the adjacent Kilombero valley contributes to lowering 
the resilience of rural livelihoods through affecting household food security and income 
status. Hediger (1999) has further argued that both the resiliencies of people’s livelihoods and 
their ecosystems measure sustainability of their production systems. 
 
Tables 5.9 and 5.10 present project-influenced benefits and costs as perceived by the 
respondents in M’baya and Idete villages respectively. During the analysis, relative weights 
(1 to 5) were allocated (as explained in Section 3.5.2) to the ranked perceived benefits such as 
support to improve education and water supply (Section 5.4) in order to gauge their relative 
impact. The perceived benefits correlated negatively with land loss in both villages, M’baya 
(─0.544**) and Idete (─0.537**). The result shows that the effect of land loss felt in both 
villages tended to decrease with increase of perceived benefits such as preferential 
employment received from projects. The affected households in both villages acknowledged 
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that the perceived benefits provided, particularly the supports in terms of in-kind 
compensation, have helped their communities significantly in terms of education and health 
services. This confirms that rural people perceived lack of facilities and services to support 
their livelihoods and development. This provides an opportunity for the project developers to 
use potential benefit as an entry point to the host communities in order to engage in 
negotiating for their future state of affairs. However, at high transaction costs and asymmetry 
of information this can be regarded as ‘blackmail’ or buying off the affected parties and host 
communities. Rawles (2002) cautions that both compensation payments and benefits to the 
affected parties or host communities should be well planned and implemented in order to 
avoid them from being regarded as a bribe. 
 
6.3.2: Factors associated with the perceived loss of household income 
During the verification survey, respondents also estimated total annual flows lost per 
household following project operations in their area, as explained in Section 6.2.1. The 
estimated perceived loss of household annual income was measured in Tanzanian Shillings 
(TZS) per household (hh). Present values of future annuity of perceived losses of incomes 
were worked out as per Section 6.2.1. The area of land lost by each affected household, 
measured in hectares, correlated positively with perceived loss of household income in 
M’baya (0.619**) and Idete (0.582**) villages (Table 6.6). 
 
Table 6.6: Variables correlated with the perceived loss of annual household income 
(TZS/household) in the village cases 
 
Type 
of  
factors 
 
Variables/Factors 
Pearson’s Coefficient of Correlation (PCC) 
M’baya Idete Overall 
Demographic 
factors 
Household size (N/hh) “HH-Size” 0.520** 
(N=38) 
0.367** 
(N=55) 
0.483** 
(N=93) 
 
 
Production 
factors 
Size of land lost by household (ha/hh)  
“HH-Land loss”  
0.619** 
(N=38) 
0.582** 
(N=55) 
0.647** 
(N=93) 
Time a household has worked on the lost land 
(years) “Land occupancy” 
0.354** 
(N=38) 
0.493** 
(N=55) 
0.401** 
(N=93) 
Distance from home to the land rented after 
compensation (km) “RL-Distances” 
 0.478** 
(N=21) 
0.486* 
(N=22) 
Value of “annual crops” (TZS/hh)  0.620** 
(N=55) 
0.577** 
(N=76)
Value of “permanent crops” (TZS/hh) 0.782** 
(N=35)
 0.750** 
(N=41)
Distribution 
factors 
Amount of compensation paid per household 
(TZS/hh) “Compensation”  
0.432* 
(N=30) 
0.792** 
(N=13) 
0.448** 
(N=43) 
 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
Source: Household Verification Survey (2007). 
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The period of time (in years) for which the household has worked on the land lost (land 
occupancy) in M’baya and Idete showed positive correlations of (0.354**) and (0.493**) 
respectively with perceived loss of household income. Land occupancy shows population 
migration into new areas. Comparing average values of land occupancies of M’baya 
(39.3±3.7) and Idete (18.4±1.6) (Table 6.1), confirms why claims for property rights by the 
affected parties at Idete village were not considered, as their average land occupancy was less 
than twenty (20) years. Thus land occupancy has implication to compensation entitlements. 
An affected party can claim property rights after occupying land continuously for more than 
twenty years. 
 
Distance from home to the location of alternative land obtained either by allocation 
(replacement), renting or purchase was positively correlated (0.478**) with perceived loss of 
annual household income in Idete (Table 6.6). The effects of this factor on agricultural 
production have been discussed in Sections 5.2.2(iii) and 6.3.1. 
 
The value of each crop cultivated was measured using a combination of its relative proportion 
in a mixed cropped farm using a scale of (0, 0.25; 0.5; 0.75 & 1.0), number of times the crop 
is harvested in a year (i.e. 1, 2, 3 & 4) and its average price per tonne (TZS/t) in the nearby 
market. Thereafter, crops were put into three groups (i.e. annual, semi-permanent and 
permanent or perennial crops) and the value for each category was worked out by summing 
up values of all crops falling in the each group. Results showing incomes of rural households 
were strongly influenced by market prices of agricultural crops (Table 6.6). Crops such as 
coconut (for M’baya) and rice (for Idete) that are given higher importance by the affected 
parties need careful identification and maximum attention during compensation, valuation in 
particular. 
 
6.3.3: Factors associated with perceived intangible losses 
According to household cases, intangible losses are those that cannot easily be measured in 
monetary terms but their effects are felt and can be identified. These include loss of access to 
and use of natural resources; fears or worries, and perceived risks and hazards; lack of peace 
of mind and others of similar nature. These losses were ranked by respondents and given 
relative weights during the analysis (as explained in Section 3.5.2) in order to measure and 
relate them with other quantitative variables.  
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Table 6.7 indicates that intangible losses correlated with other characteristics of households 
such as the size and age composition of household members. Relative size of household 
workforce was measured by the number of household members (aged between 18 and 55 
years) available to work on a land possessed by a household. At the village case level, the 
intangible losses only correlated positively with household workforce in Idete (0.344**). 
Table 6.7 also shows that when villages were pooled together, intangible losses were 
negatively correlated with age of respondents measured in years (─0.249**); land occupancy 
(─0.278**); land size (ha) currently owned by household (─0.210*) and; perceived benefits 
provided by projects (─0.255**). Some of these variables correlated to each other 
(Appendices 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4). For example, age of respondents had a positive associations 
with perceived benefits provided by projects (0.386**) and land occupancy (0.428**). The 
coefficients of correlation ranging between 0.2 and 0.4 are categorised as weak correlations 
(Salkind, 2004). But Field (2005) recommends interpretation be carried out for statistically 
significant coefficients, as these may provide meaningful and useful information. 
 
Table 6.7: Variables correlated with perceived intangible losses in the studied villages 
 
Type 
of  
factors 
 
Variables/Factors 
Pearson’s Coefficient of Correlation (PCC) 
M’baya Idete Overall 
PCC 
 
PCC 
 
PCC 
 
Demographic 
factors 
Age of the household head (years) “HHH-Age”   ─0.249** 
(N=120) 
 
 
Production 
factors 
Household workforce (labour) (N/hh) “HH-
Labour” 
 0.344** 
(N=60) 
 
Time a household worked on the lost land 
(years) “Land occupancy” 
  ─0.278** 
(N=93) 
Land currently owned by household (ha/hh)  
“HH-Landholding”  
  ─0.210* 
(N=113) 
Distribution 
factors 
Benefits perceived and ranked by household 
heads (weighted Number/hh) “HH-Benefits” 
  ─0.255** 
(N=120) 
 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
Source: Household Verification Survey (2007). 
 
The variables of age of respondent and years of land occupancy reflect knowledge and 
experience a respondent has with respect to his/her life and environment. Increase in both 
variables is associated with lower intangible losses and in this case older farmers with long 
land occupancy seemed able to sustain shocks caused by compensation more readily perhaps 
than young farmers. This is evidently true, as the young farmers at their active age are 
normally ambitious and tend to engage themselves in many productive activities such as 
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farming, bee keeping, charcoal making, crafting and many others. For example, when their 
access to natural resources is restricted, they are likely to encounter significant losses 
associated to psychological effects. If not counselled and supported, they can easily encounter 
other severe health losses such as depression as they discover their future options have been 
reduced. They are likely to fall into a vulnerable group. These views were expressed by 
several household cases in Idete (Appendices 5.7; 5.8; 5.12 and 5.14). For example, 
household case shown in Photo 6.5, his house has a message written after many people lost 
their farms to advise young people not to fear losses because life is full of ups and downs, but 
options exist as well. 
 
 
Photo 6.5: One of the uncompensated households in Idete advising young people “not to fear 
losses, because life is full of ups and downs, but options exist as well” 
 
Affected elderly people also become a vulnerable group, when they have nobody to depend 
on and especially when they realise that they have lost their assets such as land and/or homes 
that they relied on for most of their life. Appendix 5.12 illustrates a household case at the age 
of 85 which was among the uncompensated people in Idete, but he had the benefit of being 
cared for by his sons. These results raise an important question of livelihood vulnerability in 
various social groups in relation to compensation. 
 
One of the strategies to help social groups vulnerable to compensation that has arisen from 
the correlation analysis is to increase the benefits and other supports provided to the host 
communities. Community members can have their local arrangements for utilising part of the 
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received support and directing them to reduce vulnerabilities. For example, part of the social 
or bonus funds that Idete village receives from KVTC annually can be used in providing 
necessary assistance according to needs, such as income or food support for affected old 
people or organising training and advisory services for affected young people. 
 
Most of the land currently occupied or used by the affected parties is what remained after 
losing part of their land to the project. The correlation result shows that perceived intangible 
losses increase as land occupied before gets smaller. This is consistent with previous findings 
regarding land loss severity. The computed ratio of land lost to land occupied or used before 
(presented in Tables 5.4 and 5.6) measures severity of land loss and is discussed in section 
5.2.2 (iii)). Considering Idete as an example, as land loss severity increases, land currently 
occupied or used decreases and household labour per ha increases as well and, this can lead 
to household labour redundancy. This suggests an important aspect for compensation 
planning that the baseline information should as much as possible include relevant 
information about possible losses including analysis of land loss severity. It also suggests that 
the household labour likely to become redundant due to land loss can be kept actively 
productive by providing affected households with another land elsewhere, but the distance 
factor needs to be taken into account. Alternatively, the potential utility of redundant 
household labour can be increased in many ways, for instance, providing them with training 
in order to engage them in other possible kinds of income generation such as preferential 
employment offered to Idete’s villagers through KVTC contracts (Appendix 4.4). 
 
6.4 Regression analysis of variables associated with perceived losses 
All factors or variables identified to have significant correlation with land loss, household 
income loss and intangible losses (see appendices 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4 for correlation matrices) 
were used in regression models. Prior to running the multiple linear regression analysis 
(Equation. 6.2), predictor variables in each category for each case were examined for inter-
correlation. For instance, if two predicators were found to correlate moderately or strongly 
(0.4 – 0.9) with each other, one was dropped from the regression analysis in order to reduce 
the multi-co-linearity effect (Field, 2005). Since this screening did not eliminate the multi-co-
linearity effect completely, the results of the predicted regression models need careful 
interpretation. It is also worth noting that not all respondents responded to all questions, thus 
prediction of some regression models at village case level involved small samples. The 
multiple linear regression equation used was given by the following expression: 
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Y = a +b1X1+ b2 X2 + …+bnXn + ε………………………………………………(6.2) 
Where:  
Y = dependent variable (criterion) 
a = constant (intercept) 
X1 X2 to X n =1st, 2nd to nth independent variables (predictors) 
b1, b2 to b n = Coefficients of 1st, 2nd to nth predictors 
ε = error term (residual) i.e. the difference between the predicted and actual value 
 
6.4.1: Relationships between predictor variables and loss of land by households 
The weak correlations observed between land loss and most of the variables (Table 6.5) did 
not support regression analysis of predicting household land losses in both village cases. 
Perhaps, this effect was partly contributed by the fact that land is a typical institutional issue 
whose allocation is influenced by policy-legal and market factors. These observations 
however are consistent with the ADBAsia’s (2007) conclusion that it is practically impossible 
to determine a fair value of land using mathematical expressions. Like other commodities in 
the market, demand and supply of land vary over time and place. The size and quality of land 
affect its market value as well. In theory, the market value of land is determined by a price 
reached between a willing seller and a willing buyer in a perfect21 market, where the price 
reflects the present value of future capital gains from the land, discounted at the rate adjusted 
using commercial interest and inflation rates over a relevant period of time. For imperfect or 
inactive markets that are commonly found in developing economies, ADBAsia (2007) suggest 
indirect quantification methods such as the income approach, which is based on capitalization 
of income. 
 
6.4.2: Relationships between predictor variables and perceived loss of income 
The variables listed in Table 6.6 were used to estimate regression models of perceived loss of 
household annual income (TZS/hh) in village cases. Table 6.8 shows that three predictor 
variables were able to explain 92% (R2=0.92) of the variability in the perceived household 
loss of annual income (TZS/hh) across village cases (N=120). The predictor variables with 
their relative weights (β-values) in the overall regression model include size of land loss (ha) 
(β=0.635), the value of annual crops (β=0.624) and value of permanent crops (β=0.379). 
 
                                                 
21 The market is said to be perfect when it has many potential buyers and sellers and its market forces operate 
freely. 
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The results in Table 6.8 show that the value of permanent crops (TZS/hh) and size of land 
loss (ha) explained 83% (R2=0.83) of the observed variability in the perceived household loss 
of annual income per hectare in M’baya. The value of permanent crops is a stronger predictor 
variable (β=0.688) than size of land loss (β=0.478) for M’baya. Regression model for Idete 
(Table 6.8) showed different results, whereby three predictor variables explained up to 92% 
(R2=0.92) of the observed variability in perceived loss of household annual income per 
hectare. The value of annual crops was the strongest predictor variable (β=0.806), followed 
by size of land loss (β=0.417) and the distance from home to the farmlands rented after 
compensation (β=0.297). 
 
Table 6.8: Regression models for perceived loss of household annual income (TZS/hh). 
C
as
e 
M
od
el
  
Predictor variables 
 
Unstandardised 
Coefficients 
Standardised 
Coefficients 
(Beta ‘β’) 
 
t 
 
R2 
B 
(106) 
SE 
(106) 
M
’b
ay
a 
1. Constant 0.19 0.13  1.445  
0.61  Value of permanent crops by household (TZS/hh) 0.66 0.09 0.782 7.209*** 
2 Constant -0.41 0.13  -3.251**  
 
0.83 
 Value of permanent crops by household (TZS/hh) 0.58 0.06 0.688 9.293*** 
 Size of household land loss (ha/hh) 0.71 0.11 0.478 6.464*** 
Id
et
e 
1. Constant 0.33 0.32  1.022  
0.51  Value of annual crops by household (TZS/hh) 1.07 0.25 0.712 4.296*** 
2. Constant -0.77 0.23  -3.295**  
 
0.87 
 Value of annual crops by household (TZS/hh) 1.22 0.13 0.806 9.040*** 
 Size of household land loss (ha/hh) 0.67 0.10 0.609 6.825*** 
3. Constant -0.63 0.19  -3.259**  
 
0.92 
 Value of annual crops by household (TZS/hh) 1.22 0.11 0.805 11.229*** 
 Size of land loss (ha) 0.46 0.10 0.417 4.475*** 
 Distance from household home to the land rented 
after compensation (km) 
0.04 0.01 0.297 3.209** 
O
ve
ra
ll 
1. Constant 0.19 0.44  0.440  
0.47  Size of household land loss (ha/hh) 1.02 0.23 0.686 4.419*** 
2. Constant -0.39 0.31  -1.257  
 
0.78 
 Size of household land loss (ha/hh) 0.92 0.16 0.614 5.905*** 
 Value of annual crops by household (TZS/hh) 1.31 0.24 0.558 5.365*** 
3 Constant -0.99 0.22  -4.456***  
 
0.92 
 Size of household land loss (ha/hh) 0.95 0.10 0.635 9.638*** 
 Value of annual crops by household (TZS/hh) 1.47 0.16 0.624 9.341*** 
 Value of permanent crops by household (TZS/hh) 0.59 0.10 0.379 5.697*** 
***p< 0.001 
**p< 0.01 
* p<0.05 
Source: Household Verification Survey (2007). 
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It is very important to note that land loss appears in all regression models, signifying its 
importance in income matters for rural households. For example, considering land loss 
predictor variable based on final regression models for the two villages, if land loss in 
M’baya and Idete increases by 1 ha, it will respectively result into 0.7m and 0.5m (TZS/hh) 
increase of perceived loss of household incomes. The difference in increase of household loss 
of income in both villages caused by loss of 1 ha of land can largely be explained by the 
nature (types) of crops grown in the two villages and aspects of land renting. Unlike Idete, 
incomes in M’baya largely depend on permanent crops. It is therefore practically impossible 
to rent-in land for raising permanent crops. Despite costs involved in renting farmlands, the 
availability of land for renting in Idete’s neighbouring villages has reduced the effects of land 
loss by allowing the affected parties to at least continue with agricultural production. 
 
Land renting was positively associated (0.448**) with compensation received in Idete 
village, where land renting practice appeared to be more common than in M’baya village. 
However, the distance from a farmer’s home to a rented farmland appeared to have negative 
implication on perceived loss of household annual incomes in Idete. The results in Table 6.8 
show that an increase of 1 km distance from home to where rented land is located results in a 
corresponding increase in the perceived loss of household annual income of 0.04m 
(40,000/=) TZS. Causes of income loss due to distant farming have been discussed in 
Sections 5.2.2(iii) and 6.1.1. Harrison’s (2006) survey that involved 29 villages in Kilombero 
valley found 41.2% households rented-in land within their villages and 19.1% rented land 
from neighbouring villages located 5–12 km from their homes. The latter group rented land 
more cheaply but were required to camp in their fields day and night in order to guard their 
crops against theft and damage caused by wildlife. 
 
Another significant variation between the two villages is based on the influence the dominant 
category of cultivated crop has on the perceived loss of household income. Previous findings 
show that incomes in M’baya and Idete, respectively, depend on permanent and annual crops 
(see Table 6.1). But it is worth noting that annual crops (β=0.624) appear to be a more 
important predictor variable than perennial crops (β=0.379) in regression model no. 3 of an 
overall case (Table 6.8). This can partly be explained by the fact that in Idete annual crops 
have greater value than permanent crops and, this is largely influenced by land qualities. 
Some affected parties in Idete cultivated annuals in fertile valleylands that keep moisture 
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throughout the year, and this enabled them to grow multiple crops per year, for example rice 
(twice), maize (thrice) and horticultural crops (3-4 times) a year. This confirms the opinion of 
one of the household cases (Mzee Rutuba) interviewed at Idete, who stated in a jest that “if 
the affected people were to fight against the project, that war was supposed to be named the 
war of valleylands and soil fertility” (Appendix 5.9). This is consistent with Kangalawe’s and 
Liwenga’s (2005) findings that the livelihoods of people of Idete depend on wetland farming, 
where 83% of their food and 77% of their income come from the wetlands (valleylands). 
 
The above regression results confirm that income losses of rural households are broadly land 
based but very specific to land attributes such as soil fertility and moisture content; land 
availability for owning or renting; distance from home to where alternative farmlands are 
located and; types, nature and values of crops cultivated on land. Strategies to minimise 
income losses should aim at minimising land loss as much as possible and incorporating 
measures that consider carefully other arising issues as listed above.  
 
The amount of compensation paid to the affected parties in both village cases were highly 
correlated with demographic factors and perceived loss of household annual income 
(Appendices 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4). The linear regression analyses in Table 6.8 above were 
repeated while including compensation payments along with other predictor variables 
correlated with perceived loss of household annual income. The perceived loss of household 
annual income was assumed to be a dependent variable because it was established earlier in 
Section 5.2.3(ii) that compensation payments in both villages were mainly for the losses of 
agricultural crops. Agriculture was and still is the major source of income in the studied 
communities. The regression analyses were carried out using the ‘enter’ method command as 
opposed to ‘stepwise’ (used in Section 6.4.2) in order to have all predictor variables analysed. 
Table 6.9 shows that compensation paid was not significant in all regression models (i.e. 
p=0.965 for M’baya, p=0.828 for Idete and p=0.754 when both villages were pooled 
together as one sample).  
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Table 6.9: Regression models for perceived loss of household annual income (TZS/hh). 
C
as
e  
Predictor variables 
 
Unstandardised Coefficients Standardised 
Coefficients 
(Beta ‘β’) 
t 
(p-value) 
 
R2 B 
(106) 
SE 
(106) 
M
’b
ay
a 
Constant -0.38 0.15  -2.482*  
 
 
0.84 
Value of permanent crops by household 
(TZS/hh) 
0.60 0.07 0.735 8.546*** 
Size of household land loss (ha/hh) 0.66 0.14 0.438 4.780*** 
Compensation received by household 
(TZS/hh) 
-0.02 x 10–7 0.41 x 10–7 -0.004 -0.045 
(p=0.965) 
Id
et
e 
Constant -0.21 0.42  -0.497 
(p=0.706) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.99 
Value of annual crops by household 
(TZS/hh) 
1.16 0.12 0.829 9.614 
(p=0.066) 
Size of household land loss (ha/hh) 0.26 0.10 0.254 2.660 
(p=0.229) 
Distance from home to the land rented 
after compensation (km) 
0.06 0.02 0.422 3.586 
(p=0.173) 
Compensation received by household 
(TZS/hh) 
0.69 x 10–6 2.5 x 10–6 0.030 0.277 
(p=0.828) 
O
ve
ra
ll 
Constant -0.98 0.28  -3.564**  
 
 
0.91 
Size of household land loss (ha/hh) 0.96 0.11 0.650 9.029*** 
Value of annual crops by household 
(TZS/hh) 
1.46 0.18 0.615 8.263*** 
Value of permanent crops by household 
(TZS/hh) 
0.61 0.12 0.392 5.071*** 
Compensation received by household 
(TZS/hh) 
-0.02 x 10–6 0.07 x 10–6 -0.025 -0.318 
(p=0.754) 
***p< 0.001 
**p< 0.01 
* p<0.05 
Source: Household Verification Survey (2007). 
 
Comparing results in Tables 6.8 and 6.9, compensation paid explained very little of the 
observed variations in the perceived loss of household incomes in both village cases and even 
less so for the overall case because of a multi-co-linearity effect. Despite the chance that 
respondents adopted a strategic bias in estimating their perceived losses of household income, 
this finding indicates that possibilities exist where the processes to assess and calculate losses 
done by project developers may not cover all losses adequately. This is because the perceived 
loss of household income and actual compensation paid were not strongly correlated and that 
actual compensation is not a good predictor of perceived loss of household income. However, 
the analyses in Sections 6.2.1, 6.2.2 and 6.2.3 confirm that actual loss is a better predictor of 
perceived loss of household annual income than actual compensation. Furthermore, as 
discussed earlier, differences between actual losses and compensation paid (and hence also 
between perceived and actual compensation) may also be due to reduced entitlements to full 
compensation. This is confirmed by the comparisons of the village cases in relation to the 
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above-discussed differences (i.e. Figure 6.2a against Figure 6.3a and Figure 6.4a against 
Figure 6.5a) which were greater in Idete than M’baya. 
 
6.4.3: Relationships between variables and perceived intangible losses” 
An attempt was made to construct a regression model of the perceived intangible losses in the 
overall case using predictor variables listed in Table 6.7. However, no variables were 
statistically able to explain variations in the perceived intangible losses across village cases. 
Partly this is influenced by the nature of the intangible losses, which is related to 
psychological health and therefore call for special approaches in measuring them, as their 
cause may have a long history back related to the affected person. Gregory et al. (1991) 
found the perceived intangible losses are conceptually distinct and they often interact with 
other losses and result in severe effects on human welfare. Sebenius et al. (2005) specifically 
explained that losses due to welfare disruption, psycho-cultural stress and social 
disarticulation cause serious inherited risks to the affected parties of becoming successively 
poorer.  
 
Based on the findings previously reported from household cases at Idete (Section 6.3.3), the 
perceived intangible losses should not be overlooked or underrated, especially when the 
affected parties are young to middle aged people. These insights however, call for specific 
studies to be undertaken in order to clearly determine their linkages to household production 
systems and establish ways of estimating or quantify losses affecting this particular group. 
 
6.5 Key messages 
The following are major issues which emerged when different types of losses encountered by 
households or communities were compared with compensation payments received in the 
context of development projects. 
 
Potential sources of losses 
Land is a central and critical factor of rural production, and loss of land affects significantly 
income flows of rural households and potential household labour redundancy. Losses 
associated with land were both quantitatively (i.e. size of land) and qualitatively associated 
with topography, distance from home, type of soil and soil fertility. Intangible losses that can 
be felt and identified but cannot easily be measured in monetary terms can cause vulnerability 
to various social groups including young and elderly people. 
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Compensation payments and undercompensation 
Property rights associated with long-term occupiers or users of land in most of rural areas are 
not recognised and hence are easily assumed to be ‘squatters’ or ‘encroachers’. This affects 
compensation entitlements of many rural people and generally leads to undercompensation, 
complicated compensation disputes and potential high transaction costs. Moreover, 
information on farm inputs (costs) and outputs (incomes), prices and other important data are 
lacking and this affects the estimation of compensation payments. There is very limited 
information on agricultural production and incomes in most rural households in developing 
countries such that deriving reliable estimates is problematic. Reliable estimates of the 
earning capacity of land as a basis for compensation loss of income are not available unless 
special attempts are made to collect information. 
 
Compensation through reinstating initial utility of the affected parties 
Depending on the party that has an entitlement and whether the affected parties have the land 
services at the moment, it is possible to determine who compensates who using indifference 
curve theory that directs compensation payments towards maintaining satisfaction of the 
affected parties in their original utility function. This provides a possible alternative approach 
towards prediction of losses and determination of compensation payments the affected parties 
deserve. 
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Chapter 7 A COMPENSATORY FRAMEWORK FOR SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT IN DEVELOPING ECONOMIES 
 
This chapter presents and discusses various contextual factors deduced from previous 
chapters (Figure 7.1) to propose a framework for compensation as a basis for guidance on 
procedural and practical matters of compensation. The chapter presents a proposed 
framework in terms of a researched definition, values, principles, procedure, guidelines and 
criteria of compensation that promote sustainable development in the developing economy 
context. The chapter also presents “a self-critique” of the proposed framework, 
hypothetically examined against various design criteria. Finally, it critically evaluates 
relevance and potentials of the Coase Theorem in understanding project-influenced 
compensation in developing nations. 
 
 
 
Figure 7.1: Deduction of contextual factors for compensatory framework guidelines 
 
7.1 Defining fair compensation in the context of development projects 
A definition of project-influenced compensation was derived from the following key points 
of the findings of this research and reads as follows: 
 
A fair compensation practice in the context of development projects can be defined as 
one comprised of mitigation measures that equitably redistribute benefits and costs of a 
project between the gainers and losers and also addresses disputes and concerns of 
social justice and fairness through the negotiation process. 
 
Points from the preceding analysis that are relevant here include: 
• Section 5.2.2 discusses land as a critical factor of rural livelihoods and loss of land 
impairs livelihoods of the affected parties, increases land disputes and pressure on 
ecosystem functions. Compensation therefore should be a measure to maintain 
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welfare of the affected parties. Compensation should also be a potential strategy for 
addressing disputes and issues of concerns fairly. 
• In contrast to the current conventional ‘one-payment’ monetary compensation, 
Sections 4.4.3(ii) and 6.2.4 indicate that benefits-costs sharing schemes between the 
developer and affected parties and host communities taking a variety of forms have 
great potential to promote sustainability in all aspects. Such schemes can enhance 
intragenerational and intergenerational equity and have potential to reduce intrusion 
of elites attracted by monetary interests and subsequent reductions of disputes and 
transaction costs during compensation process. 
• As discussed in Section 4.4.1(ii), compensation entitlements are linked to property 
rights and Section 6.3.2 indicates that unclear property rights leads to loss of rights to 
compensation or undercompensation. Therefore clear property rights promote good 
compensation practices. 
• Section 4.3 has demonstrated that the majority of the compensation stakeholders have 
great interests in compensation and possibilities exist for the project developers and 
affected parties to negotiate compensation payments. These suggest that 
compensation should be a process that involves all key stakeholders, affected parties 
and host communities in particular. Adoption of negotiation approach would in turn 
promote participation of affected parties and host communities. 
 
7.2 Factors describing characteristics of fair compensation practices 
Characteristics of fair compensation practices are explained in terms of factors that make up 
values, guiding principles, procedures and support mechanisms of fair compensation 
practices. These factors are deduced from previous results. 
 
7.2.1: Values of fair compensation practices 
Values are set of principles or preferences that people or organisations use to guide their 
behaviour as they seek to achieve desirable outcomes (Aiken, 2002). Where outcome-based 
values are embedded in the process they help people to build relationships in order to unite 
around a common goal (Phillips, 2006), have clear focus on their priorities and acquire 
consistency throughout the process (Sagiv and Schwartz, 2007). For a successful 
compensation process, four core values have been identified and are suggested as follows 
(Figure 7.2).  
 Paul Mtoni  Cranfield University, 2010 
 
194
 
 
 
Figure 7.2: Proposed core values for fair compensation practices 
 
i) Reduced vulnerability 
Development projects in developing nations aim to improve people’s well-being, yet such 
projects impact negatively on some portion of the population. This typically occurs because 
the projects need land to operate on and, projects are likely to impair production activities, 
flows of services and other benefits. Sections 5.4.1 and 6.3.3 discussed the likelihood of 
development projects to cause hazards, risks and other intangible losses. It is worth noting 
that all these can negatively affect the affected parties or host communities socially, 
culturally, economically or psychologically and make them vulnerable to food insecurity, 
poverty and health problems. The compensation process therefore should be designed to 
reduce risks, hazards and the vulnerability of various social groups. 
 
ii) Uniformity 
Among other aspects, Section 4.4.2(i) discussed the inconsistency in treating and handling 
compensation claims of the affected parties. This has negative consequences in building trust 
and relationships between the project developers and community members for the common 
goals of sustainability. In this case, the affected parties or host communities should be 
handled and treated equally according to the legal framework and administrative procedures 
and guidelines for compensation. 
 
Equity 
 
Uniformity 
Reduced -
vulnerability 
 
Sustainability 
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iii) Equity 
Under the current practices of compensation, both the project developer (compensation 
payer) and affected parties and host communities (compensation beneficiaries) tend to forget 
the welfare of the future generations (Sections 5.2.2; 5.2.5; 5.3 & 5.4). Compensation should 
aim at addressing disputes and concerns of social justice within the community and also 
ensuring that project benefits and costs are equitably distributed between project developers 
and affected parties and host communities. This has to be done at project level. On the other 
hand, community leaders should make sure that all community members get equal access to 
and enjoy from project benefits that are channelled to the community through in-kind support 
and other assistances. Both the project developer and community members should join efforts 
to ensure that benefits and costs are fairly distributed between the present and future 
generations. 
 
iv) Sustainability 
The current development and compensation processes cause gradual deterioration of 
livelihood assets of the affected parties (Section 5.2) and, ecosystem functions and services 
(Section 5.3). There was a perception that development projects were not performing at their 
full potential towards achieving their goals and objectives due to lack of involving key 
stakeholders (Section 4.4.2(iii)). Apart from ensuring continuity of livelihoods in host 
communities and ecosystem functions and services, both the project developers and host 
community members should jointly promote continuity of all positive outcomes of 
development projects and compensation schemes. 
 
7.2.2: Guiding principles of fair compensation 
There is majority agreement on an overall principle of compensation that livelihoods of the 
affected parties should not be worse-off as a result of development projects (Magyari-Beck, 
2002; ADBAfrica, 2003; ADBAsia, 2007). However, its achievement depends on the following 
specific factors identified in this study and presented below as principles: 
 
i) Participation 
The current regimes of compensation in Tanzania are largely dominated by elites and 
intruders attracted by their own interests (Section 4.4.2(iii)). This has caused asymmetry of 
information during compensation process (Sections 4.3.1, 4.3.2 & 4.4.2(iii)) and significantly 
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reduced participation of the affected parties and host communities. Two things need to be 
done in order to promote participation of the marginalised affected parties and host 
communities in compensation processes. Firstly, compensation process should involve 
experts or actors with critical roles to the process. Secondly, the government organisations 
responsible for coordination of development projects and compensation matters should be 
charged with responsibilities of disseminating project and compensation scheme information. 
Other key stakeholders can also help in this respect. Information dissemination should not 
remain entirely the responsibility of project developers and their consultants as stated in 
many policy and legal documents such as Environmental Impact Assessment procedures and 
guidelines (NEMC, 1997). 
 
ii) Transparency 
Transparency promotes both trust and good relationships among stakeholders (Friedman and 
Miles, 2006). As reported in Section 4.4.2(iii), lack of transparency in the current 
development and compensation processes in Tanzania has been a big limiting factor in 
information flows and the communication process. Development and compensation processes 
should facilitate dialogue and forums where key stakeholders interact and decide in an open 
manner and project developers and government actors should know that not all relevant 
information is ‘confidential’. Thus, neither unnecessary information nor confidentiality 
should be entertained in compensation processes. 
 
iii) Negotiation 
Section 25 of the Regulations to implement the Village Land Act, 1999 as presented in 
Section 2.5.4.1 lists seven possible options of forms of compensation that may be considered 
by the affected parties and project developers. The seventh item “and other forms of 
compensation as may be agreed between the claimant and the developer” emphasises the 
need and importance of the two sides to engage in dialogue in order to explore other suitable 
type(s) of compensation. Essentially, the above legal requirement provides an opportunity for 
the affected parties and host communities and project developers to negotiate. 
 
A negotiation process involves voluntary participation of two parties without intervention by 
a third party (Ewert et al., 2004) and its success depends on the consensus or mutual 
agreement reached and compromise carried by each party (Kunreuther and Easterling, 1996). 
According to Hackl et al. (2007), a negotiation process is successful if its outcomes deliver 
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acceptable solutions to the problem where both sides experience maximum benefits and 
minimum costs. This is consistent with the Pareto optimality criterion which was developed 
further by Hicks and Kaldor into the compensation principle (Section 2.4.2). Essentially, the 
concept of this principle emphasises the need for those who gain from the change could 
compensate those who lose because of the same change.  
 
iv) Cost-effectiveness 
Section 4.4.4 has shown that conflict of interests, resolution of complaints, intermediary 
parties and agents (intruders) and, unclear property rights are sources of compensation 
disputes. These factors contribute to high transaction costs during compensation processes. 
Experience in the resolution of compensation disputes by one civil society organisation in 
Tanzania (Legal Environmental Action Team Tanzania ‘LEAT’) indicated that cost 
implication of handling and resolving compensation disputes is low in negotiation process 
and very high in litigation process (Section 4.3.4(ii)). Based on LEAT’s experience, cost-
effective ways that promote reconciliation among potentially disputing parties during the 
negotiation phase are required, rather than creating subsequent conflicts and disputes which 
are more expensive to resolve. 
 
7.2.3: Procedure of a proposed compensation framework 
Among others, Section 4.4.2 discusses various aspects of administration, planning, valuation, 
implementation and monitoring of compensation schemes with the view of suggesting 
possible ways of improving compensation practices. The suggested improvements to the 
compensation process are presented in the conceptual and analytical framework of this study 
(Figure 2.9; Section 2.6). These include the following key stages: Initial notification, Formal 
declaration, Baseline survey, Valuation, Negotiation, Implementation (i.e. compensation 
payments) and Monitoring (Figure 7.3). 
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Figure 7.3: The proposed compensation procedure linked to Environmental Impact 
Assessment (EIA) process in order to benefit from information generated by EIA studies 
INITIAL NOTIFICATION 
►Providing key stakeholders (esp. APs/HCs) 
with information about the proposed project 
BASELINE SURVEYS 
►Identification of potential APs and their losses 
►Verification of information collected during 
EIA  
►Search for details and specific data 
 
SCOPING 
 STAGE 
PROVISIONAL APPROVAL 
MONITORING 
►Follow-up the implementation 
►Track post-compensation outcomes 
►Prepare monitoring reports 
IMPLEMENTATION 
►Compensation payments 
►Sharing schemes of benefits & costs 
►Prepare implementation reports 
VALUATION 
►Estimation of all losses 
►Assigning monetary values 
►Prepare detailed valuation report 
LEGEND 
 
Compensation action by 
proponent 
Joint compensation action by 
proponent & APs/HCs 
Action influenced by EIA or 
compensation decision/action 
DISAGREED 
AGREED 
PROJECT REJECTED 
Action in the EIA process 
NO PROJECT 
IMPLEMENTATION 
NO COMPENSATION 
SCHEME 
Outcome resulted from EIA or 
compensation decision 
EIA  =   Environmental Impact Assessment 
EIS  =   Environmental Impact Statement 
NEGOTIATION 
►Bargaining for benefits(↑) & costs(↓) 
►Agreements prepared & signed 
EIA PROCESS COMPENSATION PROCESS 
DECISION OF THE 
REVIEW OF THE EIA 
REPORT (EIS) 
FORMAL DECLARATION 
► Compensation confirmed as one of the 
mitigation measures to be applied 
►Involvement of HC members 
DURING SCOPING 
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i) Initial notification and formal declaration 
Section 4.4.2(iii) indicates that late or lack of communication about project proposals and 
compensation schemes to host communities is an issue of great concern to host communities. 
According to ADBAfrica (2003) early and formal declaration of an intention to develop in a 
certain area is necessary since it clears doubts the affected parties might have. Early 
consultation with host communities is critical. Currently in Tanzania, it is a legal requirement 
that project information should be disseminated by the developer during early stages of 
environmental impact assessment (URT, 2004), but this is often done too late.  
 
In order to reduce costs, project developers can use the same early stages of environmental 
impact assessment to serve host communities with initial notification and formal declaration 
of expected compensation scheme. Public meetings have been proven to be a simple, formal 
and cost-effective way of consulting, informing and collecting opinions from potentially 
affected parties. 
 
ii) Baseline surveys 
Section 4.4.2(ii) discusses factors that affect planning process of the compensation schemes 
in Tanzania including lack of important information on affected parties and their natural 
environment. Several measures should be taken to improve the planning of compensation 
schemes such as increasing applied research into livelihoods, rural development and 
compensation systems. Following the discussion in Section 4.4.2(vi), monitoring and 
evaluation of compensation schemes would help to enrich baseline data. Environmental 
impact assessment systems in Tanzania require environmental impact assessment studies to 
generate information on affected environment including people’s livelihood activities, future 
scenarios and dynamics of socio-economic, socio-cultural aspects (URT, 2004). 
Compensation schemes in Tanzania can use and build on baseline information developed 
during environmental impact assessment studies. Additionally, social impact assessment can 
provide rich and targeted information for compensation schemes. 
 
The cost benefit analysis of development projects can also inform assessment of 
compensation gains and losses and, possible ways of distribution. However, Cernea (2008) 
cautions that the analysis of distribution of benefits and costs required in compensation 
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schemes should clearly reveal proportions and patterns of allocation of all benefits and costs 
by different categories of stakeholders. 
 
iii) Valuation 
Undervaluation caused by low or outdated rates of compensation and inconsistencies in 
applying compensation rules and criteria, as discussed in Sections 4.4.2(iv) and 6.2.2, were 
reported to be the most widespread problems during valuation processes in Tanzania. 
According to Sebenius et al. (2005) and Cernea (2008) valuation in which the losses 
encountered by affected parties are identified and given monetary values is the most troubled 
compensation stage in developing nations. Resolving valuation problems in relation to 
undervaluation and inconsistence can potentially minimise compensation disputes. Measures 
of minimising these problems should involve use of up-to-date compensation rates in 
valuation and, this calls for frequent review of compensation rates for all crops, land, 
structures and other losses with respect to market conditions in different areas. It should also 
involve use of competent valuers who can make use the right methods and techniques to 
identify and assess losses. Involvement of affected parties and host communities in the 
identification of their losses and joint setting of criteria for carrying out the rest of valuation 
tasks would also help to reduce complaints and subsequent low transaction costs during 
compensation process. 
 
iv) Negotiation 
Section 7.2.2(ii) shows that parties involved in disputes can potentially achieve solutions 
based on negotiated mutual agreement. Sections 4.3.2(ii) shows that project developers make 
use of both the Village and Ward leaders to help organise meetings, coordinate valuation and 
in the resolution of disputes in compensation processes at grassroots level. Despite the 
findings in Sections 4.3.2(ii); (iii), 5.2.5 and 5.4 which have shown some weaknesses of both 
Village and Ward based leaders in ensuring the rights of the affected parties, it was also 
revealed further that villagers entrust their elected leaders more than the appointed and 
recruited ones. Therefore, the elected leaders, the Village Chairperson and the Ward 
Councillor at village and ward levels respectively, could work together to organise and lead 
the affected parties and host communities in the negotiation processes. This can be done 
through involvement of all the affected parties in a series of meetings in order to raise, 
discuss and shortlist the main issues of concern that need attention during negotiation. 
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Among other issues, Section 4.4.2(iii) argues that one of the possible hindrances of 
negotiation is when the affected parties oppose project proposals and compensation schemes 
from a position of ignorance. It is therefore suggested that an objective assessment of 
distributional impacts (i.e. benefits and costs) of a proposed project before it begins and 
before negotiation engagement begins. This could take place during baseline surveys and 
valuation stages before the negotiation stage as proposed in Figure 7.3. Section 6.2.4 however 
discusses the household cases viewpoint that negotiation is expected to focus on (i) ways to 
minimise losses incurred by the individual households and the host community (ii) 
appropriate compensation payments to individual households and, (iii) appropriate 
compensation payments to a host community as a whole. This is a suitable framework for the 
Village Chairperson and the Ward Councillor to use during both the identification and 
assembly of different interests from the affected parties and make sure all issues of concern 
are well focused for the negotiations. In order to reduce risks associated with compensation 
such as landlessness, elderly people failing to re-establish in new settlements, the 
representatives should ensure that all community based losses are compensated through 
community based services as discussed in Section 6.2.4. Section 6.3.3 presents the 
community based compensation in terms of services such as education, health and water in 
rural areas can provide a safety net for both the ‘hidden’ and ‘vulnerable’ groups in the 
community. 
 
The affected parties and host communities need to be informed on various issues pertaining 
to project proposals, compensation schemes, negotiation and related laws. For instance, they 
should know well in advance that mutual agreement in negotiation is normally attained 
through compromise (Section 4.3.2 (i)). The aforementioned compromise should be reached 
through recognition of changes in the overall welfare of the affected parties and host 
communities that are attributable to a development project compared to the ‘without project 
situation. Each negotiating side should be flexible enough to forsake some rights in order to 
gain other benefits. They should also know that negotiation has potential for improving 
involvement of the affected parties and host communities which is currently limited to 
‘information-giving’ and ‘consultation’. Furthermore, negotiation has potential for improving 
relationships and building-up of trust between the project developers and affected parties and 
host communities through working together and supports rendered to each other. As argued 
in Section 4.4.4, this will sensitise and influence the affected parties and other host 
community members to render their cooperation during both the meetings and negotiations. 
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This is supported by Harris (2002) and Hackl et al. (2007) through their argument that self-
organised parties and coordinated issues of concern during negotiation could potentially help 
to reduce transaction costs and improve efficiency of the process. 
 
The literatures identify free-riding and holdout incentives as potential problems associated 
with large number of affected parties and such problems are likely to affect the bargaining 
process (Webster, 1998; Hackl et al., 2007; Miceli and Sirmans, 2007 and Cadigan et al., 
2009). There is a need to keep the number of parties participating in the negotiation 
reasonable in order to reduce the above-foreseeable problems and enhance efficiency of 
negotiation process. The affected parties and host communities may choose knowledgeable 
representatives whom they trust to negotiate on their behalf. Since Section 6.2 presents losses 
at both the household and community levels, there should be representatives chosen from the 
affected parties and community at large. This would ensure that interests of both the affected 
parties as individuals or households and those of the community are adequately represented 
during negotiation. For example, Section 6.2.4 presents loss of access to and deterioration of 
ecosystem functions as one of the community based losses likely to affect people’s welfare in 
both the present and future generations. Based on the same reason, it is suggested for this 
framework that the representatives from the rest of the host community among other issues 
should make sure that all community losses including intergenerational equity issues (if any) 
are adequately considered during negotiation. See Section 7.3.3 for more discussion on 
shared, intragenerational and intergenerational equity issues. In addition, both categories of 
representatives (i.e. from the affected and non-affected parties) in the community should 
inform the affected parties and host communities on the progress of negotiation from time to 
time. 
 
Sometimes during negotiations there might be circumstances in which either a developer is 
unwilling to pay compensation demanded or the affected parties and host communities are 
unwilling to accept compensation offered. The negotiating sides should work out to identify 
and reconsider aspects of disagreement and renegotiate. When all possible means of 
obtaining efficient solutions from negotiation have been exhausted, it would be time for 
seeking other solutions although this might result in higher transaction costs. According to 
the discussions in Section 4.4.4 and Box 4.1, mediation is next to negotiation in dealing with 
compensation disputes in least possible cost. Based on aspects of costs involved and 
efficiency, the compensation laws in Tanzania (URT, 1967, 1999a and 1999b) and in many 
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other developing countries (ADBAfrica, 2003 and ADBAsia, 2007) prefer the use of mediation 
measures over litigation in resolving compensation disputes. Otherwise, for project proposals 
of public interests, as presented in Section 2.2.1, the government is likely to implement the 
compulsory acquisition order to deal with any incentives the affected parties might have, such 
as ‘hold out problem’. Parallel to compulsory acquisition order, the government should make 
sure that developers pay compensation that at least reinstates the original conditions of 
welfare or utility satisfaction of the affected parties with justifiable entitlements (Section 
6.2.1). 
 
Sections 4.4.3 presents the findings that most respondents preferred monetary compensation 
over benefit sharing schemes and in-kind payments. Appendix 4.6 shows that benefit sharing 
schemes have potential to distribute benefits across the entire community for long periods of 
time compared to compensation paid in cash. In addition, community based compensation in 
terms of services such as education, health and water in rural areas can provide a safety net 
for both the ‘hidden’ and ‘vulnerable’ groups in the community (Section 6.3.3). However, 
respondents feared benefit sharing schemes as the schemes might not benefit the individual 
affected parties or households. Since losses encountered by individual affected parties or 
households and community at large are distinct, it is therefore suggested that individual or 
household based losses be compensated through monetary payments as preferred in Section 
4.4.3(i). Depending on the negotiation outcomes, all community-based losses should be 
compensated either through benefit sharing schemes or in-kind payments as per Sections 
4.4.3(ii), (iii) and 6.2.4. But it worth noting that despite the fact that most community based 
compensation is in-kind, the same may also be used to compensate individual losses. 
Compensation through in-kind payment such as preferential employment could be applied to 
prevent risks associated with those who have no compensation entitlements through land. 
This would help them share new benefits and offset some losses encountered because of a 
development project. 
 
v) Implementation 
Section 4.4.3(v) discusses issues relating to coordination, support mechanisms and 
compensation payments as components of the implementation stage of a compensation 
scheme. The following weaknesses or shortcomings exist in the current implementation of 
compensation and impair the performances in the above-mentioned components: 
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• The compensation process currently coordinated at the national level is not cost-
effective and has become a huge burden to local authorities as far as financial and 
human resources are concerned. The capacity of local government authorities at 
district level should be enhanced in order to coordinate compensation matters in their 
areas.  
• Currently, compensation schemes have not provided advisory services for the affected 
parties and host communities. Resolution of compensation disputes is largely done 
through costly court processes and many compensation disputes remain unresolved 
to-date. Project developers should among others establish independent, accessible and 
affordable dispute resolution unit to act as a third party in settling compensation 
disputes. For the same purposes of minimising disputes, developers can also establish 
special teams to advise affected parties on various issues including handling and wise 
use of their compensation payments. Depending on the size of compensation schemes 
and nature of shared benefits, a project developer can jointly develop specific 
guidelines for contractors commissioned to manage compensation schemes. 
• Apart from delays in disbursing compensation payments, Section 4.4.3 shows that 
many project developers over-relied on cash compensation which has many risks such 
as loss through theft and misuse. Other forms of compensation should be considered 
as discussed in Sections 4.4.3(ii) & (iii). However, implementation of any type of 
compensation payments depends on the negotiation outcomes between the affected 
parties and host communities as presented in Section 7.2.3(iv) above. 
 
vi) Monitoring 
The current compensation regime does not require monitoring of implementation of 
compensation schemes and their post-compensation outcomes (Section 4.4.3(vi)). Very few 
World Bank funded projects had a monitoring component as an integral part of their 
environmental monitoring plans. During discussions held with different project officials, 
some claimed to do monitoring of compensation schemes along with other project monitoring 
schedules. However, only one monitoring report from one project was seen. Monitoring of 
compensation schemes should be compulsory and project developers should separate 
compensation monitoring from project and environmental monitoring schedules. This would 
promote systematic monitoring to ensure that expected compensation outcomes happen as 
planned and lessons learned from previous experiences are documented. 
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7.3 Critical evaluation of the proposed framework 
This critique systematically evaluates a proposed framework against the following design 
criteria (i.e. effectiveness, efficiency, equity, sustainability, administrative feasibility and 
political acceptability) suggested earlier in the conceptual framework of this study (Figure 
2.7). This critical evaluation therefore serves as “an application of a framework” in order to 
identify gaps from both practical and policy point of views. 
 
7.3.1: Effectiveness 
From a management point of view, effectiveness relates to getting things done and is 
associated with both the process and end results (Chambers, 2009). As per definition of 
compensation suggested in Section 7.1, an overall desired outcome of a proposed framework 
is sustainable development, in which well-being of the affected parties and host communities, 
project welfare and environmental safeguard are achieved. In this case, three distinct 
perspectives (i.e. household and community; project and; ecology or environment) can be 
used to measure changes that are happening and their effectiveness following implementation 
of a compensation scheme. Normally, measuring effectiveness involves the past history, 
current trends and expectations about the future. However, measuring effectiveness of some 
qualitative parameters related to the expected compensation outcomes depends on satisfaction 
levels of compensation beneficiaries. Qualified experts are needed to facilitate and guide 
planning processes including identification of qualitative indicators for various expected 
outcomes. Alternatively, checklists for generic qualitative indicators can be generated to 
provide guidance.  
 
This framework to address issues of social justice, fairness, equity and sustain rural 
livelihoods in host communities depends not only on the participation of the affected parties 
and host communities but also whether local people, particularly rural are equipped with 
necessary information and other specific knowledge to help them negotiate and choose the 
best options available. However, Mwalyosi (2004) found that local communities in Tanzania 
were least empowered in demanding fair compensation. Facilitation is therefore needed to at 
least help affected parties and host communities to mobilise themselves and organise needs 
and preferences for optimal gains. 
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In light of the requirements of expertise discussed above, it is probably an optimistic 
expectation that multidisciplinary teams of experts can be found in developing nations such 
as Tanzania. Pryor (2006) reported that most of the political-economic systems adopted by 
many developing countries do not favour effective use of their highly trained personnel and 
no sign of recovery from this problem was seen in countries in the Sub-Saharan Region. This 
skills shortage is likely to reduce the effectiveness of a proposed compensation framework. 
 
7.3.2: Efficiency 
According to Krishnamurthy (2008), efficiency concerns achieving outcomes at the right time 
and whether the best means were used. Efficiency can be measured in terms of both 
quantitative and qualitative outputs against time. It is therefore important that the 
compensation process gives value for money, and that a proposed framework can deliver 
compensation in the most cost-effective way, avoid compensatory failures associated with 
undercompensation, overcompensation, unnecessary delays and excessive operational costs. 
 
Firstly, a great challenge that is likely to face a proposed framework is posed by unstable 
markets and economic systems found in developing nations, such that the rewards for 
developers and affected parties alike are subject of considerable uncertainty and volatility. In 
this context, it is difficult to determine the efficiency of compensation schemes. Both the 
market valuations and the basis for compensation, become highly subjective and uncertain. 
Some may think the governments could help. However, recent studies by Kee et al. (2007), 
Shilpi and Umali-Deininger (2008) and Galles (2008) concluded that states in many 
developing world have little power to improve the performance and efficiency of their 
liberalised markets. 
 
Secondly, it appears that neither developers nor affected parties appreciate the potential 
efficiency gains from a negotiated approach to compensation that starts early and delivers 
mutually advantageous outcomes, with less long running disputes and reduced transaction 
costs. Various studies, for example, Clark (1995), Hughes (1998), ADBAfrica (2003), 
Mwalyosi (2004) and ADBAsia (2007) report that despite stakeholder participation in 
development being promoted and advocated for many decades, practices in compensation 
processes show that involvement of stakeholders, affected parties in particular is limited to 
information giving and consultation. What appears to be beneficial for one affected party may 
not maximise the welfare gain of all parties taken together, nor consider the welfare of future 
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generations. A careful holistic planning and implementation of activities of project, business, 
including compensation schemes is required in order to have welfare efficient compensation 
outcomes.  
 
7.3.3: Equity 
Equity in the context of development projects and compensation is concerned with the 
distribution of benefits and costs (i) between projects and the affected parties and host 
communities (shared equity); (ii) among the affected parties and host communities members 
(intragenerational equity) and; (iii) between the present and future generations 
(intergenerational equity). Equity issues are difficult to address because their recognition and 
implementation depend on ethical and moral considerations such as a preference of having 
psychological satisfaction now by sparing tangible benefits for others, including future 
generations. However, this can be done in different ways depending on how distinctions are 
drawn between concepts of right and wrong, adhering to conventionally accepted standards 
of conduct in the society. 
 
Shared equity hypothesises a state where the affected parties and host communities are 
provided with opportunity to participate in project design, planning, implementation, 
monitoring and in sharing benefits and costs. This arrangement promotes the affected parties 
and host communities to have a direct say in development and share of benefits. This 
approach is increasingly evident in a number of developed as well as developing countries as 
discussed in Section 4.4.3(ii) (Van Wicklin, 1998 and Égré et al., 2008). In Tanzania, KVTC 
project is currently sharing benefits with more than nine village communities including the 
case study village of Idete (Appendix 4.4). There is scope to develop partnership 
arrangements to use compensation funds (Sections 7.2.1(ii)), but the policy-legal frameworks 
to support such joint ventures are rarely in place.  
 
Intragenerational equity issues in many rural communities are largely regulated by traditional 
based institutions which are becoming weaker due to many reasons including policy 
interventions and modernisation (Kideghesho and Mtoni, 2008b). For example, at a 
household level, any attempts to pay compensation or distribute benefits to the affected 
household members through the joint names of both spouses as opposed to the household 
heads (in most cases males) contravenes socio-cultural values (norms) in many African 
communities. Traditions in many communities in developing countries including Tanzania 
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favour some social groups and disadvantage others. For example, considering ownership of 
land and other household assets, men are favoured over women, elder sons get 
disproportionate larger shares than younger ones and a husband’s extended family members 
command more rights than a wife’s (Yngstrom, 2002; Brown, et al., 2003; Tsikata, 2003; 
Tripp, 2004). Such socio-cultural factors collectively pose a big challenge as far as 
intragenerational equity is concerned at household and community level. However, although 
a compensation regime works within existing institutional frameworks and arrangements, it 
might use different approaches such as education and health services at community level to 
benefit different members of households. Moreover, advisory services (Sections 4.4.3(v) & 
7.2.3(v)) can also help in providing guidance to monetary compensation beneficiaries to 
spend their money for the benefit of all household members. 
 
Intergenerational equity is the most challenging as it deals with the rights of future 
generations to benefit from an existing endowment. The responsibility of ensuring this type 
of equity lies between many stakeholders, and as a consequence it is often neglected. Efforts 
to promote intergenerational equity often conflict with the interests and preferences of 
stakeholders with strong influence. However, according to the proposed framework for 
compensation, the wellbeing of future generations is entrusted to a joint custody of the 
project developers, host communities and their neighbouring communities where they are 
expected to forge partnership for managing local resources in order to sustain both the present 
and future livelihoods. Such partnerships have potential to protect and enhance ecosystem 
goods and services, investing benefits accrued from projects in favour of tomorrow’s 
generations. 
 
7.3.4: Sustainability 
Sustainable development is not only a matter of integrity of economic and ecological 
systems, but also of socio-cultural and equity issues (Hediger, 1997 and McLeod, 2000). 
Sustainable development is concerned with co-management of critical issues of development 
and environment dynamics as an attempt to maintain people’s livelihoods and project welfare 
in an adaptive process. This requires capability of key stakeholders of forging partnerships of 
working together and integrating social, economic, cultural, ecological, institutional and 
technological matters along with adequate consideration for basic needs and wants of today 
and tomorrow’s generations. Much of this has been discussed above in Section 7.3.3. 
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Carefully designed benefit sharing schemes such as preferential employment and alternative 
income generating activities can support and help to sustain livelihoods of the affected parties 
and host communities. Also supports provided to improve and promote both primary and 
secondary education and; campaigns to raise awareness on community health and 
environmental conservation have continuous multi beneficial impacts to the host 
communities and project as well. According to Trembath (2008), the benefits that are tailored 
to the needs and values of host communities are well received by host communities and help 
to build-up trust among community members from one generation to another. Evidence of 
this approach to benefit sharing was observed in the case of the KVTC project. Successes in 
achieving sustainability also depend on whether preferences of host communities are 
adequately considered and their relevant experiences are taped and integrated with the 
implementation of benefit sharing schemes. 
 
7.3.5: Administrative feasibility 
As revealed and discussed earlier (Sections 4.4.3(iii) & 4.4.4), a number of organisations and 
institutions are involved in the compensation process. This study confirmed that losses faced 
by the affected parties and host communities in rural areas are mainly land related (Section 
6.6) and a considerable strength that compensation matters in Tanzania are currently 
coordinated by the Ministry of Lands. However, it was further revealed that while most of the 
coordination activities of compensation processes are done at district local authorities, they 
involve representatives from different national-level sector ministries (Sections 4.3.3; 4.4.2(i) 
& 4.4.3(v)). This creates conflict of interest among different government actors in relation to 
compensation matters and results in disputes, fragmented approaches and high transaction 
costs (Section 4.4.4).  
 
Another critical issue that surrounds a proposed framework is the distribution of roles and 
powers between the central and local governments. While local government authorities do 
most of the coordination tasks of compensation processes, many decisions are made at central 
and intermediary government levels (Sections 4.3.3; 4.4.2(i) & 4.4.3(v)). Unless there are 
changes in participatory approaches and actions taken to empower local people at local levels 
in rural areas in particular, stakeholder involvement and participation of affected parties and 
host communities in negotiation will remain limited. These issues go beyond that of 
compensation itself. They raise questions about the fundamental approach to development, 
the extent of participation in development, and the extent to which beneficiary and host 
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communities ‘negotiate’ about the project development as a whole, rather than only the 
arrangements for compensation. 
 
7.3.6: Political acceptability 
Decisions about whether a proposed project should proceed, or what compensation a project 
developer should pay sometimes become a political issue especially, when high rank decision 
makers have vested interests in the proposed projects. This can happen in two ways: First, the 
conflicts of interest among politicians are likely to impede the smooth operation of 
compensation processes and their outcomes. Burdge and Vanclay (1996) and Pearce and 
Swanson (2008) found political struggles can divide people in communities and impede 
development plans and processes. For example, direct involvement of political parties in 
trying to resolve resource use and compensation disputes between host communities and 
mining projects in Northern Tanzania has brought more confusion, hostility, sabotage and 
events of breach of peace. Differences in political ideologies and interests complicate any 
effort intended to resolve these problems. This study, however, calls for careful feasibility 
and environmental impact assessment studies as the only means to early identification of any 
likelihood occurrence of political conflict of interests in regard to both the proposed project 
and earmarked project areas. This would lead to the suggestion of effective mitigation 
measures. According to Pearce and Swanson (2008), project developers find geographical 
areas of high political tensions risky and ‘unhealthy’ for their investments.  Thus avoidance 
of these locations is a cost-effective mitigation measure. 
 
Secondly, in Tanzania like in many developing countries, the government is the main 
developer. This poses a big threat to any policy proposals that can lead to a reduction of 
government revenues. In such circumstances, it is very unlikely to have both the government 
and other project developers supporting a framework for fair and full compensation. This 
implies a development bias, possibly some collusion with developers, and possibly also some 
preference for circumspect about property rights (Dixit and Olson, 2000). 
 
7.4 Critical evaluation of applying Coase Theorem in developing economy 
The Coase Theorem sets out a framework for understanding the interaction between 
developers and affected parties as they seek to achieve mutually satisfactory, welfare 
maximising outcomes through a process of negotiation. However, a number of conditions 
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particular to developing countries and evident in this case study of Tanzania, challenge its 
applicability in practice. These are discussed below. 
 
7.4.1: Aspects of property rights 
Property rights are an essential aspect of Coase theorem, as they lead to disputing sides to 
bargain in order to achieve outcomes that are consistent with the efficient allocation of a 
disputed resource. This happens only if property rights are clearly defined. The results (Table 
4.2) of assessment done on property rights in the studied case of rural Tanzania in Section 
4.4.1(ii) have indicated an overall low level achievement in the four conditions for efficient 
allocation of resource by Tietenberg’s (1996) criteria, namely the requirements of 
universality, exclusivity, transferability and enforceability. Therefore, it can be argued that 
currently property rights in rural Tanzania are insecure from involuntary seizure and 
encroachment. Thus, rural dwellers that occupy and use land through customary land rights 
have weak entitlements for compensation, as distribution of benefits from relocation 
ultimately depends on who holds the property rights and their relative power (Anderson, 
2004). 
 
However, the lack of clarity shows some prospects towards improvement, as rural land 
occupiers and users are constantly demanding for recognition and formal registration of their 
farmlands. They are also demanding clear and permanent boundaries separating their village 
lands from other state owned lands. This indicates that the on-going land reforms in Tanzania 
and many other developing countries are moving towards increased private ownership of land 
for which benefits and costs of owning and using land are clearly specified. The award of 
private entitlements may require, however, that aspects of ‘public good’ contained in 
traditional property regimes are maintained or indeed enhanced, such as for example, 
conservation of land and water resources. 
 
7.4.2: Aspects of transaction costs and negotiation process 
Coase (1960) argues that provided transaction costs of bargaining process are not 
prohibitively high, a state of market will be developed and if negotiated terms would 
mutually be agreed upon, then mutually beneficial exchanges take place and a Pareto-optimal 
condition is attained. In the case of Tanzanian compensation system, its transaction costs can 
be divided into two main groups namely those related to the negotiation process and to the 
implementation of its recommendations. According to Berglund and Johansson (2004) and 
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Weigl (2008), transaction costs in negotiation process include the costs of identifying and 
bringing parties together and performing negotiation. Despite the compensation legal 
framework in Tanzania providing an opportunity for affected parties and project developers 
to negotiate, the current compensation system and practices do not include negotiation 
process. Most likely enforcers and project developers have not been practising negotiation 
during compensation, because they fear transaction costs. The findings of this study (Section 
4.4.4) have shown that transaction costs in the Tanzanian compensation system are high due 
to conflict of interests, handling of complaints and appeals, the large number of parties 
involved in compensation process, unclear property rights and resultant litigation and court 
processes. There is scope to reduce transaction costs by addressing these sources of excessive 
costs. 
 
Based on many benefits discussed in Section 7.2.2(iii) and 7.2.3(iv), this study has 
recommended that the negotiation process be an important step of compensation procedure in 
Tanzania. However, it was observed that transaction costs increase with the number of 
negotiating parties and currently threaten the negotiation process. Moreover, Sections 4.3.1, 
4.3.2 and 4.4.2(iii) pointed out that asymmetry of information can limit the potential 
applicability of Coase theorem in developing countries. Special measures are required to deal 
with these factors in order to minimise transaction costs by restricting the number of parties 
involved (as per Section 7.2.3(iv) the affected parties and host communities may choose a 
reasonable number of knowledgeable representatives) and providing improved access to 
information and support. Apart from suggested measures to discourage unnecessary 
confidentiality, special efforts are also required to inform host community members and 
representatives of the affected parties before engaging in negotiation process. The elected 
Village and Ward leaders in collaboration with experienced development facilitators should 
conduct sensitisation and training of the affected parties, host community members and most 
important their representatives. If possible, facilitators should be used in running negotiation 
processes. The use of qualified and experienced facilitators necessarily involves costs. 
Hennart (2006) notes that the aim of dealing with transaction costs is not to avoid them 
completely but to minimise unnecessary costs. However, care should be taken to make sure 
transaction costs incurred by each side should not exceed the expected benefits from 
negotiation outcomes. 
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7.5 Key messages  
The key messages from this chapter include the following points. 
 
Defining fair compensation 
A fair compensation practice in the context of development projects should deal with losers 
and gainers, existing and possible future entitlements, distribution of project benefits and 
costs, risks and uncertainties, resolution of disputes and, concerns of social justice and equity. 
Although compensation focuses on losses associated with existing entitlements, it should in 
many cases consider opportunities for sharing the potential benefits of development. All these 
should be done through a facilitated negotiation process aiming at building relationships 
between losers and gainers towards achieving a common goal for sustainable development. A 
particular challenge in many developing countries, and this case study, is that entitlements to 
benefits are not clearly defined, either because they involve customary ‘user’ rather 
‘ownership’ rights, or and more critically, they may involve assumed ‘squatter’ rights which 
have little customary or legal status. Indeed, compensating opportunistically acquired squatter 
rights may create a moral hazard. 
 
A proposed compensation framework 
A proposed compensation framework is designed to ensure continuity of rural livelihoods in 
host communities, ecosystem functions and services and, positive outcomes of development 
projects and compensation schemes. This is done through addressing all issues in regard to 
equitable distribution of benefits and costs at household and community levels without 
forgetting welfare of future generations using negotiation process between project losers and 
gainers as a major principle. A proposed compensation framework can be linked to other 
project appraisal systems such as cost benefit analysis, environmental impact assessment and 
social impact assessment. 
 
Application of Coase theorem in developing economies 
It is concluded that despite some challenges associated with property rights in particular, the 
Coase theorem can provide a good framework for studying and understanding project-
influenced compensation in a developing economy context such as Tanzania. The Coasian 
bargaining or negotiation process also emphasises the importance of measures to maintain the 
efficiency and minimise the costs of the negotiation process. 
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Chapter 8 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
This chapter presents the conclusions drawn from the main research findings with respect to 
the study objectives presented in chapter one. The chapter also discusses various 
recommendations for the key stakeholders of development and compensation processes in 
Tanzania and suggests further research studies in areas of compensation, development and 
rural livelihoods. 
 
8.1 Brief description about the study 
This research explores the potential use of compensation for promoting the sustainability of 
development projects, rural livelihoods and development at large in the context of developing 
economy, namely Tanzania. The study sought to understand the existing compensation 
regimes in their geographical settings using a conceptual and analytical framework that 
integrated the Coase theorem, concepts of ecosystem functions and sustainable livelihoods. 
The study objectives focused on issues relating to key stakeholders’ interests in and influence 
over development and compensation processes in Tanzania; compensation systems and their 
implications on both livelihoods of the affected parties and sustainable development; cost-
effective ways of compensating the affected parties and; applicability of Coase theorem, its 
relevance and potentials in understanding project-influenced compensation in a developing 
economy context. Tanzania was used as the country case from which two project cases (The 
KVTC teak project and SONGAS gas pipeline project) were studied. Exploratory visits and 
key informants interviews provided initial insights into project impacts and compensation 
regimes. Focus group discussions, in-depth household cases and, households’, project 
developers’ and service providers’ surveys were triangulated to provide the qualitative and 
quantitative information required to meet the study objectives. 
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8.2 Conclusions 
Conclusions are presented according to the order of study objectives. 
 
The first objective was to identify and describe key stakeholders, their interests in and 
influence on compensation issues in Tanzania. 
 
Development projects are deemed worthwhile if overall welfare is enhanced and, in principle, 
those who gain could compensate those who lose. In this respect, compensation is an 
important measure or method of redistribution of benefits and costs between the gainers and 
losers in the context of development projects. The conceptual framework for this study 
(Figure 2.9) synthesises literature information and shows that compensation is a process that 
involves a number of issues such as characteristics of different stakeholders; livelihood assets 
and ecosystem functions; policy, legal and procedural aspects and; market conditions. It is 
also worth noting that compensation payments can take different forms such as monetary, in-
kind and benefit sharing schemes (Chapter 4). 
 
In regard to compensation stakeholders, the study has identified the National Environment 
Management Council (National environmental agency), District Commissioner’s Office, 
project developers, and consultants as key stakeholders with both great interests in and strong 
influence on compensation issues in Tanzania. While the influence of Environmental Agency 
and District Commissioner’s Office (as Government authorities) are legally based, those of 
the project developers and consultants are important because of their roles in development 
and compensation processes in Tanzania. It was demonstrated that investment and technical 
guidance provided by project developers and consultants respectively are currently 
recognised by national policies as important inputs for socio-economic development at both 
the national and rural community levels. On the other hand, the study revealed that the local 
stakeholders (i.e. host communities, affected parties, Village and Ward Government 
Authorities) had great interests but low influence on compensation, partly caused by 
asymmetry of information in relation to projects and development issues. 
 
The survey of service providers that involved the Government organisations, consultants, 
contractors, researchers and actors from the civil society organisations revealed that an 
asymmetry of information problem exists in the processes of development and compensation 
in Tanzania. It was further revealed that the current policy-legal frameworks contribute to this 
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problem, as they emphasise that dissemination of project and compensation information is 
solely a responsibility of project developers. Lack of information about development projects 
and their compensation schemes limits many key stakeholders from participating in 
compensation processes. It was also further revealed that powers of influence of many 
important stakeholders, affected parties and host communities were reduced in particular over 
compensation issues such as eligibility for and entitlements in relation to pioneered 
customary land rights. The affected parties and host communities experienced the same effect 
in relation to the determination of amount of compensation payment and type of payment 
(whether monetary or in-kind) that suits their livelihood systems. Since this study also aimed 
to investigate possibilities of applying the Coase theorem in developing economy countries, 
asymmetry of information was found to be one of the limitations to the Coasian bargaining 
process that involves two parties (i.e. project developer as one side and affected parties and 
host community another side). 
 
The second objective was to identify and explain compensation systems commonly used in 
Tanzania and determine their potential suitability for sustainable development. 
 
Analysis of information collected from exploratory interviews and discussions with service 
providers, project officials and various project and policy documents helped to identify 
compensation systems in Tanzania. Currently, the compensation systems in Tanzania were 
found to involve three main stages namely, identification of affected parties and 
communities, valuation of losses and delivery of compensation payments.  
 
One positive aspect for the Tanzanian compensation systems is the recognition of project-
influenced compensation as a land based issue. Land legislation (i.e. Land Acquisition Act 
No.43 of 1967, Land Act No.4 and Village Land Act No.5, both of 1999) were identified 
during the exploratory visits to the study area as the main legislation that regulate 
compensation influenced by development projects in Tanzania. The Chief Government 
Valuer housed within the Ministry responsible for land issues is the overall National 
coordinator of compensation processes in Tanzania. The study found that the legal basis for 
compensation is reasonably comprehensive in principle, but seems to be not applied in 
practice. Perceptions of service providers and project developers collected during the surveys 
revealed that the Tanzanian compensation systems have the following shortcomings:- 
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• One of the fundamental objectives of the National Land Policy, on which land laws 
are based on, is to pay full, fair and prompt compensation to the affected parties 
(URT, 1999a). However, no clear compensation procedure and guidelines are in place 
to highlight and guide practices step by step in order to achieve the stated 
compensation payments. This suggest that poor planning, haphazard implementation 
and lack of monitoring of compensation schemes in Tanzania are caused by lack of 
clear compensatory framework in terms of values, principles, procedures, guidelines 
and checklists. 
 
• Responses from both the project developers and service providers show that unclear 
property rights is one of the sources of both compensation disputes and unnecessary 
transaction costs. This also causes problems associated with compensation 
entitlements such as undercompensation or not qualifying for compensation. This is 
an important message. It appears to suggest that if customary land tenure rights in 
rural areas become secure, this would clarify compensation entitlements and reduce 
both disputes and transaction costs during compensation systems. 
 
• Perceptions from service providers and project officials indicated that compensation 
processes in Tanzania have both high involvement of many unwanted parties and low 
involvement of affected parties and host communities. The unwanted parties included 
government actors with no critical roles in the compensation process and intermediary 
elites (intruders). Unwanted parties are attracted by monetary and other short term 
interests and have been the major sources of compensation disputes. The current 
practices show that involvement of affected parties and host communities is limited to 
information giving and consultation, participation is largely affected by lack of 
communication (i.e. relevant information), lack of transparency and intermediary 
intruders. 
 
• Responses from both the service providers and exploratory interviewees show that 
valuation is the most disputed stage of the compensation process. Substantial 
shortcomings are caused by many factors that lead to undervaluation and 
inconsistence. Application of low and outdated compensation rates and failure to 
consider some values or qualities of affected assets such as cumulative future values 
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lost for the productive life of permanent crops provide evidence of undervaluation. 
Inconsistencies in valuation occur when affected parties are unlawfully treated 
differently due to incompetence, negligence and manipulation of valuation inventories 
during computation of compensation. 
 
• Despite the fact that many individual affected parties prefer monetary compensation, 
both the project developers and service providers indicated that monetary 
compensation provides little benefits compared to in-kind supports and have recently 
started benefit sharing schemes. They showed clearly that compensation paid in the 
form of in-kind supports or through benefit sharing schemes has wide impact at both 
household and community levels compared to monetary payments. While many 
projects were reported to pay monetary compensation to individual affected 
households and in-kind supports to the affected communities, only one project 
(Kilombero Valley Teak Company) was found practising benefit sharing in Tanzania. 
However, many recent research findings on compensation and rural livelihoods 
(McLeod, 2000; Cernea, 2008; Égré et al., 2008; Nakayama and Furuyashiki, 2008; 
Trembath, 2008) support ‘benefit sharing schemes’. In contrast to the current 
conventional ‘one-payment’ monetary compensation, the study revealed that ‘benefit 
sharing schemes’, taking a variety of forms have built in aspects of continuity and 
have potential to enhance equity. The same schemes can also reduce intrusion of elites 
and subsequent compensation disputes. 
 
The third objective was to identify and explain effects of the existing compensation systems 
on livelihoods of affected parties and their implications on sustainability issues. 
 
In the context of development projects, the effects of the current compensation systems on 
livelihoods of the affected parties and sustainability were assessed through comparison of 
conditions of household livelihood assets and incomes before and after the compensation 
using the conceptual and analytical framework developed for this study (Figure 2.9). As a 
matter of fact rural livelihoods in developing economy largely depend on agriculture (Chapter 
2). Thus, the assessment of changes in agricultural production system as part of ecosystem 
functions focused on land services and goods, including agricultural based income flow. 
Information collected from household cases and other qualitative interviews were used to 
explain and discuss the identified changes and provided for some evidence. The effects of 
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compensation schemes in both village cases were however, mainly land, household income, 
social, environmental and psychological based. 
 
Effects to individual affected parties 
Respondents of household cases and verification surveys (Chapters 5 and 6) demonstrated 
that the affected parties in both studied village cases face many problems in relation to 
livelihoods. However, the biggest impact has been on decrease of household incomes caused 
by loss of farmlands. Land shortage due to high demand relative to its availability was partly 
influenced by development projects and was reported to be an issue of great concern. Land 
shortage manifestations in the villages studied include small household acreage, labour 
redundancy, decline of soil fertility, changes in farming systems, changes of land use, 
growing of farmland renting-in from nearby villages, persistent food shortage, decreasing 
income per capita and, increased land disputes. All these have in turn contributed to a 
decrease of agricultural productivity at household level in the studied villages. In this study, 
land loss was measured by an indicator named ‘land loss severity ratio’ which was worked 
out from the ratio of the land occupied or used by a household after and before the project 
(Chapter 5). Impairment of livelihoods in the village cases increased as ‘land loss severity 
ratio’ decreases, indicating that households have small acreage now compared to times 
before the projects. Comparing village cases using severity of land loss as an indicator, Idete 
village suffered over five times more compared to M’baya village. The type and nature of 
development projects determine the magnitude and extent of impacts caused on people’s 
livelihoods. For instance, the teak plantation is a land-take project and had major land loss 
effects on people’s livelihoods at Idete compared to the gas pipeline project that required a 
strip of land from M’baya. After construction, the pipeline way-leave was returned, subject to 
conditions, for reuse by the affected parties to farm non-permanent crops (Chapter 6). 
 
Other compensation effects to individual affected households were associated with 
undercompensation (Chapter 6). When the actual compensation paid was compared with both 
the perceived household income loss and calculated household total loss, for each case, it was 
confirmed that the affected parties in studied villages were undercompensated. The 
undercompensation was caused by undervaluation and inconsistency during valuation as 
established in Chapter 4. For example, in both village cases, the size and quality of farmlands 
lost by the affected parties because of the projects were not considered during valuation and 
hence were not taken into account in the course of determining compensation payments 
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(Chapter 6). In addition to that and specific to agricultural based households, 
undercompensation was partly caused by failure to consider future income flows from both 
permanent and semi-permanent crops.  
 
The conceptual and analytical framework for this study (Figure 2.9) suggests that several 
policy, legal and market based instruments can be used to shape compensation processes in 
order to have efficient outcomes. This is an important message, as it shows policy gaps in 
addressing losses encountered by farmers and the need for market based techniques and 
approaches in valuating farm-based losses. This is where frequent market surveys are needed 
to generate information on farm inputs (costs) and outputs (incomes), prices and other 
important data for estimation of compensation payments. Surveys could also focus on finding 
ways to promote record keeping of agricultural production at household level in developing 
countries in order to support smooth application of different methods such as income 
approach in estimating agricultural based losses. 
 
There is a clear link between compensation entitlements and property rights. Property rights 
in rural areas are not clearly defined. This affects compensation entitlements of affected 
parties and specifically leads to undercompensation. For instance, many of the Idete’s 
affected parties did not qualify for compensation because their pioneer occupancy and use of 
land was neither registered nor documented. Their ‘assumed’ property entitlements were 
associated with squatting and were compelled to accept lower compensation payments as 
they had no recognised entitlement. This is another important message that land tenure 
reforms are necessary in order to increase tenure security of customary land rights and 
promote clarity in property rights. The reforms could also establish minimum land occupancy 
period for easy determination of compensation entitlements. 
 
Effects on host communities 
The study findings (Chapter 6) revealed that compensation as currently practised has negative 
implications not only to individual households but also to the community at large. Focus 
group discussions in both village cases indicated that spill over effects that affect the entire 
communities were for example, manifested in a deterioration of ecosystem functions. The 
agricultural production systems suffer from decline of soil fertility which is part of supporting 
and regulation ecosystem functions. A land shortage problem due to high demand relative to 
its availability has prevented shifting cultivation and limited long fallows from taking place 
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and subsequently affected natural restoration of soil fertility in both farming communities. 
Furthermore, the impact of land-take project deprived community members at Idete access to 
and right of use some common resources, as for example, many horticultural farmers lost 
access to and rights to use water sources located within disputed valleylands. This reduced 
their production of both annual and semi-permanent crops more than four times. 
 
The effects of projects and associated compensation schemes were also felt at community 
level through deterioration of social capital. Social capital is an important livelihood asset in 
bringing people together, especially during problems or when a society faces challenges such 
as hosting a development project, relocation or compensation. Household cases in both 
village cases revealed that social cohesion and trust components of social capital were 
declining among community members. One of the identified factors causing decline of social 
cohesion and trust was development projects (Chapter 5). Projects interfere with sacred 
places, landscapes and farming systems that link people’s socio-cultural, knowledge and 
information flow systems to their livelihood activities. Consequently, the disrupted social 
cohesion contributed to the increase of land disputes and impairments of traditional land use 
plans in both village cases. 
 
Both qualitative and quantitative findings suggest that projects and their compensation 
schemes can have multiplicative effects. Loss of land caused a series of effects such as, 
labour redundancy, loss of incomes, rise of land rents, relocation of farms away from their 
residences, poor homes and, intangible losses. Household cases at Idete village indicated that 
intangible losses were those that can not easily be measured in money terms but their effects 
are felt and can be identified, for example, lack of peace of mind, risks and hazards had 
significant negative impact to both individual household and community levels. This 
phenomenon was established to negatively affect many social groups differently. For 
instance, affected elderly people can easily become vulnerable, when they have nobody to 
depend on and especially when they realise that they have lost their assets like land and 
homes that they relied on for most of their life. This increases social dependence at household 
and community levels. 
 
The study findings indicated male dominance in compensation processes in both village cases 
(Chapter 5). Household cases linked gender relations to many aspects of both development 
and compensation processes such as planning, decision-making, implementation and 
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monitoring. In specific to compensation, gender equality was emphasised to have potentials 
for promotion of wise use of compensation payments (money) and safety in keeping and 
handling not only compensation money but all household resources. In addition, it was 
highlighted that promotion of gender equality can help in promoting overall participation at 
both household and community levels. 
 
The fourth objective was to propose a form of compensation and its cost-effective 
implementation suitable for a developing economy context. 
 
Defining ‘fair compensation’ practice 
This study has critically reviewed the concepts and theories of compensation in the 
development project context (Chapter 2) showing the lack of a clear definition of ‘fair 
compensation’. The review prompted the need of deriving an explicit research-based 
definition for a form of compensation that suits a developing economy context. Therefore, 
various identified aspects of compensation from both the literature and findings of this study 
(Chapters 4, 5 and 6) were considered as important issues that need to be addressed by a fair 
compensation practice. Briefly, these issues included compensation entitlements as linked to 
property rights; losers and gainers; interests of stakeholders to participate and negotiation; 
distribution of benefits and costs; intragenerational and intergenerational equity; intrusion of 
elites; continuity of livelihoods of affected parties and welfare of host community; resolution 
of disputes; reduction of transaction costs and; social and environmental problems.  
 
Considering all the issues mentioned above, it was demonstrated that compensation is more 
related to issues of social, economic and distribution of benefits and costs than environmental 
issues. However, the study recognises the importance of the environmental dimension in 
sustainability. Some of the issues in relation to deterioration of ecosystem functions such as 
decline of soil fertility caused by land shortage have been mentioned to be addressed through 
partnership between project developers and affected parties and host communities in order to 
ensure quality and quantity of resources are maintained. 
 
In the contexts of development projects and rural settings in developing economies, a ‘fair 
compensation scheme or practice’ is essentially defined in terms of its ability to address 
issues of distribution of project benefits and costs, disputes and concerns of social justice 
between losers and gainers through a facilitated negotiation process. Facilitation is necessary 
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because of the existing asymmetry of information between the negotiating sides and low 
levels of awareness and understanding among the rural people, which impair efficiencies of 
negotiation process and its outcomes. It is also envisaged that through a negotiation process, 
avenues for forging new relationships and partnerships can be explored and formed for losers 
and gainers to work together towards achieving common goals such as promotion of 
sustainability. 
 
The proposed compensation framework 
The purpose of this study was partly to propose a framework for compensating people 
impacted by development projects in the context of a developing economy. The conceptual 
framework for this study (Figure 2.9) provided the base for the proposed compensatory 
framework. Factors deduced from the findings of this research, that have relevance to the 
main issues outlined in the above definition of a ‘fair compensation’ were pulled out to 
describe various characteristics of the proposed compensatory framework. The proposed 
framework consists of the outcome-based and process-embedded core values, guiding 
principles and key procedural steps to ensure that compensation schemes are 
comprehensively planned and implemented in a cost-effective manner. Early notification of 
key stakeholders, affected parties in particular; negotiation between project developer and 
affected parties; monitoring of process and outcomes and; integration of other project 
appraisal systems such as cost benefit analysis, social and environmental impact assessments 
are all important features that would enable the proposed framework to enhance 
compensation performance in Tanzania. The features mentioned above have potentials to lead 
the key stakeholders towards increased information dissemination, avoidance or minimisation 
of both disputes and unnecessary transaction costs.  
 
Lack of attention to post-compensation outcomes in the current compensation regimes 
suggests the need to incorporate core values (i.e. uniformity, reduced vulnerability, equity 
and sustainability) to describe basic desired qualities of compensatory outcomes. The 
presence of different approaches and many intermediary actors and elite intruders to 
compensation processes called for the need of having principles to describe specific aspects 
that direct and guide the process towards achieving the desired outcomes. Lack of planning 
and monitoring in the current compensation systems, and based on the importance of these 
two stages necessitated the need to suggest procedural steps to follow in order to avoid 
haphazard practices in compensation processes. The proposed procedure, in particular the 
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monitoring stage would help to link planning and implementation of compensation schemes 
and reveal practical lessons for future improvements of compensation practices. Therefore, 
core values, guiding principles and the procedure collectively describe a proposed 
compensation framework that aims to ensure continuity of rural livelihoods in host 
communities and positive outcomes of development projects and compensation schemes. 
 
The proposed framework must allow flexibility in compensation processes, as it can be linked 
to other project appraisal systems such as Cost Benefit Analysis, Environmental Impact 
Assessment and Social Impact Assessment for the purposes of obtaining useful information 
in a cost-effective way. It is worth noting that a negotiation stage that brings the developer 
and affected parties and host community sides together is a critical stage of the proposed 
framework, because it has great potential for ensuring and improving involvement of affected 
parties. Other important potentials of negotiation include reduction of disputes in cost-
effectiveness and enhancement of relationships between project developers and affected 
parties and host communities. 
 
Critical evaluation of a proposed compensation framework 
Another part of the purpose of this study was to provide a critical evaluation of a proposed 
compensatory framework against design criteria, namely: effectiveness, efficiency, equity, 
sustainability, administrative feasibility and political acceptability (Figure 2.9). A systematic 
critical evaluation of a proposed compensatory framework to predict its performance and 
identify gaps from both practical and policy point of views. Lessons learned included:- 
 
• The overall purpose of any proposed compensation framework is the promotion of 
sustainable development in which its effectiveness depends on the facilitated 
negotiation process and its outcomes. The availability of qualified and experienced 
multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary experts in developing countries poses a great 
challenge to the proposed compensatory framework. 
 
• The proposed compensatory framework can deliver compensation in a cost-effective 
way, avoid compensatory failures such as undercompensation and overcompensation 
and also avoid excessive operational costs. However, unstable market conditions and 
economic systems in developing nations pose a great challenge. 
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• The promotion of equity (i.e. shared or rent, intragenerational and intergenerational) 
depends on the type or form of compensation payments. Benefit sharing schemes 
operated in different forms have relatively higher potential than monetary and in-kind 
payments in supporting equity. While lack of formal support by policy legal 
frameworks affects the shared or rent equity, socio-cultural aspects challenge 
intragenerational equity in many developing countries particularly in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Lack of both ethical and moral considerations such as a preference to have 
psychological satisfaction now by sparing some tangible benefits for future 
generations threatens intergenerational equity. 
 
• The sustainability of compensation outcomes depend on the ability of stakeholders, 
affected parties and host communities and project developers in particular to bargain 
and form partnerships to manage available resources rationally and to ensure all three 
forms of equity outlined above. Challenges likely to impair equity threaten 
sustainability as well. 
 
• The success of the proposed compensatory framework depends on the way 
coordination tasks are distributed between the national and local government 
authorities. Otherwise, conflicts of interest can increase and threaten compensatory 
processes through increased transaction costs. 
 
• It is difficult but possible to separate development issues from political ideologies and 
interests, especially when a project involves relocating the affected parties and paying 
compensation. A big threat is when governments are main developers as is in most 
developing nations, bias can make governments render no or little support to the 
proposed framework.  
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The fifth objective was to apply and critically evaluate relevance and potentials of Coase 
Theorem in understanding project-influenced compensation in a developing economy 
context. 
 
The ambiguous ownership of lands between the State, Villages and Villagers has made it 
difficult for the current property rights regime in Tanzania to fully support an application of 
Coase theorem in looking for optimal solution in compensation. The customary property 
rights in rural areas currently face problems in relation to recognition since are not formally 
registered, encroachment (boundaries with state owned lands are neither permanent nor 
clearly defined) and benefits and entitlements are not clearly specified. 
 
High transaction costs in the current compensation processes in Tanzania are another factor 
that can limit application of Coase theorem in many developing countries. The surveys that 
involved service providers and project developers indicated high transaction costs caused by 
conflicts of interest, complaint resolution and intermediary parties in compensation processes 
are unnecessary costs that can significantly be reduced if not to be avoided completely. 
Furthermore, it was revealed that an asymmetry of information caused by lack of 
transparency (among project developers and government actors) and ignorance (among 
affected parties) on project and development issues is another factor likely to limit 
applicability of Coase theorem in developing countries. Information generation and 
dissemination are costly and if transaction costs associated with project and compensation 
information are not controlled, Coasian bargaining in particular can be prevented from 
happening. 
 
Based on the potential positive aspects of negotiated solutions, Coase theorem can be useful 
in developing economy context. It can be claimed that the seminal Coase theorem gives 
compensation insights that broaden compensation knowledge and therefore can help in 
framing the compensation challenge in the development project context. It can be argued that 
even if the solution is not optimal, bargaining or negotiation process has great potential that 
can either minimise or completely avoid worst compensation effects from taking place. The 
concepts of bargaining as a process can potentially be applied to promote involvement of 
affected parties and host communities in compensation process, resolve compensation 
disputes at low transaction costs and improve relationships between project developers and 
affected parties and host communities. 
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8.3 Recommendations 
The following recommendations are made with respect to the above concluding remarks. 
These recommendations suggest actions the study found can contribute towards addressing 
project-influenced compensation challenges in a developing economy context. Actions are 
therefore divided into three main groups namely implications for policy interventions, 
compensation practices and further research. 
 
8.3.1: Implications for policy interventions 
The study recognises the importance of policy guidance especially in setting an enabling 
environment for compensation practices that promote sustainable rural livelihoods and 
economic development. 
 
i) Recommendations on the process to empower affected parties and host communities 
This study has revealed that compensation disputes are largely influenced by marginalisation 
of the affected parties and host communities caused by lack of recognition, involvement, 
relevant information and their low capability of understanding technical aspects. It was also 
noted that in the period of 1995 - 2005, most of the government sectoral policies were 
reviewed to attract development projects from abroad and within the country. The number of 
projects kept growing from year to year with adverse effects on livelihoods of rural people. 
 
Policy makers are therefore advised to raise issues of rural livelihoods and sustainability to 
the top of the political agenda in order to balance with economic development. This should 
go in parallel with establishment of a special strategy to empower resource-disadvantaged 
rural people in order to minimise marginalisation. There are many old Swahili proverbs22 that 
clearly demonstrate that those with power normally act against any move geared to reduce 
their power, hence, ‘power struggles’. The Government is therefore advised to use different 
measures that focus on enhancing levels of rural people’s general awareness and knowledge 
on various development issues. One of the general measures should be to promote 
establishment of ‘simple information centres’ at ward level if not village level and equip them 
with popular versions of policies and laws, newspapers, booklets, leaflets and magazines on 
all categories of development information.  
 
                                                 
22 “Usimwamshe aliyelala, ukimwamsha utalala wewe”; “Mjinga akielevuka mjanja yu-mashakani” 
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Another simple but powerful measure for empowering the marginalised groups specifically in 
compensation processes is the ‘negotiation’ process between the project developer and 
affected parties and host communities. The study has demonstrated potentials the negotiation 
has in improving involvement of affected parties and it is therefore recommended for the 
policy framework to adapt it and stipulate clearly that negotiation is the only way the 
concerned parties can use in order to arrive at mutual compensation agreements. In the case 
of Tanzania, a number of conditions should be met for the negotiation process and efficient 
compensation outcomes to happen. These conditions include, (i) promotion of information 
dissemination and communication systems, (ii) provision of competent facilitators to help the 
affected parties and host communities in rural area before and during negotiation process, (iii) 
limiting the number of experts to only those with critical roles to the process and, (iv) 
keeping transaction costs as low as possible through establishing control of all factors likely 
to cause unnecessary costs. 
 
ii) Recommendations on security of customary land rights 
Land was found to be central to both the people’s livelihoods and losses encountered during 
compensation schemes. Both income and intangible losses of the rural people increase with 
the size of farmland lost to the project. It was revealed that both village cases like many 
villages and districts in Tanzania have no land use plans in place. This was contributed by 
lack of clear boundaries separating lands between villages, districts and between village lands 
and general or public lands and, between village lands and protected lands. For example, in 
Idete village, the respondents complained about boundaries of forest reserves, Udzungwa 
national park, Idete Prisons and public lands not being permanent. The Ministry of Lands 
through the National Land Use Plan Commission should facilitate village land surveys and 
preparation of both village and district land use plans. This is important since it will secure 
tenure rights of customary land occupants and reduce land disputes that have been causing 
bloodshed in some rural parts in the country. It is worth noting that further recognition of 
customary land rights through registration and clearly specifying duties and benefits would 
clarify compensation entitlements, reduce disputes and transaction costs during 
compensation. 
 
iii) Recommendations on the coordination of the compensation processes 
In Tanzania, environmental management issues have received great attention, particularly 
through policy recognition, enactment of Environmental Management Act, of 2004 and the 
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institutionalisation of environmental impact assessment. The environmental impact 
assessment framework in Tanzania, among others uses social impact assessment and cost 
benefit analysis as tools to generate important information required in the project appraisal 
process. However, the overall enforcement of Environmental Management Act has not been 
effective so far (Pallangyo, 2007). Low environmental management performance has been 
caused by a number of factors including shortage of financial resources, lack of qualified 
experts and weak coordination between the national and local levels. The same factors were 
found to affect the coordination of compensation processes as well. Local authorities are 
assigned to carry out most of the coordination tasks using their small (tight) budgets and 
unqualified staff. This led into poor performances, increased disputes, redoing some of the 
tasks and hence more costs. The study found that if compensation framework or processes are 
to be linked to other project appraisal systems such as cost benefit analysis, environmental 
and social impact assessments, there are great possibilities for the government and project 
developers to benefit from cutting down the costs involved in information generation, 
communication and overall coordination of project appraisal systems including compensation 
processes. 
 
It is therefore recommended that the Government (i) review the current set-up of the 
coordination of both the compensation matters and other project appraisal systems with the 
view of linking their key common stages and formally decentralise coordination from the 
national to local authority levels and, (ii) take efforts to strengthen local government 
authorities in terms of financial resources and expertise to enable them continue with the 
coordination of most of the project appraisal processes at the grassroots level. The suggested 
reforms can enhance performance of compensation, development and environmental 
protection through increased efficiency and effectiveness. 
 
iv) Recommendations on policy-legal matters of compensation 
The study has demonstrated the way losses in rural areas are connected to land, main crops 
grown and applicable farming systems. Both the criteria and approaches used in the valuation 
of land and all types of crops based on market prices do not capture or estimate the value lost 
properly, as undervaluation and inconsistence dominate valuation process. For example, the 
current estimations of losses of both permanent and semi-permanent crops do not consider 
cumulative future values of crops for their productive life. It is recommended that the 
government should review the current compensation guidelines and valuation criteria and 
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approaches and make them specific and suitable for rural livelihoods. This should include 
putting emphasis on making sure the affected parties are provided with alternative farmlands 
nearby in order to allow them to continue earning their livelihood through agriculture that 
still contributes more than 80% of the country’s GDP23. This is important as it would ensure 
development projects do not cause landlessness in rural areas and compromise national 
efforts to reduce poverty and achieve the Millennium Development Goals. 
 
8.3.2: Implications for compensation practices 
The following are suggestions of actions for different key stakeholders to take in order to 
improve compensation practices in Tanzania. 
 
i) Recommendations for the affected parties and host communities 
The research findings have shown that the affected parties, host communities and their village 
and ward government leaders belong to the marginalised group of stakeholders. The main 
cause of this marginalisation is asymmetry of information that manifests itself in terms of 
lack of both awareness and general knowledge regarding development issues. Promotion of 
reading culture among community members is needed. If every Ward in Tanzania has 
managed to construct a secondary school using people’s efforts and resources mobilised 
locally, it is possible for villages to construct a simple information centre (size of one 
classroom) in order to raise awareness and knowledge of villagers on various development 
issues. If villages have such facilities, it is easier for their information centres to receive 
donations of different documents from different development partners including the 
government. Potentially, this would promote rural people to use their spare and leisure time 
in reading and in turn this would facilitate empowerment process to achieve its desired goals 
as quick as possible. 
 
ii) Recommendations for project developers 
The study has shown that compensation involves resolving disputes and distribution of 
benefits and costs between gainers and losers. More importantly, compensation is about 
building new working relationships among stakeholders towards achieving sustainable goals. 
Project developers currently assisting host communities through in-kind supports, can explore 
more avenues for improving further their relationships with affected host communities. For 
                                                 
23 GDP stands for gross domestic product 
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new projects, the project developers are advised to learn from existing projects (e.g. 
Kilombero Valley Teak Company) the way they channel in-kind supports to communities and 
the impacts have been made so far. Lessons drawn from existing projects could help them to 
improve theirs. Developers are also advised to explore possibilities of paying some of the 
losses such as intangible and community-based losses using different forms of benefit sharing 
schemes. The benefit sharing schemes commit both sides into a negotiated formal partnership 
(in terms of agreement) of respecting mutual interests of each other and, also equitably share 
not only benefits but costs as well. The study has shown that benefit sharing schemes if well 
planned can potentially promote intergenerational and intragenerational equity, minimise 
intrusions of elite people and strengthen relationships between host communities and project 
developers. 
 
iii) Recommendations for service providers 
Initially, the study described the key stakeholders in three categories namely affected parties, 
project developers and service providers. The service providers group included stakeholders 
with a range of expertise from local and central governments, consulting firms, freelance, 
academic and research institutions and, civil society organisations. In addition, the study 
described various methods and techniques that can possibly help to determine amount of 
compensation the affected parties deserve and which can reinstate their previous conditions 
of welfare. It was therefore further confirmed that if experts use effectively the available 
methods and techniques to increase efficiency and clarity of disputed issues, this would in 
turn, improve performance of compensation practices and outcomes. For instance, the study 
recommends that determination of compensation payments to the affected parties and host 
communities should also consider the counterfactual scenarios that would have occurred if 
the project did not take place. In principle, compensation payments should recognise the 
change in welfare of the affected parties and host communities that is attributable to project 
development compared with the ‘without’ project situation. In addition, experts can use 
indifference curve theory to clarify perceptions of losses the affected parties might have with 
expectations for the amount they should receive as minimum compensation in order to at 
least maintain their original utility. 
 
iv) Recommendations for civil society organisations 
The study confirmed that the majority of civil society organisations such as non-
governmental organisations have roles to play in improving performance of compensation in 
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Tanzania. However, it was further revealed that most of the civil society organisations are 
controlled by groups of urban based elites and very few were found to actively deal with 
compensation issues. Despite the fact that most civil society organisations have shown low 
interests in and low influence over development and compensation matters, one civil society 
organisation in particular helped to resolve compensation disputes through negotiated 
reconciliation. It is therefore suggested that the civil society organisations should (i) become 
constituency-based (preferably rural communities) and respond to people’s needs; (ii) be 
accountable to community members; (iii) operate in a participatory and transparent way and; 
(iv) be focused on major issues affecting communities reflecting their particular knowledge 
and expertise. If the recommended reforms are done, the civil society organisations can play 
many roles in the promotion of sustainable development including the crucial role of 
mediating compensation disputes in a way that maintains good relationships and promotes 
partnerships between the affected parties and host communities and project developers. This 
will potentially influence the government to rebuild trust and possibly give to civil society 
organisations a greater delegated responsibility in the compensation processes. 
 
v) Recommendations on dissemination of information 
During the fieldwork, it was noted that the majority of respondents in both studied villages, 
experts, key informants and the visited district officials showed interests of receiving a copy 
of the report of this study. The very important message put across by their requests was about 
dissemination of research findings and recommendations in particular. Therefore, there is 
need for the project developers and service providers to cooperate and make sure that all 
relevant information generated reaches all key stakeholders, the intended users in particular. 
The best information dissemination methods should be designed and at least include 
translation of information into simpler, non-technical language for decision makers to 
understand. Other service providers such as the civil society organisations have good 
experience of preparing popular versions to suit information needs of the local community 
members. It would be of much help if this is also done to reach the rural people. 
 
8.3.3: Implications for further research 
From the discussions, conclusions and recommendations of this study, the study has 
identified several issues that appear to influence compensation systems in developing nations 
and are worthy of further research. 
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i) Land prices and rental charges 
To establish factors that determine the sale prices and rental charges of the main categories of 
rural lands. 
 
ii) Vulnerability caused by compensation 
To investigate further the dynamics of compensation-influenced vulnerability among various 
social groups such as old people, youth, women and children, and establish circumstances 
and conditions in which vulnerability increases or decreases. 
 
iii) Use of compensation monies 
To explore the use of compensation money and assess impacts at household and community 
levels 
 
iv) Empowering the marginalised for compensation process 
To determine cost-effective ways of empowering the marginalised affected parties and host 
communities living in different contexts. 
 
v) Types of benefit-sharing schemes 
To explore cost-effectiveness of different possible types or forms of benefit-sharing schemes 
that can be used to compensate the affected host communities. 
 
vi) Risk assessment of a proposed compensatory framework 
To carry out risk assessment of a proposed compensatory framework on people’s livelihoods 
in the host communities, project welfare, ecosystem functions and sustainability aspects. 
 
8.4 Closing statement 
This study sought to understand the existing compensation regimes in developing country 
economy context. The study critically applied the Coase theorem, ecosystem functions and 
concepts of sustainable livelihoods in order to frame the ‘compensation challenge’ in the 
context of development projects. The study findings are not only relevant for Tanzania, but 
the wider developing world. Many developing countries face similar challenges with respect 
to compensating those who might be negatively affected by developments which serve the 
greater 
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Appendix 2.1: Glossary 
 
Affected parties: Victims of development activities whom suffer from different losses 
including loss of land, land resources, home, means of livelihood, employment, 
business, some communal functions, infrastructures, access to economic assets. 
 
Benefit assurance: Compensation benefit that involves a guarantee of direct or indirect 
advantages such as employment to the affected community members. 
 
Coase theorem: States that the socially efficient allocation of resources will be obtained 
regardless of the allocation of property rights, assuming zero transactions costs and no 
wealth effects. 
 
Collective choice theory: Argues that individuals are willing to work together to make 
choices collectively regarding the use of natural resources and other ‘public goods’ that 
people hold in common, or as a group, based on the expected utility of their options.  
They are willing to give up some individual freedoms in pursuit of actions which serve 
both the collective and, within this, the private good. 
 
Compensating variation: – is a measure of the largest sum an individual is willing to pay for 
a good (or removal of a bad) in order to reach his/her initial utility. 
 
Compensation criteria: A set of terms and conditions of which compensation eligibility, 
claims and entitlements can be assessed, evaluated, judged and confirmed during 
valuation processes. 
 
Compensation efficiency: Is a state where both the affected and the externality-causer 
achieve the desired compensational results without wastage of resources (i.e. effort, 
money and time). 
 
Compensation entitlements: are rights established and recognized by compensation law or 
an agreement between responsible parties. 
 
Compensation framework: A set of ideas, beliefs or rules that provide the general guidance 
to compensation processes in order to avoid negative impacts to stakeholders and their 
environment. 
 
Compensation payment: Compensation package paid/given to the affected parties. 
 
Compensation performance: Generalised experience of accomplishing compensation tasks 
based on the knowledge, technology and control mechanisms available in a society. 
 
Compensation procedure: The course of actions, steps, methods and principles intended to 
facilitate achievement of the desired results in a compensation process. 
 
Compensation programme: The planned response or developed scheme that offers 
compensation to the parties suffered of losses because of proposed development 
activities. 
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Compensation recipients: Can be individuals, households, organisations, groups or 
communities that receive compensation payments. 
 
Compensation source: The source of different elements, materials or/and money provided to 
the affected parties as compensation for the losses encountered. 
 
Economic system: Comprises the configuration of institutions and organisations that specify 
property relations within a given society that channel and influence the distribution of 
goods and services. 
 
Ecosystem function: The way natural processes work directly or indirectly to provide goods 
and services that meet the needs of living organisms. 
 
Ecosystem services: A framework for analysing the benefits that society derives, directly or 
indirectly, from ecological systems. Services, sometimes referred to as functions, 
underpin uses and values. 
 
Environment: Humans, individuals of other species, ecosystems and processes all together. 
 
Equivalent variation: Is a measure of the smallest sum an individual will accept to forego a 
good or accept a bad. 
 
Externality: As perceived by neo-classical economics is unintended cost borne by one party 
without compensation or benefit enjoyed without payment due to the action of another 
independent party. 
 
Financial capital: It includes financial resources in savings, money supplied in regular 
remittances and pension schemes. 
 
Free-riding: This is a state where some members of the group may not want to fully 
participate in resolving the problem at hand but like the benefits. 
 
Functions: Properties or processes within ecosystems, for instance production of biomass; 
climate regulation; provision of habitats; a setting for recreation.  
 
Good-will-economic incentives: Compensation benefits in terms of development projects, 
charitable contributions meant to help the affected people to develop economical 
potentials. 
 
Human capital: This is people, their knowledge, skills, health status and labour, that give 
ability to pursue different livelihood strategies. 
 
Human well-being: Peace of mind and happiness, now and in the future. 
 
 
Income effect: Is a highlight on how consumption changes as influenced by change in 
purchasing power of the consumer. 
 
Inferior good: Is a good that decreases in demand when consumer income rises 
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Institutions: Rules and conventions that facilitate co-ordination among people regarding 
their behaviour, including formal and informal systems, elements of social capital and 
policy frameworks. Or the mechanisms of social structures governing the behaviours of 
two or more individuals with the purpose of making and enforcing of rules related to 
human behaviours. 
 
Land resources: Land and all other natural resources available on and in the land. 
 
Marginal rate of substitution (MRS): is the amount of one good (endowment such as land) 
that has to be given up if the consumer is to obtain one extra unit of the other good 
(project benefits) 
 
Market value: Is the price an asset would fetch in the market if it were sold immediately. 
 
Natural capital: Comprises all naturally occurrence materials including renewable and non-
renewable resources, air, water, nutrient cycles, biodiversity and land. 
 
Non-market value: Intangible values associated with ecosystem services that cannot be 
transacted in the market. 
 
Normal good: Is the for which consumers' demand increases when their income increase 
 
Perfect market competition: A hypothetical economic model that assumes neither the 
producers nor consumers have control of prices of goods and services in the market. 
 
Physical capital: This is sometimes called produced or manmade capital. It comprises the 
basic infrastructures such as roads, railways, bridges, ports, factories, machinery, 
telephone networks, satellites and so forth. 
 
Principle: A set of moral rules guiding and showing a better way of doing things and achieve 
the desired results. 
 
Property rights: A claim to a benefit stream that the State will protect through assigning 
duties to others who are likely to interfere it. It is therefore relationship between people 
with regard to things they claim to own. 
 
Public good: Goods and services which, once produced, can be consumed by everyone in 
society.  Consumption by one individual does not diminish the ability of another to 
consume the same good. 
 
Rent (economic/resource): It is a surplus value after all costs and normal returns have been 
accounted for. But when referring to rent in natural resources such as coastal space or 
minerals, it is commonly called resource rent. 
 
Scoping: Is both a consultative and an interactive process during Environmental Impact 
Assessment (EIA) where a proponent engages key stakeholders to discuss the project 
proposal in order to identify issues of concerns and boundaries of the EIA studies. 
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Social capital: This refers to as relations and networks formed by individuals or groups 
available in a society. Comprises aspects of social organisation e.g. norms of behaviour, 
interaction, trust, reciprocity and institutions. 
 
Stakeholder: Is an individual, group, community or organisation with an interest to a policy 
goal, project or particular issue such as compensation scheme, either as a result of being 
affected by it or being able to influence it positively/negatively. 
 
Stakeholder analysis: Is a process that identifies individuals, groups and organisations that 
are affected by or can affect social, economic and natural aspects of a phenomenon 
(decision or action). 
 
Substitution effect: Is when the consumer switches consumption patterns due to the price 
change alone, remains on the same indifference curve but different budget line. 
 
Tanzania: Union of Mainland Tanzania (Tanzania) and Tanzania Isles (Zanzibar). In this 
study Tanzania refers to Mainland Tanzania. 
 
Transaction costs: The costs of completing a transaction above the cost of the good or 
service being exchanged. 
 
Uses: Anthropogenic use and non-use of ecosystem services. 
 
Values: Stakeholder values and preferences associated with use and non-use of eco-system 
services. 
 
Value judgement: People’s subjective decision of what is good or bad based on ethical 
considerations such as fairness rather than strict economic rationale. 
 
Values of the process: Are desirable importance embedded in the process and practices that 
help people to focus on the expected outcome(s) from the beginning to an end of the 
process. 
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Appendix 2.2: Legal compensation entitlements in Tanzania 
 
Compensation 
entitlement 
category 
Compensation 
entitlements 
Eligibility How is it worked out 
 
Loss of land 
Loss of land Ownership/occup
ation of land 
Market value or cost of acquiring or getting the 
subject land 
Loss of 
structures 
Loss of 
assets/properties 
Ownership of 
land and 
immovable assets 
Sales actual market costs adjusted based on 
condition, amenities, quality, age, location, type 
and other market factors 
Loss of income Loss of crops Grown annual 
and perennial 
crops 
Crop counting and application of crop 
compensation rates in place 
Loss of profit Legally 
recognised 
business 
Monthly net profit of the business carried out on 
the land evidenced by audited accounts where 
necessary and multiplied by 36 months to arrive 
at the payable amount 
Intangible 
losses 
Disturbance 
allowance 
Ownership/occup
ation of land 
Calculated by multiplying value of the land by 
average interest rate offered by commercial 
banks on fixed deposits for 12 months at the 
time of loss of interest in land 
Other losses Accommodation 
allowance 
Ownership/occup
ation of land 
Market rent for the subject building multiplied 
by 36 months to arrive at payable amount 
Transport 
allowance 
Relocation of 
home 
Actual costs of transporting 12 tonnes of luggage 
by rail or road (whichever is cheaper) within 
20km from the point of displacement 
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Appendices 3.1 – 3.3: Questionnaires 
Appendix 3.1: Questionnaire for the survey of project developers 
 
1: Name of the project:………………………………………………………….……………………………… 
2: What is the nature of your main activity? (Mark ‘X’ in the provided box)  
: Agricultural production : Mining  
: Forestry conservation and production : Industrial production/Commercial business 
: Wildlife conservation and tourism : Infrastructure e.g. roads, communication, etc. 
: Energy production : Others (specify) 
3: What positive and negative impacts were caused by your project activities? (Based on their order of 
significance list 3 positive and 3 negative impacts)  
Positive impacts (Benefits) Negative impacts (Costs) 
……………………………………………. ……………………………………………. 
4: Did the project compensate the affected people during its inception? 
: Yes : No 
5: If YES, what claims were raised for compensation by the affected people and what were actual 
(compensated for)? 
Claimed for compensation Compensated 
…………………………………………….……. ………………………………………………… 
6: What do you think is your levels of interests in and influence on compensation matters in Tanzania? 
What are the levels of interests in and influence on compensation process of other key stakeholders whom 
you know? (use the provided scale) 
N
am
e 
of
  
St
ak
eh
ol
de
r  
Possible aspects that contribute into the costs of planning and 
implementation of compensation process 
H
ig
he
r 
 (4
) 
H
ig
h 
(3
) 
Lo
w
 (2
) 
L
ow
er
 (1
) 
You as a 
developer 
What do you think is your interest in compensation process? 
    
What do you think is your influence over compensation 
process?     
…………… 
…………… 
What do you think is the level of interests in compensation 
process of this stakeholder?     
How does this stakeholder influence over compensation 
process?     
7: What do you think is appropriate type(s) of compensation that is likely to improve and maintain living 
conditions of the affected rural people? (Use the provided boxes to rank the 1st, 2nd & 3rd based on their 
suitability) 
Type or form of compensation 
Advantages Disadvantages 
: Monetary compensation   
: In-kind payments   
: Shareholder (benefit sharing)   
: Others (specify)……………   
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8: What factors do you think affect developers’ willingness to pay (WTP) compensation? (Choose 3 factors 
and rank the 1st, 2nd & 3rd based on their negative influence to WTP compensation) 
 
Factor 
Give brief explanation for 
your 1st, 2nd & 3rd ranks. 
: Lack of clear compensation procedure and criteria 
: Lack of clear entitlement to land, assets & compensation 
: Unnecessarily bureaucracy 
: High expectations and unjustifiable claims from the affected people 
: High costs involved in the planning, implementation and monitoring of 
compensation schemes 
: Lack of formal compensation agreements 
: Others (specify) ………………………………………… 
1st rank: 
2nd rank: 
3rd rank: 
9: What could be done in order to reduce the effects caused by the above-ranked factors? ….…………… 
10: Based on your experience what are the possible sources of disputes during compensation processes in 
Tanzania? (Choose 3 and rank the 1st, 2nd & 3rd based on their dispute-influence) 
 
Factor 
Give brief explanation for 
your 1st, 2nd & 3rd ranks. 
: Lack of clear compensation procedures and criteria 
: Lack of clear entitlements to land, assets & compensation 
: Lack of formal compensation agreements 
: Lack of participation and involvement of key stakeholders, affected 
people in particular 
: Lack of cooperation among key stakeholders 
: Lack of information and feedback-giving 
: High expectations and unjustifiable claims from the affected people 
: Influence of traditional and cultural values 
: Others (specify) ……………………………….. 
1st rank: 
2nd rank: 
3rd rank: 
11: What measures do you think the developers could take in order to minimise compensation disputes?  
12: What measures do you think other parties (e.g. government, CSOs, financiers, donors, etc.) could take 
in order to minimise compensation disputes?………………………………………………………………… 
13: Do you agree that bargain (negotiation) process between the developer and affected community has 
potentials in reducing compensation disputes? 
: Yes 
8.4.1 If Yes or No, give reasons: 
…………………………………………………………………………………………. 
……………………………………………………………………………………….… 
……………………………………………………………………………………….… : No 
: No idea 
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14: How do the following aspects contribute into the costs of planning and implementation of 
compensation scheme? (Rate each aspect by marking ‘X’ in one of the provided scale levels ‘higher to lower’) 
Compens-
ation 
stages 
 
Possible aspects that contribute into the costs of 
planning and implementation of compensation 
process H
ig
he
r 
H
ig
h 
M
od
er
at
e 
Lo
w
 
L
ow
er
 
D
on
’t 
K
no
w
 
Pl
an
ni
ng
 st
ag
e 
 Exploration (feasibility study)
 Type of land ownership 
 Conflicts of interests 
 Types of assets and land resources involved
 Number of parties involved
 Information search  
 Methods and approaches to compensation
 Consultancy fees & middlemen charges
 Stakeholder participation 
 Structure of the plan (legal requirements)
 Structure of the plan (administrative 
Im
pl
em
en
ta
tio
n 
st
ag
e 
 Type of compensation demanded
 Developer’s willingness to pay compensation 
 Affected people’s willingness to accept 
 Conflicts of interests 
 Negotiation processes 
 Number of parties involved during negotiation
 Consultancy fees & middlemen charges
 Structure of the contract, (detailed & flexibility)
 Complains and appeals 
 Litigation (court) processes
 Repeated actions to reduce uncertainties
Po
st
-
co
m
pe
ns
at
io
n 
st
ag
e 
 Policing, follow-ups and enforcement
 Conflicts of interests 
 Monitoring programme  
 Number of parties/actors involved in 
 Feedback mechanisms 
 Intermediations (repeated actions to reduce 
15: Based on your experience identify up to 5 aspects (from Qn. 13 above) which you think contribute 
most into unnecessarily costs during compensation process? (Use the boxes provided in Qn 13 to rank them 
1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th & 5th based on their contribution) 
16: What measures do you think are effective in minimising or avoiding unnecessarily costs as identified 
in Qn. 14 above?………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
Thank you for your cooperation 
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Appendix 3.2: Questionnaire for the survey of service providers 
 
1: Name of the organisation:………………………………………………………….……………………… 
2: What is the nature of your main activities? (Mark ‘X’ in the provided box)  
: Enforcement : Research and education 
: Advisory services : Conservation 
: Public services : Others (specify) 
3: What do you think is your levels of interests in and influence on compensation matters in Tanzania? 
What are the levels of interests in and influence on compensation process of other key stakeholders whom 
you know? (use the provided scale) 
N
am
e 
of
  
St
ak
eh
ol
de
r  
Possible aspects that contribute into the costs of planning and 
implementation of compensation process 
H
ig
he
r 
 (4
) 
H
ig
h 
(3
) 
Lo
w
 (2
) 
L
ow
er
 (1
) 
You as a 
service 
provider 
What do you think is your interest in compensation process? 
    
What do you think is your influence over compensation 
process?     
…………… 
 
What do you think is the level of interests in compensation 
process of this stakeholder?     
How does this stakeholder influence over compensation 
process?     
4: Which group of stakeholders benefit most from development projects established in rural areas in 
Tanzania? (Choose 3 stakeholders and use the provided boxes to rank them 1st, 2nd & 3rd based on who gains 
most. Explain how and what impact do these benefits have in their livelihoods)  
 
Stakeholders 
 
Rank Impacts on people’s 
livelihoods 
: Project developer 
: Central government 
: Local governments (district and village authorities) 
: Local communities (village where the project is located) 
: Nearby local communities 
: Experts, consulting firms and freelance consultants (service 
providers) 
: Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) 
: Others (specify) ………………………… 
1st rank:  
2nd rank:  
3rd rank:  
5: Which stakeholders normally lose because of the development projects? (Choose 3 stakeholders and use 
the provided boxes to rank them 1st, 2nd & 3rd based on who suffers most. Also explain how and which risks are 
likely to occur)  
 
Stakeholders 
 
Rank Risks likely to occur due to 
the losses suffered (if any) 
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: Project developer 
: Central government 
: Local governments (district and village authorities) 
: Local communities (village where the project is located) 
: Nearby local communities 
: Experts, consulting firms and freelance consultants 
(service providers) 
: Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) 
: Others (specify) ………………………………………… 
1st rank:  
2nd rank:  
3rd rank:  
6: What could be done in order to minimise the chances of occurrence for the above-listed risks? …… 
7: Do the affected stakeholders get adequate compensation for the losses encountered? 
: Yes : No : Don’t know 
8: What do you think is appropriate type(s) of compensation that is likely to improve and maintain living 
conditions of the affected rural people? (Use the provided boxes to rank the 1st, 2nd & 3rd based on their 
suitability) 
Type or form of compensation 
Advantages Disadvantages 
: Monetary compensation   
: In-kind payments   
: Shareholder (benefit sharing)   
: Others (specify)……………   
9: What factors do you think affect developers’ willingness to pay (WTP) compensation? (Choose 3 factors 
and rank the 1st, 2nd & 3rd based on their negative influence to WTP compensation) 
 
Factor 
Give brief explanation for your 
1st, 2nd & 3rd ranks. 
: Lack of clear compensation procedure and criteria 
: Lack of clear entitlement to land, assets & compensation 
: Unnecessarily bureaucracy 
: High expectations and unjustifiable claims from the affected people 
: High costs involved in the planning, implementation and monitoring 
of compensation schemes 
: Lack of formal compensation agreements 
: Others (specify) ………………………………………… 
1st rank: 
2nd rank: 
3rd rank: 
10: What could be done in order to reduce the effects caused by the above-ranked factors?……………… 
11: Based on your experience what are the possible sources of disputes during compensation processes in 
Tanzania? (Choose 3 and rank the 1st, 2nd & 3rd based on their dispute-influence) 
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Factor 
Give brief explanation for your 1st, 
2nd & 3rd ranks. 
: Lack of clear compensation procedures and criteria 
: Lack of clear entitlements to land, assets & compensation 
: Lack of formal compensation agreements 
: Lack of participation and involvement of key stakeholders, 
affected people in particular 
: Lack of cooperation among key stakeholders 
: Lack of information and feedback-giving 
: High expectations and unjustifiable claims from the affected 
people 
: Influence of traditional and cultural values 
: Others (specify) ……………………………….. 
1st rank: 
2nd rank: 
3rd rank: 
12: What measures do you think the service providers could take in order to minimise compensation 
disputes? …………………………………………………………………………….. ………………………… 
13: What measures do you think the developers could take in order to minimise compensation 
disputes?………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
14: What measures do you think other parties (e.g. Government, CSOs, financiers, donors, etc.) could 
take in order to minimise compensation disputes?………………………………………………………… 
15: Do you agree that bargain (negotiation) process between the developer and any affected groups has 
potentials in reducing compensation disputes? 
: Yes 
8.4.2 If Yes or No, give reasons: 
………………………………………………………………………………………… 
………………………………………………………………………………………… 
………………………………………………………………………………………… 
………………………………………………………………………………………… 
: No 
: Don’t know 
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16: How do the following aspects contribute into the costs of planning and implementation of 
compensation scheme? (Rate each aspect by marking ‘X’ in one of the provided scale levels ‘higher to lower’) 
Compens-
ation 
stages 
 
Possible aspects that contribute into the costs of 
planning and implementation of compensation 
process H
ig
he
r 
H
ig
h 
M
od
er
at
e 
Lo
w
 
L
ow
er
 
D
on
’t 
K
no
w
 
Pl
an
ni
ng
 st
ag
e 
 Exploration (feasibility study)
 Type of land ownership 
 Conflicts of interests 
 Types of assets and land resources involved
 Number of parties involved
 Information search  
 Methods and approaches to compensation
 Consultancy fees & middlemen charges
 Stakeholder participation 
 Structure of the plan (legal requirements)
 Structure of the plan (administrative 
Im
pl
em
en
ta
tio
n 
st
ag
e 
 Type of compensation demanded
 Developer’s willingness to pay compensation 
 Affected people’s willingness to accept 
 Conflicts of interests 
 Negotiation processes 
 Number of parties involved during negotiation
 Consultancy fees & middlemen charges
 Structure of the contract, (detailed & flexibility)
 Complains and appeals 
 Litigation (court) processes
 Repeated actions to reduce uncertainties
Po
st
-
co
m
pe
ns
at
io
n 
st
ag
e 
 Policing, follow-ups and enforcement
 Conflicts of interests 
 Monitoring programme  
 Number of parties/actors involved in 
 Feedback mechanisms 
 Intermediations (repeated actions to reduce 
17: Based on your experience identify up to 5 aspects (from Qn. 16 above) which you think contribute 
most into unnecessarily costs during compensation process? (Use the boxes provided in Qn 13 to rank them 
1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th & 5th based on their contribution) 
18: What measures do you think are effective in minimising or avoiding unnecessarily costs as identified 
in Qn. 17 above?……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
19: Which criteria do you think would help to distribute fairly the benefits and costs of development 
projects among concerned stakeholders?…………………………………………………………………… 
Thank you for your cooperation 
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Appendix 3.3: Household questionnaire for the verification survey 
 
1.0: Identification information: 
Village:………………  Questionnaire No.:.......  Numerator: ……………..………….. 
 
2.0: Particulars of household head: 
2.1: Sex? 
2 : Male 1 : Female 
2.2: How old are you? […….] 
3 : Elder person (>55 years) 2 : Adult person (36-55 years) 1 : Young person (18-35 years) 
2.3: What is your highest education level attained? 
4 : Informal 3 : Primary 2 : Secondary 1 : Other (specify) ……………. 
2.4: How many people in your household depend on your farms for livelihood? […..], their gender and 
ages? 
Age groups(years)  Children (<5) Children (5-17) Youth (18-35) Adults (36-55) Elders (>55) 
Male      
Female      
2.5: How long have you lived in this village? […….] 
3 : Long (>15 years) 2 : Moderate (6-15 years) 1 : Short period (≤5 years) 
2.6: How many hectares do you currently farm? […….] 
Type of land 
farmed and lost 
because of the 
project 
Size 
(ha) 
Distance 
from 
home (km) 
Crops grown 
Type 
of 
crops 
Proportion in mixed farm 
(0; 0.25; 0.5; 075 & 1.0) 
No. of harvests in 
a year (1, 2, …) 
Market 
value 
(TZS/ton) 
Owned farmland       
Rented-in farmland       
Rented-out 
farmland 
      
 
3.0: Benefits and costs of development projects: 
3.1: What gains have you got from KVTC (teak)/SONGAS (gas) project? (Rank the first important three) 
: Good fertile land : Community services (health, education, water, road, etc.) 
: Improved house : Support to orphans and during food shortage 
: Temporary employment : Environmental and HIV/AIDS awareness campaigns 
: Increased village revenue : Others (specify)………………………………….. 
3.2: What losses have you encountered from KVTC/SONGAS project? (Rank the first important three) 
: Land shortage at household or/and community
level : Relocation and disturbances 
: Loss of fertile land : Loss of natural forests/native tree species 
: Decreased production of annual crops (food) : Destruction of water sources 
: Loss of permanent crops (income) : Others (specify)……………………………. 
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3.3: Comparing the times before and after the project what are the changes on the following? 
(Increase/decrease/unchanged) 
Goods and services 
↑,↓,→ 
Goods and services 
↑,↓,→ 
Land (availability)  Skills and innovation  
Land quality (soil fertility)  Employment  
Food production  Labour  
Cash crops  Education services  
Natural resources (specify)…………  Medical services   
3.4: Are you as a household better-off or worse-off?  
3 : YES 2 : NO 1 : Don’t know 
3.5: If YES or NO explain …………………….……………………………………………………………… 
 
4.0: Compensation payments: 
4.1: How much land did you lose because of the KVTC/SONGAS project (ha)?…………………… 
4.2: For how long were you farming the lost land?………… What types of crops were you farming? 
Land 
size 
(ha) 
Crop 
farmed 
Proportion in mixed cropping 
(0.25; 0.5; 0.75 or 1) 
Raised how many times 
in one farming year 
Harvest estimation per 
acre/year/month/week 
Crop 
market 
value (TZS) 
      
4.3: Did you receive compensation? 
2 : YES 1 : NO 
4.4: If YES, how much did you receive? (TZS) ……………, For what item/loss?………………………… 
4.5: At that time, did you find this appropriate amount/quantity of compensation? 
3 : YES 2 : NO 1 : I don’t know 
4.6: If YES 
(Explain)………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
4.7: After some while, did you find the paid compensation appropriate amount? 
3 : YES 2 : NO 1 : I don’t know 
4.8: If YES (Explain)…………………………………………………………………………………………… 
4.9: If NO what caused it? (Mention) 
: Low compensation rates : No compensation paid for other items (e.g. land, annual crops,…) 
: Undercounting of affected
items/assets : No recognition of relocation expenses and inconveniences 
: No recognition of quality difference : Others (specify)……………………… 
4.10: If you did not receive compensation (i.e. NO in Qn 4.3 above), What were the reasons? 
: Unclear property rights : my farm had no permanent crops 
: my farm was under fallow period : Others (specify)……………………………………….…. 
4.11: What is your view, are there losses which remain 
uncompensated?……………………………………………………………………………………………..… 
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4.12: What type/form of compensation would you prefer most? 
Type or form of compensation 
Advantages Disadvantages 
: Monetary compensation   
: Shareholder (benefit sharing)    
: In-kind payments   
: Others (specify)……………   
 
5.0: Compensation process: 
5.1: What is your view about the process of compensation (the way was carried out)? 
Event/stage of compensation 
5 4 3 2 1 
Informed about the proposal of Teak/Gas project      
Informed about compensation process before valuation process       
Able to be present when losses and compensation were estimated      
Participation of Village government (Committee) in valuation      
Opportunity to participate in village meetings to discuss compensation 
and project matters 
     
Opportunity to participate in entire process of compensation       
Opportunity to negotiate compensation payments      
Opportunity to give views      
Taking into consideration the views of affected parties      
Giving feedbacks during compensation process      
5.2: What is your view about implementation of compensation (the way was carried out)?  
Event/stage of compensation 
5 4 3 2 1 
Information on compensation decisions before payments       
Paying compensation on time (within 6 month after valuation)      
Special training/advice on wise use of compensation, relocation, etc.      
Assistance in obtaining alternative land      
Assistance of relocation      
Monitoring of post-compensation outcomes      
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5.3: If obtained compensation what did you do with it? How? ( main expenses & their proportion (%)) 
Expenses 
Proportion (%) 
Expenses 
Proportion (%) 
: Buying alternative land/plot  : Paying off debt  
: New or/improving home/house   : Savings  
: Education  : Leisure/social activities  
 Home/personal consumption  : Others (specify)….…  
5.4: How are unaffected households doing?…………………………………………………………………… 
 
6.0: Benefit sharing: 
6.1: Are you aware of any benefit arrangements such as social fund or special contracts between your 
village and project developer? 
3 : YES 2 : NO 1 : I don’t know 
6.2: If YES what benefits do you get from the Teak/Gas project? 
Item/Service 
5 4 3 2 1 
: Education      
: Health      
: Others (specify): ………………………………………      
6.3: If no explain why so?……………………………………………………………………………………… 
6.4: To what extent do you think the arrangements enable the communities to benefit from teak/gas 
projects?  
5 4 3 2 1 
     
6.5: Does the Social Fund/Contracts attract your household members? (for Idete respondents only) 
3 : YES 2 : NO 1 : I don’t know 
6.6: If YES, how do your household members participate and benefit from social funds?……………… 
6.7: If YES, how do your household members participate and benefit from contracts? 
Contracts 
Activity done and benefit obtained 
: Protection project land  
: Cleaning and maintenance of land boundaries  
: Protection of teak plantations from fires  
: Protection of natural forests from firs  
: Avoiding logging for timber purposes  
: Fight against wildlife poaching (illegal hunting of wildlife)  
: Preparation of monthly reports  
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6.8: If NO, why so?………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
6.9: What are positive and negative aspects of the above-mentioned contracts? 
Positive aspects Negative aspects 
1. 1. 
2. 2. 
3. 3. 
6.10: Do you think that the balance of payments to individuals in the form of compensation and the 
payments to the community as social fund/contracts are in the right balance? 
3 : YES 2 : NO 1 : I don’t know 
6.11: If YES/NO, 
explain…………………………………………………………………………………………… 
6.12: What should be done in order to enhance benefits and reduce costs in benefit sharing schemes? (For 
both M’baya & Idete respondents) …………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
 
Thanks for your time and information 
 
 
 
Appendices 4.1 – 4.3: Stakeholder analysis and other exploratory information 
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Appendix 4.1: Synthesised characteristics of stakeholders in development and compensation processes in Tanzania 
Stakeholder 
 
Key roles 
 
Key interests 
 
Resource inputs 
 
Capacity gaps 
 
Importance* 
 
Influence 
 
Project developers • Initiate and finance project 
• Involvement stakeholders 
• Achieve targets 
• Avoid liability (costs) 
• Pay less compensation 
• Investment capital 
• Experience in 
development 
• Sustainability issues 
• Participatory approaches 
 
4 
 
4 
Affected parties  
and 
Host communities 
• Host development projects 
• Share local knowledge and 
experiences in their local areas 
and environment. 
• Development and benefits 
• Improved livelihoods 
• Compensated adequately 
• Employment (jobs) 
• Land 
• Natural resources 
• Labour 
• Security 
• Poverty 
• Technical information 
• Leadership 
 
 
4 
 
 
1 
Village government authorities 
(Village Executive Officer ‘VEO’ & 
Village Chairman ‘VC’) 
• Identification & verification of 
the APs and their losses 
• Facilitate valuation and 
compensation payments 
• Improved community 
services 
• Village revenue 
• Take directives from higher 
authorities 
• Village land 
• Natural resources 
• Area experience 
• Support/facilitation 
• Security 
• Technical information 
• Confidence 
• Office resources  
 
 
4 
 
 
2 
Ward government authorities (Ward 
Executive Officer ‘WEO’ & Ward 
Councillor ‘WC’)  
• Identification & verification of 
the APs and their losses 
• Facilitate valuation and 
compensation payments 
• Community interests 
fulfilled 
• Ensure all APs got their 
compensation 
• Area experience 
• Support/facilitation 
• Security 
• Technical information 
• Confidence 
• Office resources  
 
4 
 
2 
District Commissioner’s Office 
‘DCO’ (District Commissioner ‘DC’ 
& Others) 
• Ensure participation of 
APs/HCs 
• Overseeing the compensation 
process 
• Increased investments 
• Local people’s interests  
• All laws, regulations & 
rules observed. 
• Guidance 
• Support during 
coordination 
• Security 
• Participatory approaches 
• Sustainability issues 
 
4 
 
3 
Civil Society Organisations (NGOs & 
CBOs) 
• Sensitisation of APs/HCs on 
their rights of compensation 
• Help to mediate disputes 
• Local people’s well-being 
• Human rights 
• Consultancy works/Income  
• Support/facilitation 
• Knowledge/skills 
• Government support 
• Resources 
• inter/multidisciplinarity 
 
2 
 
2 
Consultants/Experts • Provide technical advice 
• Offer facilitation services 
• Successes of the project 
• Good s/holder relationships 
• Future employment/income 
• Knowledge, skills & 
expertise 
• Experience 
• Professional credibility 
• Baseline information 
• Resources 
 
3 
 
3 
National Environment Mgt Council 
(NEMC) 
• Enforcement of EMA 
including compensation  
• Provide information to guide 
PDs and SPs 
• Sustainability  
• Public interests 
• Institutionalisation of EIA 
& other env’ntal mgt tools 
• Baseline information 
• Technical skills, 
support & services 
• Coordination skills 
• EMA enforcement  
• Research staff for baseline 
data creation 
• Research/Office resources 
 
 
4 
 
 
4 
Chief Government Valuer (CGV) • Enforcement of land laws  
• Overseeing compensation 
processes in the country 
• Increase of investments 
• Land laws & rules observed 
• Compensation processes 
without disputes 
• Coordination skills 
• Support & services 
• Land related data 
• Sustainability issues 
• Effectiveness of land law 
enforcement  
• Resources 
 
2 
 
4 
Contractors • carry out tasks on behalf of the 
PDs 
• Profit maximisation 
• Finishing tasks in time 
• Expertise & Skills 
• Experience 
• Participatory approaches 
• Agreements/contracts skills 
 
2 
 
2 
Source: Project developers’ & Service providers’ Surveys, 2007 
Scales used: (1=Very low); (2=Low); (3=High); (4=Very high): *Importance = Interest  
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Appendix 4.2: List of visited projects/service providers’ office during exploratory visits 
 
A: Government-based offices 
1) Division of Energy (Dar Es Salaam) 
2) Division of Wildlife (Dar Es Salaam) 
3) Division of Forestry (Dar Es Salaam) 
4) Ministry of Lands and Settlement Development (Dar Es Salaam) 
5) Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security (Dar Es Salaam) 
6) Ministry of Legislation and Constitutional Affairs (Dar Es Salaam) 
7) Ministry of Infrastructures (Dar Es Salaam) 
8) National Environment Management Council (Dar Es Salaam) 
9) National Land Use Planning Commission (Dar Es Salaam) 
10) Planning Commission (Dar Es Salaam) 
 
B: Development/Conservation Projects: 
1) Kilombero Valley Teak Company Ltd (Ifakara, Morogoro) 
2) Urban Sector Rehabilitation projects (Morogoro) 
3) Sustainable Morogoro Programme (Morogoro) 
4) Uluguru Mountain Biodiversity Conservation Project (Morogoro) 
5) Songosongo Gas to Electricity Project (Dar Es Salaam) 
6) Participatory Agricultural Development and Empowerment Project (Dar Es Salaam) 
7) Agricultural Sector Development Programme (Dar Es Salaam) 
8) Tanzania Social Action Fund (Dar Es Salaam) 
9) Liquefied Petroleum Gas Storage Tanks Project (Dar Es Salaam) 
10) Tanpower Resource Company Ltd. (Dar Es Salaam) 
11) Bongoyo Ecological Camp Project (Dar Es Salaam) 
12) Sustainable Iringa Project (Iringa) 
13) Marmot Gramito Mines Co. Ltd. (Mbeya) 
 
C: Civil Society Organisations: 
1) Legal Environmental Action Team (Dar Es Salaam) 
2) Wildlife Conservation Society of Tanzania (Dar Es Salaam) 
3) Tanzania Council for Social Development (Dar Es Salaam) 
4) Haki Ardhi (Dar Es Salaam) 
5) Participatory Ecological Land Use Management (Dodoma) 
 
D: Consulting Firms: 
1) Environmental Resources Services (Dar Es Salaam) 
2) Institute of Resource Assessment – University of Dar es Salaam (Dar Es Salaam) 
 
E: Freelance Consultants: 
1) Ms. N. Pallangyo (Dar Es Salaam) 
2) Mr. J. Shilungushella (Dar Es Salaam) 
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Appendix 4.3: List of Sectoral policies reviewed in the period 1995 – 2005 in Tanzania 
 
1. Environmental Policy (1997) 
2. Forestry and Bee Keeping Policy (1997) 
3. Fisheries Policy (1997) 
4. Energy Sector Policy (2000) 
5. Wildlife Policy (1998) 
6. Water Resources Management Policy (2000) 
7. Housing and Settlement Policy (2000) 
8. Land Policy (1995) 
9. Minerals Policy (1997) 
10. Investment Policy (1995) 
11. Tourism Sector Policy (1999) 
12. Trade and Industries Policy (1999) 
13. Infrastructure Policy (2001) 
14. Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) Policy (2001) 
15. Local Government Reforms Programme (1999) 
16. Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (2000) 
17. Agricultural Policy (1996) 
18. Population Policy (2000) 
19. Agricultural Sector Development Programme (2003) 
20. National Development Vision - 2025 (2000) 
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Appendices 4.4 – 4.5: Description of studied project cases 
 
Appendix 4.4: Description of teak project case study (KVTC) 
 
Introduction 
Kilombero Valley Teak Company (KVTC) operates a big project that grows teak (tectona 
grandis) in the southern parts of Tanzania. According to KVTC (2006), the project has 
acquired land under lease arrangement term of 99 years from Kilombero district (4,749ha) 
and Ulanga district (23,383ha). Currently, the project involves two (2) villages in Kilombero 
district and seven (7) in Ulanga district with the prospects of involving other four (4) more 
villages from the later district in the near future (Mtoni, 2007). In order to promote 
conservation of natural forests, KVTC’s plan is to have teak planted on the area not 
exceeding 25% of the total land acquired from each village. KVTC also promotes both the 
conservation of native species of hardwood outside their acquired lands and teak growing by 
individual villagers on their lands.  
 
The feasibility study for the project was undertaken in 1991 was preceded by the 
reconnaissance study undertaken in 1990 by a special team formed jointly by Overseas 
Development Administration (ODA) and CDC (CDC, 1991). Thereafter, a number of visits 
and surveys by both foreign and local experts were conducted in Kilombero valley to verify 
various aspects in regard to vegetations and soils (Ibid.). Further to that in 1992 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) was carried out. Among the main issues put 
forward by the EIA report included flood risks, land use conflicts, effects to wildlife and 
inadequate and incorrect project information the villagers had (ODA, 1992). However land 
acquisition by the project was finalised in 1992 and implementation began in 1993.  
 
Project developer and financiers 
KVTC is a private sector venture largely (73%) funded by the government of United 
Kingdom through the Commonwealth Development Cooperation (CDC) and, the remaining 
27% is financed by the Finish government through FINNFUND (KVTC, 2006). 
Implementation of teak project is done by the KVTC, a subsidiary of Tanganyika Wattle 
Company (TANWAT) based in Njombe, Iringa region. TANWAT is solely owned and 
operated by CDC and has been operative in Southern highlands of Tanzania for 40 years now 
(CDC, 1991). The CDC’s commitment to and experience in high value hardwood plantations 
go back to 1979 when co-financed with World Bank a huge reforestation of 70,000ha in Côte 
d’Ivore (Ibid.). 
 
Project benefits and costs 
According to CDC (1991) and ODA (1992), the expected benefits of teak project included 
to:- 
• Establish a new quality crop (teak logs) produced in a sustainable way for export, 
• Realise the economic potentials of the buffer zone of the Udzungwa Mountains 
National Park between Ifakara and Ruipa river, 
• Supply of telephone poles for both the local and regional markets, 
• Protect, enrich and manage natural forests in a sustainable manner, 
• Promote and support teak outgrowers in villages in Kilombero and Ulanga districts, 
• Increase revenue sources of villages and districts, 
• Provide employment opportunities to both skilled and unskilled labour and, 
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• Provide and support spin-off benefits such as improved roads, schools, dispensaries 
and other infrastructures. 
 
Potential costs of the project as predicted by EIA report included (i) villagers facing land loss 
and shortage as teak would need fertile land equally needed for agricultural production, (ii) 
increased land disputes, (iii) decrease/loss of wildlife such as puku (southern kob, Adenota 
vardoni), the species that are inhabiting flood plains of shorter grasses, (iv) increased risks of 
food surface run-offs, soil erosion and floods and, (v) disruption of risk aversion strategy 
incorporated in farming system practised in Kilombero valley where rice and maize are 
cultivated in different areas with different moisture contents (ODA, 1992). 
 
Compensation scheme by teak project 
KVTC paid cash compensation to 3 affected parties in Namawala village and 14 affected 
parties in Idete village. Apart from the record of who was paid how much and who was not 
paid (without reason(s) been provided), cash compensation paid to individual affected parties 
did not involve planning nor thorough documentation. According to the interviews held with 
project staff and key informants, to large extent the project avoided villagers’ lands in order 
to minimise compensation. KVTC’s compensation approach is totally focused on 
communities as whole rather than individual affected parties. KVTC established a unique 
compensation procedure to happen in Tanzania, where special “Social Funds” (SF) and 
“Annual Bonus of Contracts” (ABC) are passed to villages for their planned development 
activities and other community needs respectively. Project officials did not want these funds 
to be regarded as compensation as no village deserved compensation when the project 
acquired land and also that compensation is “one pay-off” event. However this idea 
contradicts with many authors of compensation issues (Gregory, 1991; Kunreuther & 
Easterling, 1996; Van Wicklin, 1998; Cernea, 2005; Égré et al., 2008 and; Trembath, 2008) 
who support it as one type of compensation. Essentially this is benefit sharing which shows 
potentials of cushioning the APs/HCs over long period of time. 
 
With Social Funds the project entered into special agreement with village governments that 
the project channels money to each village for approved community services and 
development activities. The amount allocated annually to each village depends on the total 
village land (ha) planted teak by KVTC and, it is a condition that an activity the funds are 
asked for has to be approved by village council and detailed in terms of sub-activities, actors 
and budget. Further to that KVTC has also entered service contracts with all 9 villages. 
Service contracts are intended to reward villages with funds named “Annual Bonus of 
Contracts” (ABC). Unlike to Social Funds, villages are freely to use (in any community need) 
the remaining funds from ABC (if any) after taking away all operation costs of their services 
rendered to contracts can be used for any need arising in their communities. The eight (8) 
contracts and their financial terms during the time of data collection were as per below table:  
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List of contracts and their financial terms Idete village entered with KVTC 
 Contract Financial terms/conditions of contracts entered Annual  
Bonus (TZS) 
1 Land clearance for 
teak planting 
- KVTC pays USD. 80 (96,000/= TZS) per ha 
- All valuable hardwoods should be spared 
- Villagers can make use of all cleared wood stuff  
 
- 
2 Protecting project 
acquired land 
- Intended removal of beacons reduces ABC by 75% 
- Damaging caused to teak trees reduces ABC by 75% 
- Trespassing in teak plantations reduces ABC by 50% 
- Accidental removal/damage of a beacon (replacement costs) 
150,000 
3 Protection and 
clearing borders of 
project lands 
- Clearance width is 3m and Idete’s border is 22km long 
- KVTC pays TZS. 34,000/= per km. 
- Clearance is done twice a year (in February and May) 
100,000 
4 Keeping fire out of 
teak plantation 
- Any fire incidence reduces the ABC by 40% 
- Fire affecting ≥30 ha of teak plantation - ABC by 80% 
- Fire in buffer zone or corridor reduces ABC by 10% 
- Extra bonus for a village that will fight fire in natural forests 
300,000 
5 Keeping fire out of 
natural forests  
300,000 
6 Avoiding illegal 
timber logging 
- Timber logging/charcoal making reduces ABC by 75% 
- Firewood collection/debarking reduces ABC by 25% 
300,000 
7 Avoiding illegal 
wildlife hunting 
(poaching) 
- Animal killing or discovery of snares ABC by 75% 
- Fishing using illegal methods reduces ABC by 25% 
150,000 
8 Reporting - Any faked monthly report reduces the ABC by 50% 
- Any missing monthly report reduces the ABC by 10% 
- For not reporting cases to police reduces ABC by 10% 
100,000 
Source (KVTC, 2006) 
 
Future plans 
The teak project has two (2) main plans for the future viz. (i) to expand teak plantations, 
production of non-timber forestry products and conservation activities of natural forests to 
local communities and (ii) improve further the sustainability of benefits currently provided to 
villages for the benefits of both the present and future generations. 
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Appendix 4.5: Brief description of gas project case study (SONGAS) 
 
Introduction 
Songosongo-gas-to-electricity (SONGAS) project extracts natural gas from Songosongo 
island and transports it through a 232km pipeline to Dar es Salaam where 115MW of 
electricity is generated using gas turbines (TPDC, 2006). The pipeline way-leave traverses 
through 25 villages located in Lindi, Coast and Dar es Salaam regions (URT, 1997). Its 
feasibility studies were undertaken in two phases (i.e. 1991 and 1994). The Environmental 
Impact Assessment (EIA) studies that began in 1996, ended in 2001 paving way for 
construction to commence in 2003 and commercial operation started in mid 2004. However, 
the project suffered considerable delays in its implementation following financial problems 
(TPDC, 2006). 
 
Project developer and financiers 
According to TPDC (2006), in 1995, the government of Tanzania (GoT), TransCanada 
Pipeline Ltd (TCPL), Tanzania Electrical Supply Company (TANESCO) and Tanzania 
Petroleum Development Corporation (TPDC) jointly created SONGAS Ltd to implement the 
project. Initially, the main project sponsors were AES Sirroco (USA), Pan African Energy 
Tanzania (PAT; formerly known as Ocelot International Inc). The current investors however 
include AES Sirroco, PAT, TANESCO, TPDC, Commonwealth Development Cooperation 
(CDC) and Tanzania Development Finance Company Ltd (TDFL). The World Bank (WB) 
and European Investment Bank (EIB) funded the project through the government of Tanzania 
(GoT).  
 
The project ownership and implementation is a bit complex. TPDC and PAT own all 
Songosongo gas reserves involved in the project. While PAT operates gas fields and 
processing facilities in Songosongo Island, TANESCO owns and operates facilities for 
generation and distribution of electricity. The GoT through the Ministry of Energy and 
Minerals (MEM) is responsible for monitoring of both the project implementation and 
environmental aspects. GoT also coordinates the roles played by TPDC and TANESCO in 
the entire SONGAS project. 
 
Project benefits and costs 
According to TPDC (2006), SONGAS project has the following benefits to the Tanzanian 
community are to:- 
• Meet the growing demand for electricity using domestic-based natural resources, 
• Reduce country’s dependence on imported mineral oil for electricity generation, 
• Provide an alternate, lower cost and reliable source of power 
• Create employment opportunities for both skilled and unskilled labour, 
• Promote use of natural gas in industries as source of energy and chemical feedstock, 
• Develop infrastructure to promote further explorations of both gas and oil, 
• Provide gas, electric power and associated economic benefits to local communities in 
Songosongo island and those living along the pipeline route, 
• Promote private investments in energy sector and in turn contribute to government 
revenue through royalties, taxes and fees, 
 
According to URT (2000) SONGAS project acquired land totalling to 12.3 km2 for the “right-
of-way” (way-leave) from both rural (91.2%) and urban (8.8%) areas. Whilst the way-leave 
in rural is 187km long and 60m wide, in urban areas is 36km long and 30m wide. In total, the 
way-leave has affected 2945 households of which 2790 lived in rural areas and 155 
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households were in urban suburbs of Dar es Salaam city. All (155) affected urban households 
were compensated and resettled within Dar es Salaam (URT, 2000). According to URT 
(1997), 176 out of 2790 affected households in rural areas required to establish new homes, 
of which 66 households had remained with enough land to construct their houses, 77 
households had land elsewhere and 33 households needed land. SONGAS bought the 33 
households plots for house construction within their villages. For example in Mwanambaya 
village, the project provided 7 households with alternative plots to re-establish their new 
homes. 
 
Compensation scheme of SONGAS project 
Since the largest funding for SONGAS project came from World Bank (WB), the project 
prepared its compensation scheme based on WB’s Operational Directive 4.30 framework. 
From the Tanzanian legal framework, the project’s compensation scheme carefully observed 
the Land Acquisition Act No. 47 of 1967, where both “granted and deemed customary rights 
of occupancy were considered during compensation (URT, 2000). Compensation processes 
started in August 1997 and continued until January 1998. By early May 1998, SONGAS had 
compensated 87% of the affected parties and from there the way-leave acquisition operations 
including compensation issues were handed over to TPDC for finalisation (Ibid.). 
 
Despite inadequate involvement of the affected parties, SONGAS project is one of the WB-
funded projects that prepared a well structured compensation plan with adequate 
documentation and record keeping. According to URT (2000), the process of acquiring the 
way-leave and resettling the affected parties was carried out in five phases as outlined 
below:- 
(i) Planning phase: involves planning and preparation of field procedures for land 
acquisition, resettlement and compensation processes. It also included 
validation and correction of data provided by consultants. 
(ii) Field operation phase: This involved three field teams namely “Front end 
team”, “Payment team” and “Logistics team”. Collectively, the teams were 
responsible for identification of the affected parties, carry out valuation and 
pay compensation. 
(iii) Finalisation and dispute resolution phase: This dealt with processing of the 
legal documentation from the village level to the national level for SONGAS 
to acquire “the certificate of occupancy” of the way-leave land. 
(iv) Infrastructure development phase: SONGAS on behalf of the GoT developed 
and managed construction of various infrastructures in areas where urban 
affected households were provided with alternative plots.  
(v) Acquisition of way-leave phase: Submission of a formal request for SONGAS 
to acquire the way-leave and obtain all necessary legal permissions and 
licences to construct the gas pipeline. 
 
However, the findings of this study show that the above plan had low level of involvement of 
affected parties in many aspects starting from planning, through implementation to 
monitoring.  
 
Future plans 
The future plans of SONGAS project include (i) to explore more reserves of natural gas along 
the coast of Indian ocean in Tanzania and Zanzibar; (ii) to encourage big electricity 
consumers (industries) to generate their own electricity using natural gas; (iii) to expand 
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production of natural gas in order to meet electricity exportation to neighbouring countries 
including those in the great lakes region. 
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Appendix 4.6: Reported advantages and disadvantages of forms of compensation 
 
Form/type of 
compensation 
Advantages Disadvantages 
 
 
Monetary 
payments 
• Simple to administer 
• Easier to use/spend for all needs you 
have such as land 
• Flexibility in planning 
• Can be invested easily anywhere 
• Attracts many elite intruders in 
compensation process 
• Has many risks e.g. loss, misuse and 
safety issues 
• Difficult to handle and manage in rural 
areas 
 
 
Benefit sharing 
schemes 
• Improve quality of life such as education, 
health and infrastructures 
• Provide equal chances to all community 
members to benefit 
• Care for both present and future 
generations 
• Incorporate features of continuity thus 
promotion of sustainability 
• Build relationships between project 
developers and affected communities 
• Promote partnerships and spirit of 
working together 
• Improve involvement of affected parties 
and communities 
• Can provide employment 
• Incorporate high risk of mismanagement 
if schemes are operated by communities 
alone 
• Do not avoid loss of land to individual 
affected household 
• Individual affected parties/households 
can easily be overshadowed and cause 
undercompensation 
• Smooth and efficient operation of benefit 
sharing schemes needs both national 
policy and legal back up. 
• Costs of training local community 
members are inevitable and high 
 
 
In-kind 
payments 
• Quite useful for both affected individuals 
and communities 
• Can benefit many if not all 
household/community members 
• Can take different forms depending on 
needs of affected parties 
• Can not address all needs someone has 
• Constantly supplied thus need plans and 
management 
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Appendices 5.1 – 5.2: Description of village cases 
 
Appendix 5.1: Brief description of Mwanambaya village case study 
 
Mwanambaya village abbreviated as M’baya in this study is found in Tambani Ward, 
Mkuranga District, Coast Region and is located along Kilwa road, 40km south of Dar es 
Salaam, the capital city of Tanzania (Figure 3.2). People’s settlements are surrounded by 
home gardens cropped with coconuts, cashew nuts and fruit trees, mostly mangoes and 
oranges. The history of M’baya goes back to the German rule, when the area was called 
Kiloweko. M’baya village was named after a goat keeper (Mr. Omary Kisigalile) who fled 
away from his relatives looking for more grazing space for his goats and he was then nick-
named ‘Mwana-mbaya’, meaning ‘a bad boy’. In 1974, when the settlement was formally 
recognised as an Ujamaa village, was officially known as Mwanambaya. Administratively, 
the village is divided in seven (7) zones and each is led by the chairperson. 
 
During the time of this study (2007), M’baya village had a population of 2,984 people found 
in 764 households, out of which 100 households are female-headed. The village composes 
about six (6) ethnic groups namely Zaramo, Matumbi, Ndengereko, Ngindo, Gogo, Mwela 
and Nyamwezi. The village has one primary school and one Ward secondary school which is 
still under construction and is located in M’baya village. The village also has a public 
dispensary. Unlike many public services M’baya’s primary school is well-equipped with 
teachers, books and furniture and dispensary has drugs, equipments and both permanent and 
volunteer medical staff. 
 
People in M’baya are farmers that cultivate coconut, cashew nuts, pineapples, passions, 
oranges, cassava and legumes in mixed cropping farming system. Villagers depend on 
coconut, cashew nuts, pineapples and oranges for income and cassava and legumes for food 
supply. However, some M’baya villagers have diversified their livelihood activities to 
include small off-farm and income generation activities such as kiosks, food vending and 
village/home based market, commonly known as ‘genge’. The main constraints faced by 
M’baya villagers include, (i) Little emphasis on the importance of education among villagers 
(ii) shortage of land for agriculture, (iii) lack of reliable market for agricultural crops and, (iv) 
pests that attack coconut and cashew nut trees. 
 
The village leaders emphasized that the developer of SONGAS project followed all important 
regulations in introducing the project at the grassroots level. It was highlighted that SONGAS 
had two distinct phases in M’baya. The first phase happened in 1995 and involved paying 
compensation for the losses caused by the wayleave. The second phase in 2005 was related to 
the implementation of benefits that were promised in the first phase, particularly the 
distribution of electricity and a deep borehole. According to village leaders, the second phase 
was so disputed, as the contractors hired to deliver benefits to M’baya village did not 
approach the community properly.  
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Appendix 5.2: Brief description of Idete village case study 
 
Idete village in Idete Ward, Kilombero District, Morogoro Region started 1969 with five 
households that had purposes of living and farming together. The number of households kept 
increasing constantly and by 1973 the village had a big number of children that necessitated 
an establishment of a primary school. Following villagisation policies, the village bulged in 
1974 and in 1975 the village was formally registered with 250 households and currently the 
village has 882 and the village has been ruled by 8 chairpersons since its inception. During 
villagisation people were strategically moved to new settlements along the TAZARA24 
railway for security purpose as well. 
 
Idete is highly diverse in terms of ethnic composition, as it has more than 14 ethnic groups, 
where the main ones include the Ngoni, Hehe, Ngindo, Ndamba, Pogoro, Sukuma and Waha 
people. Majority of the population at Idete is made up by migration of Hehe, Ngoni and 
Sukuma people from Iringa, Ruvuma and Shinyanga regions respectively. People at Idete are 
involved in several production activities such agriculture (i.e. rice, maize, cassava, banana 
and horticultural crops), livestock keeping (mainly pigs and local children), fishing in river 
Kilombero and selling of agricultural/farm products and fishes. Mixed farming agriculture 
dominated by rice and horticultural crops make the mainstay for people’s livelihoods at Idete 
village. Rice is an important crop grown for both food and cash purposes. It was noted from 
the discussion that women groups had income generating activities such as milling machine 
and diary cattle keeping. However, both projects are currently not operative due to 
differences in political ideologies. Both projects started as initiatives of the women 
organization of the ruling party (UWT25). 
 
In regard to community/public services, the village has three primary schools and one Ward 
secondary school located at Idete village. The financial supports from KVTC and TASAF26 
have helped the village to accomplish eight (8) classrooms and headmaster’s house in the 
secondary school project. During the time of this research, the school had hundreds of 
students in forms one and two levels. However, the school had shortage of teachers and 
books. Idete village also has constructed the market (with 10 selling spaces/tables, office, 
storeroom and several surrounding small kiosks) and dispensary that provides primary health 
care to people of Idete and those from the neighbouring villages that have no dispensaries. 
The number of people served by this dispensary is overwhelmingly larger than the health 
staff, drugs and other facilities available. The village is connected to the district headquarters 
(Ifakara town) with a 22km earth road which is passable with difficulties during long rainy 
season between February and May every year. But for long travels and transportation of 
luggage to places along TAZARA rail line, people of Idete enjoys affordable services offered 
by TAZARA. 
 
It was learned that the developer of teak project (KVTC) involved most the district and 
higher authorities at national level in acquiring land at Idete. Involvement of villagers was 
done at a very low level and this has led to complicated land disputes. Administratively, Idete 
village has seven (7) zones and Ndundu zone contains a great number of the affected 
households. Majority of the households that suffered from loss of land had a long history with 
their farmlands, as many have been occupying and using their farmlands since 1984. The 
village leaders claimed that the criteria applied in the identification of affected parties, 
                                                 
24 TAZARA = Tanzania Zambia Railway 
25 UWT = Umoja wa Wanawake wa Chama cha Mapinduzi 
26 TASAF = Tanzania Social Action Fund 
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compensation entitlements and estimation of compensation payments were not understood at 
all, as were neither made open to villagers nor their government. This happened because 
compensation process involved largely the district authorities and project officials. 
 
According to village leaders the teak project is viewed in two different faces. Majority of 
villagers, especially the affected households view the KVTC project to have caused a lot of 
problems associated to land and food shortages in Idete and this group could have liked the 
project to stop and quit. The other group sees the project as beneficial to the community and 
has potentials for promoting further social/community services and development if important 
aspects get improved in both developers’ and village government’s sides. It was learned that 
the developer uses different arrangements including Social Funds and Special Contracts to 
pass some benefits to host communities. Host communities through their village government 
authorities are required to carry out need assessment, prepare mini project proposals and 
present the budget to KVTC for funding through earmarked Social Fund. Contract money are 
provided after the village through its villagers have accomplished special assignments such as 
protection of natural forests and teak plantations from fire, fight against illegal hunting of 
wildlife, preparation of monthly reports and so many others. 
 
Benefits gained from teak plantation (project) include (i) KVTC contributions to basic 
community services such as education and health, (ii) support to orphans, (iii) awareness 
campaigns on HIV/AIDS and environmental conservation, (iv) food supply during times of 
food shortages and, supply of seedlings of both teak and selected native trees of commercial 
importance. Losses caused by the project as identified by the village leaders included land 
shortage, decline of soil fertility, increased drought and destruction of watersheds. 
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Appendices 5.3 – 5.14: Interviewed household cases 
 
Appendix 5.3: Compensated household case (Mzee Omega) in M’baya 
 
Mzee Omega (58) heads a household of eight (8) family members and his household has lived 
at M’baya since 1983. His household depends on agricultural activities for a living. The 
household cultivates coconut, fruit trees, cassava, legumes and pineapples. Before SONGAS 
project the household occupied 4 acres (1.6ha) but now (after the project) the household has 
remained with 1.5 acres (0.06ha). Mzee Omega and his wife make a very exceptional 
household case compared to all other households interviewed as cases. Both have both 
inward and outward thinking and are very careful at balancing issues such as their personal 
interests as a household and those of the community; project interests as compared to those of 
the community. 
 
Mzee Omega commended the developer of SONGAS project for early communication of 
both the project proposal and compensation plans before the ground surveys and valuation 
exercise. Although important information such as compensation rates were not known to the 
affected parties, majority were informed about valuation process and hence participated in 
showing boundaries of their farms and counting affected crops and assets. He also reported 
that one of the unanswered questions during compensation process was about why land was 
not compensated for while by that time land was selling at TZS 400,000/= (173.91 GBP). 
Mzee Omega’s household lost most of his coconut trees for the gas pipeline wayleave. The 
household was paid TZS 540,000/= (234.78 GBP) as compensation for their coconut, banana 
and cassava. They used compensation money to renovate their house, buying school needs of 
their children and a small proportion was spent for personal/home general expenses. 
 
Apart from compensation money to affected individual households, Mzee Omega reported 
benefits at community level accrued from SONGAS project as, education support directed to 
the primary and secondary schools; electrical distribution in M’baya village and free 
installation to 50 households and; drilling water borehole. SONGAS wanted the villagers to 
start their efforts and then the project would come in and help in taking it further. It was sadly 
noted by Mzee Omega that no documentation was kept by village leaders which was a big 
blunder, as it is a matter of fact that office bearers can change at anytime. He went on 
explaining that community benefits are important and necessary, as for example education 
support brings together the affected and non-affected community members to share benefits 
and promotes spirits of collective responsibilities as a community. Mzee Omega and his wife 
however expressed some shortcomings appeared during the process of delivering the 
promised benefits. They mentioned about contractors commissioned to deliver (implement) 
benefits did not do their job according to the developer’s promise. They cited the water 
borehole constructed is a shallow instead of a deep one, its workmanship is poor and its 
location has made it less useful. The couple also explained the way electrical distribution 
further destroyed their crops and other farmers as well without informing them (Photo 5.3). 
They suggested that all promised benefits should be in the form of formal agreement/contract 
and a clear plan should be established jointly by both the project developer and affected 
parties/community. An emphasis was put on both sides to avoid unnecessary conditions that 
can jeopardise project or community welfare and they should also fulfil their obligations 
according to the contract. 
 
Finally, Mzee Omega expressed a big lesson he learned from the whole issue of SONGAS 
project that women can equally do things like men, as his wife supervised everything in 
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relation to SONGAS compensation process while he was hospitalised. She kept him informed 
about the progress and on top of that she put enormous efforts during the improvement of 
their house. 
 
 
 
Emerging Issues 
• Land is a central to all other losses encountered. 
• Main crop such as coconut is highly linked to people’s livelihoods and their 
losses encountered. 
• Large proportion of compensation money was spent in improving houses. 
• Ignorance increases losses 
• Women involvement in development matters has great potentials of great 
successes at both household and community levels. 
• Importance of formal agreement for both compensation matters and benefit 
promises. 
• Need for striking a balance between project’s and people’s welfares 
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Appendix 5.4: Compensated household case (Mr. Kisikisi), M’baya 
 
Mr. Kisikisi has been living in M’baya village since his birth (about 51 years ago) and he 
heads a family of 6 people. His household largely depends on farming activities and to small 
extent it also runs small income generating activities such as a small shop (kiosk) and sales of 
farm-based produces (genge). Mr. Kisikisi’s household lost 4 acres (1.6 hectares) of farmland 
that contained coconut, mango, cashew nuts and orange trees to SONGAS project and 
received a compensation of TZS 0.7 million (304.35 GBP). He utilized the compensation 
money to improve his house by roofing it with corrugated iron sheets. He also bought a 
bicycle, radio and clothes. 
 
Despite the fact that all affected parties got compensated, Mr. Kisikisi mentioned about the 
complaints that came out following the majority of affected parties were not satisfied with the 
way compensation calculations were done i.e.: 
• Affected parties were not well informed about the process, and the amount of land 
(e.g. 60 m passage that was taken by the way-leave) was not clear in particular. 
• Crops such as cassava, legumes, pineapples and other annual crops were grouped 
together and its compensation was paid based on land size. 
• Some affected parties missed the valuation of their assets as information was not 
made available well in advance. 
 
Mr. Kisikisi acknowledges SONGAS’ support in education facilities in for both the primary 
school in M’baya village and a secondary school construction in Tambani ward. He 
supported his argument that education is the only way of helping all people in the community 
and its outcomes have great continuity potentials. He confidently commented that if such 
trends of valuing and supporting education continue, the future of their children and 
grandchildren would certainly be bright. He also valued the potential benefits that are likely 
to be realised from the electricity service when its development is finalised. He stressed his 
point by giving mentioning few examples of benefits such as better living conditions. 
Electricity would promote small to medium income generating activities and provide 
employment to many youth, artisanal workers in particular. He however, questioned the 
approach used by SONGAS in delivering the promised benefits to affected communities.  
 
Talking about general costs face because of the SONGAS project, Mr. Kisikisi expressed 3 
major ones as it follows below: 
1. Loss of constant flow of profit from permanent crops, coconut in particular. 
Comparing compensation amount paid for loss of each mature coconut tree [TZS 
25,000/= (10.87 GBP)] and an average annual income that was generated by the same 
coconut tree [TZS 20,000/= (8.70 GBP)], Mr. Kisikisi, classified the rate used as 
unjust. This is absolute loss bearing the fact that a coconut tree takes 6-9 years to 
reach maturity, he added. Assuming that an amount of compensation paid per coconut 
tree covers for purchase of planting material and caring for seedling to reach maturity, 
each affected farmer suffers a big loss for the period of 6-9 years.  
2. The society continues facing a huge loss of social values such as social cohesion that 
is embedded in mango trees/fruits. In the past minority who had no mango trees were 
allowed to gather mango fruits that have fallen on the ground from anybody’s mango 
tree(s). This traditional system allowed a gatherer to carry any amount of mangoes 
his/her hands could hold at once (i.e. no bags/vessels) free of charge and this went 
without asking. The community by then had a slogan that states “Ya nini kugombana 
kwa ajili ya embe, embe tunda la msimu” (Why destruct your social relations while 
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mango is a seasonal fruit?). This brought people (i.e. individuals/families) closer to 
each other. According to Mr. Kisikisi, SONGAS project has significantly reduced the 
mango-based social arrangement as it destroyed more than 150 mango trees of dodo 
species (maginifera indica) in M’baya village. He went on claiming that over the past 
10 years period, attitude of M’baya people towards this mango-based social 
arrangement have changed to the worse. From his point of view he identified the 
SONGAS project and compensation paid to the affected parties as a leading factor in 
weakening social cohesion and subsequently disruption of social relations between 
one household and another. Some reached a point of telling the mango gatherers 
should eat papers (compensation money). However, Mr. Kisikisi also mentioned other 
factors that affect the mango-based social relations. These include: 
• Urbanisation is constantly turning everything including into a market commodity. 
Majority of mango owners are currently restricting people from having few 
mangoes because of money. 
• Other mango owners have replaced the dodo specie by new shorter varieties that 
do not suit the mango-based social arrangement. 
 
In regard to compensation process by SONGAS project, Mr. Kisikisi had the following issues 
to express: 
• A process: Compensation needs careful planning and adequate preparation. He 
wanted all stakeholders to know one fact related to compensation that compensation 
has no fixed rate or amount for a certain asset or foregone services. Instead, Mr. 
Kisikisi had a suggestion that compensation amount be determined through 
negotiation between the developer and the affected parties and their agreed terms be 
kept in records. 
• Lack of participation: The affected parties came to know the amounts of their 
compensation on the very day they were provided with their cheques. 
• Under-compensation: Compensation offered to the affected parties was not 
reflecting the exact value of replacing a destroyed asset or restoring a forgone service. 
Hidden costs (losses) exist which also need to be compensated. 
• Divide and rule: Few elite affected parties were singled out the big group and got 
paid well as compared to the rest.  
 
In concluding Mr. Kisikisi wrapped up by putting more emphasis on: 
• Education: knowledge on how government and its administrative procedures work, 
especially when it comes an aspect of involving rural people in sensitive processes 
such as compensation. 
• Gender relations: when spending compensation money at household level, it is wise to 
make sure all grown-up members of the family are involved in planning, decision-
making and even benefit sharing. 
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Emerging Issues 
• Here large proportion (>80%) of compensation money was spent in improving 
the home and People in rural areas like to live in good and quality houses.  
• Support to education ensures equal benefit to every community member and has 
great sustainable potentials because of continuity of its outcomes. 
• Some assets/features represent important socio-cultural values such as big 
mango trees of dodo type (maginifera indica) used to cement social relations 
among community members in communities in Coast region. 
• Affected parties were not satisfied with the way valuation and calculations of 
compensation were conducted. 
• Compensation rates applied for paying losses of mature coconut trees were low 
and outdated. 
• Gender relations in regard to involvement and sharing of benefits at household 
level, community level. 
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Appendix 5.5: Compensated household case (Mzee Msasa) in M’baya 
 
Mzee Msasa is 82 years old and heads a household of five (5) people. He is practices both 
crop and animal product. His household lost 2 acres (0.8ha) of farmland that contained 
coconut and orange trees and other annual crops. Mzee Msasa is one of the affected parties 
who were compensated by SONGAS developer in 1997. 
 
According to Mzee Msasa all villagers in M’baya were well informed about the SONGAS 
proposal before aerial survey. The affected parties including him had 3 meetings with project 
officials (also attended by village leaders) to discuss both the project and compensation. Mzee 
Msasa received cash TZS 200,000/= (86.96 GBP) as a compensation for losses encountered 
through losing coconut and orange trees. Despite of many affected parties seemed to be 
satisfied with compensation paid some important stages such as valuation of losses and 
compensation computation did not involve the affected parties. Later on most of the affected 
parties realised that were undercompensated after they started relocating their homes and 
activities. Mzee Msasa spent his compensation money to buy used corrugated iron sheets and 
improved his old house as pictured in Photo 6.4. 
 
According to Mzee Msasa, M’baya’s affected parties faced and are still facing big loss in 
relation to land loss and permanent crops such as coconut and cashew nut trees. Land was not 
compensated and there was no consideration of future flow of income from permanent crops. 
He associated these losses with ignorance of affected parties and lack of information relevant 
to compensation rates and criteria used. Mzee Msasa gave an example of his loss was big 
with respect to his age of 82, as he worries much about his future life. Since he has no 
coconut farm and in this way he has been forced to become a dependant. Mzee Msasa 
claimed that coconut crop is so important for people’s living style in the Coast. He outlined 
some benefits of coconut crop that included treatment of some diseases such as skin disease 
and diabetes. He claimed that coconut juice increases longevity. Mzee Msasa continued with 
his explanation on big losses caused by compensation in relation to expenditure. He claimed 
that many affected parties wasted their compensation as they did not involve their wives and 
the rest of their family members in deciding wise use of their money. He argued based on his 
example that his wife had a big contribution in supervision and monitoring. 
 
 
 
Emerging Issues 
• Land is a central to all other losses encountered. 
• Main crop such as coconut is highly linked to people’s livelihoods and their 
losses encountered. 
• Large proportion of compensation money was spent in improving houses. 
• People’s ignorance multiplied and increases their losses 
• Women have special roles, especially monitoring of wise use of compensation. 
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Appendix 5.6: Compensated household case (Mr. Ustaadhi) in M’baya 
 
Mr. Ustaadhi is an ordinary farmer in M’baya village and he is 51 years old. He is among the 
affected parties who were compensated by SONGAS gas project 1997. His household (with a 
total of 8 members) received TZS 8 million (3478.26 GBP) as a compensation encountered 
after losing land (approx. 1.6 hectares) and different types of crops. Apart from farming, 
some family members are also involved in income generating activities such as buying and 
selling fruits and other farm produces. In his community, Mr. Ustaadhi serves as a religious 
leader and a member of school improvement committee.  
 
Mr. Ustaadhi is very much concerned about education backwardness of M’baya community. 
He links some of the problems people currently face to SONGAS project. He further links 
losses encountered by the affected parties to both people’s ignorance and their low level of 
education. Mr. Ustaadhi claimed that because of the same reasons the affected parties did not 
realise they were under compensated. Focusing on his experience, he gave an example of one 
of major losses he encountered in relation to compensation. After receiving his compensation 
he quickly rushed into buy an alternative land of 2 hectares (“kwa sababu fidia imetokana na 
umiliki wa ardhi basi ni lazima itumike kwa mambo yanayoendana na umiliki wa ardhi” 
Since the paid compensation received was because he owned land, it should be spent wisely 
in land-related matters). He unfortunately realised later that the land he bought is relatively 
not suitable for agriculture as compared to his former land. He claimed to have tried to 
fertilize it using crop residues, poultry and animal droppings but in vein. He expressed this as 
a big loss emanating from compensation. He openly admits himself to have little knowledge 
and experience in both identifying and categorising land based on its suitability. 
 
He claimed the M’baya village to have benefited only from SONGAS’ education support as 
this has helped their village to improve quality of education in terms of increasing classrooms 
and desks. He specifically went on appreciating the recently donated TZS 49million 
(21304.35 GBP) by SONGAS to help the Tambani ward in the construction of secondary 
school. Mr. Ustaadhi however, seriously questioned to why the promises were fulfilled after 
both the village and district governments did a number of several follow-ups. 
 
According to Mr. Ustaadhi, compensation-specific costs include losses due to: 
• Uncompensated land,  
• Socio-cultural values (i.e. loss of inheritance to future generations). 
• Uncompensated efforts invested in coconut farms from the beginning 
• Discontinuation of constantly flows of farm-based profit emanating from permanent 
crops in particular such as coconut. 
 
Mr. Ustaadhi, had been repeatedly emphasizing the fact he believes in that development of a 
certain location has largely to be influenced by its dwellers’ attitudes. He explicitly 
mentioned a need for people to change the ill-development notions and acquire positive 
attitude towards the following important aspects: 
• Education: unlike to other region in Tanzania, the Coast region has been disvaluing 
education for decades now. For instance at some stages of SONGAS compensation 
process, most of the affected parties did not know where they were coming from, they 
were and they were heading to because of low level of education. 
• Gender issues: culturally, the Coast region like many societies in the World, women 
are not given room in decision-making process. Citing few examples, Mr. Ustaadhi 
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pointed out that many affected parties lost/wasted their compensation for not 
involving their wives in planning for and using it.  
 
 
 
Emerging Issues 
• Land rights is a basic factor for affected parties to qualify for compensation 
rights. Yet it is ignored during valuation  
• Large proportion of compensation money was spent in buying alternative land 
and house. 
• Obvious incurred costs before compensation in achieving various capitals/assets 
and loss of profit encountered soon after compensation are both invisible during 
valuation. 
• Education (i.e. awareness, information, knowledge and technology) broadens 
understanding which avoids losses and promotes development (Kh). 
• Gender relations at household and society levels carry both social and cultural 
values and have great positive/negative influence to compensation outcomes at 
household level.  
• Costs and benefits can be directly and indirectly influenced by either nature of 
the project itself or its compensation scheme. 
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Appendix 5.7: Compensated household case (Mr. Oxygen/Mbogamboga), Idete 
 
Mr. Oxygen commonly known as Mr. Mbogamboga in Idete village is a young farmer (28 
years old) heading a young family of three including him. For the past five years he has been 
cultivating horticultural crops such as vegetables, tomato, spices, banana and sugar canes on 
the land of 1.5 acres (0.6 ha) that he lost to the teak project. He had an average income flow 
of 2500/= TZS a day earned from sales of his horticultural harvests. Using irrigation water 
from the well he dug in his farm was able to cultivate horticultural crops 3-4 times a year. 
According to him he was nicknamed Mr. Mbogamboga (literally meaning Mr. Vegetables) as 
he was the leading supplier of vegetables and spices within and outside the village. His 
customers included the market traders from Ifakara, the district administrative town located 
22 km from Idete. Despite the caused loss of income, Mr. Mbogamboga reported 
deterioration of health conditions of his family members as the results of poor nutrition 
caused lack of vegetables and other food items. 
 
Mr. Mbogamboga was among the fourteen households that received cash compensation from 
KVTC (teak project) in 2006. He received 139,000/= TZS (60.34 GBP) as a blanket 
compensation for his losses and he claimed to know nothing about its breakdown todate. Mr. 
Oxygen viewed the compensation payment received as something given to justify eviction 
from their fertile farmlands. He used the compensation money to buy a quarter an acre plot, 
poles, and built mud and grass thatched shelter for his family. He was totally dissatisfied with 
compensation received. He compared the loss of his fertile valleyland that had permanent 
natural water supply with compensation paid and equated it with paralysis disease that 
incapacitate someone in terms of development works. He went on explaining that he is 
somehow confused and since 2006 his wife and him never went back into production and 
have been working for food in others fields and largely depending on assistance from 
relatives. 
 
He claimed to know very little about benefits accrued from the teak project. He only 
mentioned employment and the teak project is the source of revenue to the village 
government, district and national authorities as major benefits. Employment is provided 
through eight (8) contractors such as SHIKIKA, MTEWELE and NYAKI. Despite little wage 
paid per piecework a day (TZS 1500-2000) by the contractors, it has been helpful especially 
for the times after crop harvest. In some cases, villagers have not preferred to work for small 
wages but contractors have also decided to hire causal labourers from outside the non-host 
communities. At the village level this money has been assisting construction of the Ward 
secondary school. In concluding benefit issues from the project, Mr. Oxygen expressed his 
worries on the future of their villagers as far as land issues are concerned and the promised 
employment that seems to favour most those from the non-host village communities. 
 
 
Emerging Issues 
• Service based loss (vegetable supply) experienced at an individual/household level 
has spill over effects in the entire community. 
• Losses cause confusion and can cause psychological and mental health effects 
• Compensation paid was so little, unrealistic and unjustifiable. 
• Large proportion of compensation money was spent in buying alternative land/plot 
• Contractors affect the flow of benefits into the host communities if their operations 
are not closely monitored  
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Appendix 5.8: Compensated household case (Mr. Wageni), Idete 
 
Mr. Wageni (58) has eight (8) family members that include him, his wife, their children and 
grand children. His household has lived in the village since 1979. Mr. Wageni is a leader of 
one of the Christian churches in the village. His household practices typical subsistence 
farming where their most of the agricultural produces are consumed at household level. 
Before the project, the household has been cultivating rice, maize, vegetables, tomato, banana 
and sugar canes on the land of seven acres (2.8ha), occupied since 1992. According to Mr. 
Wageni, his land was very fertile, located about 60m from River Idete that facilitated 
irrigation and production throughout the year. Within his farm also Mr. Wageni had 14 bee 
hives located at peripherals of his farmland. He had an income flow ranging between 1000 - 
2500/= TZS from his daily sales of his farm harvests, mainly horticultural crops, sugar canes 
and banana. 
 
In 2006, Mr. Wageni received 66,000/= TZS (28.70 GBP) as compensation payment from 
KVTC for all his losses encountered because of the teak project. Mr. Wageni claimed to have 
known nothing in relation to criteria used to arrive at that amount he was paid. He went on 
explaining that compensation paid by KVTC was processed within very short time (in 2 
weeks time) leaving many (both the compensated and uncompensated) with a lot of questions 
but did not know where to go for a help. He also mentioned that their village leaders were not 
active enough during compensation process following their low influence and dominance by 
district authorities. Mr. Wageni indicated that was totally dissatisfied with amount of 
compensation paid to him and the way entire exercise of compensation was carried out. Mr. 
Wageni used his little compensation money to buy 3 corrugated sheets and he paid the 
remaining money (6000/= TZS) to the village government as application fee for land that he 
never got todate. Both the church members and relatives assisted him to obtain another 
farmland and build a unfinished house. 
 
Mr. Wageni reported benefits of KVTC’s teak project to include improved quality of 
education in terms school buildings/classrooms, furniture and books. KVTC joined the Plan 
International to start a primary school that has lowered student-teacher ratio has in all three 
primary schools and in turn this has provided teachers with more time in preparation of their 
subject teaching plans. Part time employment in relation to teak plantations was mentioned as 
very helpful to many households, especially the youth group. However, the contractors 
operating between the developer and labourers (host communities) were reported to exercise 
discrimination in terms of gender, wage payments and securing a place. The huge negative 
impact as per Mr. Wageni is the loss of agricultural lands for the present and future 
generation. Other losses influenced by the teak project were mentioned as loss of income 
generation opportunities such as bee hive project; increased food insecurity due to decreased 
food production and poor nutritious food items and; excessive loss of natural vegetation and 
destruction of water sources. 
 
 
Emerging Issues 
• Not all losses were compensated 
• Village leaders and affected parties are disadvantaged in terms of information and 
capability to defend their rights or to question whatever felt is wrong. 
• Large proportion of compensation money was spent in establishing home 
• Contractors affect the flow of benefits into the host communities if their operations 
are not closely monitored. 
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Appendix 5.9: Compensated household case (Mr. Rutuba), Idete 
 
Mzee Rutuba at his early 70s has two wives and a total of 10 household members. Mzee 
Rutuba and his household entered Idete 1985. He migrated from Ruvuma looking for fertile 
lands where he could have farmed naturally (without applying artificial fertilizers) and ended 
establishing his settlement at Idete village. In 1987 he was given 8 acres (3.2 ha) by a friend 
(the Kiluwila family) who occupied a very large land in Ndundu area since 1970s. On this 
land, Mzee Rutuba cultivated rice, maize, banana, sugar canes and fruit trees and his 
household used to earn TZS 3000/= - 5000/= from their daily sales of his farm harvests. 
 
Mzee Rutuba participated in counting agricultural crops that were involved in compensation 
paid by KVTC’s developer and ended up receiving TZS 390,000/= (170.00 GBP) as 
compensation payment for a loss of one (1) palm, three (3) orange and five (5) mango trees. 
He expressed his dissatisfaction with the amount paid, as no compensation was received for 
3.2 ha of his farmland and 2 traditional houses. Mzee Rutuba emphasized that this 
compensation process did not involve the affected parties and was not open enough to 
affected communities. He equated the process that was like a person being punished without 
knowing his/her mistakes. He also condemned some villagers who heard about KVTC was 
about to start teak plantations in Ndundu area and quickly invaded some areas for 
compensation speculations, as this brought a lot of chaos and disputes. in According to Mzee 
Rutuba, compensation process left the affected people (including himself) with a number of 
questions such as why the affected parties were not informed well in advance before 
relocation; their land ownership was not recognised; were not provided with alternative 
farming lands and; why the government and developer are not following interested in 
knowing difficulties the affected households undergo following relocation. Mzee Rutuba used 
his compensation money to buy 10 corrugated sheets and 3000 burnt bricks that he used to 
improve his house in the other home where his first wife resides. 
 
According to Mzee Rutuba gains experienced because of the teak project include their 
support in the construction of both primary and secondary schools. This support has 
significantly reduced villagers’ contributions as frequently been demanded by village 
authorities. According to Mzee Rutuba the teak project has also helped to construct the road 
joining Ndundu zone and the village headquarters, although the developer has never 
completed the construction of the promised two bridges and 1 culvert. He was also very 
happy with the project developer’s initiatives of supporting farmers interested in planting teak 
and other natural trees to raise them in their farms. This has somehow reduced a big demand 
for poles in the community. 
 
Mzee Rutuba reported the loss of their fertile valley land was central to all other losses they 
are currently facing. He gave an example that “if people of Idete were to fight a war against 
the teak project, it could have been appropriate to name it the war of valleylands and soil 
fertility”. Other negative impacts included the loss of agricultural lands for semi-permanent 
and permanent crops. Other losses influenced by the teak project were mentioned as loss of 
income generation opportunities such as bee hive project; increased food insecurity due to 
decreased food production and poor nutritious food items and; excessive loss of natural 
vegetation and destruction of water sources. 
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Emerging Issues 
• Information asymmetry and lack of involvement of affected parties 
• Customary land rights of the affected parties not recognised 
• Land/compensation speculation is a potential source of compensation disputes 
• Loss of agricultural high productive (fertile) valleylands 
• Loss of production of semi-permanent and permanent crops due to land shortage 
• House construction/improvement was a priority allocated large proportion of 
compensation money 
• Lack of monitoring of post-compensation outcomes 
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Appendix 5.10: Compensated household case (Mr. Ling’ang’a), Idete 
 
Mr. Ling’ang’a (42) is married and his household has a total of 7 people. He has been living 
at Idete since 1975 when they moved together with his parents during villagisation. Like 
other cases, Mr. Ling’ang’a is a farmer who lost his 2 acres farmland (0.8ha). On this land, 
Ling’ang’a has been cultivating banana, sugar canes, vegetables and rice and he was 
harvesting twice a year, as the soil was capable of keeping the good amount of moisture 
throughout the year. On the same land, he had a house, orange and mango trees. Despite other 
many losses, Mr. Ling’ang’a claimed a loss of average daily income flow of 4000/= TZS 
from sales of sugar canes and banana. 
 
Mr. Ling’ang’a was among the households received cash compensation from KVTC (teak 
project) and he received 270,000/= TZS (117.40 GBP). According to Ling’ang’a’s interest, 
he wanted to know exactly how the losses were counted and valuated, especially the way 
banana stems which contains a lot of banana plants of different ages. But no one was 
available to respond to their questions from the project or government authorities. Mr. 
Ling’ang’a spent almost all his compensation in buying 4 acres (1.6ha) of alternative 
farmlands in the neighbouring village. Connected to this, he expressed problems associated 
with distant farming such as theft and crop predation by wildlife such baboons and monkeys 
are very high especially for the farms located close to natural forests. 
 
The gains that Idete villagers have benefited from the teak project are their support in 
construction of both primary and secondary school. He expressed his personal views that he 
was so pleased with KVTC’s support, as education is an important social/community service. 
Losses caused to Idete villagers include loss of land, for future generations in particular. He 
was so worried with the KVTC’s plan of expanding their teak plantations, especially when he 
considered the land availability for his children and grand children. He also associated the 
teak plantation and the 2006/07 drought that has caused River Idete to dry out, something 
they never happened to see before. Another serious concern of Mr. Ling’ang’a was a socio-
cultural issue, as the developer did not consider or take initiatives of resolving burial sites 
(graves) the affected partied had on their farmlands. 
 
 
 
Emerging Issues 
• Agricultural production and watershed systems have been adversely affected and 
both effects affect entire community. 
• Socio-cultural effects associated with burial sites (graves). 
• Support of KVTC in education is very important means for promotion of 
community development and is a potential method for compensating all 
community members equally and in a sustainable way 
• Compensation process did not involve affected parties and was not open 
• Used almost all his compensation payment to buy another farmland in the 
neighbouring village. 
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Appendix 5.11: Uncompensated household case (Mama Mjasirimali ), Idete 
 
Mama Mjasirimali is 33 years old and heads a household of 8 people that have been 
depending on 1.5ha farmland they lost to the teak project in 2006. Since 1997, this household 
has been cultivating rice, maize, tomatoes and vegetables and had an average daily income of 
TZS 1200/= earned from sales of tomato and vegetables. The household used to harvest about 
15 bags (15x70kg) of paddy rice and 7 bags (7x70kg) a year. As a livelihood coping strategy, 
she runs a mini kiosk at her home and providing food vending services to labourers working 
in teak plantations. She currently has a net income of more than TZS 3000/= per day. 
 
Mama Mjasirimali’s household is one of 43 uncompensated households at Idete village. 
Mama Mjasirimali claimed that people living in Ndundu zone kept on hearing informally that 
teak project is underway to start big plantations and by 2005/6 about 100 households were 
forcibly evicted. She highlighted that very few people received compensation leaving the 
majority uncompensated by reasons that villagers occupied and used KVTC’s land illegally 
and many had no permanent crops, thus were not eligible for compensation. According to 
Mama Mjasirimali the affected parties deserved compensation payments at least for their 
annual crops and efforts spent in clearing natural forests. 
 
Mama Mjasirimali claimed that if someone has to compare benefits and costs caused by teak 
project it is obvious that losses outweigh gains. She pointed out, the developer channels some 
funds for village development, but according to her this money has not helped the losers, 
instead village leaders have spending this money to satisfy their own interests and influential 
unaffected parties. The project dug the earth road that affected further the fruit trees at 
people’s homesteads. She also complained about increased road accidents that involve 
domesticated animals such as chicken and dogs. The high mortality rate of chicken has 
multiplied losses encountered, she claimed. Mama Mjasirimali went further comparing 
impact done by teak and plan projects and said Plan International has influenced great 
changes in people’s lives in Idete, as has assisted in construction of a new primary school and 
water borehole for people in Ndundu zone. Mama Mjasirimali claimed that the livelihoods of 
the affected households have been severely devastated especially loss of their farmlands, as 
both food production and household incomes have been reduced. She also cautioned that 
many households have no signs of recovery if there are no measures to be taken to resolve 
land shortage problem, they are currently facing.  
 
 
 
Emerging Issues 
• Information asymmetry and lack of involvement of affected parties 
• Unclear land ownership (property rights) 
• Villagers used KVTC’s legally owned land unknowingly (encroachment) 
• Food insecurity and loss of incomes 
• Benefits not reaching the affected parties 
• Income generating activities can provide alternative means of earning a living 
(livelihoods). 
• Education and water supply are potential means of compensation for losses 
encountered at household level 
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Appendix 5.12: Uncompensated household case (Mzee Siogopi Hasara), Idete 
 
Mzee Siogopi Hasara is 85 years and is living with his wife at her early seventies. 70s has 
two wives and a total of 10 household members. The old couple has lived in Idete village for 
over 40 years. Mzee Siogopi Hasara obtained a farm of 4 acres (1.6ha) through clearing the 
virgin bush in one of the fertile valleylands. The couple has been cultivating rice, maize and 
banana with average income of TZS 2000 per day from sales of banana. The couple also used 
to earn annually an average of TZS 40,000/= (17.39 GBP) from renting out the farm to others 
for annual crops. Mzee Siogopi Hasara was not compensated for his farm, as he had no 
permanent crops in his farm.  
 
In a desperate state, Mzee Hasara expressed his concern that when uncompensated affected 
parties including him asked for their compensation rights, the village leaders promised to 
make follow up on the matter but no response todate. Discussing about his compensation 
eligibility, Mzee Siogopi Hasara insisted that as there is no way someone can obtain free land 
as it used to be in the past, he therefore deserved compensation for his farmland. He went on 
saying “anyway he do not want to trouble his old mind as his children take care of him and 
his wife” and following that event of losing his farmland he wrote a notice on the wall of his 
house that states “ you don’t have to fear about losses” (Photo 6.5). 
 
Mzee Siogopi Hasara was also aware of the support by teak project developer in education, 
where he commended it and found it a better way of helping communities. He also mentioned 
that if young people get educated, this passes knowledge from one generation to others and 
would minimise losses happening because of ignorance. The big loss caused by the project, 
according to Mzee Hasara is loss of their good agricultural lands. He expresses his concern of 
both the project and government not considering the conditions of affected parties like the old 
people. He went on explaining other concerns in association with restricted access to forests 
and other natural resources. 
 
 
 
Emerging Issues 
• Loss of land has multiplicative effect on farm-based livelihoods, as it leads into 
food insecurity, income loss, psychological effects and so many others. 
• Roles of government authorities in both development and compensation should 
include caring for the affected vulnerable groups such as elderly people. 
• Education is an important support for affected rural communities, as it promotes 
development among youth and from one generation to another. 
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Appendix 5.13: Uncompensated household case (Mzee Washamba), Idete 
 
Mzee Washamba is 80 years old and is living with his wife, his daughter and his grandson. 
The household has lived in Idete village since 1970 and during that time, he obtained a 
farmland of 3.5 acres (1.4ha) through bush clearing. In every year the couple has been 
cultivating rice on their land and harvesting average of 7 bags of (70kg each) paddy rice per 
acre. 
 
Mzee Washamba did not receive compensation for the loss of his farmland because he had no 
crops on the farm by the time of relocation. According to Mzee Washamba, the first 
information they received about KVTC’s teak project was just a notification that land is no 
longer theirs, as the government had allocated that land to an investor. He heard that the 
village government organised a meeting to discuss about the KVTC proposal and their land 
requirements but Mzee Washamba did not want to attend because he was busy working in his 
farm. He further explained that it was wastage of time to attend the meeting, as it was already 
decided by the higher government authorities that the affected people should relocate and 
give room for the project. Mzee Washamba claimed that both project and compensation 
processes lacked involvement and democracy. He pointed out two worse and unfair things 
happened in the KVTC’s compensation process included (i) failure to recognise long land 
occupancy of affected parties and, (ii) failure to provide the affected parties with replacement 
of land. Mzee Washamba claimed that he is no longer cultivating rice due to land shortage 
and has no money for renting-in land and according to him majority of landowners charge 
between TZS 10000/= and 20000/= per acre per one farming season. 
 
Mzee Washamba mentioned the road constructed by the developer of teak project as the only 
benefit he has been enjoying but he critically pointed out that essentially the road serves most 
the project than communities. He went on explaining negative consequences of road that 
vehicles of the teak project and contractors have been killing their tamed animals such as 
chicken, goats and dogs. When asked about social funds donated annually by the teak project 
developer, he responded that community based benefits can not offset losses encountered by 
individual households. 
 
 
 
Emerging Issues 
• Prearranged outcomes/decisions in meetings, involvement of affected parties 
• Lack of recognition of long land occupancy  
• Government influence in compensation issues  
• Impacts of benefits need assessment and evaluation 
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Appendix 5.14: Uncompensated household case (Mama Marimba ), Idete 
 
Mama Marimba is a widow and lives at Ndundu zone of Idete village. She is at her late 
fifties, living with her last two sons and four grandchildren from her two daughters who died 
of HIV/AIDS in 2001 and 2004. Her husband and she moved to Idete from Iringa region in 
1977 and have been tilling the lost farm (of about 3ha) since early 1980s. They cultivated 
rice, maize, banana, sugar cane and cassava. Although she did not remember exactly their 
annual harvest for each crop, she claimed to have faced no food shortage and money for their 
other pressing needs such as school requirements of their children and drug prescriptions. 
Mama Marimba whose farm partly was planted annual crops and another part left under 
furrow did not get compensation. She bitterly complained, how comes a naturally affected 
household like hers is not even provided with an alternative farming land! She gets money for 
supporting her household from sales of local brew and vegetables raised in her home garden. 
As widow, she also gets little support (money, food or clothes) from a local church. She 
however complained about life hardships caused by loss of her farmlands. 
 
Mama Marimba pointed out that despite all wrong deeds by KVTC’s teak project she is 
happy especially with their support in education (school construction) and other 
infrastructures such as roads and market, as are critically important for development of every 
community member. She however, suggested that government should seek ways of 
supporting the affected parties, the vulnerable poor such as old people, widows and orphans. 
She emphasized on the government to particularly ensure that all affected parties in rural 
areas get land replacement to keep their livelihood activities going. She added landlessness 
welcomes food insecurity and multiplies poverty. She concluded by saying if people are well 
informed, respected and taken through step by step in both project and compensation 
processes, there would be nobody or very few people to oppose the project, thus local people 
should be involved in determining the fate of their livelihoods.  
 
 
 
Emerging Issues 
• Land is a critical asset that cushions rural livelihoods from food insecurity and 
absolute poverty 
• Government authorities at both levels have critical roles to play in ensuring 
people’s livelihoods (no landlessness) and development is maintained. 
• Benefits channelled through community services such education have potentials of 
benefiting both the present and future generations. 
• Income generating activities can only supplement basic means of rural livelihoods. 
• Early involvement of affected parties/host communities in key steps of both 
project and compensation processes can strengthen relationships between the 
affected partied/host communities and the developer. 
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Appendices 5.15 – 5.21: Interviewed key informants 
 
Appendix 5.15: Key informant interview with Mama Mhamasishaji, M’baya 
 
Interview with Mama Mhamasishaji was held on 3rd July 2007 to explore more about the 
factors within the community that tend to influence participation positively and negatively. It 
was also meant to get to know about group dynamism in M’baya village. 
 
Mama Mhamasishaji is 52 years old, married with 6 children. She is a famous town/village 
crier in M’baya and her neighbouring villages within Tambani ward. She realised she has a 
unique talent of commanding when she was attending paramilitary (mgambo) training in 
1978. She is also involved in several campaigns of different nature (e.g. education, health and 
development) organised and funded by government and some by non-government 
organisations. Mama Mhamasishaji is highly gifted with great convincing power and she 
talks with strong persuasive language. Constantly, she has been acquiring knowledge in 
different life disciplines and skills in public sensitisation and facilitation from different 
forums she happened to attend. Mama Mhamasishaji participated in the compensation 
process of SONGAS project as she was fulfilling her obligation as a town crier, calling 
villagers to convene and attend meetings of SONGAS project. The discussion with Mama 
Mhamasishaji was held in the context of her job as a town crier of inviting people/villagers to 
attend public forums. 
 
Mama Mhamasishaji mentioned that in order to have good attendance to meetings, a town 
crier has to briefly tell the villagers about the expected outputs of the meeting and should be 
something that interests them. Meetings with SONGAS on their compensation were well 
attended because the main agenda was money (i.e. who, how much, when). She claimed to 
have never seen such turn ups throughout her work as a town crier. However, attending is one 
thing and participation and giving contribution is another thing. Based on her assessment, she 
claimed the meetings had no active discussions because of the following barriers: 
• Most of the meetings were dominated by the SONGAS team and leaders and were like 
information/feedback giving forums, 
• Agendas were not availed to people well in advance before the meetings start. 
• Compensation as a subject matter was new to villagers and this affected their 
participation during discussions, particularly when you consider differences in education, 
• Equipment used in meetings were too sophisticated for rural environment. These must 
have intimidated villagers not contribute during discussions 
• Based on cultural and religious values and economic status, group hierarchies in M’baya 
favour adult men over other groups. Adult men have rights to attend public matters such 
meetings and women are responsible for domestic chores. 
• SONGAS team maintained rigidity and confidentiality in some matters. For instance the 
team was not ready to change or consider any suggestion from the affected parties.  
 
According to Mama Mhamasishaji, potentials strengths in favour of participation in future 
exist and these include: 
• Promotion of both primary and secondary school in village and ward levels would 
promote awareness and understanding of various issues among school children and their 
parents and subsequently build up of confidence and hence active participation. 
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• Few men who openly involved their wives (entire family) in spending their received 
compensation and many who did not are respectively good and bad examples of 
involvement at household level. 
 
 
 
Emerging Issues 
• Participation to village meetings depends on attendance which basically is 
determined by the way the meeting agenda interest the invitees. Compensation 
as main agenda has a self-incentive that attracts both affected parties and non- 
affected parties to its meetings. The challenges ahead include the following: 
1. how to attract the marginalised groups, women in particular, 
2. how to obtain representatives of both groups the affected parties and 
non- affected parties, 
3. how to handover the stick to the meeting delegates (a big challenge to 
both experts and leaders) 
4. how to facilitate the meeting to achieve good outcomes of compensation 
• Education (i.e. awareness, information, knowledge and technology) broadens 
understanding which builds confidence and trust and in turn the trust lays down 
a strong foundation of active participation. 
• Participation is both cultural and artistic behaviour in somebody’s lifestyle and it 
can be shaped by external factors. Participation starts at the household level. 
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Appendix 5.16: Key informant interview with Mr. Jujukisi, M’baya 
 
Interview with Mr. Jujukisi was held on 1st May 2007 to explore the way SONGAS project 
entered in Mwanambaya (M’baya) village, acquired land for its pipeline way-leave, planning 
and implementation of its compensation scheme. It was also meant to inform the study about 
the gains and losses encountered by both the affected parties and community at large. In 
addition, the interview sought to obtain important general and practical matters to focus on 
during the selection of household case studies in M’baya. 
 
Mr Jujukisi is in his early 60s and he has been in M’baya since his birth. Currently, he is a 
honourable Councillor of Tambani ward. His late grandfather was the founder of 
Mwanambaya village and therefore Jujukisi has a rich history of the village. His grandfather 
was nicknamed Mwanambaya by his relatives and friends after he fled away from where his 
relatives lived (where headquarters of Mkuranga district is currently located). Mwanambaya 
literally means “bad boy”. He was called a bad boy as he did not want to live close to his 
relatives. But in the really sense, he decided to establish a new settlement somewhere he 
could have kept his goats without complaints of crop predatory from his neighbours. The 
name of the area he resided was also gradually changed from Kiloweko to Mwanambaya. A 
person’s nickname became the village’s name! Todate, Kiloweko represents one of the 7 
zonal areas within Mwanambaya village. 
 
Based on the historical background of M’baya and the fact that people have voted for him as 
their Chancellor, Mr. Jujukisi feels that has a big responsibility to work for people of M’baya 
and neighbouring villages that make up Tambani ward. Despite difficult challenges he 
sometimes face, he enjoys working for people’s social welfare and development. As the ward 
chancellor he was also involved in compensation process to ensure all parties affected by the 
gas pipeline (way-leave) project get their rights. Even during this interview he was working 
on the compensation claims by villagers who were affected by the implementation of one of 
the promised benefits (i.e. electrical transmission line) by SONGAS. 
 
In regard to the first experience of SONGAS project in the village, Mr. Jujukisi said that 
SONGAS came into the ears of M’baya villagers through rumour mongers after seeing an air 
survey plane frequently flying over their farmlands. A couple of months passed before the 
hired experts (SONGAS team) visited the village to introduce the project. The team identified 
all the affected parties in collaboration with the village leaders and ward officials. After a 
couple of months the prescribed list of assets and other types of losses to be compensated was 
made available to the affected parties without showing the applicable rates. Surprisingly, 
without informing what was following next, SONGAS sent a team of workers (contractor) to 
clear and mark the passage for the pipe wayleave. This triggered a lot of chaos and unrest 
situation in the village. The exercise was halted for weeks and continued after a series of 
meetings where the affected parties were informed about the amount of compensation 
allocated to everyone. From that day it took about 8 months for the affected parties to receive 
their compensation. SONGAS organised with the Postal Bank to visit the village and 
facilitate affected parties to open bank accounts in order to enable them bank their cheques 
right in the village. 
 
According to Jujukisi, majority of the affected parties were satisfied with the amount of 
compensation paid to them, though few expressed their dissatisfaction. As far as the process 
of compensation was concerned, people were not happy with the following aspects 
(shortcomings): 
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• Despite the SONGAS team to work in a collaborative way with the village and ward 
governments, their decisions on important aspects such as losses to be compensated and 
applicable rates remained top secret. Similarly, involvement of Affected parties in the 
entire process was very minimal (purely top-down). However, the village leaders share 
blames for not playing a key role to organise villagers, affected parties in particular to 
participate in the process. 
• The Affected parties who thought their losses were not adequately compensated received 
partial treatment. Two M’baya-based affected parties when expressed their 
dissatisfactions, were straightforward told to launch their complaints in the court of law, 
unlike to the 3 elite affected parties and renowned people who reside in Dar es Salaam 
city (40 km from M’baya) were given opportunity to negotiate and got paid more than 
what was indicated before. This left behind a number of unanswered questions among the 
affected parties based in M’baya. Many developed feelings that were undercompensated. 
 
However, in general views of Mr. Jujukisi, compensation process by SONGAS in M’baya 
village ended well and all affected parties got their compensation. As he went on comparing 
it with the past government experiences of paying compensation elsewhere in Tanzania, Mr. 
Jujukisi credited SONGAS for paying reasonable amounts of compensation to the affected 
parties. This enabled a good number of affected parties to improve their homes through 
upgrading roofs and/or walls of their houses. However, the affected parties lacked 
sensitization on how better they could have used their compensation. Majority of the affected 
parties never owned such big amount of money before, and were therefore overwhelmed and 
ended up spending them unwisely. He embarked on giving an example where some Affected 
parties bought TV sets and after a short while they changed their taste to something else and 
sold the TV sets for lower prices (less than half purchase price). He sadly mentioned the 
death of one of the affected parties who was invaded and murdered by bandits in the night. 
The murderers were looking for money and valuable assets the deceased bought in the 
previous day. 
 
He also pointed out both positive and negative aspects of the support SONGAS makes to 
community. From the beginning SONGAS promised to help M’baya community in 
education, electrification and water supplies projects. SONGAS donated TZS 49millions 
(21304.35 GBP) and 100 desks to the construction project of the ward-based secondary 
school (in 2007) and the village-based primary school (in 2006) respectively. Such support to 
community services has a big impact to people of M’baya in especially fostering forward 
their community development. It also creates and cements good relationship between the 
project and host villages. Mr. Jujukisi however, expressed a serious concern in regard to the 
implementation of some benefits. He had the following to tell:  
1. SONGAS promised to provide electrical transmission line in M’baya and free installation 
of electricity to 50 homes so long as their wiring system is approved by the electrical 
distribution agency (TANESCO). The implementation of this promise/benefit faced 2 
obstacles viz.  
• The contractor responsible for erecting electrical posts destroyed crops of villagers 
without following proper procedures (photo A). The project was suspended by the 
District Commissioner pending to the resolution of compensation claims and,  
• The way distribution of 50 application forms for free installation of electricity was 
done, it triggered enormous complaints from villagers, Affected parties in particular. 
He blamed the village leaders for not involving all villagers to set criteria of selecting 
the required 50 beneficiaries. 
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        Photo A: Affected farmer starring at his damaged coconut and orange trees in M’baya 
 
2. SONGAS also promised to drill a deep borehole to allow villagers, dispensary and 
primary school to access clean water services within shortest distance (< 1km) and in a 
convenient way (deep borehole should be installed with a pump). Contrary to that, the 
contractor hired by implementing agent (TANESCO) drilled a shallow borehole down the 
valley (cost saved was for the benefits of few), far from homes (about 2-3 km), 
dispensary and school (about 1.5-2.0 km). He added that workmanship embedded to the 
borehole is of poor quality (photo B). Once again this happened because of the 
weaknesses of village leaders. The big question here is what difference this borehole has 
made in the community? 
 
 
Photo B: A “finished deep borehole” in M’baya-as one of the promised benefits by SONGAS 
project 
 
3. The promise to improve and support the village-based dispensary so that it gets upgraded 
into a higher status (i.e. medical centre) is not yet fulfilled. But he further commented that 
Sun-drying of pieces of 
cassava, grasses around 
the borehole indicate the 
facility is not used. 
Remaining (stumps) of 
damaged coconut and 
orange trees 
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probably it is too early to judge that SONGAS has turned down. As these promises were 
not documented and signed as a formal agreement and owners and officials of SONGAS 
project keep on changing from time to time, there is a big worry of losing some of the 
promised benefits. 
 
Mr. Jujukisi concluded by pointing out that developers are willing to compensate the affected 
parties/communities adequately and are keen to forge good partnerships with local 
communities in various development issues. However, the regulatory bodies and elite people 
who attach themselves in the compensation processes and pretend to guide and help 
developers in persuading local communities/organisations always undermine the welfare of 
the affected parties. He verified his conclusion by giving evidences that whatever 
promise/benefit that was implemented by the developer was successful, but those 
implemented by contractors under supervision of intermediary agents ended up not delivering 
the required results.  
 
 
 
Emerging Issues 
• Affected parties involvement was intermittent (they only gathered to be informed 
about outcomes, decisions made and what would follow next). Top-down. 
• Partial treatment of Affected parties during compensation processes. 
• Confusion to villagers as number of actors keeps on increasing. For instance 
developer (SONGAS), benefit implementing agencies e.g. TANESCO, contractors 
and smart individual opportunists. 
• Lack of contractors’ guidelines affect their performance 
• Weaknesses among regulatory bodies including village leadership’s, 
implementing agencies, etc. undermine Affected parties/communities’ welfare in 
regard to compensation and benefit sharing. 
• Something good if not done in proper time, at a proper place, and in the proper 
way it may turn into a bad and useless thing. 
• Special training (seminars) to Affected parties on both how to keep safe and spend 
wisely their compensation has potentials of reducing risks of losing and misusing 
it. It would also reduce enhance security to Affected parties. 
• Good people-project relationship adds into sustainability of people’s livelihoods, 
project’s activities, environmental aspects and economic development. 
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Appendix 5.17: Key informant interview with Mzee Kizazikipya, M’baya 
 
Interview with Mr. Kizazikipya was held on 1st May 2007 to explore more about the way 
M’baya community has benefited from or/and lost to SONGAS project. 
 
Mzee Kizazikipya does not know precisely his age. However, using various historical events, 
he suspects his age to be any figure between 72 and 75. Mzee Kizazikipya has been a political 
leader for many years, serving in different positions from hamlet to district levels. He 
declared a complete retirement from politics, leadership in particular in June 2007. He has 
decided to take a rest fro politics and spend most of the time in his coconut farm. But he will 
not hesitate to advise young leaders and politicians on how to make good leadership. He 
talked so boldly. 
 
Mzee Kizazikipya did not wait for the question. Instead, he started by making an apology that 
him being a politician and a typical man from Coast region, he is privileged with talking. He 
first expressed his joy of retiring from politics ceremoniously (without been alleged of any 
sort of misconduct). He went on explaining that in the past era of single political party, both 
political and government leaders were committed in serving people, despite minimum level 
of popular participation in decision-making. He claimed the situation now with multiparty 
system is even more confusing as someone would have expected to see more democracy, 
increased participation in decision-making process and advancement in socio-economic 
welfare. According to his general assessment, almost everything diminishes as you go down 
to the village level from the national level. What is causing this deterioration seems to be a 
difficult question. However, smart politicians, leaders and experts always have prescribed 
answer (i.e. globalisation). He emotionally commented “Indeed it is simple and short answer 
but I hate this monster called globalisation and, I hate it most when is used as a scapegoat 
reason for every failures and difficulties faced in the development process”. He bitterly 
exclaimed “with all experts and learned people the nation has can’t we strategically position 
ourselves on safe places – which I suspect there are”. 
 
Responding to the principle question about benefits and costs the community of M’baya is 
experiencing with respect to SONGAS project, its compensation scheme in particular, he 
expressed the following remarks. SONGAS paid good amount of money to its Affected 
parties and most of them cherished with monetary compensation at the beginning, but 
gradually the Affected parties started realising the difference between the period before and 
after compensation. Despite getting good money (perhaps they never held before) not all lost 
values were compensated. He took an example of coconut as the main crop in M’baya and 
outlined its values from farmers’/local people’s perspective.  
 
• Food: coconut fruit provides cooking oil and is a unique additive used to flavour many 
dishes deliciously. 
• Beverage: coconut juice (dafu) and brew (tembo/mnazi) refresh local people at affordable 
prices. Availability of both drinks is very convenient with local environment (i.e. 
available all weather, all seasons throughout the year). 
• Employment: both young and adult people render their service as causal labourers during 
weeding and harvesting (wakwezi = climbers) and get paid. For weeding payment is 
always made in terms of cash while a harvester is paid 10% of all harvested coconut fruits 
(i.e. he takes 1 coconut fruit from every 10 fruits counted randomly). 
• Social values: ownership of coconut farm (kiunga) regardless of its size puts someone in a 
better position to command respect at both the household and community levels. In other 
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words coconut crop to people living in the coastal strip is a symbol of wealth and, if 
someone has at least 100 coconut trees is regarded as a rich person. 
• Cultural values: coconut farm to coastal people is the only valuable and inheritable asset 
that is passed to children (descendants). 
• Medicinal values: despite the ill-notion that coconut juice and brew cause lymphatic 
diseases and laziness to people, but to the best his knowledge, Mzee Kizazikipya claimed 
the coconut juice and brew (if taken in small-moderate amount) help to clear dysfunctions 
in kidneys and blood systems. For decades, the same coconut stuff has cushioned coastal 
communities including M’baya from diabetes. He added that the locally processed 
coconut oil (i.e mbata) when externally applied it prevents and cures a number of skin 
diseases on babies, children and adults. While smiling, he also mentioned about a mature 
coconut fruit that has fallen itself from top the tree (mdondo) is highly needed by 
traditional healers in treating various diseases including fortune.  
• Construction materials: coconut tree provides a highly valuable roofing material and more 
than 90% of rural coastal houses are roofed by coconut leaves. Similarly, luxurious, 
resting and entertainment places in urban areas and big/tourist hotels have at least one 
open building roofed with coconut leaves for purpose of increasing comfortability during 
hot sunny days. When coconut tree is yielding very small-sized coconut fruit (normally at 
the age >75 years) or hit by lightning or attacked by beetles has to be replaced and its 
stem gives good and strong poles. In recent days, people have started making quality 
furniture from coconut wood.  
• Source of income: Most of the above-mentioned values can be exchanged easily in 
monetary value and subsequently enable the owner to earn good income. 
 
It was not clear whether the computation of compensation considered the labour and time 
spent in raising a coconut tree to at least reach its maturity (13 – 18 years) and the loss of 
constant income someone used to accrue from every after 3 month harvests. Production time 
for coconut ranges between 75 – 80 years and can live up to 100 years. If one of the above 
criteria was adequately considered, compensation must have exceeded TZS 25000.00 (10.87 
GBP), the amount SONGAS paid per coconut tree. Mzee Kizazikipya is confident that most 
of the above outlined values of a coconut crop were not considered by experts who did 
valuation of losses and subsequent computation of compensation. 
 
In regard to the benefits received from SONGAS, especially supports to both primary and 
secondary schools, Mzee Kizazikipya expressed a sense of appreciation. He specifically 
pointed out that the support through education is a very good and effective way of 
distributing project benefits among community members. He however thought of the 
following aspects need attention: 
• Benefit sharing was supposed to be a written and signed agreement by both parties (i.e. 
the developer and village government). Village has rights to share benefits and not to beg 
and/or position themselves or by whoever in the receiving end and keep on waiting for 
supports/aids to be provided in the form of handouts.  
• Monitoring of the implementation of the promised benefits is not in place. As a result 
contractors hired by the developer to implement the benefits do things contrary to what 
was agreed upon between SONGAS and the village. He cited examples from M’baya, 
where villagers were not satisfied with the quality of the borehole. Both its hygiene and 
location still irritate people to-date. He also mentioned that the implementing agent 
(TANESCO) and its contractor diverted electrical transmission line searching for the 
shortest distance and causing serious damage to people’s permanent crops. The verbal 
agreement the village reached with SONGAS was to use the same pipeline way-leave 
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(passage) for transmitting electricity to the beneficiary village. However, TANESCO 
decided to cut down transmitting costs by shifting some costs to the poor villagers (i.e. 
again loss of land and permanent crops). 
 
 
 
Emerging Issues 
• Lack of commitment and creativity among both political and government leaders 
undermine rural people’s efforts towards development. 
• Benefit sharing is highly undermined by selfishness among leaders and intermediary 
agents. 
• Generally, levels of democracy, participation and development priorities decrease as 
from national level (urban areas) down to grassroots level (rural areas). 
• Like coconut crop to M’baya people, there are some assets/capitals they mean 
everything to affected parties’ livelihoods. A combination of different forms of 
compensation may provide helpful approach towards better outcomes. 
• Affected parties know most about the importance, values and benefits constantly 
flowing from the assets they own or work with everyday. Their participation in shaping 
the criteria for valuation and assessment of their losses is necessary. 
• In practice, it is not possible to exhaust all losses. The remaining uncompensated losses 
after active participation of affected parties in compensation process can be termed as 
sacrifice by affected parties. 
• Supports to community in terms of social services and promotion of community 
development have potentials in offsetting the affected parties’ sacrifice and 
community’s losses. 
• Joint planning, implementation and monitoring of compensation scheme and benefit 
sharing and minimise disputes and promote sustainability. 
• Both individual households and the community as whole suffered from losses caused by 
the project. However, the effect is more severe on the former than the later. 
• Sometime poverty among the affected parties is the main driver of their quick 
acceptance of little compensation offered which leads into a regret after a short while. 
This suggests importance of patience and negotiation. 
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Appendix 5.18: Key informant interview with Mr Kazi, Idete 
 
Interview with Mr. Kazi was held on 18th May to investigate more about the way Idete 
community benefit from the Social Funds and Contracts the village has entered with KVTC 
project. Interview also explored the losses incurred by villagers as a result of the teak 
project. 
 
Mr. Kazi was born in 1977 in Idete village and is married with 2 children. He is a secondary 
school form four leaver, knowledgeable young man and very critical to various issues 
happening around the village and other parts of the country as well. He is currently a rice 
farmer in his home village. 
 
In discussing about both the KVTC project and the compensation paid to the affected parties 
in Idete, Mr. Kazi explained that KVTC did not come to Idete in one day or one night but it 
was a process led by very smart people (“whom they call themselves experts”) from the 
district headquarters and other parts of the country. During meetings that were held to decide 
on the KVTC’s request for land, villagers were not provided with opportunity to discuss 
whatever has been agreed upon between the village executive committee and KVTC. Rather 
were more on information giving and “rubber stamp sort of forums”. In such meetings where 
foreign companies meet directly the rural poor people, both sensitisation and facilitation are 
necessary for bringing up the villagers to the common understanding of the agenda so that 
they can discuss and share their views with the rest of stakeholders.  
 
He gave a further example from the nearby village of Kisegesi. KVTC rented-in an acre land 
for 3 years for the purpose of establishing teak nursery beds. In the course of raising their 
seedlings they left some seedlings to grow into big trees, something signalled to the villagers 
that in future KVTC might resist returning back the land to the village. At the end of their 
tenure, villagers wanted their land back. However, KVTC negotiated with the village and 
bought it for TZS. 4millions. He exclaimed, “an acre (0.4ha) of land selling at TZS 4millions! 
How much Idete village has lost from its 7000ha taken by the same KVTC?! He went on 
commenting that Idete village was too fast at accepting the project and subsequently lost their 
opportunity for negotiating for the best deal”. 
 
Mr. Kazi sees the Social Fund (SF) remittances to villages as something carefully designed to 
use the non-affected majority villagers to silence the affected minority ones from claiming 
their primary rights in regard to livelihoods and development. He termed it as “divide and 
rule strategy”. He went on questioning “how can a village cherish at peanut benefits at the 
expense of its people’s livelihoods?” His concerned was TZS. 2million the village receives 
annually from KVTC as SF for community services and development is too small compared 
to amount of land taken. Further to that, it is too little compared to the village needs in terms 
of social services and development. Kazi equated the situation with a grown-up person who 
needs sticky porridge (ugali) and instead is given porridge (uji). He/she would not die but 
he/she will noticeably grow weak and weaker”. 
 
Additionally, he questioned the legitimacy of advocacy for exchange primary rights on land 
for compensation, the monster they don’t know well. Most of the affected parties did not 
know or even have a crude idea of compensation consequences. They did not know while 
they do not know precisely about the grew older many of his  
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Emerging Issues 
• Low level of both education and awareness among villagers, affected parties in 
particular bid disadvantage. 
• Negotiation is possible and has potentials of giving efficient compensation 
outcomes 
• Livelihood issues need careful and critical scrutiny and patience too. 
• Credibility of village leadership and participation of villagers is highly 
questionable! 
• Compensation of individual affected parties/households and community 
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Appendix 5.19: Key informant interview with Mzee Sitaki, Idete 
 
Interview with Mzee Sitakisitaki held on 20th June 2007, focused on land issues such as 
acquisition process by the teak project, compensation, shortage, land disputes and possibility 
of resolving them. 
 
Mzee Sitakisitaki moved to Idete and started his life there in 1979. He has a good record of 
historical events transpired in Idete during land transfer and acquisition processes. Currently, 
he works for KVTC as a field inspector responsible for guarding both farm boundaries and 
teak trees. He started by explaining that up to 1990, Idete had large areas of land lying idle 
and villagers enjoyed shifting cultivation freely. A big piece of land was firstly given to a 
company called MIFURA (1984) which later transformed rice farms into sugarcane 
plantation. This land now falls under jurisdiction of Namawala village government. Between 
1984 and 1991, a number of rich farmers such as Mr. Mwakifuna were also allocated land for 
rice cultivation. In 1991/92 more than 7000ha was given to KVTC and in 1993 the village 
government leaders approved the request by Idete Prisons to expand its boundaries. Village 
leaders signed an agreement with the Idete Prisons officials neither with villagers’ consent 
nor informing them.  
 
The KVTC land acquisition started and involved people from bottom-up and avoided areas 
that were used by villagers. The process went through the following steps: 
• 1990: KVTC submitted their request for land to the village government formally in and 
the village executive committee (VEC) met and passed it to village general assembly 
(VGA) for further scrutiny and discussion. 
• 1991: The majority in the VGA unanimously approved the request and the affected 
parties were among the people who voluntarily and willingly participated in showing 
where the boundary should be casted. The affected parties quickly made their decision in 
favour of KVTC as the company showed no interest to the valleys, the land most of the 
affected parties valued much because of their good soil fertility and maintenance of 
moisture content through the year. Affected parties also anticipated compensation from 
KVTC as well. 
• 1992: Experts from Ministry of Lands and District Offices teamed up with the village 
leaders to survey and mark the KVTC allocated land. 
• 1993: The village government convened another VGA to verify the areas allocated to 
KVTC and officially hand it over to the developer.  
 
In 1993, only 4 affected parties qualified for compensation as were having permanent crops 
but only 2 affected parties were compensated. It was not made clear to why the other 2 were 
not compensated. However, these 2 affected parties plus their relatives and friends whom 
they invited into the area were all (totalling to 12) in 2006 and requested to move out of 
KVTC land. KVTC hired the district valuer to estimate compensation for each affected 
parties and only permanent crops were involved in calculating the amount of compensation. 
Houses were of low quality thus were not considered. Most of these people are currently 
residing at Ndundu zone and few moved to neighbouring village. When they requested land 
allocation from the village government, they were told they have compensation money and 
should seek land for themselves within and outside the village. The village government was 
ready to find them land for the fee of TZS. 10000.00 (4.35 GBP) per acre, but none went for 
it. 
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In regard to affected parties’ complaints that soon after compensation they were restricted 
from harvesting their crops and tilling the valley lands that KVTC promised from the 
beginning, Mzee Sitakisitaki had the following to say. KVTC did not direct that to happen but 
the causal labourers worked for different KVTC’s contractors lobbed the affected parties’ 
crops. As far as valley lands are concerned in 2005 KVTC established a system of allowing 
farmers to use the valleys free of charge by applying every year using special application 
forms obtained from KVTC or village government offices. He pointed out the 
misconceptions that surround this problem being the inefficiencies and limitations of this 
arrangement as outlined below:  
1) affected parties not given priority of tilling their former valleys  
2) availability and processing of application forms are not done in time, 
3) village leaders are not paying adequate cooperation in this matter and, 
 
Discussing land shortage, Mzee Sitakisitaki blamed both the village government leaders and 
villagers for not protecting their village land. He pinpointed the ignorance and personal 
interests as main drivers of land shortage in Idete. In terms of what should be done to reduce 
the problem, he suggested the following:- 
1) In the northern part of the village across KVTC land (22km from the village) lays a 
very big strip of land that belongs to village. This exists between KVTC land, Iyovo 
forest reserve, Mr. Mtande’s farm, Prison’s farm and beacon no. 380. KVTC should 
think of adjusting its boundary to take this land and return its equivalent size of land it 
is holding now in its boundary with the village. This will allow farmers to regain 
some of the nearby valleys. 
2) KVTC, village government and the former owner of the valley lands have a joint 
planning forum to improve the current arrangement of using this type of lands. 
3) The village should recover land that was freely allocated to individuals and has not 
been used adequately and/or efficiently. 
 
 
 
Emerging Issues 
• Series of events and agreements are neither documented nor kept and are not 
known to many villagers of Idete. 
• Leaders lack commitment to serve and help the people they lead 
• KVTC has a responsibility for enacting guidelines to ensure its contractors 
conduct themselves properly while undertaking their assignments in the field. 
• Since compensation done for 14 affected parties was paid in 2006, was supposed 
to follow the Village Land Act no. 5 of 1999. Losses of land, non-permanent 
crops, etc. deserved full compensation. 
• Establish a kind of partnership between the project developer, villagers, and 
village government authority to manage the use of valleylands. 
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Appendix 5.20: Key informant interview with Mzee King, Idete 
 
Interview with Mzee King held on 11th May 2007 aimed at exploring about different 
compensation schemes by different projects that happened in Idete village, with the view of 
focusing the study on the targeted project case study (KVTC project). It also informed the 
study the general and practical matters that facilitated the selection of household case studies 
and important issues to focus on. 
 
Mzee King is 62 years old and a permanent resident of Idete village since 1978. He worked 
with different government parastatals for more than 20 years, before he retired on medical 
grounds. Although Mzee King has not been involved in compensation before, he witnessed 3 
compensation schemes by different development projects in Idete namely, Kihansi-Kidatu 
power transmission line project (by TANESCO/SIEMENS); Church construction project (by 
Catholic Church) and Teak plantation project (by KVTC). The afore-mentioned projects were 
all discussed by comparing and contrasting them in order to have information that would 
enable to draw the boundary of this study, how to select household cases in particular. It was 
also meant also to explore how to learn from compensation experience and performance of 
the first 2 projects without disrupting the focus of studying KVTC as the project case study. 
Compensation schemes by all 3 projects had different approaches and the following were 
expressed by Mzee King as noticeable matters of concern. 
 
According to Mzee King, compensation scheme which is open, transparent, participatory, and 
has no intermediary agents (persons) stands a better chance to satisfy its affected parties in 
terms of compensation rates and implementation. According to Mzee King, this was proved 
true by TANESCO/SIEMENS project. About 20 affected parties were compensated and most 
of them utilised their compensation money in obtaining new homes and improving their 
houses. No complaints were heard as the affected parties were allowed to cultivate rice, 
maize and other non-permanent crops on their former lands, now under the high voltage 
transmission line. Moreover, this project provides continuous benefits to the community by 
paying TZS. 50000.00 per electrical post per year to the village government of Idete for 
guarding the transmission infrastructures. Idete village guards a total of 12 electrical posts.  
 
The Catholic Diocese of Mahenge asked its church members to volunteer into giving land for 
church construction project with the promise of compensating them. 6 church members gave 
part of their lands and the following happened. Out of 6, only one had a house constructed for 
him (as his compensation) using building materials remained from the main church 
construction. For the other 5 members, each received less than 50% of the promised cash 
compensation by instalments over couple of years. Some even reached a point of refusing to 
take little instalment payments. Mzee King went on explaining that complains exist that the 
Church has kept on extending the boundary inside the lands of its land donors. This however, 
has turned into a serious and complicated land dispute between the descendants of land 
donors and the Church leaders and members (the Church). As all the above agreements were 
done by word of mouth and no documented records were kept, the affected parties are losers.  
 
According to Mzee King, since the introduction of KVTC project in 1990, signs of causing 
serious land problems were seen from different standpoints shown by their district leaders. 
However, the project used intermediary persons to convince village leaders and influential 
villagers using propaganda and promises of benefits of different natures which some have 
been realised and others have remained promises to-date. The project lobbied within the 
government machinery at both district and national levels in order to acquire land from the 
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village. Mzee King pointed out that during both processes of acquiring land and 
compensation, the project dealt most with village leaders with very minimum involvement of 
the affected parties. This left the majority (>75%) of affected parties uncompensated. Another 
serious concern came when the project drove village leaders into signing a number of 
contracts that are neither known to villagers nor to the affected parties. He added that benefits 
accrued from these contracts are too small compared to losses by individuals and a 
community at large. A good number of affected parties who could not secure land within the 
village decided to shift into the neighbouring villages. 
 
He concluded by a serious concern that “if compensation means what I happened to see, it is 
therefore a robbery of people’s land and resources. Hence it is a serious problem”. 
 
 
 
Emerging Issues 
• Different approaches to compensation by different projects in the same village. 
• Involvement of affected parties smoothen the compensation process and promotes 
• Continuous community-based benefits have potentials for sustainability. 
• Documentation of agreed bits and pieces made between parties was done. 
• Compensation is a challenging problem. 
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Appendix 5.21: Key informant interview with Mzee Mtafutaji, Idete 
 
Interview with Mzee Mtafutaji was held on 1st May 2007 to explore general issues pertaining 
to introduction of teak project in Kilombero valley, KVTC’s land acquisition process, 
KVTC’s compensation scheme, affected Parties, gains and losses by villagers. It also 
informed the study the general and practical matters that facilitated the selection of 
household case studies and important issues to focus on. 
 
Mzee Mtafutaji is almost 60. He is a forester by profession and a civil servant working with 
the local government in Kilombero district. Despite his advanced age, Mzee Mtafutaji likes 
fieldwork as he is one of the 4 contractors commissioned by Kilombero Valley Teak 
Company Ltd (KVTC) to undertake some activities on behalf of the company. To KVTC, 
Mzee Mtafutaji has different and unique reputation compared to other contractors as he 
participated and guided the team that undertook feasibility studies in different places in the 
country including Kilombero valley in 1991. He also worked hand in hand with KVTC in the 
processes of land acquisition at the ministry level and in both districts of Kilombero and 
Ulanga. 
 
As far as land acquisition is concerned, Mzee Mtafutaji pointed out that KVTC did not violate 
any laws in place by then. Despite of lobbying that was done at different levels of the 
government systems, KVTC went through the process of informing all villages about its 
request of land for the proposed teak plantations. After all most of lands fell under state 
ownership and only about 15% of total land acquired by KVTC in 1991 was in use by 
villagers and shifting cultivation dominated the farming practices in the area. He also 
mentioned the problems he spotted among village leaders and villagers were ignorance and 
lack of organisation towards understanding more about both the benefits and costs of the 
proposed project by then. According to his analysis local people were quickly overwhelmed 
by benefits promised by KVTC. He also recalled and mentioned some district leaders who 
were against the project but villagers did not support their ideas. 
 
In regard to the distribution of project benefits and costs, Mzee Mtafutaji pointed out that 
KVTC’s developer has been more than responsible and keen in helping village communities 
and not the affected individual households. From the beginning, KVTC had a thought that 
monetary compensation would not be helpful to the affected parties as compared to 
community services. KVTC therefore devised a mechanism of funding host villages in order 
to improve social services through special agreements that established social funds calculated 
based on the land size planted teak in each village. 
 
Later on in 2005/06 when KVTC decided to compensate the affected parties in Idete and 
Namawala villages, few (<20) qualified for compensation and it was felt by many that 
compensation paid was little compared to the losses. When asked whether the paid 
compensation was adequate and fair, Mzee Mtafutaji exclaimed “how someone could get fair 
compensation in the situation where mechanisms and systems for guiding compensation 
processes were lacking”. He went on mentioning specific two affected parties in Idete village 
who received large amount of money and though was adequate but after a lapse of time they 
realised was not, especially in the process of acquiring alternative land. From year 2000, 
KVTC has been requesting for more land from the same villages in both districts 
unsuccessfully. Some villages such as Mavimba need compensation to be paid first for their 
land previously taken, prior to the start of negotiation for the new request for land extension. 
Mzee Mtafutaji commented that slowly people are getting to know the long term effects of 
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the project such as land shortage and disputes in the village. Despite land disputes among 
individuals/households, he admitted existence of unresolved land conflicts between KVTC 
and other organisations (Idete Prison and Selous Game Reserve). 
 
Operating as a KVTC contractor, Mzee Mtafutaji is responsible for maintaining roads, 
clearing pristine forests, planting teak, weeding, scaring destructive animals (baboons) and 
pruning young teak trees. When he started working, operations and things were running 
smoothly and invoices were paid promptly. He complained things to have changed (i.e. 
amount of work has increased while payment to have remained the same) and subsequently 
causing labourers’ wage to go down. The most worst than all is the delay in effecting 
payments done by KVTC. He stressed this to have had serious negative impacts of causal 
labourers who expect their wages to be paid on daily basis. Frequent failures in paying 
labourers in time has demoralised them and now contractors have opted to bring new 
labourers from outside the project villages. He also suspected grudges might be building up 
among the resident youths against the non-residents who sell their labour cheaply. 
 
 
 
 
Emerging Issues 
• Land acquisition processes involved lobbying at all levels (i.e. village, district 
and central governments) 
• In early stages seemed there were kind of discussions about the project but was 
dominated by ignorance (lack of information); overwhelmed by positive 
promises (wealth effect); were not well facilitated and; villagers were not 
organised. 
• The 1050 ha (15%) of land (7000ha) taken by KVTC from Idete was under 
cultivation (shift cultivation) by villagers – deserved compensation. 
• Community services versus individual monetary compensation (Good idea but 
unfair for the land losers!) 
• Mechanisms and systems for guiding compensation process lacked and hence 
unfair compensation was implemented. 
• Land shortage and subsequent disputes exist between KVTC and villagers, Idete 
Prisons and Selous game reserve. 
• Reduced payment per piece of work and delayed payment are factors affecting 
KVTC-Contractors-Labourers relationships. 
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Appendices 5.22 – 5.26: Focus group discussions 
 
Appendix 5.22: Focus group discussion with youth in M’baya village 
 
Focus group discussion was held with six young people aged between 18 and 35 to explore 
from youth perspective the way Mwanambaya (M’baya) community has benefited and lessons 
learned from both compensation and benefit schemes by SONGAS project. 
 
The youth group discussed positively about SONGAS project since the developer entered 
their village. They acknowledged efforts done by the project developer in information 
dissemination among villagers, consultation done with different leaders, compensation paid 
to the affected parties and fulfilment of benefits promised. However, they pointed out causes 
to shortcomings appeared during and after compensation as follows:- 
• Some household faced delays in receiving their compensation payments as their farms 
obtained through inheritance were jointly owned by a number of family members and 
in many cases from different households. Such situations caused complicated 
ownership problems that needed time to resolve and involved different organs. 
• Some household received little portion of compensation paid that was generally 
regarded as undercompensation. However in real sense was the matter about who had 
more rights in the jointly owned farms and therefore intra-household distribution of 
compensation. 
• Some compensation beneficiaries lost their compensation money following lack of 
plans on how better they could have used their compensation. Some household heads 
did not want to involve their wives and other family members and ended up spending 
the money for needs that were not a priority of the household. In this regard, the youth 
participants also mentioned perhaps advisory services or seminars on “better ways of 
keeping, handling and using your compensation money” could have minimised this 
problems if were provided before compensation is paid. 
 
Regarding benefits gained from the SONGAS project the youth at M’baya had discussed the 
following aspects:- 
• Project developers should know that have a big role to play in improving community 
services so as to promote development in host communities. And governments in 
developing countries should put this point clear across all investors and project 
developers. As local people’s resources are used in one way or another by their 
project activities and in some places local people’s access to and right to use natural 
resources become limited, there is need for compensation be paid at community level 
and this should be through community services and development. 
• According to participants, M’baya community could have benefited more from 
SONGAS project if villagers were organised and having a single say on various 
issues. Lack of cooperation among affected parties, community members and between 
villagers and their village leaders provided opportunities for elites/intruders to benefit 
from both compensation and benefit schemes. 
• They also emphasized need of documenting all agreements such as promises, pledges, 
benefits and important decisions to minimise potential disputes and loss of benefits 
likely to happen because of changes of office bearers and project ownership. The 
suggestion also was discussed as potentially effective way of ensuring benefit 
implementation follows what was agreed upon by the concerned parties. 
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• They finally remarked that nature of impacts of projects should be known early and be 
evaluated in relation to the conditions available at the host community in order to 
avoid adverse implications on people’s livelihoods, especially when the project causes 
local people to lose their farmlands. They insisted that whatever benefits gained from 
the project would turn into a net loss as land is a necessary livelihood asset for rural 
communities. 
 
 
 
Emerging Issues 
• Cultural values can complicate issues of ownership and compensation entitlements 
• Involvement of household members in planning and setting household priorities leads 
into wise use of compensation payments. 
• Joint actions by villagers and their leaders have potential successes in influencing 
higher level decisions in favour of community interests. 
• Intermediary agencies as intruders, elites, implementing agency and contractors can 
potentially reduce compensation payments and other benefits meant for the affected 
parties/host communities if community members are not organised. 
• Compensation payments at community level can possibly be done through 
community services and support to community-based development activities. 
• Documentation of all important decisions and agreements has potentials of 
minimising compensation and other likely future disputes. 
• Land remains as necessary rural livelihood asset thus careful decisions are required in 
exchanging it with compensation payments. 
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Appendix 5.23: Focus group discussion with people affected by TANESCO’s electrical 
distribution project in M’baya village 
 
Focus group discussion was held with some of the parties, affected by the implementation of 
electrical distribution scheme which was one of the benefits promised by the developer of 
SONGAS project in M’baya village. 
 
The participants started by making a distinction between their compensation dispute and the 
compensation scheme by the developer of SONGAS project that was implemented between 
1997 and 1999. They clearly pointed out that the on-going compensation dispute was caused 
by the implementation of one of the benefits promised by the developer of SONGAS project 
to M’baya community. The developer promised to provide 100 desks for M’baya primary 
school, installation of electrical transmission line in the village, construction of a deep 
borehole and improvement of the village-based dispensary services. Implementation of the 
installation of electrical transmission line across the village caused significant damage to 
villagers’ crops and other properties. Things were worse when the affected parties learned 
that there were no signs of receiving compensation for the encountered losses. 
 
According to participants, nothing was wrong with an electrical transmission line as 
important service to the community as a benefit, but its implementation ignored the affected 
people and their properties. No involvement of any sort was done, as the affected parties 
received no information before or even during crop clearances for passage of electrical 
transmission line. Both implementing agency (TANESCO) and the hired contractors did not 
involve village leaders. Participants’ response to why the village government was not 
involved or consulted was because of lack of accountability among village leaders, as they 
have failed even to call for village meetings. They claimed that outsiders use the same 
weaknesses and lack of cooperation among villagers to perpetuate their interests. 
 
The participants complained that the approach used was quite different from the one used by 
the developer (SONGAS project to acquire a way-leave for the gas pipeline and was going to 
impoverish them. The electrical transmission line affected 26 households that lost their crops 
such as coconut, orange and mango trees. The crops destructed largely contributed to their 
food security, household incomes and helped them to cater for school and health needs of 
their family members. Participants cautioned that compensation payments should take a 
number of factors into consideration. They gave an example from a permanent crop that a 
coconut tree can benefit a farmer and his descendants for a hundred years. Therefore, 
whatever compensation to be paid would not offset losses encountered. 
 
It was reported that as the demand for compensation halted the implementation, the District 
Commissioner intervened and it was further learned that the district authorities also were 
neither informed nor involved. The four joint meetings chaired by the District Commissioner 
and attended by officials from SONGAS project, implementing agency (TANESCO), the 
contractor, district, ward and village leaders and the affected parties revealed/deliberated on 
the following:- 
 
• SONGAS as a developer paid the money for both benefit implementation and 
compensation payments as it was done in the communities of Rufiji district. 
• Both TANESCO and contractors approached wrongly the matter and TANESCO 
promised to pay compensation for the caused damage. 
 
 Paul Mtoni  Cranfield University, 2010 
 
324
The damages were assessed but during the focus group discussion, the participants showed 
that the processes of preparing their compensation payments were taking so long without 
feedbacks. It was further noted that affected parties were desperately tired of waiting. When 
this discussion was going on, there were rumours that their compensation payments are ready 
and can be disbursed at any time. 
 
 
 
 
Emerging Issues 
• If benefits are not carefully implemented can trigger complicated disputes 
• Intermediary agencies (i.e. implementing agency and contractors) have proved to be 
sources of disputes/conflicts  
• Settlement of compensation disputes should include involvement of affected parties 
and community-based joint action. 
• Village leaders have a vital role to play in both development and compensation issues. 
• Communication that involves feedback giving reduces misunderstandings and conflicts 
among parties. 
• Determination of fair compensation is very challenging as it needs to consider various 
aspects involved in losses encountered by affected parties. 
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Appendix 5.24: Focus group discussion with youth in Idete village 
 
Focus group discussion with 6 young men and two young ladies aged between 18 and 35 to 
explore from youth perspective the way Idete community has benefited from both social and 
contractual funds provided by KVTC’s teak project since 2003 todate. 
 
Social fund and contractual payments paid annually by the developer of SONGAS project 
were both reported by the youth participants as the only dependable sources of revenue for 
Idete village. The Idete community has used the provided assistance to improve community-
based services and also for development purposes. The following were discussed in regard to 
Social fund and Contractual payments. 
 
Social Fund: 
Social funds are paid based on the land area of planted teak by KVTC and on average basis 
Idete receives about TZS 3.8m in every year. The funds are used to improve community 
services such as education, health, road and other infrastructures. Participants pointed out that 
social funds have had big impact in improving education in particular construction of 
classrooms and provision of books and equipment in both primary and secondary schools in 
their village. However, based on huge losses (loss of land and soil fertility) encountered by 
Idete villagers, the youth group suggested social funds be increased in order to offset the 
losses. 
 
Contractual payments: 
Idete village leadership has entered eight service based contracts with the developer of KVTC 
teak project. The contracts include land clearance for teak planting; protection of project 
acquired land; protection and clearing borders of project lands; keeping fire out of teak 
plantation; keeping fire out of natural forests; fight against illegal timber logging; fight 
against illegal wildlife hunting (poaching) and; preparation of monthly reports. The developer 
pays the wages for all labourers involved in the implementation of all contracts through their 
village authority and on top of that the contractual bonus (TZS 1.4m) is paid to the village for 
development activities annually. The participants showed that contractual payments are good 
sources of revenue for both the village government and villagers at Idete as they benefit from 
bonus and wage payments respectively. The following were identified as shortfalls regarding 
the above mentioned contracts. 
• Contracts were prepared by the developer’s side only. One of the participants 
commented that contracts were brought to village authority like newspapers. The 
other party (the village leaders were not involved at all. Local govt regulations require 
the WEO/WC or Sub-district Secretary to assist villages in the process of entering in 
different agreements with parties. Surprisingly KVTC’s developer did not follow 
these regulations and village authority did not either. 
• Contracts have not been reviewed for many years now. 
 
Other benefits: 
The youth participants reported other benefits accrued from KVTC teak project include the 
following: 
i. Employment has been providing both individuals and households with extra income 
earned during off-farm seasons. However contractors acting between KVTC and 
labourers have maximised their profit at the expense of the intended preferential 
employment gains. Contractors were also reported to have been causing problems to 
labourers as many have no capital for their operations. Instead contractors have been 
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depending on KVTC’s payments to pay for all costs and this has been causing 
frequent delays in paying wages to labourers. 
ii. Frequent support to schools in terms of food, school uniforms and writing materials 
has helped the orphan pupils to obtaining education. 
iii. Both the seminars and bulletin called “SIMCHEZO” provided by KVTC have helped 
to raise awareness on environmental issues and campaigns against spread of 
HIV/AIDS disease. 
 
In regard to distribution of benefits between the affected and non-affected community 
members, the participants claimed it to be difficult exercise, but pointed out that most of the 
above listed benefits are service oriented at community level, all community members have 
equal chance of benefiting. They however, mentioned some leadership weaknesses such 
excessive powers the village leaders have affect planning, implementation and monitoring of 
development activities funded by finances from both the social fund and contractual 
arrangements.  
 
 
 
 
Emerging Issues 
• Both social funds and contractual payments have potential ways of compensating 
community-based losses. 
• Project gains channelled through community-based services have potentials for 
equitable distribution of benefits among community members. 
• Benefits provided on annual basis to the affected parties/communities show an aspect 
of continuity and hence sustainability 
• Examples of social funds and contractual payments (bonus) show that agreements in 
compensation schemes are necessary. 
• Intermediary agencies acting between the developer and affected parties/communities 
such as contractors tend to reduce benefits intended for affected parties. 
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Appendix 5.25: Focus group discussion with people affected by TANESCO/SIMENS’ 
electrical distribution project in Idete village 
 
Focus group discussion was held with parties who were affected and compensated by 
TANESCO/SIMENS’ electrical distribution project in Idete village. The discussion focused 
on the steps involved during compensation and the main issues and outcomes that came out 
following compensation. 
 
The participants pointed out that both the land survey and clearance started without 
notification been served to the affected parties and many did not exactly know what was 
going on in relation to their affected farmlands and other assets. Participants also reported 
that they were surprised that for whatever questions they asked, both the project’s and 
contractor’s staff responded by mentioning “compensation” as a solution for all problems to 
be caused by the project.  
 
The survey started 1997 and compensation was paid to the affected parties in December 
1998. The participants reported lack of involvement as government leaders dominated the 
process. The district government authorities supervised an entire compensation process and 
compensation was paid using government rates. Compensation was paid for the losses of 
permanent crops, trees and structures. It was however reported that some affected parties did 
not receive payment notification letters and were not in the payment list on political grounds. 
This led the affected parties to receive little compensation (deliberate undercompensation) 
which were not equal to losses caused.  
 
It was generally discussed that the affected parties faced unnecessary delays in receiving their 
compensation payments and they had to make several follow ups that ended up reducing their 
compensation amounts. Another form of undercompensation was experienced by affected 
parties who were completely relocated and whose their permanent crops were at their early 
stages of growth, as their losses were not properly estimated. Few affected parties who did 
not accept their compensation estimations were called for negotiation and finally all managed 
to secure good compensation payments. Most of the affected parties used their compensation 
payments to improve their homes/houses, some bought farmlands and some invested in 
farming activities.  
 
According to participants, people affected by this project count themselves as losers in many 
respects including undercompensation. Comparing their experience and the nearby village 
(Mbingu village) said unlike to Idete, the government leaders in Mbingu village helped and 
supported their villagers and therefore received compensation payments that satisfied them. 
They claimed that during compensation process in Idete, majority of the affected parties did 
not know where to go for help. 
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Emerging Issues 
• Developers and intermediary agencies (i.e. implementing agency and contractors) 
wrongly assume compensation as a remedy for all losses 
• Excessive involvement of the central government authorities has negative effects on 
involvement of the affected parties in compensation processes. 
• Village leaders have a big role to play in dealing with development and 
compensation issues. 
• Negotiation has great potentials for conflict resolution in compensation. 
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Appendix 5.26: Focus group discussion with people affected by the Catholic Church 
project in Idete village 
 
Discussion was held with a group of people at Idete village affected by the Catholic Church 
project to learn the way compensation scheme was planned and implemented and its 
implications. 
 
The participants claimed that in September 2006, the church officials counted assets 
including crops for compensation that they never paid todate. The valuation did not involve 
village or district authority and there were no formal documentation of both losses 
encountered and compensation payments provided to few. Following an increase of tensions 
and disputes between the church officials and affected parties the village government leaders 
were brought in to resolve land and compensation disputes. The discussants claimed that the 
village authority did not do it by the reason that can not interfere with church affairs. 
Although it was learned from the discussion that the affected parties hesitated to take any 
further actions based on spiritual grounds, but it was further learned that many affected 
parties do neither know their rights nor where to go for help (further actions). 
 
According to the participants, the affected parties received part of their compensation through 
different ways including their personal relationships with the church leaders. Payments were 
neither lump sum nor instalments but were done through demands. Few were asked to search 
for plots somewhere else and the church paid for them. Depending on the pressing need an 
affected party has, the priest in-charge used to pay TZS 5000/=; 10,000/= or 20,000/= as 
compensation for losses of fruit and other timber trees. It appeared that exact amount of 
compensation for each affected party was neither unknown nor set. It was determined by 
his/her needs and made available through difficult process full of bureaucracy. Some of the 
affected parties died without receiving their compensation payments. It was reported that one 
of the affected parties decided to go to court and hearing of his case is still continuing. One 
affected party resisted to relocate until he receives his compensation. He was the only one 
who received the highest monetary compensation (TZS 100,000/=) through instalments in a 
period more than a year. 
 
 
 
 
Appendices 5.27 – 5.29: Land and benefits information in the studied village cases 
 
 
Emerging Issues 
• Early planning is one of the necessary steps in compensation scheme preparation  
• Documentation is a tool that avoids and helps in resolution of disputes in during 
compensation. 
• Early involvement of affected parties and their village government leaders in all 
compensation processes is as important as it minimises disputes. 
• Need for faith-based institutions/organisations to observe and adhere to both 
administrative and legal frameworks. 
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Appendix 5.27: Causes and consequences of land shortage at M’baya village 
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Appendix 5.28: Causes and consequences of land shortage at Idete village 
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Appendix 5.29: Photographs showing promised borehole and traditional well at M’baya 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The “zebra” painted structure is the 
finished shallow water borehole that 
was promised as a deep borehole for 
M’baya villagers. The contractor 
located the borehole far from people’s 
settlement (2-3 km), in the valley 
where the water table is high to save 
the costs on his/her side. Water 
fetchers, mostly women have found it 
difficult to climb uphill terrain with 
their buckets of water. They also 
explained that its location is unsafe for 
women to fetch water early in morning 
or late in the evenings, as are afraid of 
snakes and rape. 
Despite of the location, many 
respondents complained about poor 
workmanship as it can be seen from the 
top view of the borehole. They claimed 
that the developer promised a deep 
borehole with an electrical pump 
installed inside it. But the contractor 
used curvets to make shallow water 
well, open for water fetchers to use a 
rope and bucket to fetch water. The 
borehole is not used frequently as it can 
be proved by one farmer who decided 
to sun dry his/her pieces of cassava as 
caught by the camera on the day of the 
visit. 
For conveniences, most of the 
villagers prefer to use their old nearby 
traditional water wells (as shown in 
the photo) for washing and cleaning 
purposes. Cooking and drinking water 
is fetched from a deep boreholes 
drilled by the government which is 
located at the village dispensary. 
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Appendix 5.30: Checklist for interviews and discussions held with household cases 
 
A: Visit One: (Discussion on development project, community and household matters) 
1) What development projects currently operate in your village? 
2) What can you generally say about these projects? 
3) What specific things can you say about SONGAS gas project (for M’baya)/KVTC 
teak project (for Idete)? 
4) What have been the “good and bad outcomes” and that happened as a result of 
gas/teak project? 
a) List the main good (benefits) and bad (costs) outcomes and rank them 
b) How important are they in your daily life (at household and community levels)? 
c) What are good indicators that show these outcomes do exist in your community? 
d) How are they distributed among community members? Who benefits/loses more 
than others? 
e) Is there any special consideration given to individuals/households affected by the 
project in terms of benefit maximisation or loss minimisation? 
f) What is the current status (increase/decrease) for the outcome ranked 1st, 2nd and 
3rd? What reasons can be associated with their increase/decrease? 
g) What is your future prediction on the statuses of these outcomes? 
 
B: Visit Two: (Discussion on matters related to affected households, compensation 
received and household/community well-being) 
1) What can you generally say about the compensation scheme by gas/teak project? 
2) What losses were you compensated for? 
3) What type of compensation did you receive for your losses? 
4) How this compensation was arrived at (process and decision)? 
5) What came out as questions or big issues of concern in this compensation scheme? 
6) What was the response to these questions/issues? Were you satisfied by these 
responses? If not, what did you do? 
7) Did the compensation payment cover all your losses? If not, which losses do you 
think were not adequately compensated? 
8) Considering other benefits the community/individual households receive, can you say 
the compensation was relatively reasonable? (Explain you answer) 
9) Can you distinguish which benefits and losses are/were specific to individual 
households and community at large? 
10) How best could the affected individuals, households and the community be 
compensated for losses encountered as a result of a development project? 
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C: Visit Three: (Analysis and discussion on changes happened on assets/stocks and 
service flows before and after compensation (during project) 
 
Category Values Values 
 
Land 
related 
Settlement (land for home creation) Recreation and aestheticism (spaces, 
natural landscapes, climate, …) 
Cultivation (agricultural land) Minerals 
Livestock keeping (grazing lands) Knowledge (creation and transfer) 
Cultural heritage (archeological, historical, 
burial and ritual sites) 
Bequest 
 
 
Forest 
related 
Forests Air quality 
Hunting and gathering (meat, insects, honey, 
fruits, mushrooms, vegetables, …) 
Climate regulation 
Materials (fuelwood, charcoal, timber, poles, 
fibres, thatching grass, herbs, …) 
Conservation (forets, wildlife and 
habitats) 
Forest grazing Knowledge (creation and transfer) 
Watershed or water catchments Bequest 
Recreation, leisure and aestheticism  
 
 
Water 
related 
Clean and safe water for human consumption Fishes 
Clean and safe water for livestock consumption Navigation 
Water for irrigation Recreation, leisure and aestheticism 
Water other uses  
 
 
 
Others 
Food Freedom and respect 
Shelter Production time, occupation and 
job/employment matters 
Clothes Market and trade 
Health Physical assets (ownership and security) 
Education Life security and peace of mind 
Social relations, interactions and networks Physical security and safety issues 
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Appendix 6.1: Graphs showing improved lines of fit for the linear regression tests 
 
 
Figure 6.2b: Improved line of fit for the perceived loss of household annual income and 
compensation received at M’baya-paid by SONGAS project in 1997 
 
 
Figure 6.3b: Improved line of fit for the perceived loss of household annual income and 
compensation received at Idete-paid by KVTC project in 2006 
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Figure 6.4b: Improved line of fit for the calculated total household loss and compensation 
received at M’baya-paid by SONGAS project in 1997 
 
 
 
Figure 6.5b: Improved line of fit for the calculated total household loss and compensation 
received at Idete-paid by KVTC project in 2006 
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Figure 6.6b: Improved line of fit for the calculated total loss against perceive income loss in 
M’baya village 
 
 
Figure 6.7b: Improved line of fit for calculated total loss against perceive income loss in Idete 
village 
 
Appendices 6.2 – 6.4: Correlation matrices 
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Appendix 6.2: Correlation matrix for variables associated with household losses caused by development project in M’baya village 
 
Variables 
Age of HH 
head 
(years) 
Household 
size 
(N) 
Number of 
male 
people in a 
HH (N) 
Household 
workforce  
per ha 
(N/ha) 
Land 
owned by 
the  HH 
(ha) 
Land loss 
(ha) 
Land 
occupancy 
(years) 
Value of 
annual 
crops 
(TZS/ton) 
Value of 
permanent 
crops 
(TZS/ton) 
Perceived 
loss of HH 
income 
(TZS/ha/yr) 
Intangible 
losses 
(relative 
weight ‘N’) 
Perceive 
benefits 
(relative 
weight ‘N’) 
Amount of 
compensati
on paid 
(TZS) 
Age of 
household 
head (years) 
Pearson correlation  1       0.440* 0.448** -0.380*    
Sig. (2-tailed)        0.04 0.007 0.018    
N 60       22 35 38    
Household 
size (N) 
Pearson correlation   1 0.761**   0.443**   0.513** 0.520**  0.314* 0.545** 
Sig. (2-tailed)   0.000   0.005   0.002 0.001  0.015 0.002 
N  60 60   38   35 38  60 30 
Number of 
male people in 
the HH (N) 
Pearson correlation   0.761** 1 0.332*  0.390* 0.390*   0.404*  0.355**  
Sig. (2-tailed)  0.000  0.010  0.016 0.02   0.012  0.005  
N  60 60 60  38 38   38  60  
Household 
workforce  
per ha (N/ha) 
Pearson correlation    0.332* 1 -0.332*        0.501** 
Sig. (2-tailed)   0.010  0.012        0.005 
N   60 60 60        30 
Land owned 
by the HH 
(ha) 
Pearson correlation     -0.332* 1        0.457* 
Sig. (2-tailed)    0.012         0.011 
N    60 60        30 
Land loss 
(ha) 
Pearson correlation   0.443** 0.390*   1    0.619**  -0.544** 0.454* 
Sig. (2-tailed)  0.005 0.016       0.000  0.001 0.012 
N  38 38   38    38  38 30 
Land 
occupancy 
(years) 
Pearson correlation    0.390*    1  0.5.03** 0.354**    
Sig. (2-tailed)   0.02      0.002 0.002    
N   38    38  35 38    
Value of 
annual crops 
(TZS/ton) 
Pearson correlation  0.440*       1      
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.04             
N 22       22      
Value of 
permanent 
crops 
(TZS/ton) 
Pearson correlation  0.448** 0.513**     0.503**  1 0.782**    
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.007 0.002     0.002   0.000    
N 35 35     35  35 35    
Perceived loss 
of HH income 
(TZS/ha/yr) 
Pearson correlation  -0.380* 0.520** 0.404*   0.619** 0.354**  0.782** 1   0.432* 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.018 0.001 0.12   0.000 0.002  0.000    0.017 
N 38 38 38   38 38  35 38   30 
Intangible 
losses (relative 
weight “N”) 
Pearson correlation               
Sig. (2-tailed)              
N              
Perceived 
benefits 
(relative 
weight ‘N’) 
Pearson correlation   0.314* 0.355**   -0.544**      1  
Sig. (2-tailed)  0.015 0.005   0.001        
N  60 60   38      38  
Amount of 
compensation 
paid (TZS) 
Pearson correlation   0.545**  0.501** 0.457* 0.454*    0.432*   1 
Sig. (2-tailed)  0.002  0.005 0.011 0.012    0.017    
N  30  30 30 30    30   30 
Source: Survey, 2007;   ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed);   * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed): 
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Appendix 6.3: Correlation matrix for variables associated with household losses caused by development project in Idete village 
 
Variables 
Age of HH 
head 
(years) 
Household 
size 
(N) 
Number of 
male 
people in a 
HH (N) 
Household 
workforce  
per ha 
(N/ha) 
Land 
owned by 
the  HH 
(ha) 
Land loss 
(ha) 
Land 
occupancy 
(years) 
Land 
rented after 
compensati
on (ha) 
Distance 
from home 
to rented 
land (km) 
Value of 
annual 
crops 
(TZS/ton) 
Value of 
semi 
perma’nt 
crops 
(TZS/ton) 
Perceived 
loss of HH 
income 
(TZS/ha/yr) 
Intangible 
losses 
(relative 
weight ‘N’) 
Perceived 
benefits 
(relative 
weight ‘N’) 
Amount 
of 
compensa
tion paid 
(TZS) 
Age of household 
head (years) 
Pearson correlation  1   -0.341**   0.363**       -0.308* 0.686* 
Sig. (2-tailed)    0.008   0.006       0.016 0.014 
N 60   60   55       60 13 
Household size 
(N) 
Pearson correlation   1 0.777**  0.297* 0.450**      0.367**    
Sig. (2-tailed)   0.000  0.026 0.001      0.006    
N  60 60  56 55      55    
Number of male 
people in a HH 
(N) 
Pearson correlation   0.777** 1   0.441**      0.370**    
Sig. (2-tailed)  0.000    0.001      0.005    
N  60 60   55      55    
Household 
workforce 
(N/ha) 
Pearson correlation  -0.341**   1 -0.355** 0.430**  -0.542*     0.344** 0.367**  
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.008    0.007 0.000  0.011     0.007 0.004  
N 60   60 56 55  21     60 60  
Land owned by 
the HH (ha) 
Pearson correlation   0.297*  -0.355** 1 0.424**          
Sig. (2-tailed)  0.026  0.007  0.002          
N  56  56 60 51          
Land loss (ha) Pearson correlation   0.450** 0.441** 0.430** 0.424** 1 0.326*  0.596**   0.582**  -0.537**  
Sig. (2-tailed)  0.001 0.001 0.000 0.002  0.015  0.004   0.000  0.001  
N  55 55 55 51 55 55  21   55  55  
Land occupancy 
(years) 
Pearson correlation  0.363**     0.326* 1   0.272*  0.493**    
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.006     0.015    0.047  0.000    
N 55     55 55   54  55    
Land rented 
after compens’n 
(ha) 
Pearson correlation     -0.542*    1       0.448** 
Sig. (2-tailed)    0.011           0.000 
N    21    21       13 
Distance from 
home to rented 
land (km) 
Pearson correlation       0.596**   1   0.478**    
Sig. (2-tailed)      0.004      0.002    
N      21   21   21    
Value of annual 
crops (TZS/ton) 
Pearson correlation        0.272*   1 0.616** 0.620** 1  0.578* 
Sig. (2-tailed)       0.047    0.002 0.000   0.049 
N       54   54 23 54 55  13 
Value of semi-
permanent crops 
(TZS/ton) 
Pearson correlation           0.616** 1     
Sig. (2-tailed)          0.002      
N          23 23     
Perceived loss of 
HH income 
(TZS/ha/yr) 
Pearson correlation   0.367** 0.370**   0.582** 0.493**  0.478** 0.620**  1   0.792** 
Sig. (2-tailed)  0.006 0.005   0.000 0.000  0.002 0.000     0.002 
N  55 55   55 55  21 55  55   13 
Intangible losses 
(relative weight 
‘N’) 
Pearson correlation     0.344**         1   
Sig. (2-tailed)    0.007            
N    60         55   
Perceived 
benefits (relative 
weight ‘N’) 
Pearson correlation  -0.308*   0.367**  -0.537**        1  
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.016   0.004  0.001          
N 60   60  55        55  
Amount of 
compensation 
received (TZS) 
Pearson correlation  0.686*       0.448**  0.578*  0.792**   1 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.014       0.000  0.049  0.002    
N 13       13  13  13   12 
Source: Survey, 2007;   ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed);   * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
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Appendix 6.4: Correlation matrix for variables associated with household losses caused by development projects across the villages (overall) 
 
Variables 
Age of HH 
head 
(years) 
Household 
size 
(N) 
Number 
of female 
people in 
a HH (N) 
Household 
workforce  
per ha 
(N/ha) 
Land 
owned by 
the  HH 
(ha) 
Land loss 
(ha) 
Land 
occupancy 
(years) 
Land 
rented 
after 
compensat
ion (ha) 
Distance 
from home 
to rented 
land (km) 
Value of 
annual 
crops 
(TZS/ton) 
Value of 
perma’nt 
crops 
(TZS/ton) 
Perceived 
loss of HH 
income 
(TZS/ha/yr) 
Intangible 
losses 
(relative 
weight ‘N’) 
Perceived 
benefits 
(relative 
weight ‘N’) 
Amount 
of 
compensat
ion paid 
(TZS) 
Age of household 
head (years) 
Pearson correlation  1      0.428**   -0.248*   -0.249** -0.281**  
Sig. (2-tailed)       0.000   0.031   0.006 0.002  
N 60      93   76   120 120  
Household size 
(N) 
Pearson correlation   1 0.827** 0.187* 0.269** 0.248* 0.224*    0.496** 0.483**   0.507** 
Sig. (2-tailed)   0.000 0.041 0.004 0.016 0.031    0.001 0.000   0.001 
N  60 120 120 113 93 93    41 93   43 
Number of male 
people in a HH 
(N) 
Pearson correlation   0.781** 0.315** 0.272**  0.274**      0.390**    
Sig. (2-tailed)  0.000 0.000 0.003  0.008      0.000    
N  120 120 120  93      93    
Household 
workforce 
(N/ha) 
Pearson correlation   0.187*  1 -0.303**   -0.484*      0.211* 0.434** 
Sig. (2-tailed)  0.041   0.001   0.010      0.021 0.004 
N  120  60 113   27      120 43 
Land owned by 
the HH (ha) 
Pearson correlation   0.269** 0.278** -0.303** 1     -0.265*   -0.210* 0.227*  
Sig. (2-tailed)  0.004 0.003 0.001      0.024   0.025 0.032  
N  113 113 113 60     72   113 89  
Land loss (ha) Pearson correlation   0.248*    1   0.601**   0.647** 0.227*   
Sig. (2-tailed)  0.016       0.003   0.000 0.029   
N  93    55   22   93 93   
Land occupancy 
(years) 
Pearson correlation  0.428** 0.224* 0.265*    1   -0.244* 0.521** 0.401** -0.278**   
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.031 0.010       0.033 0.000 0.000 0.007   
N 93 93 93    55   76 41 93 93   
Land rented 
after compens’n 
(ha) 
Pearson correlation     -0.484*    1        
Sig. (2-tailed)    0.010            
N    27    27        
Distance from 
home to rented 
land (km) 
Pearson correlation       0.601**   1   0.486*    
Sig. (2-tailed)      0.003      0.022    
N      22   22   22    
Value of annual 
crops (TZS/ton) 
Pearson correlation  -0.248*    -0.265*  -0.244*   1  0.577**    
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.031    0.024  0.033     0.000    
N 76    72  76   76  76    
Value of 
permanent crops 
(TZS/ton) 
Pearson correlation   0.496** 0.540**    0.521**    1 0.750**    
Sig. (2-tailed)  0.001 0.000    0.000     0.000    
N  41 41    41    41 41    
Perceived loss of 
HH income 
(TZS/ha/yr) 
Pearson correlation   0.483** 0.396**  0.227* 0.647** 0.401**  0.486* 0.577** 0.750** 1   0.448** 
Sig. (2-tailed)  0.000 0.000  0.032 0.000 0.000  0.022 0.000 0.000    0.003 
N  93 93  89 93 93  22 76 41 41   43 
Intangible losses 
(relative weight 
‘N’) 
Pearson correlation  -0.249**    -0.210* 0.227* -0.278**      1 -0.255**  
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.006    0.025 0.029 0.007       0.005  
N 120    113 93 93      93 120  
Perceived 
benefits (relative 
weight ‘N’) 
Pearson correlation  -0.281**   0.211*       1  -0.255** 1  
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.002   0.021         0.005   
N 120   120       12  120 120  
Amount of 
compensation 
received (TZS) 
Pearson correlation   0.507** 0.464** 0.434**        0.448**   1 
Sig. (2-tailed)  0.001 0.002 0.004        0.003    
N  43 43 43        43   43 
Source: Survey, 2007;   ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed);   * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
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Appendix 6.5: List of variables included in the household verification survey 
No. Variable name Label (descriptions of variables) Measure 
1 v1Villag Name of the village case Nominal 
2 v21HhHead Gender of the household head Nominal 
3 v22AgeResp Age of the respondents (years) Scale 
4 v22AgeGrp1s Categorised age of respondents (years) Ordinal 
5 v23AgeGrp2 Age based on workforce and elderly groups Ordinal 
6 v23EducLev1 Education levels of respondents in three groups Ordinal 
7 v23EducLev3 Education levels of respondents in weight wise Scale 
8 v23EducLev2 Education levels of respondents in two groups Ordinal 
9 v24HhSize Household size Scale 
10 v24HhMe1 Number of male household members in age group below 5 years Scale 
11 v24HhFe1 Number of female household member in age group below 5 years Scale 
12 v24HhMe2 Number of male household member in age group btn 5 and 17 years Scale 
13 v24HhFe2 Number of female household members in age group between 5 and 17 years Scale 
14 v24HhChldn Number of children (0-17) years old Scale 
15 v24HhMe3 Number of male household member in age group btn 18 and  35 years Scale 
16 v24HhFe3 Number of female household members in age groups between 18 and 35 years Scale 
17 v24HhYth Number of young people/youth (18-35) years old Scale 
18 v24HhMe4 Number of male household member in age group btn 36 and  55 years Scale 
19 v24HhFe4 Number of female household members in age group between 36 and 55 years Scale 
20 v24HhAdults Number of adult people (36-55 years old) Scale 
21 v24HhMe5 Number of male household member in age group above 55 years Scale 
22 v24HhFe5 Number of female household member in age group above 55 years Scale 
23 v24HhElders Number of elderly people (above 55 years) Scale 
24 v24HhDpdnt Number of dependants (0-17 group and above 55 years) Scale 
25 v24HhWforc Workforce available at the household (18-55years) Scale 
26 v24HhDpWfRt Dependant-Workforce ratio Scale 
27 v24HhWfha Workforce per ha currently farmed by the household Scale 
28 v24HhMeTot Number of total male people in the household Scale 
29 v24HhFeTot Number of female people in the household Scale 
30 v25DurSty Duration a household has stayed in the village Scale
31 v25DurStGrp Categorised duration of stay in the village Ordinal 
32 v26LandOwn1 Land owned (acres) Scale
33 v26LandOwn2 Land owned (ha) Scale 
34 v26LandOwn3 Landhold (own) grouped Ordinal
35 v26TotFLand Total farmed land (ha) Scale 
36 v26DistOwn Distance to land owned by the household (kms) Scale
37 v26Crop1 Growing permanent crops on h/h land (coconut, cashew, mango, oranges) Nominal 
38 v26Crop2 Growing semi permanent crops on h/h land (cassava, pineapple, legumes) Nominal
39 v26Crop3 Growing rice on household land Nominal 
40 v26Crop4 Growing maize on household land Nominal
41 v26Crop5 Growing banana on household land Nominal 
42 v26Crop6 Growing sugarcane on household land Nominal
43 v26Crop7 Growing horticultural crops on household land Nominal 
44 v26LandRent Renting or not renting-in land Nominal
45 v26LandReSz1 Size of land the household has rented-in (acres) Scale 
46 v26LandReSz2 Size of land the household has rented-in (ha) Scale
47 v26DistRent Distance to land the household has rented (kms) Scale 
48 v26CropR1 Growing permanent crops on rented land (coconut, cashew, mangoes, oranges) Nominal
49 v26CropR2 Growing semi permanent crops on rented land (cassava, pineapples, legumes) Nominal 
50 v26CropR3 Growing rice on rented land Nominal
51 v26CropR4 Growing maize on rented land Nominal 
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52 v26CropR5 Growing banana on rented land Nominal 
53 v26CropR6 Growing sugarcane on rented land Nominal 
54 v26CropR7 Growing horticultural crops on rented land Nominal 
55 v26LanReOt Size of land the household has rented out (acrea) Scale 
56 v26DistReOt Distance to land the household has rented out (kms) Scale 
57 v26CropO1 Growing permanent crops on rented out land ( coconut, cashew, mangoes, oranges) Nominal 
58 v26CropO2 Growing semi permanent crops on the rented out land (cassava, pineapples, legumes) Nominal 
59 v26CropO3 Growing rice on the rented out land Nominal 
60 v26CropO4 Growing maize on the rented out land Nominal 
61 v26CropO5 Growing banana on the rented out land Nominal 
62 v26CropO6 Growing sugarcane on the rented out land Nominal 
63 v26CropO7 Growing horticultural crops on the rented out land Nominal 
64 v31Bnft1 Perceived as first benefit accrued from the project Nominal 
65 v31Bnft11 Weighted first rank of benefit Scale 
66 v31Bnft2 Perceived as second benefit accrued from the project Nominal 
67 v31Bnft22 Weighted second rank of benefit Scale 
68 v31Bnft3 Perceived as third benefit accrued from the project Nominal 
69 v31Bnft33 Weighted third rank of benefit Scale 
70 v31BnftTot Weighted total benefit Scale 
71 v31BnftCmty1 Total financial support to community per household (TZS/hh) Scale 
72 v31BnftCmty2 Total financial support to community per lost household (TZS/hh) Scale 
73 v31BnftCmty3 Total financial support per household member (TZS/person) Scale 
74 v32Loss1 Perceived as first loss incurred as a result of the project Nominal 
75 v32Loss11 Weighted first rank of loss Scale 
76 v32Loss2 Perceived as second loss incurred as a result of the project Nominal 
77 v32Loss22 Weighted second rank of loss Scale 
78 v32Loss3 Perceived as third loss incurred as a result of the project Nominal 
79 v32Loss33 Weighted third rank of loss Scale 
80 v32LossTot Weighted total of loss Scale 
81 v33LndChg Changes in land availability after the project Ordinal 
82 v33FtyChg Changes in land fertility after the project Ordinal 
83 v33FodChg Changes in food availability Ordinal 
84 v33IncChg Changes in income from cash crops Ordinal 
85 v33NrsChg Changes in natural resources such as forests, woods Ordinal 
86 v33IksChg Changes in skills and innovativeness Ordinal 
87 v33EmpChg Changes in employment opportunities Ordinal 
88 v33LbrChg Changes in labour availability Ordinal 
89 v33EdcChg Changes in education services Ordinal 
90 v33HltChg Changes in health services Ordinal 
91 v34LStdChg Comparison of living standard before and after the project Nominal 
92 v35ReasB Reasons for better living standard after the project 1 Nominal 
93 v35ReasW1 Reasons for decreased living standard after the project 1 Nominal 
94 v35ReasW2 Reasons for decreased living standard after the project 2 Nominal 
95 v41LandLos1 Land lost as a result of the project (acres) Scale 
96 v41LandLos2 Land lost as a result of the project (ha) Scale 
97 v41LandLos3 Land lost grouped Ordinal 
98 v41LandLos4 Land loss to land owned ratio Scale 
99 v41LandLos5 Severity of land loss-land owned ratio Ordinal 
100 v42TimeLL Time a household worked in the land lost Scale 
101 v42TimeLLGrp Grouped experience Ordinal 
102 v42Cocnut Grew coconut Nominal 
103 v42CocTrs Number of coconut trees grown Scale 
104 v42CocHvst Coconut used to be harvested (coconut fruits) Scale 
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105 v42CocTsh Current value of the lost income from coconuts (TZS) Scale 
106 v42Cshnut Grew cashew nuts Nominal 
107 v42CshTrs Number of cashew nut trees grown Scale 
108 v42CshHvst Cashew nut used to be harvested (kg) Scale 
109 v42CshTsh Current value of the lost income from cashew nuts (TZS) Scale 
110 v42Mango Grew mangoes Nominal 
111 v42MgoTrs Number of mango trees grown Scale 
112 v42MgoHvst Mango used to be harvested (tengas) Scale 
113 v42MgoTsh Current value of the lost income from mangoes (TZS) Scale 
114 v42Orange Grew oranges Nominal 
115 v42OrgTrs Number used of orange trees grown Scale 
116 v42OrgHvst Orange used to be harvested (tengas) Scale 
117 v42OrgTsh Current value of the lost income from Oranges (TZS) Scale 
118 v42Pineapp Grew pineapples Nominal 
119 v42PapAcrg Stems of pineapples planted on lost land Scale 
120 v42PapHvst Pineapple used to be harvested (kg) Scale 
121 v42PapTsh Current value of the lost income from pineapples (TZS) Scale 
122 v42Banana Grew banana Nominal 
123 v42BnnAcrg Acreage/stems of planted banana Scale 
124 v42BnnHvst Banana used to be harvested (bunches) Scale 
125 v42BnnTsh Current value of the lost income from banana (TZS) Scale 
126 v42Cassava Grew cassava Nominal 
127 v42CassAcrg Acreage/stems of planted cassava Scale 
128 v42CassHvst Cassava used to be harvested in (kg) Scale 
129 v42CassTsh Current value of the lost income from cassava (TZS) Scale 
130 v42Rice Grew rice Nominal 
131 v42RiceAcrg Acreage/stems of planted rice Scale 
132 v42RiceHvst Rice used to be harvested (kg) Scale 
133 v42RiceTsh Current value of the lost income from rice (TZS) Scale 
134 v42Maize Grew maize Nominal 
135 v42MaizAcrg Acreage/stems of planted maize Scale 
136 v42MaizHvst Maize used to be harvested in harvest (kg) Scale 
137 v42MaizTsh Current value of the lost income from maize (TZS) Scale 
138 v42SgCane Grew sugarcane Nominal 
139 v42ScanAcrg Acreage/stems of planted sugarcane Scale 
140 v42ScanHvst Canes used to be harvested (kg) Scale 
141 v42ScanTsh Current value of the lost income from sugar canes (TZS) Scale 
142 v42Legume Grew legumes Nominal 
143 v42LegmAcrg Acreage of planted legume Scale 
144 v42LegmHvst Legumes used to be harvested (kg) Scale 
145 v42LegmTsh Current value of the lost income from legumes (TZS) Scale 
146 v42HortCrps Grew horticultural crops Nominal 
147 v42HortAcrg Acreage of planted horticultural crops Scale 
148 v42HortHvst Horticultural crops used to be harvested in Scale 
149 v42HortTsh Current value of the lost income from horticultural crops (TZS/hh) Scale 
150 v42AnnCrLos Estimated income loss of annual crops (TZS/hh) Scale 
151 v42AnnCrLos2 Estimated income loss of annual crops per household (TZS/hh) Scale 
152 v42AnnCrpIndx Value of annual crop (TZS/ton) Scale 
153 v42SmPerLos Estimated income loss of semi-permanent crops (TZS/hh) Scale 
154 v42SmPerLos2 Estimated income loss of semi-permanent crops per household (TZS/hh) Scale 
155 v42SmPerIndx Value of semi-permanent crop (TZS/ton) Scale 
156 v42PermLoss Estimated income loss of permanent crops (TZS/hh) Scale 
157 v42PermLoss2 Estimated income loss of permanent crops per household (TZS/hh) Scale 
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158 v42PermCrpIdx Value of permanent crop importance (TZS/ton) Scale 
159 v42TotLoss1 Total crop-income lost because of the project (TZS/hh) Scale 
160 v42TotalLoss2 Total crop-income lost per household (TZS/hh) Scale 
161 v42TotLoss2 Total loss of household annual income per household (TZS/hh) Scale 
162 v42FPmCrp Growing (not) permanent crops Nominal 
163 v42FSPmCrp Growing (not) semi permanent crops Nominal 
164 v42TotLossI1 Total loss of income per ha as per AP (TZS/hh) Scale 
165 v42FAnnCrp Growing (not) annual crops Nominal 
166 v43CompPd Compensated or not compensated Nominal 
167 v44CompPd1 Amount of compensation paid (TZS) Scale 
168 v44CompCal Calculated household total loss (TZS) Scale 
169 v44CompPcvd Perceived loss of household income (TZS) Scale 
170 v44PvdIncL3 Perceived loss of household income per household (TZS/hh) Scale 
171 v44CompAspt Aspects which were compensated for Nominal 
172 v45AdqcyBgn Compensation adequacy at the beginning Nominal 
173 v46ReasAdqB Reasons for adequate compensation at the beginning Nominal 
174 v47AdqcyAft Compensation adequacy after sometimes Nominal 
175 v48ReasAdqA Reasons for adequate compensation after sometimes Nominal 
176 v49LCompF1 Low payment for the losses incurred Nominal 
177 v49LCompF2 All losses were not properly counted Nominal 
178 v49LCompF3 Improper asset valuation Nominal 
179 v49LCompF4 Time and energy used on farm were not valuated Nominal 
180 v49LCompF5 Land was not compensated Nominal 
181 v49LCompF6 Short term crops were not considered Nominal 
182 v49LCompF7 Resettlement costs were not considered Nominal 
183 v49LCompF8 Others Nominal 
184 v410NoComp Reasons for not being compensated Nominal 
185 v411Comnts Comments on the losses which were not compensated Nominal 
186 v412CompPf1 Types of compensation preferred 1 Nominal 
187 v412CompPf2 Types of compensation preferred 2 Nominal 
188 v412CompPf3 Types of compensation preferred 3 Nominal 
189 v412CompPf4 Types of compensation preferred 4 Nominal 
190 v412GReasPf1 Good reasons for resettlement Nominal 
191 v412BReasPf1 Bad reasons for resettlement Nominal 
192 v412GReasPf2 Good reasons for cash payment Nominal 
193 v412BReasPf2 Bad reasons for cash payment Nominal 
194 v412GReasPf3 Good reasons for inkind compensation Nominal 
195 v412BReasPf3 Bad reasons for inkind compensation Nominal 
196 v412GReasPf4 Good reasons for IGA project Nominal 
197 v412BReasPf4 Bad reasons for IGA projects Nominal 
198 v413ModeCash Forms of cash payment Nominal 
199 v413GResLump Good reasons for lump sum payment Nominal 
200 v413BResLump Bad reasons for lump sum payment Nominal 
201 v413GResInst Good reasons for instalments Nominal 
202 v413BResInst Bad reasons for instalments Nominal 
203 v51Awareness a) Satisfaction levels for sensitisation done by project developers on their proposed projects Ordinal 
204 v51PptVMtngs b) Satisfaction levels for participation of villagers in discussions of proposed project activities Ordinal 
205 v52ProjInfo a) Satisfaction levels for adequacy of information provided in introduction of compensation  Ordinal 
206 v52PptComp b) Satisfaction levels for participation of APs/HCs in planning of compensation schemes Ordinal 
207 v52OppDscssn a) Satisfaction levels for the opportunities given to APs/HCs to discuss compensation issues Ordinal 
208 v52ConsdView b) Satisfaction levels for consideration given to views and concerns raised by APs/HCs  Ordinal 
209 v52PptAPs a) Satisfaction levels for participation of the APs in valuation processes Ordinal 
210 v52PptVGovt b) Satisfaction levels for participation of the village governments in valuation processes Ordinal 
211 v52CompInfo a) Satisfaction levels for Information provided on compensation estimation before payment Ordinal 
212 v52Advice b) Satisfaction levels for training/advice provided to APs Ordinal 
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213 v52TimelyPay a) Satisfaction levels for the timing of compensation payments Ordinal 
214 v52DespHand b) Satisfaction levels for the handling mechanisms of compensation complaints Ordinal 
215 v52AsstLand a) Satisfaction levels for the assistance given to APs in acquiring alternative plots/farmlands Ordinal 
216 v52AsstRestt b) Satisfaction levels for the assistance given to APs during relocation Ordinal 
217 v51Feedback a) Satisfaction levels for communication systems in compensation processes Ordinal 
218 v52Monitoring b) Satisfaction levels for monitoring of post-compensation outcomes Ordinal 
219 v53LandAcqst Usage of the compensation payment on land acquisition Nominal 
220 v53LAcqPge Estimate used for buying another plot in percentage (%) Scale 
221 v53House Usage of the compensation payment on house construction Nominal 
222 v53HosePge Estimate used to build another house in percentage (%) Scale 
223 v53Education Usage of the compensation payment for education Nominal 
224 v53EducPge Estimate used to pay for education in percentage (%) Scale 
225 v53HhExpns Usage of the compensation payment on daily household expenses Nominal 
226 v53HhExPge Estimate used for daily household expenditures in percentage (%) Scale 
227 v53DebtSrvc Usage of the compensation payment for debt repayment Nominal 
228 v53DebtPge Estimate used to pay debts in percentage (%) Scale 
229 v53SocialEvnt Usage of the compensation payment for ceremonies percentage (%) Nominal 
230 v53SociPge Estimate used for ceremonies in percentage (%) Scale 
231 v53Saving Usage of the compensation payment for saving in percentage (%) Nominal 
232 v53SavePge Estimate used for saving in percentage (%) Scale 
233 v53OthExpns Usage of the compensation payment for other expenses in percentage (%) Nominal 
234 v53OthrPge Estimate used for others in percentage (%) Scale 
235 v54NonCHh Comparison with non-compensated households Nominal 
236 v61PrjBnft Benefit gained from the project (SF/SONGAS) Nominal 
237 v62EducBnft Satisfaction with educational services provided by the project Ordinal 
238 v62HlthBnft Satisfaction with health services provided by the project Ordinal 
239 v62ElctBnft Satisfaction with electrical power services provided by the project Ordinal 
240 v62WatBnft Satisfaction with water services provided by the project Ordinal 
241 v62OthrBnft Satisfaction with other services provided by the project Ordinal 
242 v63DistRns Reasons for dissatisfaction Nominal 
243 v64BnftShrng Goodness of the way the project share benefits with the community(SF/KVTC) Ordinal 
244 v65PrjCtrcts Sharing benefits between KVTC and Idete community of through SF and contracts Nominal 
245 v6568Pve1 Liked aspects of the project benefits (Contracts/KVTC) 1 Nominal 
246 v6568Pve2 Liked aspects of the project benefits (Contracts/KVTC) 2 Nominal 
247 v6568Pve3 Liked aspects of the project benefits (Contracts/KVTC) 3 Nominal 
248 v6568Nve1 Disliked aspects of the project benefits (Contracts/KVTC) 1 Nominal 
249 v6568Nve2 Disliked aspects of the project benefits (Contracts/KVTC) 2 Nominal 
250 v6568Nve3 Disliked aspects of the project benefits (Contracts/KVTC) 3 Nominal 
251 v66611Vw1 Opinions on how to balance the community and Individual compensation 1 Nominal 
252 v66611Vw2 Opinions on how to balance the community and Individual compensation 2 Nominal 
253 v65PptCtr Household participation in contract implementation Nominal 
254 v66PptLand Household participation in KVTC's land protection Nominal 
255 v66PptBrd Household participation in border protection Nominal 
256 v66PptTeak Household participation in fire protection in Teak plantations Nominal 
257 v66PptNRs Household participation in fire protection in natural forests Nominal 
258 v66PptTLog Household participation in avoiding timber logging Nominal 
259 v66PptWldf Household participation in avoiding wildlife poaching Nominal 
260 v66PptRept Household participation in making monthly report Nominal 
261 v66CtrBnft Benefits gained from participation in contracts implementation Nominal 
262 v67NoPptRn Reasons for not participating Nominal 
263 v69IndvCom Comparison between individual and community compensation Nominal 
264 v610ImbRns Reasons for imbalance between individual and community compensation Nominal 
 
